Religion  of  Science  Library    No.  35 


THE 

ETHICAL    PROBLEM 


BY 

DR.  PAUL  CARUS 


CHICAGO 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 


UNIVERSITY  OF 

ILLINOIS  LIBRARY 

AT  UR3ANA-CHAMPAIGN 

ILL  HIST.  SURVEY, 


THE 


ETHICAL    PROBLEM 


THREE  LECTURES 


ON  ETHICS  AS  A  SCIENCE 


DR.  PAUL  CARUS 


THIRD  EDITION 

REPRINT  OF 

SECOND  EDITION 

ENLARGED  BY  A  DISCUSSION  OF  THE  SUBJECT  BY 

WILLIAM  M.  SALTER,  JOHN  MADDOCK,  F.  M.  HOLLAND, 

PROF.  FRIEDRICH  JODL,  DR.  R.  LEWINS,  PROF. 

H.  HOEFFDING,  PROF.  L.  M.  BILLIA 

WITH  REPLIES  BY  THE  AUTHOR 


CHICAGO 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

LONDON  AGENTS: 

Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Trubner  &  Co. 

1910 


9M-U^Jh  X. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION. 


This  second  edition  of  The  Ethical  Problem  contains  be- 
sides the  original  three  lectures  the  entire  controversy  that  was 
thereby  elicited,  and  also  the  author's  replies  to  some  prominent 
thinkers  holding  different  views  on  the  subject.  The  history  of  the 
lectures,  the  occasion  of  their  delivery,  and  the  incidents  through 
which  the  controversy  originated,  are  sufficiently  explained  in  the 
preface  of  the  first  edition,  which  with  a  few  unimportant  altera- 
tions is  here  republished  in  its  original  form.  While  the  circum- 
stances under  which  the  three  lectures  and  the  ensuing  controver- 
sies originated  are  indifferent,  they  served  to  ventilate  some  of 
the  most  important  questions  of  ethics,  such  as  the  nature  of  con- 
science, the  distinction  between  moral  law  and  moral  rules,  the 
ultimate  basis  of  morality,  the  relation  of  pleasure  and  pain  to 
moral  motives  and  kindred  topics. 

p.  c. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION. 


The  ethical  problem  has  come  into  great  prominence  in  these 
days.  The  importance  of  ethics  has  been  brought  home  to  us  more 
than  ever.  An  ethical  movement  is  taking  place,  affecting  all  the 
interests"  of  humanity.  Chairs  of  ethics  have  been  created  in  our 
universities,  and  the  churches  are  more  and  more  urged  to  set 
aside  for  avvhi'e  their  useless  disputes  about  dogmas  and  to  devote 
themselves  to  ethical  work.  Yet  it  has  been  found  that  it  is  impos- 
sible for  the  churches  to  set  aside  their  dogmatic  creeds  for  the 
sake  of  ethics,  because  these  creeds  form  the  very  basis  of  their 
ethics  ;  that  which  religious  people  conceive  to  be  ethical  depends 
upon  their  religion  ;  they  cannot  ignore  the  dogmas,  for  the  dogmas 
are  the  very  instruments  of  their  morality  ;  they  are  the  guides  that 
teach  and  advise  them  as  to  their  conduct  in  life.  If  the  dogmas 
of  the  churches  have  for  some  reason  become  unsuitable  as  a  basis 
of  ethics,  and  I  believe  that  at  least  in  their  traditional  interpreta- 
they  have  indeed  become  so,  the  churches  cannot  simply  ignore 
them  ;  they  will  have  to  revise  them,  and  the  revision  will  have  to 
be  made  with  special  reference  to  their  ethical  importance. 

An  important  sign  of  the  times,  proving  the  great  prominence 
of  the  ethical  movement,  is  the  foundation  of  the  Societies  for  Eth- 
ical Culture.  These  societies  are  devoted  to  the  advancement  of 
the  ethical  movement,  and  many  earnest  friends  of  progress  have 
watched  their  development  with  the  keenest  interest.  The  Of  en 
Court  having  been  founded  to  afford  a  place  for  the  discussion  of 
phliosophical  and  ethical  subjects  with  the  purpose  in  view  of  estab- 
lishing ethics  and  religion  upon  a  scientific  basis,  has  devoted  con- 
siderable space  to  the  publication  and  examination  of  the  views 
brought  forward  by  leaders  of  the  Societies  for  Ethical  Culture. 
Yet  in  spite  of  all  the  agreement  that  obtained  between  the  ten- 


vi  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

dency  of  The  Open  Court  and  the  aims  of  the  Societies  for  Ethical 
Culture  a  mutual  understanding  on  the  most  important  point,  viz., 
that  concerning  the  basis  of  ethics,  could  not  be  arrived  at.  The 
Ethical  Record,  of  Philadelphia,  maintained  that  the  Societies  for 
Ethical  Culture  had  taken  special  care  not  to  commit  themselves 
to  any  religious  or  philosophical  view,  while  The  Open  Court  de- 
clared that  some  religious  or  philosophical  view  was  indispensable. 
Ethics  must  have  a  basis  to  rest  upon.  Without  a  philosophical 
or  religious  view  that  gives  character  to  the  different  conceptions 
of  what  is  to  be  considered  as  good  or  bad,  ethics  would  be  an  im- 
possibility. 

The  standpoint  taken  by  The  Open  Court  was  embodied  in  a 
short  article  which  is  here  reproduced  : 

THE  BASIS  OF  ETHICS  AND  THE  ETHICAL  MOVE- 
MENT. 

"We  are  strongly  in  sympathy  with  the  Societies  for  Ethical 
Culture,  because  among  all  the  liberal  movements  of  ethical  aspi- 
rations they  show  the  greatest  sincerity  and  earnestness  with  re- 
gard to  moral  ideals.  Yet  there  is  a  point  of  fundamental  impor- 
tance in  which  we  have  not  as  yet  been  able  to  ascertain  whether 
we  agree  or  disagree  with  them.  It  is  the  problem  as  to  what  is 
the  basis  of  ethics.  The  solution  of  this  problem  is  for  every  one 
of  greatest  importance  ;  it  must  become  the  corner-stone  of  the  eth- 
ical movement,  and  it  is  concerning  the  problem  and  its  solution 
that  we  are  anxious  to  come  to  a  mutual  understanding. 

'  The  Ethical  Record  says  :  '  We  think  there  is  some  lack  of 
clearness  as  to  what  a  basis  of  ethics  means. ' 

"The  basis  of  ethics  is  the  'reason  why'  man  must  regulate 
his  actions  in  a  certain  way,  and  thus  it  is  the  philosophical  foun- 
dation upon  which  ethics  rests.  The  moral  'ought,'  which  in- 
volves that  which  we  call  good,  depends  upon  the  basis  of  ethics. 
Our  definition  of  '  good  '  will  be  different  according  to  the  differ- 
ent answers  given  to  the  question,  Why  must  I  feel  bound  by  any 
'  ought '  or  '  moral  law '  ? 

"It  might  be  maintained  that  a  philosophical  foundation  of 
ethics  is  of  secondary  importance  :  the  first  demand  is  to  obey  the 
moral  'ought.'  And  certainly  we  admit  that  action  is  more  than 
knowledge.  But  let  us  not  forget  that  ethics,  if  it  means  anything, 
is  the   regulation   of   action   conformably   to   some   principle  or 


PREFACE.  vii 

maxim.  The  ethical  man  is  first  of  all  a  thinking  man.  He  acts 
in  a  certain  way  because  he  considers  this  kind  of  action  as  good 
and  another  as  bad.  What  would  ethical  action  be  without  the 
ethical  principle  by  which  we  have  to  regulate  it  ? 

"Man  'considers'  something  as  good,  we  say.  But  the  ques- 
tion is  not  what  a  man  considers  as  good.  The  question  is, 
What  are  good,  and  what  bad,  actions  ?  Professor  Adler  says  : 
'  Concerning  them  (the  facts  of  moral  obligation)  there  is  a  general 
agreement  among  good  men  and  women  everywhere.'  This  is  an 
ethics  of  mere  conventionalism.  Moreover,  that  general  agree- 
ment is  an  error  ;  for  while  the  Spartan  thought  stealing  without 
being  caught  was  a  virtue,  the  Athenian  considered  it  a  shame. 
Yet  Professor  Adler  limits  the  agreement  concerning  these  facts  as 
obtaining  'among  good  men  and  women  '  This  would  stamp 
everybody  who  disagrees  with  Professor  Adler,  as  bad  ;  and  that 
can  scarcely  be  his  meaning. 

"The  answer  given  by  The  Ethical  Record  to  the  question, 
Why  should  we  Tict  morally  ?  is  :  '  We  conceive  that  the  obliga- 
tion of  justice  and  love  is  self-evident  to  rational  beings.'  This 
conception  of  ethics  would  be  intuitionalism,  a  theory  which  we 
thought  belonged  to  the  dead  past. 

' '  Justice  and  love  are  admirable  words,  but  they  are  too  gen- 
eral to  give  a  clear  idea  regarding  what  they  mean.  We  all  agree 
that  justice  and  love  must  be  the  impulses  of  our  actions.  In  the 
name  of  justice  and  love  the  anarchists  demand  the  abolition  of  all 
law,  the  nationalists  demand  the  removal  of  *  wolfish  '  competition, 
the  single-taxer  asks  for  the  confiscation  of  land,  and  for  justice 
and  love  charitable  people  feed  paupers.  How  widely  different 
must  their  conceptions  of  justice  and  love  be  ! 

"  Schopenhauer  says  :  '  Moral  predigen  ist  leicht,  Moral  be- 
grunden  schwer '  (to  preach  morals  is  easy,  but  to  place  it  upon  a 
philosophical  foundation  is  difficult). 

"The  Ethical  Record  says;  'The  ethical  movement  has 
taken  special  pains  not  to  commit  itself  to  the  philosophical  views 
of  its  lecturers.'  The  ethical  lecturers  represent  the  ethical  move- 
ment, and  if  the  ethical  movement  has  taken  particular  pains  not 
to  commit  itself  to  their  views,  this  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  it 
has  no  views  whatsoever.  The  ethical  movement,  we  are  informed, 
'made  a  statement  of  its  aim  (in  the  constitution  of  the  "  Union  ") 
after  mature  consideration,  and  expressly  welcomes  to  its  fellow- 
ship those  who  sympathize  with  its  aim  (the  elevation  of  the  moral 


viii  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

life)  whatever  their  theological  or  fhilosofhical  opinions  '  How 
can  we  have  a  common  aim  in  the  'elevation  of  moral  life,'  if  we 
are  not  agreed  upon  what  a  moral  life  is,  if  our  philosophical  opin- 
ions about  good  and  bad  differ  ?  If  the  ethical  movement  welcomes 
people  of  any  creed  and  of  no  creed,  they  cannot  expect  that  its 
members  will  have  the  same  or  even  a  similar  and  harmonious 
ethical  ideal. 

' '  Peoples  of  various  opinions  may  very  well  band  themselves 
together  for  the  purpose  of  searching  for  the  truth  and  discussing 
it ;  but  the  ethical  societies  are  apparently  not  debating  clubs. 

"To  have  an  opinion  and  to  dare  to  be  of  one's  opinion  ;  to 
stand  up  for  it  bravely  ;  and  in  case  we  have  not  as  yet  an  opinion 
of  our  own,  to  search  for  it  and  have  no  rest  until  we  have  found 
it, — this  is  the  very  first  step  in  ethics,  the  most  indispensable  con- 
dition of  ethics.  The  man  who  has  a  wrong  opinion  and  holds  it 
in  good  faith  is  more  ethical  than  he  who  waives  the  question. 
How  can  we,  when  building  a  good  house  adapted  to  our  needs, 
invite  all  our  neighbors  to  assist  us,  whatever  be  their  opinions 
with  regard  to  the  plan  of  the  house,  with  regard  to  what  must  be 
understood  by  a  good  house  ? 

"  Before  we  commence  building  let  us  have  a  plan.  Philo- 
sophical views  and  also  theologies  are  by  no  means  mere  theories 
having  no  practical  value.  They  are,  or  rather  they  become,  if 
they  are  accepted  as  true,  the  maxims  and  regulative  principles  of 
our  actions  ;  and  any  ethics  without  a  philosophical  view  back  of 
it  is  no  ethics,  but  ethical  sentimentality.  It  is  like  a  wanderer  in 
search  of  a  goal,  who  has  lost  his  way  and  does  not  care  to  be  in- 
formed about  the  right  direction. 

1 '  We  maintain  that  dogmatic  religion  can  no  longer  serve  as  a 
basis  for  ethics.  We  no  longer  believe  in  the  possibility  of  a  su- 
pernatural revelation,  and  search  for  another  and  a  natural  reason 
why  we  should  live  morally.  If  the  ethical  teacher  preaches  the 
moral  ought,  everybody  in  his  audience  has  the  right  to  ask  the 
question  :  '  By  what  authority  do  you  sustain  this  command  ?  ' 
If  the  moral  ought  of  the  ethical  teacher  is  merely  an  expression 
of  his  individual  opinion,  he  has  no  right  to  preach  it  to  others.  If 
he  no  longer  believes  in  the  supernatural  God,  he  must  give  ac- 
count of  that  God  who  gave  him  the  authority  to  preach. 

' '  The  Ethical  Society,  as  I  understand  it,  has  been  founded 
because,  in  the  opinion  of  its  members,  dogmatic  religion  no  longer 
suffices  as  a  basis  of  ethics.     But  if  the  leaders  of  the  Ethical  So- 


PREFACE.  ix 

ciety  refuse  to  lay  a  new  basis  this  undertaking  has  no  meaning. 
We  deem  it  their  duty  that  they  should  speak  out  boldly  and  with 
no  uncertain  voice.  A  non-committal  policy  in  the  face  of  other 
views,  religious  as  well  as  philosophical,  is  just  as  good  as  giving 
up  the  attempt  altogether. 

"  Many  clergymen  and  many  rabbis  are  very  clear-sighted  on 
this  matter  ;  they  seem  to  know  the  needs  of  the  time ;  they  ear- 
nestly and  judiciously  work  for  a  purification  of  religion.  And  we 
wish  that  those  who  profess  to  carry  out  the  ideal  of  the  present 
age,  namely,  the  foundation  of  a  purely  ethical  religion,  should 
not  remain  behind  ;  they  should  know,  and  if  they  do  not  know, 
they  should  search  for,  the  ground  upon  which  we  are  to  stand. 
The  question,  '  What  is  the  basis  of  ethics  ?  is  of  paramount  im- 
portance to  all  of  us,  to  the  religious  dogmatist,  to  the  freethinker, 
and  above  all  to  the  members  of  the  Societies  for  Ethical  Culture. 
The  success  of  the  ethical  movement  will  in  the  end  depend  upon 
how  their  leaders  solve  this  question." 

THE  THREE  LECTURES  ON  ETHICS. 

Soon  after  the  publication  of  this  article,  which  appeared  in 
No,  140  of  The  Open  Court,  the  board  of  trustees  of  the  Society 
for  Ethical  culture  of  Chicago  invited  the  editor  of  The  Open 
Court  to  present  his  views  of  ethics  in  a  series  of  lectures.  These 
lectures  were  delivered  in  Emerson  Hall  on  the  first,  second,  and 
third  Sundays  of  June,  1890,  at  11  a.  m. 

These  three  lectures  on  the  Ethical  Problem  delineate  a  sys- 
tem of  ethics  which  is  based  upon  a  unitary  conception  of  the 
world.  This  system  takes  exception  to  the  vagueness  of  The  Eth- 
ical Record,  whose  ethics  as  a  matter  of  principle  has  no  founda- 
tion ;  and  it  attempts  to  settle  the  dispute  between  Intuitionalists 
and  Utilitarians.  Objection  is  made  to  Intuitionalists  because  of 
their  supernaturalism,  to  Utilitarians  because  of  a  mistaken  inter- 
pretation of  the  facts  of  nature. 

Perhaps  the  best  defence  of  Intuitionalism  is  made  by  Pro- 
fessor H.  Sidgwick  of  Cambridge,  who  in  his  personal  attitude  is 
neither  a  Utilitarian  nor  an  Intuitionalist.  But  since  he  considers 
the  moral  ought  as  an  "ultimate  and  unanalysable  fact"  (see 
Mind,  October,  1889)  he  is  to  be  classed  among  Intuitionalists. 

Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill  defines  Utilitarianism  as  follows:  "The 
"creed  which  accepts  as  the  foundation  of  morals  Utility,  or  the 


x  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

"  Greatest  Happiness  Principle,  holds  that  actions  are  right  in  pro- 
"  portion  as  they  tend  to  promote  happiness,  wrong  as  they  tend  to 
"produce  the  reverse  of  happiness.  By  happiness  is  intended 
"pleasure,  and  the  absence  of  pain;  by  unhappiness.  pain,  and 
"the  privation  of  pleasure." 

The  most  prominent  Utilitarians  of  the  living  generation 
against  whose  doctrines  the  ethics  here  defended  are  set  forth  are 
Mr.  Spencer  of  England,  Madame  Cl£mence  Royer  of  France, 
Professor  Georg  von  Gizycki  of  Berlin,  and  Professor  Harald 
HOffding  of  Copenhagen.* 

The  data  of  Mr.  Spencer's  system  of  ethics  are  well  known  to 
all  English  readers. 

Madame  Royer,  in  her  latest  book  on  ethics,  advance  sheets 
of  which  were  kindly  sent  me  by  the  author,  pursues  the  same  di- 
rection as  Mr.  Spencer.  In  the  Conclusion  she  defines  "the  good 
as  the  sum  of  pleasurable  feelings  (jouissances  senties)  in  all  con- 


*The  great  English  historian  of  European  morals,  W.  E.  H.  Lecky.  leads 
us  to  infer  that  ethical  systems  must  be  either  intuitional  or  utilitarian.  He 
does  not  take  into  consideration  that  there  might  arise  a  theory  of  ethics  in 
opposition  to  these  "  two  rival  theories  of  morals."  And  yet  there  is  a  great 
English  thinker  who  is  not  an  Intuitionalist  and  at  the  same  time  stands  in 
strong  opposition  to  the  favorite  doctrines  of  our  most  prominent  utilita- 
tarians.    W.  K.  Clifford  says  in  his  essay  "  The  Scientific  £}asis  of  Morals  "  : 

"The  end  of  Ethic  is  not  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number. 
Your  happiness  is  of  no  use  to  the  community,  except  in  so  far  as  it  tends  to 
make  you  a  more  efficient  citizen — that  is  to  say,  happiness  is  not  to  be  de- 
sired for  its  own  sake  but  for  the  sake  of  something  else.  If  any  end  is 
pointed  to,  it  is  the  end  of  increased  efficiency  in  each  man's  special  work, 
as  well  as  in  the  social  functions  which  are  common  to  all.  A  man  must 
strive  to  be  a  better  citizen,  a  better  workman,  a  better  son,  husband,  or 
father. 

"Again,  Piety  is  not  Altruism.  It  is  not  the  doing  good  to  others  as  oth- 
ers, but  the  service  of  the  community  by  a  member  of  it,  who  loses  in  that 
service  the  consciousness  that  he  is  anything  different  from  the  community." 

Professor  Wilhelm  Wundt  expresses  similar  ideas,  rejecting  both,  utili- 
tarianism and  intuitionalism,  in  \\\%  Ethik:  Et'ne  Untrrsuckung der  Thattacken 
vnJ  Gesetze  ties  sittlichen  Lebens  (Stuttgart,  :886). 

If  the  generation  of  pleasurable  feelings  is  not  the  aim  of  ethics  it  fol- 
lows as  a  matter  of  logical  consequence  that  altruism  is  just  as  wrong  as  ego- 
tism. The  aim  of  ethics  is  neither  the  welfare  of  self  nor  that  of  other  indi- 
viduals but  of  those  interests  that  are  super-individual. 

Such  men  as  Professor  Clifford  and  Professor  Wundt  are  certainly  not 
benighted  by  theological  prejudices  or  vague  a  priori  speculations.  They 
stand  upon  the  solid  ground  of  mathematical  and  empirical  methods,  and  I 
value  an  agreement  with  these  thinkers  highly. 


PREFACE.  xi 

scious  beings  ;  the  bad  as  the  sum  of  their  sufferings."  The  moral 
good  is  the  remedy  of  the  bad,  it  tends  to  decrease  the  sum  of  the 
bad  and  to  increase  the  sum  of  the  good. 

Madame  Royer's  book  is  clear  and  to  the  point ;  the  style  is 
lucid,  and  not  the  least  interesting  part  of  her  work  is  her  attempt 
to  define  the  absolutely  good  of  the  Universe  in  terms  of  pleasur- 
able feelings  by  the  help  of  algebraic  formulas — a  method,  that 
from  her  standpoint  must  be  considered  as  the  only  correct  way  of 
making  ethics  a  science.  I  have  anticipated  this  error,  in  Funda- 
mental Problems,  p.  217,  where  it  is  said  that  "ethics  is  not  an 
arithmetical  example  by  which  to  calculate  how  we  can  purchase, 
at  the  least  sacrifice,  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness." 

In  her  Preface  Madame  Royer  says  in  an  italicised  passage : 
"  That  which  increases  in  the  world  the  quantity  of  conscious  ex- 
istence is  good,  that  which  diminishes  it  is  bad."  I  consider  it  as 
a  proved  fact,  that  consciousness  is  caused  by  pain.*  An  unsatis- 
fied want  intensifies  our  dim  feelings,  and  renders  them  conscious ; 
and  a  perfect  adaptation  makes  consciousness  sink  again  into  the 
dream-like  state  of  unconscious  soul-life.  Human  life  is  so  in- 
tensely conscious  because  man  has  constantly  to  adapt  himself  to 
new  conditions.  If  there  were  no  progress,  if  we  lived  in  that 
state  of  perfect  adaptation  which  is  Mr.  Spencer's  ideal,  men's  lives 
would  elapse  in  idyllic  harmony  and  with  the  mechanical  rhythm  of 
a  machine.  It  would  be  the  state  of  a  happy  dream  ;  conscious- 
ness would  disappear  as  it  has  disappeared  in  those  movements  of 
our  body  which  we  execute  as  pure  reflex  motions,  without  further 
thought,  because  they  are  perfectly  adapted  to  their  ends.  There- 
fore "the  good"  or  that  which  produces  consciousness,  is  want, 
disturbance,  pain. 

Accordingly  the  definition  of  good  in  the  preface  of  Madame 
Royer's  book  does  not  agree  with  the  definition  proposed  in  the 
conclusion. 

Professor  Gizycki's  work  on  ethics  has  the  merit  of  being 
very  popular — a  virtue  which  is  rare  in  the  books  of  German  pro- 
fessors, f    He  has  to  some  extent  abandoned  the  principle  of  utility 

*  See  the  editorial  article  on  "  Pleasure  and  Pain,"  The  Open  Court,  No. 
120,  Vol.  III.,  p.  1987. 

t  The  chapters  on  Determinism  and  Indeterminism  in  Professor  Gizycki's 
Moraiphilosophie  appeared  first  in  an  English  translation  in  The  Open  Court, 
Nos.  25  and  26.  Other  passages,  remarkable  for  their  beauty  and  strength- 
appeared  shortly  after  the  publication  of  the  book  in  The  Open  Court  under 


xii  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

and  formulates  the  maxim  of  ethics  in  the  sentence  :  ' '  Strive  for 
peace  of  soul  by  devoting  thyself  to  the  welfare  of  humanity." 

Professor  Gizycki  maintains  that  "feelings  are  the  ultimate 
basis  of  morals."  He  says  "the  moral  feelings — reverence  and 
contempt,  esteem  and  indignation,  peace  of  soul  and  remorse — are 
not  activities  of  reasdn,  but  simply  feelings."  This  is  an  error.  So 
long  as  we  possess  feelings  only,  we  can  have  none  of  what  Profes- 
sor Gizycki  calls  "moral  feelings."  Every  one  of  the  so-called 
"moral  feelings, "  for  instance,  esteem  or  indignation,  is  a  judg- 
ment ;  and  how  can  we  pass  a  judgment  of  esteem  or  indignation 
unless  we  compare  and  reason  concerning  certain  feelings?  It  is 
true  that  if  man  were  not  a  sentient  creature  he  could  have  no 
ethics.  But  the  properly  ethical  element  in  ethics  does  not  consist 
in  feelings,  but  in  the  judgment  concerning  feelings. 

Brutes  possess  feelings  just  as  much  as  man,  but  man  alone  is 
in  possession  of  reason,  and  the  regulation  of  his  feelings  by  rea- 
son makes  him  ethical.  The  conduct  of  brutes  exhibits,  with  rare 
exceptions,  a  lack  of  morality  ;  and  in  the  measure  that  a  creature 
begins  to  judge,  it  becomes  ethical. 

Professor  Harald  Hoffding  of  Copenhagen,  is  perhaps  the 
most  advanced  of  the  Utilitarians.  He  goes  so  far  in  the  state- 
ment of  his  principle  of  ethical  estimation  as  to  object  to  the  very 
wo^ds  "happiness  or  utility"  (A'utzen  oder  Gliick,  German  trans- 
lation of  his  "  Data  of  Ethics,"  p.  37).  In  their  stead  he  proposes 
to  put  the  term  "  welfare"  (IVohlfahrt)  in  order  to  embrace  also 
the  higher  wants  of  man's  nature.  Professor  Hoffding  defines  wel- 
fare (p.  98)  "as  a  continuous  state  of  pleasurable  feeling"  (IVohl- 
fahrt ist  ein  dauernder  Zustand  des  Lustgefiihls).  The  present 
edition  contains  an  exposition  of  his  views  in  his  own  words  which, 
in  criticism  of  the  author's  positions,  he  kindly  consented  to 
write  as  a  contribution  to  The  Monist  (Vol.  I.,  No.  4,  pp.  520- 
551).  His  statement  is  perhaps  the  best  and  most  scientific  formu- 
lation of  Hedonism,  the  ethics  based  upon  man's  pursuit  of  hap- 
piness. 

We  may  say  that  the  pursuit  of  happiness  is  a  natural  right 
of  man,  but  we  cannot  derive  the  moral  ought  from  the  pursuit  of 
happiness.  And  the  mere  pursuit  of  happiness  is  not  sufficient  to 
make  a  complete  and  worthy  human  life.     On  the  contrary,  the 

the  titles;  "Death  and  Life  "  (No.  70)  and  "Nature  and  Eternal  Youth  ' 
(No.  72). 


PREFACE.  xiii 

mere  pursuit  of  happiness  wherever  it  prevails  unchecked  in  the 
soul  of  man  is  a  most  dangerous  tendency,  which  unfits  man  for 
business  as  well  as  for  family  life,  and  above  all  for  ideal  aspira- 
tions. What  is  the  reason  that  trustworthy  persons,  competent 
workers,  dutiful  men  and  women,  are  so  rare  ?  It  is  simply  be- 
cause most  people  are  too  eager  in  their  pursuit  of  happiness. 

The  pursuit  of  happiness  is  not  wrong.  Enjoyment  is  not  a 
sin  and  recreation  is  not  improper.  Yet  it  is  wrong  to  make  hap- 
piness the  sole  aim  of  existence.  We  cannot  live  without  enjoy- 
ment ;  enjoyment  keeps  our  minds  healthy  and  buoyant.  Yet  en- 
joyment is  not  the  purpose  of  life.  Recreation  is  the  rest  we  take 
after  our  work  is  done.  We  do  not  work  in  order  to  have  recrea- 
tion ;  but  we  seek  recreation  in  order  to  do  more  work. 

If  the  pursuit  of  happiness  is  not  sufficient  to  make  man's  life 
complete  and  worthy,  what  then  is  needed  to  make  it  so  ?  We  all 
know  what  is  needed  :  it  is  ethics.  Then  let  us  have  ethics — not 
theories  about  procuring  pleasurable  sensations,  but  true  ethics — 
ethics  that  are  nobler  than  the  mere  pursuit  of  happiness. 

* 
*  * 

Criticisms  are  solicited  from  all  who  dissent  from  the  views 
set  forth  in  the  following  lectures.  I  shall  be  glad  to  learn  from 
my  critics,  and  wherever  any  one  will  convince  me  of  an  error  he 
will  find  me  ready  to  change  my  opinion  and  to  accept  the  truth 
whatever  it  be.  p.  c. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Introduction * xvii 

Three  Lectures  by  Dr.  Paul  Carus. 

Ethics,  A  Science 3 

The  Data  of  Ethics 25 

The  Theories  of  Ethics 51 

Discussions. 

Dr.  Carus  on  "The  Ethical  Problem."  By  William  M.  Salter, 

Lecturer  of  the  Chicago  Ethical  Society 86 

Mr.  Salter  on   "The  Ethical  Problem."     Reply  by  Dr.  Paul 

Carus 97 

Science  and  Ethics.    Reply  by  Dr.  Paul  Carus  (Continued)     .   125 

The  Authority  of  the  Moral  Law.     Reply  by  Dr.  Paul  Carus 

(Continued) 131 

Concluding  Remarks  of  the  Discussion  with  Dr.  Paul  Carus. 

By  William  M.  Salter 138 

The  Ought  and  the  Must.     A  Criticism.     By  John  Maddock, 

Esq.,  Minneapolis,  Minn 149 

The  Ought  and  the  Must.     Reply  by  Dr.  Paul  Carus     .     .     .   152 

Leading  Principles  in  Ethics.  Remarks.  By  Dr.  F.  M.  Hol- 
land, Concord,    Mass 157 

A  Test  of  Conduct.  Remarks.  By  Dr.  F.  M.  Holland  (Con- 
tinued)       162 

A  Criticism.  By  Dr.  Friedrich  Jodl,  Professor  in  the  Univer- 
sity of  Vienna 168 

In  Answer  to  Professor  Jodl.     By  Dr.  Paul  Carus     ....   170 

Religion  and  Science — Their  Incongruity.  A  Criticism.  By 
Dr.  Robert  Lewins,  V.  C.  ;  late  of  the  British  Army   .     .  179 


xvi  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

PAGE 

Science  and  Religion.     In  Answer  to  Dr.  Lewins's  Criticism. 

By  Dr.  Paul  Carus 184 

Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  on  Morality  and  Religion.     A  Criticism. 

By  Dr.  Paul  Carus 186 

The  Principle  of  Welfare.     An  Essay.    By  Dr.  Harald  Hoff- 

ding,  Professor  in  the  University  of  Copenhagen  .     .   199 

The  Criterion  of  Ethics  an  Objective  Reality.    An  Essay.    By 

Dr.   Paul  Carus 234 

First  Principles  in  Ethics.  An  Essay.  By  William  M.  Salter  264 
The  "Is"  and  the  "Ought."  Remarks.  By  Dr.  Paul  Carus  279 
An  Analysis  of  the  Moral  Ought.     Comments  upon  Prof.  H. 

Sidgwick's  View.     By  Dr.  Paul  Carus 285 

Nature  and  Morality.     An  Examination  of  the  Ethical  Views 

of  John  Stuart  Mill.    By  Dr.  Paul  Carus 296 

An  American  Moralist.     By  Dr.  L.  M.  Billia,   Professor  in 

the  University  of  Turin 317 

Rosmini's  Philosophy.     By  Dr.  Paul  Carus 325 

Faith  and  Reason.  A  Review  of  Fechner's  Method  of  Recon- 
ciling Religion  with  Science.     By  Dr.  Paul  Carus  .     .     .  334 


INTRODUCTION. 


In  endeavoring  to  establish  ethics  as  a  science, 
the  author's  aim  has  been  on  the  one  hand  to  point 
out  the  intimate  and  inalienable  connexion  of  moral- 
ity with  religion  ;  and  on  the  other  hand  to  show  that 
ethics  can  by  no  means  be  derived  from  mere  sen- 
timent. Both  the  intuitionist  and  the  hedonist  are 
wrong,  the  former  in  seeking  the  ultimate  foundation 
of  ethics  in  the  sentiment  of  moral  impulses  called 
conscience  and  the  latter  in  determining  moral  worth 
by  a  consideration  of  pleasure  and  pain. 

In  order  to  find  the  objective  element  that  consti- 
tutes the  nature  of  morality,  we  must  discover  the 
objective  element  of  man's  soul.  Man's  soul  is  not 
merely  subjectivity.  The  fact  that  he  feels  is  an  in- 
dispensable condition  of  his  existence  as  a  living  and 
thinking  being,  but  it  is  not  the  essential  feature  of  his 
humanity.  He  does  not  consist  of  feelings  pure  and 
simple,  but  of  feelings  of  a  definite  kind  and  nature. 
The  most  important  part  of  man's  existence  is  his 
character,  and  character  is  quality ;  a  man's  character 
is  not  the  feeling  element  of  his  feelings,  but  is  deter- 
mined by  the  forms  of  his  feelings,  by  his  thoughts, 
and  his  intentions.  And  forms  are,  if  our  philosophy 
be  right,*  not  mere  subjective  semblances  (as  Kant 
would  have  it),  but  objective  realities. 

•See  the  author's  Primer  of  Philosophy  and  Fundamental  Problems. 


xviii  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

The  problem  of  ethics  presupposes  the  solution  of 
the  psychological  question  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
soul,  which  has  been  treated  elsewhere,  and  can  here 
only  briefly  be  dealt  with. 

In  reply  to ^the  question,  What  am  I  myself?  we 
say,  the  self  of  every  man  is  his  character.  I  am  not 
my  body,  but  that  which  determines  the  actions  of  the 
body.  I  am  the  longings,  the  impulses,  the  ideals 
which  inspire  me,  and,  above  all,  the  actions  which  I 
do.  In  brief,  the  soul  consists  of  thoughts  and  voli- 
tions. Accordingly,  I  am  a  certain  form  of  life, — a 
form  formed  and  forming.  I  am  formed  by  formative 
factors  that  existed  before  I  was  combined  into  this 
peculiar  idiosyncrasy,  and  I  in  my  turn  am  forming 
the  idiosyncrasies  of  future  generations  with  whom  I 
come  directly  or  indirectly  into  contact.  In  this  sense, 
I  (that  is,  the  forms  of  life  which  make  up  my  per- 
sonality) existed  to  a  great  extent  before  I  was  born, 
and  shall  exist  in  the  reproductions  of  my  most  per- 
sonal features  after  the  dissolution  of  my  body.  The 
indestructibility  of  every  event  that  ever  happened  is 
especially  true  of  the  form  of  life,  the  soul,  which  at 
every  moment  of  its  existence  is  simply  the  summed 
up  result  of  its  entire  previous  history,  beginning  with 
the  first  appearance  of  life  on  earth.  And  as  the  past 
is  immortalised  in  us  so  we  shall  be  immortalised  in 
the  future  ;  and  this  immortality  of  the  soul  is  a  fact 
in  spite  of  the  transiency  of  every  successive  moment 
of  our  life  as  well  as  the  final  dissolution  of  the  body. 

Morality  is  a  formation  of  character ;  it  is  the  ac- 
quisition and  preservation  of  those  forms  of  life 
which,  in  our  best  judgment,  must  be  deemed  worthy 
of  existence.  We  have  been  built  up  by  the  soul-life 
of  the  past,  and  we  are  building  up  the  soul-life  of  the 


INTRODUCTION.  xix 

future.  Our  self  extends  into  both  directions,  into  the 
ages  that  have  been  and  into  the  ages  to  come.  The 
present  temporary  incarnation  of  this  soul-life  is  tran- 
sient, while  its  forming  factors  are  enduring. 

Self  is  a  word  of  doubtful  significance ;  if  we  un- 
derstand by  self  our  body  in  its  material  concreteness, 
life  teaches  us  the  transiency  of  self,  and  ethics  would 
practically  consist  in  the  eradication  of  all  selfish- 
ness. We  must  cease  clinging  to  the  self  of  this  tran- 
sient incarnation  of  our  form  of  life,  which  is  most 
easily  done  by  overcoming  the  delusion  that  this 
bodily  self  is  neither  a  reality  of  permanence  nor  does 
it  possess  any  absolute  dignity.  If,  however,  we  un- 
derstand by  self  the  form  of  our  soul-life,  our  charac- 
ter, the  ideals  that  inspire  us,  and  the  aims  which  we 
pursue,  ethics  would  be  simply  the  science  of  self-cul- 
ture and  self-preservation.  In  this  sense  morality  is 
the  highest,  the  best,  and  most  consistent  selfishness. 

Taking  this  attitude,  the  contrast  between  ego- 
tism and  altruism  breaks  down  :  ethics  is  as  little 
egotistic  as  it  is  altruistic.  Ethics  is  antagonistic  to 
self  in  its  narrow  and  bodily  sense,  but  if  we  under- 
stand by  self  that  which  constitutes  the  character  of 
our  life,  viz.,  the  form  of  our  being,  the  essential  fea- 
ture of  that  which  constitutes  our  personality,  ethics 
is  simply  the  enhancement  of  our  self.  It  will  in  the 
long  run,  and  if  methodically  considered,  teach  us  the 
selfishness  that  does  not  cling  to  the  heap  of  atoms 
called  body,  but  to  its  more  important  formal  and 
formative  features,  our  ideals,  which  will  continue  to 
exist  after  the  breakdown  of  our  material  existence. 

If  by  individual  we  mean  the  concrete  and  mate- 
rial embodiment  of  our  soul,  and  by  personality  the 
characteristic  features  of  our  aspirations,  the  form  of 


xx  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

our  life,  our  spiritual  being  :  we  would  say  that  ethics 
as  a  science  finding  an  objective  foundation  in  the 
realities  of  life  must  transcend  the  realm  of  the  indi- 
vidual, and  establish  solidly  and  forever  our  personal- 
ity. Our  personality  and  our  conception  of  personality 
must  be  lifted  into  the  domain  of  the  super- individual ; 
we  must  learn  to  regard  the  fleeting  as  fleeting,  and 
appreciate  the  value  of  permanence.  The  individual 
is  not  only  subject  to  a  constant  change,  but  it  is 
finally  doomed  to  die.  The  individual  should  there- 
fore be  the  instrument  of  personality;  it  is  the  occa- 
sion through  which  our  personality  can  make  its 
influence  felt  in  the  development  of  the  entire  life  of 
mankind  ;  and  ethics  is  simply  a  method  of  improv- 
ing this  opportunity. 

Ethics  is  not  altruism,  although  it  sometimes 
prompts  us  to  altruistic  deeds,  because  the  enhance- 
ment of  our  self-interest  in  the  higher  sense  of  the 
word  naturally  leads  to  the  enhancement  of  our  own 
self  as  incorporated  in  our  fellow-beings.  Helping 
others  is  not  moral  on  the  principal  that  they  are  oth- 
ers, but  rather  because  they  are  or  may  become  like 
unto  us :  they  represent  our  own  life- form  which  is  in 
need  of  assistance.  Hence  charity  extended  to  peo- 
ple who  are  unworthy  is  no  virtue ;  and  goodnatured- 
ness  without  circumspection  is  either  weakness,  or 
negligence,  or  foolishness,  but  never  meritorious. 

The  idea  is  very  prevalent  that  ethics  is  goody- 
goodyism,  that  it  is  anti-selfishness,  that  it  is  a  sup- 
pression of  our  own  personality  in  favor  of  other  per- 
sonalities. If  a  man  from  sheer  good  nature  yields  to 
the  unreasonable  demands  of  another,  or  if  he  con- 
fides in  him  without  a  sufficient  guarantee,  he  may 
be  unselfish,  but  he  is   therefore  not  moral.     Many 


INTRODUCTION.  xxi 

people  who  lack  the  strength  of  saying  "no"  at  the 
right  time,  when  the  results  of  their  false  altru- 
ism become  apparent,  console  themselves  with  the 
thought  that  they  were  too  good ;  but  they  are  mis- 
taken ;  their  conduct  is  not  moral,  but  weak,  and 
weakness  is  immoral.  The  acquisition  of  strength 
which  may  often  appear  as  sternness  is  one  of  the 
most  urgent  duties  of  life,  and  goodnaturedness  as  a 
rule  is  merely  a  euphemism  for  a  lack  of  character, 
implying  a  deficiency  in  the  power  of  resistance. 

An  example  of  these  wrong  ethics  is  the  sheep,  for 
the  sheep  in  its  meekness  and  weakness  is  supposed 
to  be  moral,  while  its  enemy  the  wolf  is  represented 
as  the  incarnation  of  immorality.  We  would  say  that 
neither  the  sheep  nor  the  wolf  is  moral ;  but  if  the 
simile  is  understood  as  a  parable,  we  might  just  as 
well  take  the  wolf  as  the  representative  of  morality; 
for  while  the  sheep  sets  an  example  of  cowardice  and 
indifference,  the  wolf  at  least  exhibits  courage ;  he 
stands  up  for  his  own  self,  and  fights  the  struggle  of 
life  energetically  and  boldly. 

Courage  is  not  a  vice,  but  one  of  the  cardinal  vir- 
tues, although  its  significance  as  a  virtue  has  been 
underrated  in  the  centuries  during  which  through  a 
literal  acceptation  of  the  lamb  as  the  symbol  of  inno- 
cence an  ovine  morality  was  preached  and  the  theory 
of  an  absolute  non-resistance  to  evil  had  become  the 
highest  moral  ideal. 

There  is  a  certain  sense  in  the  religious  injunction, 
"Resist  not  evil,"  but  as  it  is  commonly  formulated 
the  statement  is  wrong,  and  ought  to  read,  "Resist 
not  evil  with  evil."  The  principle  of  retaliation  is 
wrong,  but  the  principle  of  fighting  error,  vice,  and 


xxii  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

falsity,  is  not  only  not   immoral,  but  it  is  the  main 
duty  of  morality. 

Evil  is  exactly  the  thing  to  be  resisted,  only  we 
should  not  overcome  evil  homeopathically  by  increas- 
ing the  evils  of  the  world.  Lao-Tze  expresses  the 
right  sentiment  in  the  Tao- Teh-King  when  he  says  : 

"  Requite  hatred  with  goodness." — Chap.  63. 

' '  The  good  I  meet  with  goodness  ;  the  bad  I  also  meet  with 
goodness  ;  for  virtue  is  good  (throughout).  The  faithful  I  meet 
with  faith ;  the  faithless  I  also  meet  with  faith  ;  for  virtue  is  faith- 
ful (throughout)." — Chap.  49. 

The  old  Buddhist  Scriptures  say  of  a  saintly  man: 

"  Anger  he  conquers  by  calmness, 
And  by  goodness  the  wicked  ; 
The  sti-igy  he  conquers  by  generosity, 
And  by  truth  the  speaker  of  lies." 

A  prevalent  error  is  the  idea  set  forth  by  many 
men  of  great  prominence  that  ethics  has  nothing  to 
do  with  religion.   For  instance,  Professor  Petrie  says  :* 

' '  That  the  idea  of  personal  morality  is  not  an  integral  part  of 
most  religions,  is  obvious  to  any  one  who  has  had  a  practical  view 
of  them.  Right  and  wrong  do  not  enter  into  the  circle  of  religious 
ideas  to  most  races.  The  piety  of  the  Carthaginian  before  Moloch, 
of  the  Roman  as  he  sent  his  captives  from  thecapitol  to  be  slaugh- 
tered in  the  Colosseum,  of  Louis  XI.  as  he  confided  his  duplicities 
to  the  Virgins  in  his  hat-band,  or  of  Louis  XV.  as  he  prayed  in  the 
Parc-aux-Cer/s,  show  what  the  brigand  who  pays  for  his  masses, 
or  the  Arab  who  swindles  in  the  intervals  of  his  prayers,  prove  in 
the  present  day — that  the  firmest  religious  beliefs  have  no  neces- 
sary connection  with  the  idea  of  moral  action." 

The  error  of  this  view  consists  in  the  fact  that  our 
own  views  of  morality  are  imputed  to  people  of  either 
a  different  religion  or  a  different  religious  conception. 
The   savage  who  worships  his  deity  by  slaughtering 

*Religion  and  Conscience  in  Ancient  Egypt,  pp.  14-15. 


INTRODUCTION.  xxiii 

the  captives  is  subjectively  (viz.,  before  the  tribunal 
of  his  conscience)  as  moral  as  the  Christian  general 
who  would  be  intent  on  saving  their  lives.  Saul  was 
rejected  by  Samuel  simply  because  he  did  not  slaugh- 
ter all  the  captives,  and  did  not  destroy  the  property 
of  a  conquered  race,  and  he  was  deemed  irreligious ; 
his  act  was  considered  by  Samuel  as  decidedly  im- 
moral. The  immoral  actions  of  savages  are  the  best 
evidence  of  the  close  connection  between  religion  and 
morality.  A  savage  religion  produces  savage  views 
of  morality.  The  Carthaginians  who  sacrificed  to  Mo- 
loch, and  I  might  say,  by  way  of  parenthesis,  the 
Israelite  king,  Manasseh,  too,  who  made  his  sons  and 
daughters  pass  through  the  fires  of  Baal,  were  sub- 
jectively considered  moral ;  they  did  not  perform 
these  acts  on  account  of  a  perversity  of  their  moral 
fiber,  but  on  account  of  a  perversity  of  their  religion. 
They  believed  in  a  savage  religion.  Undoubtedly, 
they  performed  these  horrible  rites  with  fear  and  trem- 
bling, and  against  their  better  instincts,  simply  be- 
cause they  deemed  them  right,  and  the  proper  thing  to 
do.  They  thought  that  God,  or  the  gods,  demanded 
such  sacrifices.  Their  religion  is  at  fault,  not  their 
morality. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  ethics  of  the  promotors  of 
the  Inquisition,  and  of  the  popes  who  introduced  and 
sanctioned  this  inhuman  system  of  making  propa- 
ganda for  the  religion  of  love.  Torquemada,  the 
Grand  Inquisitor  of  Spain,  is  reported  even  by  his 
enemies  to  have  been  a  pure-minded  man,  of  best  in- 
tentions, and  he  was  at  the  same  time  so  tender- 
hearted that  he  left  the  room  as  soon  as  the  suspected 
heretic  was  put  on  the  rack.  Subjectively  considered, 
he  certainly  was  moral,  and  acted  under  the  impulse 


xxiv  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

of  high  motives  against  the  better  instincts  of  his  hu- 
manity. His  fault  is  not  one  of  wickedness,  but  of 
belief ;  and  his  errors  are  not  due  to  the  viciousness 
of  his  heart,  but  to  the  errors  of  his  religion. 

We  insist,  therefore,  on  the  truth  that  religion  is 
closely  connected  with  morality.  And  how  could  it 
be  otherwise?  For  religion  is  the  conviction  we  have 
of  the  truth, — the  conviction  which  comprises  our 
conception  of  the  universe,  and  becomes  as  such  the 
determining  factor  of  all  our  actions. 

Religion  need  not  be  a  belief,  but  it  is  always  a 
faith.  Belief  is  opinion  ;  it  is  a  taking  for  granted, 
without  having  evidence  ;  but  faith  is  a  synonym  for 
conviction.  Faith  is  the  determination  to  be  true  to 
one's  ideal.  It  is  true  that  many  deem  belief  to  be  an 
essential  element  of  religion,  but  this  is  only  an  emer- 
gency for  those  who  are  lacking  in  comprehension. 
The  belief  that  justice  extended  to  enemies  is  the 
proper  thing  to  do,  does  not  become  less  religious 
when  through  a  deeper  insight  into  the  interrelations 
of  human  life  it  is  changed  into  positive  knowledge. 
We  would  here  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
Hebrew  word  for  belief,  njTEtf  (amuna),  means  firm- 
ness, or  character  (connected  with  the  word  )*$ 
(amen),  which  means  "it  is  established");  and  the 
Greek  word  for  belief,  viotk,  means  fidelity,  and 
ought  to  be  translated  by  the  English  word  "faith," 
and  not  "belief." 

It  goes  without  saying  that  religion  originates  with 
mere  opinion,  but  it  progresses  more  and  more  to  a 
clear  comprehension.  First  we  know  in  part  and  we 
prophesy  in  part ;  but  when  that  which  is  perfect  is 
come,  then  that  which  is  part  shall  be  done  away. 


THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM 


ETHICS  A  SCIENCE. 


The  ethical  problem  is  the  burning  question  of  to- 
day. It  is  a  fact  that  the  majority  of  civilized  people 
demand  obedience  to  certain  ethical  rules  of  conduct. 
To  some  extent  they  enforce  them  by  law,  yet  it  is 
generally  agreed  upon  that  the  statutes  would  not  be 
sufficient  to  ensure  the  observance  of  those  rules  un- 
less the  members  of  society  possessed  the  spirit  of 
which  those  laws  are  merely  an  expression ;  and  the 
laws  of  a  country  can  only  prescribe  in  roughest  out- 
lines the  most  general  demands  of  the  community. 
The  laws  rest  upon  the  ethical  spirit  that  animates  a 
nation.  The  motive  to  do  right  must  be  a  living  power 
in  every  citizen,  and  if  we  speak  of  the  ethical  problem 
we  demand  an  answer  to  the  question,  How  can  we 
plant  that  motive  in  the  souls  of  men? 

The  ethical  problem  accordingly  is  a  practical 
problem.  It  is  no  mere  speculation  for  theorizers.  It 
is  the  living  question  of  to-day  which  is  at  the  bottom 
of  all  questions,  and  we  may  justly  say  that  it  has  been 
the  burning  question  of  all  the  ages  past,  and  will  re- 
main the  chief  interest  of  human  life  in  all  the  cen- 
turies to  come. 


4  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

Yet  because  the  ethical  problem  is  practical,  we 
cannot  dispense  with  theoretical  enquiries.  Theories 
and  their  practical  applications  are  inseparable.  Theo- 
rizing without  practical  use  is  a  Vanity  Fair  of  mental 
exertions.  Theories,  if  they  are  correct  theories,  if 
they  are  properly  derived  from,  and  if  they  agree  with, 
facts,  are  the  most  practical  inventions  made.  The 
savage  may  build  his  hut  without  a  knowledge  of 
mathematics,  but  the  study  of  mathematics  is  no  mere 
and  useless  theorizing  for  the  architect  who  builds  a 
dome  or  who  bridges  an  arm  of  the  sea.  A  correct  theory 
makes  a  man  more  efficient  in  his  work  ;  and  indeed 
right  theories  are  the  indispensable  conditions  of  all 
progress  in  practical  life. 

It  will  be  impossible  to  implant  in  the  souls  of  men 
the  motive  of  doing  right  without  telling  them  what 
is  meant  by  "right."  We  cannot  inculcate  ethics  with- 
out laying  down  a  principle  or  standard  by  which  a 
man  may  decide  for  himself  what  is  right  and  what  is 
wrong.  If  we  demand  that  he  refrain  from  doing  wrong 
and  be  guided  by  what  is  right,  we  are  bound  to  give 
him  a  reason  why.  If  right-doing  were  always  ad- 
vantageous to  him,  he  might,  as  a  matter  of  course,  obey 
the  moral  behest  and  we  should  need  no  ethics.  But 
if  it  sometimes  conflicts  with  his  personal  interest,  we 
must  give  him  a  reason  that  will  be  stronger  than  his 
egotism,  we  must  implant  the  ethical  motive  in  his 
soul.  How  can  we  do  that  without  enquiring  into  the 
principles  of  ethics,  the  factors  of  moral  life,  without 


ETHICS  A  SCIENCE.  5 

understanding  the  origin  and  evolution  of  ethics,  with- 
out digging  down  to  the  roots  from  which  the  ethical 
spirit  grows  ? 


The  ethical  problem  is  as  old  as  the  human  race. 
Humanity  has  always  been  in  search  of  certain  rules 
to  regulate  the  conduct  of  society.  These  rules  must 
have  had  a  very  slow  growth  at  first ;  they  developed 
unconsciously  in  the  era  when  man  was  still  an  animal 
living  in  herds.  Civilized  society  evolved  from  sav- 
age life  in  the  degree  that  certain  rules  of  conduct 
were  more  and  more  clearly  recognized.  It  is  natural 
that  those  tribes  prospered  best  in  whom  the  ethical 
spirit  was  comparatively  well  developed,  and  in  the 
process  of  natural  selection  the  growing  nations  of 
the  world  were  sifted  with  ruthless  cruelty  "  like  as 
corn  is  sifted  in  a  sieve."  Thus  humanity  was  edu- 
cated in  the  hard  school  of  experience,  to  find  out  the 
basic  principles  from  which  to  derive  the  rules  of  con- 
duct. 

The  ethics  of  a  people  at  a  given  time,  being  the 
result  of  their  experience,  is  naturally  the  practical 
application  of  their  conception  of  the  world.  There 
is  no  action,  i.  e.,  purposive  motion,  without  knowl- 
edge. Knowledge  transforms  motion  into  action.  Ac- 
tion depends  upon  knowledge,  and  the  sole  purpose  of 
knowledge  is  its  application  to  action.  Knowledge 
and  ethics   are   correlatives,    they   are   brothers,  yet 


6  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

knowledge  is  the  elder,  he  is  always  a  little  in 
advance  of  his  younger  brother,  ethics.  The  evolu- 
tion of  knowledge  will  necessarily  promote  the  evolu- 
tion of  ethics. 

Ethics,  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  term,  means 
regulation  of  action.  And  in  this  sense  every  knowl- 
edge must  have  its  ethical  application.  If  the  sav- 
age knows  that  friction  produces  fire,  this  knowledge 
finds  its  practical  application  in  the  ethical  rule  :  In 
case  you  want  fire,  produce  it  by  friction.  There  is 
no  scientific  discovery,  be  it  ever  so  small  or  ever  so 
great,  that  cannot  be  formulated  in  the  shape  of  an 
ethical  injunction.  For  instance,  in  order  to  build  a 
house,  observe  the  laws  of  gravitation.  Sometimes  a 
very  crude  knowledge  suffices  to  perform  a  -certain 
work  ;  sometimes  man,  unconsciously,  without  a  clear 
knowledge  of  what  he  is  doing,  succeeds  in  doing 
something  that  is  right,  but  it  cannot  be  doubted  that 
the  more  knowledge  he  has,  and  the  clearer  he  under- 
stands the  science  of  a  thing,  the  better  will  he  perform 
a  special  work,  and  the  more  properly  will  he  be  en- 
abled to  attend  to  it. 

All  science  has  its  ethical  application — ethical  in 
the  widest  sense  of  the  term.  And  we  may,  in  this 
way,  consider  all  practical  instruction,  and  the  appli- 
cation of  all  human  activity  as  ethical.  Yet  there  is 
a  special  usage  of  the  term  ethics,  the  science  of 
which  is  more  difficult  to  understand,  and  this  special 
ethics  is  meant  if  we  speak  of  ethics  in  general. 


ETHICS  A  SCIENCE.  7 

Ethics,  in  the  more  definite  sense,  represents  those 
duties  which  must  be  performed  in  the  interest  of  so- 
ciety. Very  often  these  can  be  performed  only  by  a 
certain  self-sacrifice  ;  and  yet  they  must  be  done. 
They  have  to  be  performed  not  only  under  the  com- 
pulsion of  law  from  the  motive  of  fear,  but  of  free 
will  from  the  motive  of  love.  Penal  laws  can  serve 
for  extremities  only  ;  they  are  mere  safety-valves  for 
protecting  society  in  desperate  cases.  They  are  not 
the  factors  that  make  the  community  grow.  The 
members  of  a  society  must  be  willing  to  sacrifice  some 
of  their  individual  interests,  and  if  they  are  not  ani- 
mated with  this  spirit,  our  legislative  apparatus  can  be 
of  no  avail. 

The  ethical  stimulus  has  been  implanted  into  man 
by  religion.  All  the  religions  of  the  world  are  justly  con- 
sidered ethical  movements.  Confucius  inaugurated 
an  ethical  movement,  the  decalogue  of  Mount  Sinai  is 
an  ethical  movement,  Buddha  is  the  founder  of  an 
ethical  movement,  and  Christ's  Sermon  on  the  Mount 
is  intended  to  replace  a  slavish  obedience  to  the  letter 
of  the  law  by  the  ethical  spirit  of  religious  aspiration. 

What  is  religion?  Religion  is  a  conception  of  the 
world  applied  to  practical  life.  It  is  a  theory  of  the 
universe  in  its  ethical  importance.  It  is  a  philosophy 
employed  as  a  regulative  principle  for  action. 

If  there  is  a  difference  between  philosophy  and  re- 
ligion it  is  this  :  The  word  philosophy  is  mostly  em- 
ployed when  we  speak  of  the  world-conception  of  single 


8  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

thinkers;  the  word  Religion  signifies  a  philosophy  en- 
dorsed by  a  whole  society.  In  addition  to  this  dis- 
tinction we  notice  that  religion  always  includes  the 
ethical  application  of  a  conception  of  the  world,  while  a 
philosophy  may  imply,  but  need  not  necessarily  contain 
its  ethical  corollaries.  In  a  philosophy  the  theoretical 
part,  in  a  religion  the  practical  application,  is  predom- 
inant, yet  there  is  no  difference  in  principle ;  every 
philosophy  is  a  religion  and  every  religion  a  philosophy. 

The  history  of  all  the  sciences  begins  with  the  be- 
lief in  magic.  The  inventor  who  has  made  himself 
useful  in  this  or  that  way  has  accomplished  something 
extraordinary,  something  wonderful,  something  im- 
possible ;  it  appears  impossible  to  the  natural  abilities 
of  man.  Accordingly,  it  is  argued,  he  can  have  done  it 
only  by  the  aid  of  supernatural  forces.  And  the  man 
who  made  the  invention  is  under  the  same  impression. 
He  did  not  make  his  own  ideas,  but  the  ideas  grew  in 
him  as  the  flowers  grow  in  spring.  They  came  to  him 
like  a  revelation  from  above.   He  felt  himself  inspired. 

And  there  is  a  great  truth  in  this  conception  of  in- 
spiration— a  truth  which  is  at  present  little  heeded. 
All  growth  comes  to  us  like  a  gift  from  on  high.  It 
is  true  that  we  have  created  by  our  own  efforts  the 
higher  life  of  a  civilized  humanity  ;  yet  on  the  other 
hand,  it  is  true  also  that  all  our  efforts  would  have 
been  in  vain,  did  nature  not  contain  the  conditions 
for  evolving  that  higher  life.  Man  is  a  conscious  being 
and  he  can  learn  to  understand  his  wants,  he  can  rep- 


ETHICS  A  SCIENCE.  g 

resent  in  his  consciousness  the  growth  of  his  body 
as  well  as  his  mind  and  the  conditions  that  favor  this 
growth.  He  can  also  scan  the  future  so  as  to  provide 
for  emergencies  and  to  protect  himself  against  dan- 
gers. Thus  consciousness  becomes  a  factor  having 
great  influence  upon  man's  life  for  properly  directing 
his  future  evolution  and  for  preserving  the  health  of 
his  life.  Yet  it  was  not  his  consciousness  that  made 
man  grow.  Humanity  is  of  a  natural  growth  not  other- 
wise than  is  the  unconscious  growth  of  plants. 

There  is  no  science  and  no  application  of  science 
which  at  first  was  not  considered  as  magical.  How 
could  it  be  otherwise  with  the  science  that  forms  the 
basis  of  ethics?  Almost  all  the  old  religions  are  still 
in  the  state  of  infancy;  they  represent  the  phase  of 
astrology  before  it  developed  into  astronomy,  the 
phase  of  alchemy  before  it  developed  into  chemistry. 
Yet  like  the  sciences,  religion  also  will  develop  into 
a  state  of  scientific  maturity. 

Religion  was  supposed  to  have  come  to  man  by 
inspiration.  And  it  did  come  to  him  by  inspiration  in 
a  certain  sense,  as  an  idea  comes  to  a  poet,  as  a  dis- 
covery comes  to  a  scientist.  The  inspiration  of  re- 
ligious prophets  was  not  different  from  that  of  scien- 
tists, poets,  or  social  reformers.  Yet  it  was  considered 
different,  and  up  to  this  time  the  magical  phase  of  re- 
ligious views  has  with  the  majority  of  mankind  not  yet 
developed  into  that  scientific  state  reached  by  the 
other  branches  of  human  experience.     This  step  how- 


,o  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

ever  must  be  made,  and  the  signs  of  the  time  indicate 
that  it  will  be  made  in  the  near  future  of  humanity. 
Indeed  the  ethical  problem  at  present  is  •  othing  but 
our  desire  to  make  this  step. 

The  vanguard  of  those  thinkers  who  are  the  leaders 
of  human  progress  feel  the  necessity  to  place  religion 
upon  a  scientific  basis.  The  religion  of  magic,  of  su- 
pernaturalism,  of  superstition,  must  develop  into  a  re- 
ligion of  science,  it  must  become  the  scientific  basis  of 
ethics.  Religion  will  remain  a  conception  of  the  world 
that  serves  as  a  regulative  principle  for  action.  Yet 
this  conception  will  cease  to  be  the  product  of  an  in- 
stinctive imagination,  it  will  become  a  scientific  sys- 
tem of  certain  truths  that  have  to  be  examined  and 
proved  by  the  usual  methods  of  scientific  enquiry. 

The  religion  of  science  will  have  no  dogmas,  the 
truth  of  which  is  asserted  on  grounds  of  assumed 
authority ;  yet  it  will  have  truths,  the  authority  of 
which  depends  upon  on  their  capability  of  proof. 
The  religion  of  science  accordingly  is  not  a  religion 
of  sentimental  toleration  which  endures  any  and  every 
opinion  with  equal  indifference.  The  religion  of  science 
will  be  the  most  exclusive  and  orthodox  religion 
that  ever  existed — orthodox  in  the  proper  sense  of 
the  word  :  having  the  right  conviction,  or  being  in 
possession  of  provable  truth.  And  if  the  term  is  not 
misunderstood,  we  may  add,  that  the  religion  of 
science  will  also  be  the  most  intolerant  religion,  for  it 
will  destroy  all  the  views  that  are  incompatible  with  it. 


ETHICS  A  SCIENCE.  n 

It  will  no  longer  surfer  them  to  exist.  However  it  will 
not  destroy  antagonistic  views  by  putting  opponents  to 
death  or  persecuting  them,  but  by  convincing  them  of 
their  errors. 

ii. 

The  ethical  problem  of  to-day  can  be  formulated 
in  the  question  :  "Is  ethics  a  science  ;  or  if  it  is  not 
at  present,  can  ethics  be  founded  upon  a  scientific 
basis?"  This  question  is  substantially  the  same  as 
the  effort  to  conciliate  Religion  with  Science,  or  to 
evolve  Religion  from  its  state  of  infancy  into  its  state 
of  manhood  ;  from  dualism,  into  monism,  from  the 
mysticism  of  vague  supernaturalistic  speculations  to 
the  clearness  of  positive  certainty,  from  authoritative 
belief  and  credulity  into  that  of  knowledge. 

We  want  new  ethics  but  no  new  morality.  The 
morality  of  the  old  religions  is  not  wrong.  Their  in- 
junctions upon  the  whole  are  right.  The  command- 
ments :  "Honor  thy  father  and  mother,"  "thou 
shalt  not  steal,"  "thou  shalt  not  kill,"  "thou 
shalt  not  bear  false  witness,"  are  to-day  as  valid  as 
they  ever  were.  They  have  rather  gained  in  mean- 
ing, for  the  consciences  are  more  sensitive  to  resent 
any  injury  done  to  a  neighbor  since  Christ  taught  us 
to  consider  even  sinful  desire  to  be  culpable  as  though 
the  sin  itself  were  committed.  It  is  not  the  morality 
of  the  old  religions  we  object  to,  but  it  is  the  argu- 
ment upon  which  the  old  religious  morality  is  based. 


12  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

You  may  say  it  matters  not  why  a  man  leads  a 
moral  life,  so  that  his  life  be  moral.  And  to  some 
extent  it  is  of  little  consequence  indeed,  namely,  in 
so  far  as  morality  has  become  a  habit  of  his  character 
which  he  could  not  change  even  though  the  motive 
that  impelled  him  to  do  right  should  disappear. 
However  it  is  by  no  means  indifferent  if  we  consider  the 
necessity  of  educating  the  growing  generation  whose 
characters  are  plastic  like  clay  in  a  potter's  hand.  Man 
wants  motives  for  his  actions,  and  above  all  he  wants 
motives  for  those  actions  that  appear  to  run  counter  to 
his  personal  interests.  Man  wants  strong  motives  for 
those  actions  which  he  would  not  perform,  if  his 
egotism  had  the  sole  decision.  And  man  has  a  right 
to  demand  motives  for  he  is  a  thinking  being  and  it 
is  his  prerogative  to  be  guided  by  reason. 

The  old  reasons  of  religious  ethics  have  become 
untenable,  and  it  is  therefore,  solely  therefore,  that 
the  ethical  problem  has  become  a  burning  question. 
If  the  belief  in  a  supernatural  and  personal  God,  as 
taught  by  the  churches  were  as  strong  to-day,  as  it 
was  centuries  ago,  if  the  authority  of  church  doctrines 
were  as  firm  and  undisputed  as  it  was  formerly,  we 
would  have  no  ethical  problem.  There  would  be  no 
meaning  in  the  very  phrase  "the  ethical  problem."  It 
is  this  need  to  supply  a  new  and  tenable  basis  for 
ethics  which  lies  back  of  all  ethical  aspirations  to-day. 

There  is  no  ethical  problem  to  the  dogmatic  be- 
liever, for  he  imagines  that  God  in  person  has  spoken 


ETHICS  A  SCIENCE.  13 

through  the  mouths  of  his  prophets  and  his  only  be-  ' 
loved  son,  and  whosoever  believes  and  obeys  God's 
commands  will,  after  death,  receive  the  crown  of  life. 
And  yet  such  is  the  imperative  demand  of  progress  that 
even  to  the  thoughtful  dogmatist  the  ethical  problem 
is  brought  home.  He  may  conceive  the  increase  of 
unbelief  among  the  thinkers  of  mankind  as  a  sign  of 
depravity  in  the  human  race  ;  nevertheless  this  state 
of  things  demands  his  attention  likewise.  If  he  has  an 
interest  in  the  welfare  of  society,  he  must  see  the  need 
of  teaching  ethics  to  unbelievers.  The  dogmatist  is 
an  ethical  teacher,  an  ethical  missionary  also.  He 
knows  that  a  teacher  must  go  down  to  the  level  of  his 
disciples,  and  from  their  stand-point  raise  them  to  his 
own.  Every  missionary  must  speak  in  the  language 
of  those  whom  he  wishes  to  convert.  Thus  even  a 
dogmatist,  from  his  stand-point,  can  appreciate  that 
an  appeal  to  the  accounts  of  revelation  would  be  use- 
less with  regard  to  those  who  have  ceased  to  believe 
them.  He  himself  will  be  obliged  to  appeal  more  to 
natural  and  demonstrable  arguments  than  to  his  creed, 
and  thus  it  will  happen  that  the  churches  themselves, 
even  though  they  retain  their  denominational  names, 
will,  under  the  pressure  of  facts,  by  the  gentle  in- 
fluence of  the  times,  change  into  societies  for  ethical 
culture. 

There  is  one  point  you  ought  to  understand  well. 
The  ethical  movement  will  work  for  the  progress  of 
mankind  whatever  you  do  ;  for  it  will,  under  all  cir- 


i4  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

cumstances,  help  to  ethicalize  our  churches.  But  if  you 
intend  to  give  permanence  to  your  work  in  the  ethical 
movement,  if  you  wish  that  the  Societies  for  Ethical 
Culture  shall  continue,  you  must  not  rest  satisfied  with 
negations,  you  must  do  the  positive  work  of  affirmation. 
It  is  not  sufficient  to  drop  the  antiquated  creeds  of 
supernaturalism,  which  furnished  in  former  centuries 
the  motives  for  moral  action,  you  must  replace  them 
by  new  motives  that  can  stand  scientific  criticism.  It 
is  not  sufficient  to  propound  the  ethical  problem  and 
to  push  it  to  the  front  of  human  interests,  so  as  to  call 
to  it  all  the  attention  that  it  deserves  ;  you  must  also 
solve  it. 

The  work  done  by  the  leaders  of  the  ethical 
movement  is  undoubtedly  a  great  achievement,  and 
the  mere  selection  of  the  name  is  most  appropriate. 
The  mere  formulation  of  a  problem,  said  David  Hume, 
is  almost  half  of  its  solution.  You  have  elicited  sym- 
pathies all  over  the  world  among  the  learned  profes- 
sors of  ethics  as  much  as  among  the  liberal  clergy 
who  are  willing  to  follow  the  spirit  of  scientific  prog- 
ress. Will  you  now  leave  the  task  undone  ?  Will 
you  shrink  from  completing  the  work  lest  you  commit 
yourselves  to  a  real  solution  of  the  ethical  problem  ? 
I  hope,  and  indeed  I  believe,  that  you  will  not. 
Does  noc  Christ's  word  apply  to  you  as  well  as  it  did 
of  yore  to  the  multitude  that  listened  to  his  words  in 
Galilee  :  "  Ye  are  the  salt  of  the  earth,  but  if  the  salt 
have  lost  its  savor  wherewith  shall  it  be  salted.     It  is 


ETHICS  A  SCIENCE.  15 

thenceforth  good  for  nothing,  but  to  be  cast  out  and  to 
be  trodden  under  foot  of  men. "  If  you  leave  the  work 
undone,  if  you  positively  refuse  to  do  it,  it  is  certain  that 
your  societies  will  pass  away,  for,  in  that  case,  they 
would  have  no  reason  to  exist,  they  would  be  mean- 
ingless, like  the  salt  that  has  lost  its  savor. 

Your  failure  to  solve  the  ethical  problem  would  be 
a  serious  loss  to  the  cause  of  progress ;  yet  if  the 
ethical  societies  would  pass  out  of  existence,  the  ethi- 
cal movement  would  remain.  Though  you  misunder- 
stood your  own  ideals,  your  ideals  would  live  in  spite 
of  you.  They  will  take  root  in  the  hearts  of  others 
who  possess  the  strength  and  the  courage  to  realize 
them. 

After  all,  it  is  not  impossible  that  the  churches 
may  be  roused,  for  there  is  still  much  power  for  good 
in  them.  The  churches  have  not  lost  the  capability 
of  regeneration  ;  the  demands  of  the  time  press  them 
very  hard  ;  they  feel  no  less  than  you  the  urgency  of  the 
ethical  problem,  and  why  should  not  a  spirit  of  reform 
seize  them  as  happened  in  the  era  of  Luther  ?  The  lead- 
ers of  the  churches  will  become  aware  of  the  fact  that 
they  are  losing  contact  with  their  times.  If  they  continue 
in  the  old  rut,  their  numbers  will  diminish  and  their 
influence  decrease.  But,  in  that  case,  is  it  not  most 
probable  that  in  the  last  moment  of  necessity  the  clergy 
will  understand  the  dilemma :  Either  the  churches 
have  to  adapt  themselves  to  the  needs  of  the  time,  or 
they  will  cease  to  exist?     If  they  understand  this, 


16  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

an  ethical  revival  will  undoubtedly  animate  church  life 
and  with  all  the  advantages  of  their  organization,  with 
their  historical  inheritance  and  traditions,  they  will 
evolve  into  that  higher  phase  of  religion  which  is  free 
from  the  superstition  of  magic.  They  will  purify  their 
faith  so  as  to  shake  off  the  illusions  of  supernaturalism, 
and  unequivocally  take  their  stand  on  the  solid  ground 
of  scientific  truth. 

There  can  be  no  doubt,  if  there  is  any  truth  in  the 
law  of  evolution,  that  the  ethical  movement  will  be 
victorious  in  the  end.  Its  enemies  cannot  suppress 
it,  neither  can  its  friends  nor  its  founders.  It  must 
have  its  way.  We  can  hinder  its  growth,  we  can  re- 
tard its  progress  by  miscomprehending  it,  but  we  can- 
not undo  it.  Yet  we  can  also  promote  its  progress, 
we  can  enhance  its  growth,  we  can  mature  its  harvest  : 
and  in  doing  so  we  shall  work  for  the  cause  of  hu- 
manity. 

in. 

The  question  now  arises  :  How  can  we  have  a 
scientific  basis  of  ethics  ?  How  is  the  transition  from 
the  old  state  to  the  new  to  be  effected  ?  And  which 
philosophy  shall  give  us  the  theoretical  assistance  of 
method  for  our  operation  ? 

Which  philosophy  ?  There  are  so  many  !  And 
one  philosopher  contradicts  the  other.  There  is 
materialism  and  spiritualism,  realism  and  idealism, 
monism  and    agnosticism.     Which   shall   we   select 


ETHICS  A  SCIENCE.  17 

as  a  basis  for  ethics  ?  I  believe  the  bewildering 
number  of  so  many  different  systems  hindered  the 
leaders  of  the  societies  for  ethical  culture  from  en- 
dorsing any  one  of  them.  We  have  so  many  little 
systems  of  world-theories  as  to  what  the  essence  of 
the  world  might  be  like,  that  an  outsider  can  only  re- 
serve his  judgment.  I  can  only  approve  of  Professor 
Adler's  proposition  that  an  ethical  movement  must 
not  commit  itself  to  any  one  of  these  thought-con- 
structions of  theorizing  philosophers. 

Yet  if  there  is  no  philosophy  of  permanent  value, 
the  ethical  movement  must  contribute  as  much  as 
possible  to  create  a  philosophy  that  will  be  sufficient 
for  our  needs.  And  at  present  it  is  not  so  much  a 
philosophical  system  that  is  needed,  as  clearness  about 
the  principle  by  which  to  guage  the  depth  and  the  im- 
portance of  world-conceptions. 

Schiller  said  in  one  of  his  xenions : 

"  Which  will  survive  of  the  many  philosophies  ? — Surely  I  know  not! 
Yet  Philosophy  will,  truly,  forever  remain." 

There  was  a  time  when  we  had  several  astronomies. 
Which  of  them  survived  ?  Only  one,  that  of  Coper- 
nicus. We  name  it  after  the  man  who  first  discovered 
it;  yet  we  might  have  named  it  the  astronomy  of  facts. 
All  the  ingenious  theories  and  fantastic  speculations 
had  to  be  abandoned,  when  this  most  simple  theory 
was  propounded,  which  rightly  considered  was  in  need 
of  no  hypothesis  and  although  it  did  credit  to  the  im- 
aginative power  of  its  inventor,  it  was  merely  a  con- 


18  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

sistent  and  simple  explanation  of  facts.  So  it  will  be 
with  all  the  philosophies.  All  the  thought-construc- 
tions of  absolute  being  must  go,  and  only  the  philoso- 
phy of  facts  will  remain.  And  the  new  ethics  in  order 
to  become  a  science  must  be  established  on  facts. 

Here  is  the  line  of  demarcation  between  the  new 
ethics  and  the  old.  The  old  ethics  is  based  upon 
revelation,  upon  absolute  ideas,  upon  anything,  but 
not  upon  facts.  The  new  ethics  is  based  upon  facts 
and  is  applied  to  facts. 

There  are  perhaps  many  among  you  who  would  say : 
"Facts  are  a  poor  capital  to  start  with.  What  are  facts ? 
Are  they  not  the  realities  of  life,  the  sensory  impres- 
sions we  have,  the  happenings  and  events  of  history 
and  of  our  individual  experience,  the  natural  processes 
that  take  place  around  us  ?"  Certainly  all  these  things 
are  facts,  and  facts  are  the  realities  of  life. 

Laplace  searched  the  skies  and  he  could  not  find 
God.  In  the  same  way,  you  may  search  the  facts  of 
reality  and  you  will  not  find  ethics.  Ethics  is  not 
ready  made ;  it  is  not  the  one  or  the  other  fact  among 
all  the  realities  of  the  universe.  Ethics  is  our  attitude 
toward  the  facts  of  reality. 

The  objection  that  can  be  made  to  the  proposition 
of  basing  ethics  upon  facts  can  be  stated  as  follows : 
"The  realities  of  life  are  often  very  sad;  and  they  are 
especially  insufficient  in  the  properly  moral  element. 
Ethics  therefore  wants  something  greater  and  grander 
than  facts.     Science  may  explain  the  things  that  are  ; 


ETHICS  A  SCIENCE.  19 

science  may  De  satisfied  with  facts,  but  ethics  deals 
with  things  that  ought  to  be ;  ethics  is  not  satisfied 
with  facts  but  it  brings  us  ideals.  The  basis  of  ethics 
and  of  ethical  ideals  must  be  sought  in  something  su- 
perior to  facts,  in  something  absolute." 

It  is  true  that  ethics  is  not  satisfied  with  the  present 
state  of  things ;  ethics  attempts  to  improve  the  state 
of  facts  as  they  are.  Ethics  deals  with  ideals.  Yet 
these  ideals  whence  do  they  come?  Are  they  really 
derived  from  the  absolute?  Do  ideals  come  to  us  from 
fairy  land  ?  Are  they  really  of  a  mysterious  and  a  su- 
perterrestrial  origin?  If  so,  supernaturalism  would 
be  right  after  all ! 

What  are  ideals  ?  Ideals  have  a  very  humble 
origin ;  they  are  not  of  celestial  or  transcendental 
parentage.  Ideals  are  the  children  of  our  needs.  If 
an  inventor  is  engaged  in  inventing  a  machine  for 
filling  some  need  in  human  life,  he  has  an  ideal,  for 
an  ideal  is  an  idea  to  be  realized. 

Ideals  do  not  come  down  to  us  from  the  skies,  nor 
are  they  mere  dreams,  mere  poetical  visions  of  our 
prophets.  Not  at  all !  Man  wants  something,  so  he 
conceives  the  idea  how  good  it  would  be  if  he  had  it. 
If  a  man  is  a  mere  dreamer,  he  is  pleased  with  his 
imagination,  and  complains  about  the  hard  facts  of 
reality.  However,  if  he  is  a  thinker,  that  is,  a  dreamer 
who,  in  addition  to  his  imaginative  faculty,  possesses 
self-discipline,  will,  and  the  ability  to  prune  his  imagina- 
tion, and  to  criticize  his  dreams,  he  will   study  facts. 


20  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

And  only  by  studying  facts  will  he  be  enabled  to 
realize  his  ideal.  Those  apparent  ideals  which,  for 
some  reason,  are  not  adaptable  to  facts  are  no  ideals, 
but  dreams. 

The  ethical  ideal  rises  as  all  other  ideals,  from  the 
wants  of  man.  Humanity  is  in  need  of  a  better  state 
of  things,  of  more  benevolence  in  our  mutual  inter- 
course, of  more  justice  in  our  dealings,  more  enthu- 
siasm for  the  common  good.  This  produces  concep- 
tions of  a  higher  conduct  than  humanity  at  present 
possesses,  of  better  laws  and  institutions,  and  we  are 
constantly  investigating  the  different  plans  to  decide 
whether  or  not  they  would  be  an  improvement  if  real- 
ized. If  ethical  ideals  do  not  agree  with  the  laws 
that  science,  after  a  careful  examination,  has  derived 
from  facts,  they  are  mere  dreams,  and  are  just  as 
worthless,  perhaps  also  just  as  misleading,  as  is  the 
mirage  of  a  fata  morgana  in  the  desert,  or  an  ignis 
fatuus  in  a  marshy  region. 

The  religions  of  supernaturalism  teach  that  the 
source  of  all  goodness  and  morality  is  a  great  personal 
being  residing  beyond  the  skies  ;  and  he,  by  means  of 
magic,  implants  into  man's  bosom  the  ethical  ideal. 
No  wonder  that  Laplace  could  not  find  God  !  A  medi- 
cine-man, who  works  miracles,  has  no  room  in  nature 
even  though  he  were  omnipotent  enough  to  let  the 
stars  spin  around  his  fingers.  Yet  there  is  a  great 
truth  in  the  idea  of  God.  The  religion  of  science 
recognizes  that  there  is  a    power,   an  all-pervading 


ETHICS  A  SCIENCE.  21 

law  in  the  universe,  which  is  not  personal,  but  super- 
personal.  And  this  superpersonal  power  not  only 
obtains  in  the  motions  of  the  stars  and  in  the  laws  of 
cosmic  life,  but  also  in  the  destinies  of  nations,  in  the 
growth  of  society,  and  in  the  fates  of  individuals.  It 
wrecks  those  who  do  not  conform  to  its  injunctions. 
If  Laplace  had  sought  for  this  God,  for  the  God  of 
science,  who  is  a  reality  of  life  no  less  than  the  law 
of  gravitation,  he  would  not  have  failed  to  discover 
him.  We  need  not  search  the  skies  in  order  to 
find  this  God.  We  need  but  look  into  our  own  hearts, 
for  there  he  lives  in  our  ethical  aspirations  and  ideals. 
He  is  not  far  from  every  one  of  us,  for  in  him  we  live, 
and  move,  and  have  our  being. 

The  old  religion  of  magic  teaches  that  God  works 
by  magic,  and  can  in  turn  be  worked  upon  by  magic. 
Hence  the  institutions  of  prayer  and  adoration  in 
spite  of  Christ's  command  that  God  is  spirit,  and 
those  who  worship  him  must  worship  him  in  spirit  and 
in  truth.  The  new  worship  is  no  adoration,  but  obe- 
dience to  the  ethical  laws,  as  Christ  says  :  '*  Not  every 
one  that  saith  unto  me,  Lord,  Lord,  shall  enter  into 
the  kingdom  of  heaven,  but  he  that  doeth  the  will  of 
my  Father  which  is  in  heaven."  The  God  of  science 
demands  no  creed,  but  deed.  What  is  creed  but  the 
belief  in  the  letter  of  parables  ?  And  is  it  not  ex- 
pressly and  repeatedly  stated  that  Christ's  words  are 
truths  symbolically  expressed?  "All  these  things 
spake  Jesus  unto  the  multitude  in  parables  ;  and  with- 


22  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

out  a  parable  spake  he  not  unto  them."  (Matt, 
xiii,  34). 

What  would  Christ  say,  if  he  saw  the  modern 
paganism  of  Christianity  which  has  retained  a  modi- 
fied idolatry,  instead  of  realizing  the  purely  ethical 
religion  of  a  worship  in  spirit  and  in  truth  ?  His 
word  that  "God  is  spirit"  is  wrongly  translated 
by  the  phrase  "God  is  a  Spirit."  This  insertion  of 
the  article  alters  the  entire  sense  of  the  passage.  It 
changes  God  into  a  Ghost,  into  a  bodiless  person, 
and  gives  new  occasion  for  the  continuation  of  pagan 
rites  and  customs. 

There  is  a  tendency  now  along  the  whole  line  of 
scientific  enquiry  to  prove  that  every  one  of  our 
sciences  ultimately  stands  on  facts.  Mathematics  and 
logic  were  formerly  supposed  to  hang  in  mid-air, 
their  fundamental  truths  were  said  to  be  axioms  that 
need  no  proof  because  they  are  self-evident.  Modern 
mathematics  has  succeeded  in  proving  that  mathema- 
tics is  ultimately  based  on  facts  no  less  than  any  other 
science,  and  the  same  has  been  proved  of  logic. 
Modern  Mathematics  has  not  superseded  Euclid,  and 
modern  logic  has  not  superseded  Aristotle.  Yet  the 
modern  conception  of  these  sciences  has  made  an 
amendment  which  will  guard  against  the  error  that 
the  formal  sciences  are  anything  like  an  unexplain- 
able  miraculous  revelation. 

We  are  so  much  accustomed  to  respect  those 
things  only,  the  origin  of  which  we  do  not  compre- 


ETHICS  A  SCIENCE.  zS 

hend,  that  it  seems  to  us  like  a  disappointment  if  we 
are  told  we  should  be  able  to  understand  the  founda- 
tion of  ethics  and  to  search  for  its  basis  among  facts. 
Indeed  those  who  yet  believe  in  absolute  ideas,  those 
who  have  not  as  yet  succeeded  in  coming  down  to 
facts,  still  stand  beyond  the  line  of  demarcation  that 
separates  the  old  view  from  the  modern  or  scientific 
view.  The  idea  to  base  ethics  on  absolute  concep- 
tions, on  mystic  emotions,  on  vague  methods  of  in- 
tuition, or  on  incomprehensible  ideals,  is  in  principle 
not  very  different  from  the  old  method  of  a  superna- 
tural revelation  of  ethics.  The  line  of  distinction  is 
sharper  than  any  color  line  can  be,  and  those  who 
have  not  as  yet  felt  the  need  of  basing  ethics  upon 
facts  cannot  be  said  to  be  imbued  with  the  spirit  of 
modern  ethics. 

Here  is  an  ideal  worthy  of  the  noblest  efforts  of 
our  enthusiasm.  Ideals  may  have,  as  I  said  before, 
a  lowly  origin.  This  detracts  not  in  the  least  from 
their  divine  grandeur.  On  the  contrary  this  adds  to 
their  greatness.  This  world  of  ours  is  not  a  world 
suited  to  the  taste  of  the  pleasure-seeker,  yet  it  affords 
an  ample  field  to  the  man  who  finds  his  satisfaction 
in  realizing  ideals. 

Ideals  are  born  of  want,  and  the  birth  of  ideals  is 
often  accompanied  by  painful  throes,  by  suffering, 
anguish,  and  anxiety.  Yet  all  the  affliction  man  has 
to  undergo  is  fully  compensated  in  the  noble  satis- 
faction he  enjoys  in  the  work  of  realizing  his  ideals. 


24  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

Be  not  afraid  lest  in  this  world  the  Ideal 
Should  disappear,  or  like  a  flower  fade  ; 
For  she  is  not  mere  fancy's  fickle  shade. 

She  is  a  glowing  presence,  true  and  real. 

Still  firmly  an  alliance  hymeneal 
Joins  her  to  Human  Progress,  as  a  maid 
Is  wedded  to  a  hero,  whom  his  blade 

Protects;  thus  faithfully  he  shields  the  Ideal. 

Wondrously  from  this  bridal  union  springs 

The  life  which,  breathing  through  the  human  race 
In  ardent  youth  shines  forth  from  every  face  ; 
It  lends  to  the  inventor  fancy's  wings, 
And  stirs  the  poet's  heart,  who  gaily  sings 
The  Ideal's  beauty  and  the  Ideal's  grace. 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


All  knowledge  is  a  representation  of  facts  in  sen- 
tient beings.  Those  facts  which  form  the  subject- 
matter  of  a  special  branch  of  knowledge  are  called  its 
data.  For  instance  the  data  of  astronomy  are  the  mo- 
tions of  the  celestial  bodies,  the  data  of  botany  are  the 
phenomena  of  plant-life. 

What  are  the  data  of  ethics? 

The  data  of  ethics  are  the  motives  for  human  action. 

In  order  to  understand  the  laws  that  regulate  the 
motives  for  human  action,  we  must  study  the  soul  of 
man,  the  origin  and  mechanism  of  its  ideas,  their  re- 
lations to  the  surrounding  world  and  above  all  the  in- 
terconnections that  obtain  between  man  and  man. 

It  devolves  upon  us  to  explain  how  man  happens 
to  be  a  moral  being.  Having  motives,  man  must  have 
aims,  and  he  can  have  aims  only  by  being  able  to  fore- 
cast future  events  and  calculate  the  consequences  of 
his  intended  actions.  We  must  further  understand 
how  man  can  have  motives  of  duty  stronger  than  his 
personal  interests.  The  motives  of  duty  are  called 
conscience.  This  will  lead  us  to  the  ultimate  purpose 
of  ethics :  How  can  we  make  man  responsible  for  his 
actions  and  how  can  we  educate  him  to  obey  the  be- 


26  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

hests  of  his  conscience,  the  motives  of  duty,  in  prefe- 
rence to  all  egotistic  desires  ? 


Man  is  the  only  creature  on  earth  that  is  an  ethical 
being,  because  he  alone  is  able  to  think.  The  begin- 
ning of  all  ethics  is  thought.  Before  I  act,  I  think, 
I  can  forecast  the  probable  result  of  my  action  ;  yea, 
even  more  than  the  probable  result.  If  I  know  all  the 
conditions  and  control  them,  I  can  with  certainty  fore- 
tell the  consequence.  It  appears  wonderful  that  man 
can  know  something  before  it  happens,  and  yet  it  is  a 
fact ;  and  if  it  were  no  fact,  how  could  we  have  ethics? 

This  is  the  old  problem  of  Kant's  a  priori,  which  has 
caused  much  dispute  among  philosophers.  Mr.  John 
Stuart  Mill  has  tried  to  do  away  with  it,  he  put  it 
down  and  denounced  it ;  but  the  a  priori 'is  like  a  stand- 
up,  that  queer  wooden  toy-man  standing  upon  a 
rounded  leaden  base.  You  may  knock  down  the  stand- 
up  as  often  as  you  please,  it  will  spring  to  its  feet 
again.  So  the  a  priori  has  been  declared  to  be  an  im- 
possibility, but  here  it  is  again. 

Says  Kant*  :  "We  say  of  a  man  who  undermined 
his  house,  he  might  have  known  a  priori  that  it  would 
fall ;  that  is,  he  need  not  have  waited  for  the  experience 
that  it  did  actually  fall." 

The  a  priori  is  the  foundation  of  all  our  ethical 
action  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  term  ethics ;  it  is  the 

*  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,"  ad  Edition,  Introduction. 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


27 


basis  of  all  practical  application  of  knowledge.  If  we 
were  not  able  to  forecast  the  result  of  our  actions, 
there  would  be  no  ethology. 

Is  it  not  marvelous  that  man  can  know  something 
before  gaining  the  actual  experience  of  it  ?  Is  this 
not  an  inexplainable  mystery,  the  influence  of  some 
supernatural  power  ? — No.  The  mystery  of  the  a  priori 
is  easily  explained  as  soon  as  we  understand  the  na- 
ture of  formal  laws. 

If  I  construct  a  number  of  triangles  all  different  in 
shape,  rectangular,  obtuse,  and  equilateral,  I  shall  find 
that  the  sum  of  the  angles  of  each  of  them  measures 
one  hundred  and  eighty  degrees.  This  is  wonderful 
indeed ;  but  it  is  not  miraculous.  It  is  a  necessary 
consequence ;  in  all  these  cases  like  conditions  pro- 
duce like  results.  And  mathematics  as  a  science  is 
engaged  in  showing  how  the  conditions  are  the  same, 
although  they  may  at  first  sight  appear  different. 

It  is  true  that  we  cannot  determine  beforehand  how 
some  substance  which  we  have  never  seen  before,  will 
be  affected  by  this  or  that  treatment ;  but  we  do  know 
beforehand  the  laws  that  underlie  one  quality  in  all  the 
things  which  in  our  experience  we  can  possibly  meet. 
We  do  know  beforehand  the  laws  of  form,  and  every- 
thing that  exists,  everything  that  can  become  an  ob- 
ject of  our  experience,  is  equally  subject  to  the  laws 
of  form.  If  I  put  twice  two  apples  into  a  basket,  I 
have  put  four  apples  into  it.  "Twice  two  are  four" 
is  perhaps  the  simplest  statement  of  a  formal  law,  and 


28  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

we  know  beforehand  that  wherever  the  same  action  of 
two  being  doubled  takes  place,  the  result  will  always 
be  the  same  ;  it  will  be  the  product  of  twice  two,  which 
we  call  four.  When  we  know  that  a  result  will  always 
be  the  same,  we  call  it  necessary. 

Thus  we  can  formulate  all  the  formal  laws  and  we 
can  know  beforehand  that  no  experience  ever  will  re- 
fute them.  The  formal  laws  of  numbers  we  call  arith- 
metic; those  of  spacial  relations  "mathematics,"  those 
of  thinking  "logic,"  and  the  formal  laws  of  natural 
sciences  are  sometimes  called  "metaphysics."* 

The  formal  laws  being  universal  are,  objectively 
considered,  the  conditions  of  the  regularity  that  pre- 
vails in  nature;  subjectively  considered,  being  conceived 
as  necessary,  they  afford  us  the  means  of  comprehend- 
ing the  phenomena  of  nature.  Comprehension  is 
nothing  but  the  recognition  of  the  regularity  that  pre- 
vails in  the  facts  of  experience,  and  comprehension 
enables  us  to  suit  our  actions  to  special  purposes,  and 
thus  to  determine  the  course  of  events. 

Ethics,  accordingly,  is  ultimately  based  upon  the 
same  universal  order  of  things  that  makes  mathe- 
matics, arithmetic,  logic,  and  human  reason,  possible. 
Reason  is  that  quality  of  man  that  makes  him  an 
ethical  being. 

The  word  metaphysics  has  often  been  defined  as  the  science  of  the  myctical 
essence  which  underlies  the  existence  of  reality.  Metaphysical  was  (accord- 
ing to  a  wrong  etymology  of  the  word)  supposed  to  be  that  which  lies  behind 
the  physical.  This  kind  of  metaphysics  has  long  since  been  superseded  by 
positivism.  The  most  important  law  of  true  metaphysics,  t.  e.,  purely  formal 
natural  science,  is  that  of  the  conservation  of  matter  and  energy. 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS.  2g 

Reason  has  been  supposed  to  be  of  supernatural 
origin ;  yet  reason  is  no  more  supernatural  than  is  the 
ability  to  understand  that  twice  two  will  always  be  the 
product  of  twice  two,  that  is  four.  This  very  ability 
is  reason,  for  all  the  complicated  activities  of  our  mind 
in  logical  argumentation  and  ratiocination,  all  methods 
of  induction  and  deduction  are  the  same  thing  over 
again,  they  are  formal  thought  or  applications  of  formal 
thought* 

The  laws  of  form  being  the  key  to  our  understand- 
ing the  regularity  of  the  course  of  nature,  reason,  as 
it  were,  reveals  to  us  the  unity  of  All-existence.  This 
revelation  is  no  revelation  in  the  old  theological  sense, 
it  is  a  natural  revelation,  the  origin  of  which  we  can 
trace  in  the  formal  laws  of  existence.  This  revelation 
is  not  the  inexplicable  act  of  an  extra-mundane  deity; 
it  is  no  mysticism,  no  supernaturalism.  It  is  simply 
the  recognition  of  the  universal  order  of  things.  Knowl- 
edge being  the  representation  of  facts,  this  revelation 
is  nothing  but  the  recognition  of  the  regularity  that 
prevails  among  these  facts,  and  this  recognition  pours 

*  Kant  distinguishes  between  "transcendental,"  i.  c,  formal,  and 
"transcendent,"  i.  e.,  that  which  transcends  all  comprehension.  Everything 
supernatural  is  transcendent ;  but  those  truths  which  Kant  calls  "  transcen- 
dental "  are  by  no  means  "transcendent";  they  are  the  clearest  thoughts 
possible,  the  laws  of  logic,  arithmetic,  mathematics.  If  there  is  anything 
transcendent,  our  knowledge  of  it  is  necessarily  mysticism. 

Kant  made  a  grave  mistake  when  he  called  formal  thought  "transcen- 
dental." For  Kant's  disciples  confounded  both  words  and  considered  trans- 
cendental truths  as  transcendent.  Thus  the  radical  Kant  became,  in  their 
minds,  a  supporter  of  supernaturalism,  and  those  thoughts  of  his  which  des- 
troyed all  mysticism,  became  a  new  basis  of  it. 


30  THE  'ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

a  flood  of  light  over  this  world  of  ours,  for  while  the 
many  various  facts  of  experience  at  first  appeared  to 
us  as  a  bewildering  chaos  without  rhyme  or  reason, 
we  now  learn  to  consider  it  as  a  cosmos  in  which  the 
minutest  detail  is  ordained  by  an  immanent  and  in- 
trinsic law. 

* 
*  * 

Kant  has  written  an  excellent  little  book  in  which 
he  lays  the  foundation  for  a  metaphysics  of  ethics. 
It  is  entitled  Grundlegung  zur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten. 
In  this  book  he  enquires  into  the  purpose  of  reason. 
Is  happiness  the  end  of  reason?  Kant  says,  no!  He 
argues : 

"In  the  physical  constitution  of  an  organized  being  we  take 
it  for  granted  that  no  organ  will  be  found  in  it  for  any  purpose  but 
such  as  is  also  the  fittest  and  best  adapted  for  that  purpose.  If  in 
a  being  possessing  reason  and  will,  the  preservation,  the  prosperity, 
in  a  word,  the  happiness  of  that  being  constituted  the  actual  pur- 
pose of  nature,  nature  had  certainly  adopted  an  extremely  unwise 
expedient  to  this  end,  had  it  made  the  reason  of  that  being  the 
executive  agent  of  its  purposes  in  this  matter.  For  all  actions  that 
it  had  to  perform  with  this  end  in  view,  and  the  whole  rule  of  its 
conduct,  would  have  been  far  more  exactly  prescribed  by  instinct, 
and  this  end  would  have  been  far  more  safely  attained  by  this 
means  than  can  ever  take  place  through  the  instrumentality  of 
reason. 

"  As  a  matter  of  fact  we  find,  that  the  more  a  cultivated  reason 
occupies  itself  with  the  purpose  of  enjoying  life  and  happiness, 
the  farther  does  the  person  possessing  it  recede  from  the  state  of 
true  contentment ;  and  hence  there  arises  in  the  case  of  many,  and 
pre-eminently  in  the  case  of  those  most  experienced  in  the  exercise 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS.  31 

of  reason,  if  they  are  only  frank  enough  to  confess  it,  a  certain 
degree  of  ' '  misology  "  or  hate  of  reason  ;  for  after  weighing  every 
advantage  that  they  derive,  I  will  not  say  from  the  invention  of  all 
arts  facilitating  ordinary  luxury,  but  even  from  the  sciences, 
(which  after  all  are  in  their  eyes  a  luxury  of  the  intellect, )  they 
still  discover  that  virtually  they  have  burdened  themselves  more 
with  toil  and  trouble  than  they  have  gained  in  point  of  happiness, 
and  thus,  in  the  end,  they  are  more  apt  to  envy  than  contemn  the 
commoner  type  of  men  who  are  more  immediately  subject  to  the 
guidance  of  natural  instinct  alone,  and  who  do  not  suffer  their 
reason  to  influence  in  any  great  degree  their  acts  and  omissions. " 

What  then  is  the  use  of  reason,  if  its  purpose  can- 
not be  found  in  producing  happiness  ?  Reason  en- 
ables us  to  comprehend  the  regularity  of  the  order 
of  nature  and  the  unity  of  cosmic  existence.  Every- 
thing that  exists  conforms  to  it.  And  if  some  com- 
bination of  things  ceases  to  conform  to  the  laws  of 
cosmic  existence,  it  will  ultimately  meet  with  destruc- 
tion. 

We  have  learned  in  our  previous  lecture  that  all 
knowledge  can  be  formulated  as  an  ethical  prescript. 
Thus  we  express  the  same  truth  ethologically  as  fol- 
lows :  If  you  wish  to  exist,  obey  reason.  Reason 
teaches  us  how  to  regulate  our  actions  in  conformity 
with  the  order  of  natural  laws.  If  we  do  regulate  them 
in  conformity  with  the  order  of  natural  laws,  they  will 
stand  ;  otherwise  not.  In  the  former  case  they  will  be 
good,  they  will  agree  with  the  cosmical  conditions  of 
existence ;  in  the  latter  case  they  are  bad,  they  will 
not  agree  with  the  cosmical  conditions  of  existence  j 


32  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

therefore  they  will  necessarily  produce  disorder  and 
evil. 

Kant  calls  this  attitude  of  man,  produced  under 
the  influence  of  reason  and  prompting  him  to  conform 
to  universal  laws,  "the  good  will."  This  attitude  of 
the  will,  Kant  says,  "is  not  the  sole  and  whole  good, 
but  it  must  still  be  considered  as  the  highest  good  and 
the  condition  necessary  to  everything  else,  even  to  all 
desire  of  happiness." 

The  conclusion  derived  from  these  premises  Kant 
formulates  in  the  following  statement : 

"To  know  what  I  have  to  do  in  order  that  ray  volition  be  good, 
requires  on  my  part  no  far-reaching  sagacity.  Unexperienced  in 
respect  to  the  course  of  nature,  unable  to  be  prepared  for  all  the 
occurrences  transpiring  therein,  I  simply  ask  myself  :  Canst  thou 
so  will,  that  the  maxim  of  thy  conduct  may  become  a  universal 
law?  Where  it  can  not  become  a  universal  law,  there  the  maxim 
of  thy  conduct  is  reprehensible,  and  that,  too,  not  by  reason  of 
any  disadvantage  consequent  thereupon  to  thee  or  even  others,  but 
because  it  is  not  fit  to  enter  as  a  principle  into  a  possible  enact- 
ment of  universal  laws." 

II. 

Kant's  ethics  has  been  criticized  of  late  as  "mere 
formalism ; "  yet  could  we  not  on  the  same  ground 
reject  all  the  sciences  because  they  are  based  upon 
the  laws  of  formal  thought  ?  It  proves  the  superiority 
of  Kant's  reasoning  that  he  so  clearly  shows  the  formal 
side  of  ethics.  We  cannot  treat  of  grammar  without 
understanding  logic  !     Or  if    we  do,  our  discussions 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS.  33 

will  be  idle  talk.  Any  investigation  into  ethics  ac- 
cordingly must  be  based  upon  clear  notions  of  the 
metaphysics  of  morals,  or  as  we  would  prefer  to  call 
it  of  "purely  formal  ethics." 

The  criticism  of  Kant's  ethics  would  be  justified, 
if  formal  ethics  were  the  whole  of  ethics.  However 
formal  ethics  is  as  little  the  whole  of  ethics  as  logic  is 
the  whole  of  grammar.  The  principle  of  modern 
ethics  is  to  base  ethics  upon  facts,  and  the  formal  laws 
that  regulate  the  interconnection  of  facts  is  one  part 
only  of  all  the  facts.  Purely  formal  ethics,  like  all  the 
purely  formal  sciences,  is  empty.  The  contents  of 
formal  ethics  must  be  derived  from  the  actual  facts  of 
cur  experiences. 

The  application  of  the  precept  "so  to  will  that 
the  maxim  of  thy  conduct  can  become  a  universal 
law,"  depends  entirely  upon  the  society  of  which  an 
individual  is  a  member.  The  same  formal  law  might 
be  applicable  to  the  code  of  a  band  of  robbers  no  less 
than  to  the  customs  of  peaceful  citizens..  How  can 
we  determine  whether  the  maxim  of  a  certain  action 
is  "fit  to  enter  as  a  principle  into  a  possible  enact- 
ment of  universal  laws, "  otherwise  than  by  experience  ? 
Man  being  a  rational  animal,  he  naturally  will  employ 
his  reason ;  but  reason  can  be  employed  to  advantage 
only  if  it  uses  the  material  of  facts,  as  we  find  it  in 
experience.  Ratiocinations  of  pure  formalism  may 
be  good  mental  exercises,  they  may  be  indispensable 
for  training  the  mind,  yet  if  they  had  no  practical 


34  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

purposes,  if  they  were  not  applied,  and  never  to  be 
applied  to  actual  facts,  they  would  be  as  sounding 
brass  or  a  tinkling  cymbal. 


The  facts  to  be  considered  in  ethics  are  the  many 
and  various  relations  in  which  man  stands  to  his  sur- 
roundings. These  relations  produce  the  many  different 
motives  that  prompt  man's  actions.  The  most  im- 
portant relations  of  all  for  ethical  consideration  are 
those  which  connect  the  life  of  a  single  individual  to 
the  fates  of  all  his  fellow  beings.  The  relation  be- 
tween man  and  man  constitutes  that  super-individual 
soul-life  which  we  call  society. 

Relations  are  not  material  things,  and  it  is  difficult 
therefore  to  understand  that  they  are  actual  and  most 
important  realities.  Relations  are  facts  of  experience 
also.  Let  us  for  the  sake  of  illustration  imagine  that 
all  the  relations  of  a  man  to  his  surroundings  are  so 
many  invisible  silken  threads,  fastened  to  those  spots 
of  his  body  where  the  objects  affect  him.  Every  con- 
tact with  the  outer  world  sets  some  of  these  threads  in 
vibration,  thus  causing  a  commotion  among  the  in- 
numerable plugs  or  hooks  to  which  they  are  fastened. 
This  commotion  is  the  pulsation  of  man's  physical 
and  mental  activity.  The  contact  of  his  breathing 
organs  with  the  oxygen  of  the  air  keeps  the  flame  of 
his  life  aglow,  and  the  constant  consumption  of  the 
energy  with  which  the  structures  of  his  organism  are 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS.  35 

freighted,  causes  the  need  of  renewing  them  for  a 
continuation  of  the  process  of  life. 

Among  all  the  threads  that  connect  man's  body  with 
the  outer  world  and  the  different  parts  of  the  body 
among  themselves,  there  are  some  that  pass  through 
the  sensory  organs  to  his  brain ;  the  end  stations  to 
which  they  are  hooked,  are  the  different  places  where 
a  commotion  produces  a  state  of  consciousness  repre- 
senting that  object  with  which  it  stands  in  relation. 
The  hooks  in  man's  brain  are  not  only  connected  with 
threads  that  pass  through  the  sensory  organs  into  the 
brain,  but  also  with  others  that  connect  the  hooks 
among  themselves  and  connect  some  hooks  with  the 
muscles  of  the  body.  Thus  a  commotion  caused 
among  the  cerebral  hooks  will  set  the  muscles  in 
motion. 

Now  suppose  that  a  consumption  of  energy  has 
taken  place  through  the  contact  with  the  outer  world, 
there  will  result  a  strong  pull  of  certain  threads  to  the 
brain  and  a  state  of  consciousness  will  be  produced 
which  we  call  hunger  and  thirst. 

This  state  of  consciousness  acts  as  an  irritation 
upon  man.  It  prompts  him  to  action,  and  in  so  far 
as  it  is  the  cause  of  some  motion,  we  call  it  "motive." 
Motive  is  that  which  moves,  and  the  distinction  we 
make  between  cause  and  motive,  is  that  a  motive  is  a 
cause  which  in  its  action  is  accompanied  with  con- 
sciousness. The  motion  of  an  organism  that  is  ac- 
companied with  consciousness  is  called  "action,"  or 


3CJ  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

an  "act,"  and  the  attitude  of  passing  into  action  is 
called  "will." 

The  hooks  on  which  the  innumerable  threads  are 
fastened,  represent  man's  soul.  What  are  these  hooks 
and  how  did  they  originate  ? 

The  world-substance  cannot  be  dead  matter  ;  it 
must  contain,  in  its  simplest  and  most  elementary 
forms,  the  germs  of  life,  so  that  in  special  combina- 
tions, as  we  find  them  in  organized  animal  substance, 
the  motion  of  atoms  is  accompanied  with  feeling.* 

In  consideration  of  the  fact  that  the  whole  world  in 
all  its  dimensions  is  a  most  complicated  network  of 
causes  and  effects,  it  will  be  natural  that  an  animal 
organism,  which  has  been  formed  somewhere,  will  be 
affected  by  innumerable  impressions  that  show  an  un- 
failing regularity.  The  different  impressions  will  pro- 
duce different  forms  of  structure  in  the  organism,  and 
the  motions  vibrating  through  the  different  structures 
will  be  accompanied  with  different  feelings.  The 
preservation  of  these  forms  is  called  '  ■  the  memory  of 
living  substance,"  and  modern  investigations  of  physi- 
ology teach  us  that  all  the  various  functions  of  the 
different  organs  and  nerve-cells  are  due  to  the  un- 
conscious memory  of  the  living  substance  inherited 
from  countless  ancestors.  Accordingly,  these  hooks 
of  our  soul  of  which  we  spoke,  are  nothing  but  the 

♦Compare  the  article  "Is  Nature  Alive?"  in  Fundamental  Problems, 
pp.  110-133. 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS.  •  37 

effects  which  the  threads  of  causal  relations  have  pro- 
duced by  constant  contact. 

Innumerable  sensory  impressions  have  produced 
in  the  feeling  substance  representations  of  their 
causes  in  the  surrounding  world ;  and  many  of  these 
representations  act  as  stimuli,  they  are  motives  for 
action. 

*  * 

Ethics  is  an  estimation  of  the  motives  for  action, 
whether  we  shall  yield  to  them  or  suppress  them,  and 
in  case  we  have  to  choose  among  several  motives  of 
which  one  only  can  be  selected,  ethics  has  to  instruct 
us  as  to  which  motive  is  to  be  preferred.  But  ethics 
can  be  of  service  only  if  it  gives  us  a  principle  ac- 
cording to  which  we  can  form  our  judgment.  Ethics 
without  a  principle  or  maxim,  without  a  standard  for 
discrimination,  is  no  ethics.  It  may  be  enthusiasm, 
it  may  be  sentimentality,  it  may  be  zeal  for  some  un- 
known good  ;  it  may  be  mysticism  or  romanticism, 
but  it  is  not  ethics,  for  judgment  as  to  right  and 
wrong,  according  to  a  definite  conviction,  is  the  very 
nature  of  ethics.  Take  away  that  conviction,  deprive 
ethics  of  the  principle  of  estimation,  and  ethics  will 
cease  to  be  ethics. 

Ethics  by  passing  judgment  upon  man's  motives 
will  under  ordinary  circumstances  always  strengthen 
some  of  them  and  weaken  others.  Yet,  an  ethical 
man  is  he  whose  aspiration  it  is  to  live  in  perfect  har- 
mony with  the  moral  law.     To  him  it  will  be  impossi- 


38  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

ble  to  let  any  motive  pass  into  act  upon  which  the 
verdict  of  "wrong"  has  been  pronounced  by  the  jury 
of  his  ethical  consideration. 

* 

The  most  important  relations  of  a  man  are  the  re- 
lations that  obtain  between  him  and  his  fellow-beings. 
They  form  the  soul-life  of  a  super-individual  organ- 
ism which  is  called  society.  The  importance  of  these 
connections  is  enormous,  and  their  overwhelming  in- 
fluence upon  the  emotions  of  every  individual  cannot 
be  overrated.  Every  individual  is,  by  the  thousands 
of  threads  that  connect  him  with  wife  and  children, 
with  friends  and  fellow-citizens,  tied  to  society.  Con- 
sider the  immense  power  of  the  inherited  memory  of 
sociological  functions  in  past  generations,  and  we  shall 
easily  comprehend  the  strength  of  social  motives. 

Some  philosophers  are  prone  to  consider  egotistic 
motives  as  the  natural  springs  of  action,  while  they 
look  upon  purely  altruistic  motives  as  something  ex- 
traordinary and  inexplainable.  They  are  wrong ; 
egotistic  motives  are  no  more  and  no  less  natural  than 
altruistic  and  social  motives.  Both  have  developed 
at  the  same  time,  both  have  differentiated  from  mor- 
ally indifferent  and  simple  reflex  actions.  Morally  in- 
different are  those  actions  concerning  the  motives  of 
which  no  ethical  estimation  is  required.  The  lowest 
stages  of  animal  development  know  neither  egotism 
nor  altruism.  The  differentiation  of  both  appears  si- 
multaneously at  a  later  period.     It  is  remarkable  that 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS.  39 

in  the  mental  development  of  a  child,  the  ability  of 
speaking  in  the  first  person  with  the  pronoun  "I" 
signifies  a  comparatively  mature  state  of  mind. 

When  some  egotistic  motive  impels  man  to  do 
an  act  that  is  injurious  to  one  or  several  of  his 
fellow  beings,  he  experiences  a  pull  of  the  social 
threads  which  is  sometimes  very  strong  even  in  the 
thoughtless.  It  often  acts  like  a  thunderstorm  with 
the  irresistible  force  of  elementary  powers.  And  the 
behests  of  conscience  overruling  with  imperative  com- 
mand man's  individual  interests  appear  to  him,  and 
indeed  they  are,  invested  with  that  superindividual 
authority  which  conscience  represents.  The  behests 
of  conscience  confront  us  as  an  "ought"  and  we  call 
them  our  duty,  obedience  to  which  is  as  a  rule  tacitly 
admitted. 

Conscience  is  nothing  supernatural,  it  is  of  a  nat- 
ural growth.  Man  being  a  social  animal,  it  is  all  but 
impossible  that  the  social  instinct  and  the  motives  for 
actions  in  behalf  of  society  should  not  have  been 
strongly  developed.  There  are  people  in  whom  ego- 
tistic desires  possess  greater  strength  than  moral  im- 
pulses, but  it  is  all  but  impossible  that  a  man  should 
be  void  of  all  conscience. 

The  animal  allows  itself  to  be  guided  by  instinct, 
but  it  is  the  prerogative  of  man  to  regulate  his  actions 
by  reason.  Conscience  as  a  mere  moral  instinct  is 
certainly,  as  experience  teaches  in  many  most  perplex- 
ing situations,  often  the  safest  and  best  guide.   Never- 


40  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

theless  conscience  as  a  mere  instinct  can  by  no  means 
be  considered  as  infallible;  nor  must  we  lose  sight 
of  the  fact  that  the  different  behests  of  conscience 
very  often  come  in  conflict  among  themselves.  But 
even  if  it  were  not  so,  the  dignity  of  man  as  a  rational 
being  demands  that  he  should  examine  all  his  mo- 
tives and  also  the  behests  of  conscience. 

in. 

The  purpose  of  ethics  is  to  determine  the  moral 
import  of  the  different  motives,  and  we  ask  now  what 
is  the  principle  that  should  guide  us  in  our  estimation 
concerning  the  worth  of  motives. 

When  we  try  to  explain  the  growth  and  origin  of 
man's  soul,  we  must  go  back  to  the  first  appearance 
of  living  substance.  Human  soul-life  would  be  an 
inexplainable  mystery  if  we  did  not  consider  the  con- 
tinuity of  soul-life  through  all  the  generations  of  man's 
ancestors  from  the  very  beginning.  The  facts  that 
scientists  have  brought  to  light  in  studying  the  phases 
of  evolution  require  us  to  regard  humanity  as  one 
great  and  immortal  organism.  The  soul-life  of  our 
ancestors  continues  in  us  and  at  the  same  time  must 
we  know  the  most  important  fibres  of  our  emotional 
and  intellectual  soul-life  originate  in  the  relations  that 
bind  us  to  our  fellow-beings.  These  considerations 
remove  the  barriers  that  seem  to  obtain  between  the 
individual  and  humanity — aye,  and  the  whole  creation 
of  cosmic  existence. 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS.  41 

We  are  apt  to  think  that  our  soul-life  is  something 
quite  distinct  from  the  outside  world.  The  subjective 
world  of  representations  is  so  different  from  the  ob- 
jective world  of  things.  Nevertheless  they  are  one. 
Every  sensation  is  a  subjective  state,  but  it  is  such 
only  through  the  objective  state  that  causes  it.  It  is 
no  mere  internal  act  but  it  is  a  relation  between  object 
and  subject — a  relation  in  which  neither  subject  nor 
object  is  a  redundant  element.  In  the  course  of  evo- 
lution and  in  the  development  of  human  soul-life,  the 
representations  of  the  surrounding  world  and  of  man's 
relations  become  increasingly  distinct.  The  regularity 
that  obtains  in  nature  around  him  and  within  him  is 
more  clearly  recognized  ;  and  man's  power  over  nature 
grows  in  the  same  measure  as  the  human  soul  expands 
in  the  comprehension  of  facts.  In  this  sense  we  speak 
of  a  higher  evolution  of  the  human  soul.  The  facts 
carefully  gathered  by  all  the  sciences,  by  comparative 
physiology,  history,  psychology,  prove  that  the  ten- 
dency of  growth  of  a  higher  evolution  is  intrinsic.  As 
a  child  grows  whether  he  will  or  not,  so  humanity  de- 
velops, and  it  has  often  developed  differently  from 
what  the  philosophers  expected ;  and  there  are  many 
in  whom  the  spirit  of  progress  was  active  who  "builded 
better  than  they  knew."  Yet  while  the  growth  and 
progress  of  humanity,  of  the  soul-life  of  society  as  well 
as  of  the  individual  soul,  is  of  a  spontaneous  nature, 
man  can,  to  a  great  extent,  make  or  mar  his  own  fate 
and  that  of  his  race.     Man  certainly  cannot  make  the 


4a  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

details  of  his  physical  growth,  yet  he  can  easily  mar  it 
by  negligence.  And  his  mental  development  depends 
entirely  upon  a  wise  choice  and  direction  which  is 
of  his  own  making. 

We  can  thus  promote  or  retard  the  development  of 
human  soul-life  :  all  the  efforts  that  tend  to  preserve 
and  to  promote  it,  are  "good,"  while  all  the  efforts 
that  tend  to  dwarf  it,  are  "bad." 


The  task  of  ethics  is  to  expand  the  interests  of  each 
individual  so  that  they  embrace  the  weal  and  woe  of 
the  whole  human  race  in  all  its  future  generations.  It 
is  not  enough  to  take  into  consideration  the  narrow 
span  of  our  present  life,  we  must  regulate  our  motives 
according  to  an  ethics  of  eternity.  We  must  not 
think  and  feel  and  act  as  individuals  who  care  nothing 
for  future  generations  ;  we  must  think,  and  feel,  and 
act,  as  the  immortal  human  soul,  which  is  the  soul  of 
mankind.  It  began  with  the  beginning  of  all  life  upon 
earth,  it  lives  now  in  us,  it  glows  in  our  thoughts  and 
hopes,  and  it  will  continue  to  live  in  future  humanity. 

There  will  be  a  time  when  this  generation  will  have 
passed  away,  when  we  shall  be  no  more — and  yet  we 
shall  continue  to  live ;  our  work  done  in  the  interest 
of  humanity,  our  soul-life  will  continue  beyond  the 
grave. 

The  efforts  we  have  made  in  childhood  and  in 
youth  to  expand  our  soul,  say,  for  instance,  in  study- 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS.  43 

ing  at  school,  continue  to  live  in  us  even  now.  The 
material  particles  that  did  the  work  at  that  time,  have 
long  since  passed  away  in  the  flux  of  matter,  but  the 
structures  in  our  brain  (representing  the  physio- 
logical basis  of  our  memories),  as  they  were  shaped 
through  our  former  activity,  remain,  because  the  re- 
newal of  our  brain  tissues,  indeed  the  renewal  of  all 
living  structures,  preserves  the  forms  once  produced, 
thus  constituting  a  continuity  of  soul-life. 

The  continuity  of  soul-life  and  the  preservation  of 
the  forms  of  brain  tissue  which  are  the  physiological 
basis  of  thoughts  and  the  memories  of  thoughts,  are 
patent  to  every  one  of  us.  But  the  continuity  of  soul- 
life  is  a  law  also  in  the  development  of  our  whole 
race.  The  souls  of  our  ancestors  and  their  thoughts 
are  as  little  lost  as  is  the  work  of  our  school  days. 
They  continue  to  live  in  us,  for  our  souls  have  grown 
from  theirs,  they  are  a  reproduction,  a  re-formation, 
a  continuation  of  their  soul-life. 

The  continuity  of  the  soul-life  of  humanity  is  as 
strong  and  demonstrable  as  that  of  the  individual.  The 
ethical  duty  for  the  single  moments  of  man's  life  and 
the  individual  atoms  of  his  body  is  based  on  the  very 
same  principle  as  the  ethical  duty  of  individuals  toward 
humanity.  A  single  motive  in  our  soul  that  presses  upon 
our  will  to  pass  into  act,  has  no  right  to  be  considered  for 
itself  alone ;  all  the  other  motives  have  at  least  the  same 
right.  Thus  we  ought  to  compare  them  and  decide  which 
will  contribute  most  to  enhance  human  soul-life.  Every 


44  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

motive  must  be  weighed  against  all  other  motives  of 
the  present  and  the  future ;  and  those  which  tend  to 
lower  the  standard  of  human  soul-life  in  ourselves  or 
in  the  race  should  never  be  permitted  to  pass  into 
action. 

If  all  the  motives  of  man  were  so  many  single  and 
isolated  or  sovereign  feelings,  there  would  be  no  ethics. 
The  data  of  ethics  are  not  motives  that  are  equivalent, 
i.  e.,  of  equal  value,  but  unequal  motives  ;  unequal  in 
their  worth,  and  those  which  either  promise  or  actually 
afford  the  greatest  pleasure  are  by  no  means  those 
which  deserve  the  highest  ethical  approval. 

What  a  poor  creature  man  would  be  if  we  could 
deprive  his  soul  of  all  those  thoughts  that  represent 
his  connections  with  mankind  !  The  strength  of  a 
tiger  chiefly  lies  in  his  muscles  and  his  teeth  ;  yet  the 
greatness  and  the  strength  of  man  lies  in  his  relation 
to  the  human  race.  The  human  soul  is  powerful  be- 
cause of  its  connections  with  mankind,  which  form 
the  superindividual  element  of  the  soul.  The  data  of 
ethics  therefore  cannot  be  found  in  the  individual 
alone  as  a  separated  being,  but  in  the  super-individual 
relations  of  the  individual ;  and  the  social  motives 
like  so  many  invisible  threads  pull  in  his  mind  power- 
fully so  that  for  the  peace  of  his  soul  and  for  his  own 
satisfaction  he  must  obey;  or  he  will  ruin  himself. 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS.  45 


IV. 

Having  sketched  as  briefly  as  possible  the  condi- 
tions of  ethics  that  make  ethics  possible,  that  con- 
dition its  growth  and  its  importance,  I  will  not  con- 
clude without  touching  an  important  point  concerning 
which  there  is  little  agreement  and  still  less  clearness. 
It  is  the  problem  of  man's  freedom  of  will.  Is  there 
free  will,  or  is  free  will  an  illusion  ? 

It  is  generally  conceded  that  a  free  man  only  can 
be  held  responsible  for  his  action ;  a  slave  who  does 
not  act  from  free  will,  who  is  compelled  to  do  this  and 
to  leave  that  alone,  cannot  be  held  responsible. 

Epictetus  said  :  "  No  one  can  deprive  us  of  our  free 
will, "  and  Schiller  said  :  "Man  is  free  e'en  were  he 
born  in  chains. " 

All  the  sages  of  mankind,  all  the  great  moral 
teachers  of  the  world  have  inculcated  the  truth  that  a 
man  can  be  free  if  he  wants  to  be,  and  that  freedom  of 
will  is  possible  only  by  observing  the  moral  law.  The 
man  who  yields  to  his  passions  enslaves  himself,  he 
commits  actions  which  later  on  will  bring  consequences 
upon  him  that  he  will  have  to  regret ;  or  they  will  en- 
tangle him  in  a  net  of  circumstances  that  will  be  like 
iron  fetters  upon  his  will.  But  he  who  controls  his 
passions  by  self-discipline,  will  preserve  his  freedom 
of  will. 

This  doctrine  of  free  will  has  on  the  one  hand  by 


46  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

theologians  been  declared  to  be  an  inscrutable  mystery, 
and  on  the  other  hand  it  has  been  denounced  by  so- 
called  freethinkers  as  an  illusion.  The  idea  of  free- 
dom of  will  has  been  represented  as  if  it  were  an  ex- 
ception in  the  course  of  natural  processes.  All  phe- 
nomena are  determined  by  causes,  yet  the  actions  of 
a  free  will  were  supposed  not  to  be  determined  by 
cause. 

The  cause  that  sets  the  will  into  motion,  we  call 
motive.  If  free  will  meant  a  will  not  determined  by 
motives,  it  would  indicate  a  state  of  disease ;  for  an 
unmotived  action  is,  properly  considered,  no  action, 
but  a  mere  reflex  motion,  caused  through  pathological 
conditions.  The  action  of  a  free  will  of  this  type  must 
appear  to  us  as  the  arbitrary  whim  of  an  alienated 
person ;  and  people  whose  actions  are  not  determined 
by  motives  cannot  be  considered  responsible,  and  ought 
to  be  confined  in  an  asylum. 

The  old  theological  conception  of  the  freedom  of 
will  is  not  only  untenable,  it  is  self-contradictory,  and 
will  not  stand  a  close  examination.  It  is  erroneously 
defined,  not  as  "the  freedom  to  act  as  one  wills,"  but 
as  "  the  freedom  to  will  as  one  wills," — as  if  there  were 
any  sense  in  the  conception  that  a  man  can  will  dif- 
ferently from  what  he  wills! 

In  opposition  to  this  false  statement  of  a  free  will, 
the  adversaries  of  religious  ethics  rose  and  declared 
that  there  is  no  such  a  thing  as  freedom  of  will.  Every 
act  of  ours  is  determined  ;  and  therefore  they  declared 


THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS.  47 

we  are  compelled  to  act  as  we  do.  The  criminal  acts 
as  he  does  of  necessity  and  a  moral  man  also  acts 
morally,  of  necessity ;  both  are,  so  they  say,  slaves  of 
their  motives.  Both  obey  the  compulsion  of  a  natural 
law. 

Strange  these  very  same  men  who  object  so  strongly 
to  the  idea  of  free  will,  are  the  very  same  men  who 
clamor  for  freedom  of  thought,  and  generally  call 
themselves  "freethinkers."  If  there  is  no  freedom  of 
will,  there  is  certainly  no  freedom  of  thought,  for  the 
laws  of  thought  are  very  rigid  and  admit  of  no  freedom. 

The  mistake  made  by  both,  the  old  school  of  theo- 
logians as  well  as  their  antagonists,  is  a  lack  of  dis- 
tinction between  necessity  and  compulsion.  Neces- 
sity is  that  which  is  determined  by  law ;  compulsion, 
however,  is  an  act  of  violence  to  force  a  man  to  do 
something  against  his  will.  A  slave  that  is  compelled 
to  work  for  his  master,  is  not  free ;  he  would  not  work 
if  he  were  not  forced  to  do  it.  A  free  man,  let  us  say 
an  artist  full  of  an  idea,  executes  his  work  without  any 
compulsion,  he  works  of  his  own  free  will.  His  actions 
are  determined  by  a  motive  of  his  own,  not  by  a  foreign 
pressure.     Therefore  we  call  him  free. 

A  freethinker  tells  me  that  a  man's  motive  compels 
him  to  act  as  he  does ;  accordingly,  man  is  a  slave  of  his 
motive.  I  would  have  no  objection  to  the  usage  of  the 
word  compulsion  in  that  sense,  if  it  were  properly  un- 
derstood. In  that  case  the  free  man  would  be  he  who 
himself  compels  himself  to  whatever  actions  he  under- 


48  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

takes  while  the  slave  is  compelled  by  other  things,  for 
instance,  by  his  master's  whip.  But  this  usage  of  the 
word  compulsion  is  contrary  to  custom,  and  we  would, 
if  we  changed  our  language  in  this  way,  produce  the 
impression  in  our  mind  as  if  the  act  which  is  deter- 
mined by  a  motive  that  resides  within  a  man's  soul 
and  is  a  part  and  a  characteristic  feature  of  himself,  is 
exactly  the  same  as  that  act  which  is  the  result  of  com- 
pulsion. It  would  produce  the  impression  as  if  a  free 
man  were  as  irresponsible  for  his  action  as  is  a  slave. 
A  free  man,  in  that  case,  ought  to  be  called  a  slave, 
and  a  freethinker  an  enslaved  thinker. 

Freedom  of  thought  can  mean  only  the  absence  of 
all  compulsion,  that  prevents  thought  of  thinking  in 
accordance  with  the  laws  of  thought.  Yet  in  the  ab- 
sence of  all  compulsion  thought,  in  order  to  be  correct, 
has  rigorously  to  obey  the  laws  of  thought.  There  is 
no  freedom  of  thought  in  the  sense  that  we  may  reach 
this  or  that  conclusion  just  as  we  please. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  actions  of  a  man  are 
strictly  determined  by  his  motives.  A  will  not  deter- 
mined by  a  motive  is  as  nonsensical  as  an  effect 
not  produced  through  a  cause.  And  if  actions  could 
be  willed  by  a  will  not  determined  through  mo- 
tives, ethics  would  have  no  sense.  What  would  be 
the  use  of  implanting  moral  motives  into  the  minds  of 
men,  of  teaching  them  the  laws  of  nature  and  the  laws 
ot  society,  to  which  they  have  to  conform,  if  their  ac- 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS.  49 

tions  after  all  would  not  be  determined  by  these  or 
any  other  motives? 

Responsibility  is  the  consciousness  of  a  free  man, 
that  he  is  the  author  of  his  actions  and  of  their  conse- 
quences. He,  himself,  and  also  others  have  to  bear 
the  consequences  of  his  actions,  be  it  for  good  or 
for  evil.  A  man  who  knows  the  laws  of  nature  and 
especially  also  the  moral  law  that  pervades  and  builds 
up  society,  and  who  has  at  the  same  time  the  good  will 
to  conform  to  it,  is  a  law  unto  himself.  He  will  act 
morally,  not  from  compulsion  but  from  free  will ;  and 
this  attitude  of  being  a  law  unto  himself,  we  call  the 
autonomy  of  will,  derived  from  avros,  self,  and  vo/uos, 
law.  The  autonomous  man  alone  is  a  free  man ;  he 
alone  is  an  ethical  man  ;  and  the  autonomy  of  man 
constitutes  the  dignity,  the  majesty,  the  divinity  of 
man. 

Ethics  alone  can  make  a  state  of  society  possible 
which  consists  of  free  men.  Ethics  instructs  men 
about  the  moral  law,  and  by  implanting  the  moral 
law  in  their  souls  so  as  to  rule  the  habits  of  their  lives, 
it  makes  them  autonomous.  If  there  is  a  millennium 
possible  upon  earth,  it  can  be  realized  through  ethics 
only.  We  shall  not  be  able  to  abolish  all  pain,  and 
struggle,  and  anxiety,  for  life  is  strife,  and  there  is  no 
growth,  no  progress,  without  disturbances,  pains,  and 
anxieties.  Yet  we  can  abolish  the  worst  evils  of  exist- 
ence, which  are  those  produced  by  our  own  ignorance 
and  narrowness.     Let  every  man  be  a  law  unto  himself 


50  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

and  society  will  be  better  than  it  is  now  ;  it  will  be 
the  realization  of  the  highest  ideals  of  mankind,  of 
justice,  of  order,  and  of  freedom. 

Man's  freedom  means  not  licence  : 

Nor  action  without  cause  : 
Man's  freedom  is  obeisance 

Unto  the  soul's  own  laws. 

For  Anarchy  unruly 

Must  leave,  a  slave,  you  still. 
Mark !  Liberty  is,  truly, 

Autonomy  of  will. 

A  weakling  seeks  for  pleasures. — 

Results  learn  to  foresee  ; 
Heed  Nature's  laws  and  measures 

Truth  only  makes  you  free. 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS. 


Ethics  as  a  science  began  with  doubt.  It  was 
doubted  whether  or  not  there  is  any  true  ethics, 
whether  or  not  non-egotistical  motives  can  exist ;  and 
if  they  exist,  whether  their  origin  might  not  be  of  a 
natural  growth. 

Prescientific  ethics  was  mythological,  as  it  had  to 
be.  How  could  uneducated  people  understand  the 
application  of  abstract  principles  otherwise  than  in 
parables.  If  ethics  were  not  of  such  paramount  im- 
portance, it  would  scarcely  have  arisen  before  the  dis- 
covery of  mathematics  or  logic.  Being  indispensable 
to  the  welfare  and  progress  of  the  human  race,  ethics 
was  first  taught  in  myths  and  legends,  which  were  ac- 
cepted not  in  their  allegorical  but  in  their  literal  mean- 
ing. Belief  in  their  literal  meaning  was  very  soon 
considered  indispensable  for  all  who  sought  partici- 
pation in  the  sacred  rewards  promised  in  ethical  myths. 
It  was  feared,  that  if  the  letter  should  go,  the  spirit 
would  have  to  go  also. 

All  myths  in  their  literal  meaning  involve  the  mind 
in  absurdities,  and  so  all  mythological  dogmas,  unless 
allegorically  interpreted  and  understood  according  to 
the  purpose  for  which  they  were  invented,  are  contrary 


52  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

to  human  reason.  They  convey  truths  which  in  their 
mythological  garb  must  appear  paradoxical.  The  un- 
believer objected  to  dogmas  incompatible  with  reason 
and  he  objected  also  to  any  ethics  based  upon  myth- 
ological ideas. 

The  development  of  ethics  as  a  science  has  been  a 
continuous  battle  between  the  infidel  doubter  and  the 
pious  believer;  the  former  generally  aggressive,  the 
latter  defensive;  the  former  negative,  bold,  hasty, 
radical  in  convictions,  prone  to  make  sweeping  as- 
sertions, and  ready  to  welcome  any  new  discovery 
that  would  seem  to  overthrow  the  old  established 
views ;  the  latter  conservative,  more  scholarly  than 
scientific,  rather  slow  to  understand  new  truths  but 
greatly  appreciating  the  valuable  gold  contained  in  the 
old  truths.  We  find — how  could  it  be  otherwise  ? — 
misunderstandings  on  both  sides. 

The  path  of  science  in  its  victorious  progress  is 
strewn  with  errors  of  heroes  who  fought  for  truth.  The 
mistakes  of  the  searchers  for  truth  have  often  been 
decried  or  at  least  ridiculed  not  only  by  their  respec- 
tive adversaries,  but  also  by  the  following  generations 
who  knew  better  than  their  predecessors  because  they 
had  reaped  the  fruits  of  their  labors.  Let  us  therefore 
bear  in  mind  that  every  scientific  truth  has  become  a 
possession  of  the  human  mind  only  through  an  exam- 
ination from  many  different  points  of  view.  The 
defenders  of  those  conceptions  which  had  to  be  re- 
jected did  no  less  valuable  and  indispensable  work 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  53 

than  those  who  were  on  the  right  track.  For  in  the 
search  for  truth  every  path  has  to  be  followed  and 
every  possible  solution  must  be  considered.  Most  of 
the  errors  in  the  development  of  the  sciences  are  ne- 
cessary errors ;  they  are  attempts  to  find  the  truth 
and  often  contain  germs  of  the  truth  or  represent  one 
phase  of  it  which  is  distorted  only  by  a  one-sided  con- 
ception. 

i. 

The  old  dogmatic  teachers  of  ethics,  anxious  to 
establish  their  mythology  as  indispensable,  used  to 
argue  in  this  way:  "All  the  sciences  may  be  able 
to  prove  that  within  each  sphere  of  their  investiga- 
tions natural  laws  rule  supreme.  Yet  the  conduct  of 
man  differs  from  natural  phenomena ;  if  a  man  is 
guided  by  moral  motives,  we  must  assume  that  a  su- 
pernatural influence  is  at  work  in  his  heart.  If  man 
were  merely  a  child  of  nature,  he  could  follow  the  nat- 
ural motives  of  egotism  only.  Since  he  possesses 
motives  that  are  altruistic  and  non-egotistic,  this  is  an 
indubitable  sign  that  he  carries  within  his  soul  a  spark 
of  the  supernatural,  the  divine.  Conscience  is  the 
voice  of  God  ;  conscience  teaches  man  his  duty ; 
and  the  presence  of  conscience  proves  that  man  is 
created  in  the  image  of  something  supernatural — of 
God,  and  that  this  supernatural  being  must  exist." 

From  the  standpoint  of  supernaturalism,  the  pres- 
ence of  conscience  in  man's  soul  remains  unexplained 
and   is   considered   as   inexplicable.      The    sense   of 


54  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

duty  is  declared  to  be  a  miracle  ;  the  idea  of  what 
is  right  and  the  meaning  of  the  ought  are  treated  as 
facts  not  capable  of  analysis,  which  stand  in  contra- 
diction to  natural  laws  and  which  come  to  us  by  an  act 
of  divine  revelation.  The  idea  of  right,  we  are  told, 
is  within  us,  and  all  we  can  do  is  to  discover  it  there 
by  an  introspection  into  the  secrets  of  soul-life.  From 
the  method  recommended  by  this  class  of  ethical  en- 
quirers, their  conception  of  ethics  is  called  intuitional- 
ism. 

In  opposition  to  the  intuitionalist,  some  infidel 
philosophers  denounced  the  idea  that  man  could  be 
in  possession  of  any  other  than  natural  motives ;  they 
declared  it  irrational,  and  in  their  zeal  to  defeat  their 
adversary  they  maintained  that  man  followed  only 
egotistic  motives.  They  denied  the  existence  of  purely 
altruistic  motives  altogether  ;  and  examples  from  real 
life,  where  no  egotistic  motive  could  have  influenced 
a  man,  were  so  explained  that  altruistic  motives  ap- 
peared as  a  special  and  refined  kind  of  egotism.  A 
man  loves  himself  in  his  wife,  in  his  children,  in  his 
friends,  in  his  countrymen  ;  sacrifices  brought  for  their 
welfare,  spring  from  mere  egotism  ;  nothing  more.  It 
not  only  gives  him  satisfaction  to  bring  such  sacrifices, 
but  he  is  also  supposed  to  have  brought  them  in  order 
to  get  fair  returns  for  them.  He  is  said  to  be  like  a 
man  who  gives  away  money  in  the  expectation  of  re- 
ceiving it  back  with  interest. 

The  religious  teacher  of  ethics  had  always  insisted 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  55 

upon  the  sovereignty  of  the  moral  command  ;  it 
must  reign  supreme  over  pleasures  and  pains.  The 
unbeliever  attempting  to  undermine  an  important  ar- 
gument of  the  believer,  maintained  that  ethics  did 
nothing  of  the  kind.  Ethics,  if  it  tried,  could  not 
suppress  the  natural  desire  to  seek  pleasure  and  to 
avoid  pain.  The  whole  purpose  of  ethics,  he  de- 
clared, is  to  avoid  those  pleasures  which  in  the  end 
will  necessarily  cause  pain,  and  to  endure  with  pa- 
tience those  pains  which  are  unavoidable  conditions 
for  future  pleasures.  The  good,  it  was  maintained,  is 
the  very  same  thing  as  the  useful :  every  thing  that  is 
useful  is  good,  and  useful  is  that  which  affords  more 
pleasure  than  pain.  From  their  definition  of  good, 
this  class  of  ethical  enquirers  adopted  for  their  view 
the  name  "  Utilitarianism." 

Bentham  is  generally  looked  upon  as  the  most  con- 
sistent and  classical  representative  of  Utilitarianism, 
and  his  works  are  a  model  of  psychological  insight 
and  keen  judgment.  Nevertheless,  we  must  regard 
his  views  as  one  phase  in  the  history  of  ethics  only 
which  is  now  recognized  as  one-sided.  The  failure  of 
Bentham's  ethics  is  conceded  even  by  those  who  are 
his  followers  and  disciples.*  Bentham's  utilitarianism 
was  an  attempt  to  base  ethics  upon  purely  egotistic  mo- 

•Hoffding  criticizes  Bentham  in  his  "  Grtmdlage  der  humane*  Ethik." 
Bentham's  error,  he  says,  is  the  supposition  that  there  is  a  perfect  harmony 
among  the  egotistic  interests  of  all  individuals,  if  they  are  but  clear  concern- 
ing their  own  interests. 


56  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

tives ;  modern  Utilitarianism  recognizes  the  necessity 
of  admitting  non-egotistic  motives.  Not  the  happi- 
ness of  the  individual  is  maintained  to  be  the  aim  of 
ethics,  but  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  num- 
ber. This  step,  however,  is  inconsistent  with  Ben- 
tham's  principle  and  overthrows  the  whole  system.  It 
is  a  surrender  of  the  cardinal  point  of  egotistic  ethics. 
The  weakness  of  intuitionalists  is  their  despair  of 
ever  explaining  the  natural  origin  and  meaning  of 
moral  motives.  They  are  so  overawed  by  a  reverent 
admiration  of  the  presence  of  super-individual  mo- 
tives, that  they  bow  down  in  the  dust  and  worship 
the  unknown  power  which  they  suppose  to  be  the 
originator  of  these  motives.  The  weakness  of  the 
Utilitarians  is  their  denial  of  the  possible  existence  of 
super-individual  motives;  they  argued  that  all  our 
motives,  being  parts  of  our  own  personality,  must  be 
egotistic.  And  yet  the  non-egotistic,  the  super-indi- 
vidual motives,  the  impulses  that  urge  us  to  obey  a 
higher  law  than  self-interest,  are  indubitable  facts  of 
soul-life.  However,  though  they  are  super-individual, 
•  they  are  not  supernatural,  as  is  claimed  by  intuition- 
alists. The  relations  of  man  with  his  surroundings 
and  with  his  fellowmen  establish  so  many  connections 
which,  like  invisible  threads,  powerfully  pull  on  man's 
mind  and  set  the  springs  of  his  action  free,  in  which 
he  recognizes  the  representation  of  a  higher  interest 
and  a  greater  concern  than  his  pleasures  and  individ- 
ual welfare. 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  57 

Now  we  may  consider  as  correct  the  view  of  the  in- 
tuitionalists,  if  their  theory  is  interpreted  to  mean  that 
ethics  must  be  based  upon  the  study  of  the  human 
soul ;  there  we  find  a  moral  instinct  that  teaches  man 
to  be  guided  by  higher  motives  than  those  of  egotism. 
At  the  same  time  we  may  side  with  their  adversaries, 
when  we  construe  their  ethics  in  the  sense  that  the 
moral  motives  can  in  so  far  be  called  egotistic,  as  they 
are  actual  parts  of  our  soul.  Moral  motives  are  of  a 
natural  growth,  and  their  origin  can  by  scientific  in- 
vestigation satisfactorily  be  accounted  for.  However, 
we*must  emphatically  object  on  the  one  hand  to  the 
mystic  element  that  attaches  to  intuitionalism,  and  on 
the  other  to  the  identification  of  pleasure  with  the  idea 
of  moral  goodness  that  is  unwarrantably  introduced  by 
Utilitarianism. 

It  is  true  that  the  good  is  always  useful,  but  we 
cannot  invert  the  sentence  and  say  the  useful  is  al- 
ways good.  Blue  is  always  a  color,  but  not  every  color 
is  blue.  Utilitarians  are  right  in  saying  that  every  act 
which  is  morally  good,  must  be  useful.  Moral  acts 
are  not  always  useful  to  him  who  does  them,  but 
they  are  always  useful  either  to  society,  to  our  coun- 
try, or  to  humanity  in  general,  in  promoting  the  wel- 
fare, the  power,  the  nobility,  the  ideal  of  human  soul- 
life.  But  Utilitarians  are  mistaken  if  they  make  utility 
the  standard  of  measurement  for  that  which  must  be 
called  good. 

There  are  acts  which  under  certain  circumstances 


58  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

may  be  productive  of  good,  if  good  means  pleasur- 
able to  individuals.  Take  for  instance  the  well- 
known  Broadway  street-railway  case.  It  is  unde- 
niable that  the  enterprise  of  running  horse-cars  on 
Broadway  in  New  York  is  useful  not  only  to  the 
company  who  undertook  the  work,  but  also  to  society. 
Franchises,  according  to  a  law  of  New  York,  which 
has  been  altered  since  then,  must  be  given  by  twenty- 
four  aldermen.  Now  there  were  some  doubts,  not  con- 
cerning the  usefulness  of  the  enterprise,  but  whether 
another  proposal  by  some  other  company  to  lay  the 
tracks  of  the  railway  through  another  street  might^iot 
be  preferable,  and  there  may  have  been  still  more 
points  of  deliberation.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  Broad- 
way scheme  was  preferable.  But  the  manager  was 
pained  by  the  loss  of  time  caused  through  protracted 
deliberation.  He  was  a  practical  man,  he  wanted  to 
push  matters  and  keep  the  majority  of  the  aldermen 
in  good  humor.  He  succeeded  by  sending  envelopes 
containing  eighteen  thousand  dollars  to  thirteen  alder- 
men, and  the  franchise  was  speedily  given. 

Every  act  was  useful  to  somebody,  and  the  whole 
scheme  was  useful  to  society  also.  It  is  true  that 
offering  money  was  a  degradation  of  the  moral  charac- 
ter of  the  aldermen.  But  after  all,  they  did  not  mind,  and 
their  characters  were  not  so  pure  as  to  suffer  greatly. 
In  that  direction  no  harm  could  be  done.  The  only 
thing  that  could  bring  harm  was  publicity.  Now  if 
the  useful  were  the  standard  of  morality,  the  act  of 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  59 

the  manager  ought  to  be  condemned  on  account  of  his 
carelessness,  that  he  neglected  the  necessary  precau- 
tions to  secure  secrecy. 

The  first  jury  did  not  agree  on  the  case  and  had  to 
be  dismissed.  This  roused  a  storm  of  indignation  and 
the  second  jury  was  selected  with  great  care.  The 
second  jury  brought  in  a  verdict  of  guilty. 

The  conscience  of  the  people  at  large  condemned 
the  act ;  and  yet  there  were  many  opinions  in  favor  of 
the  manager  on  the  ground  that  though  he  had  acted 
from  private  interest,  his  enterprise  had  been  for  the 
public  benefit.  The  bribery  was  committed  as  a  means 
to  a  good  end  and  it  was  rather  unfortunate  that  it  had 
become  known. 

We  do  not  decide  here  whether  bribery  is  excus- 
able in  a  state  where  honorable  enterprises  can  pros- 
per only  by  means  of  bribing.  We  only  inquire  whether 
the  utility  of  consequences  constitutes  the  morality  of 
an  act.     And  we  answer  this  question  in  the  negative. 

Similar  acts  may  happen  which  do  not  become 
public.  Who  dares  to  defend  them  on  the  ground  of 
Utilitarianism.  Indeed  no  one  does.  Not  even  Utili- 
tarians !  Utilitarians  would,  if  they  had  to  give  their 
opinion  on  such  examples,  explain  that  by  useful,  they 
do  not  mean  that  only  which  benefits  the  material  in- 
terests of  men,  but  also  that  which  promotes  their  in- 
tellectual welfare  and  ennobles  their  characters.  They 
would  fit  the  facts  to  their  principle  instead  of  trying 
to  find  a  principle  that  should  be  suited  to  all  facts. 


60  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

In  order  to  suit  the  facts  to  the  principle  of  utility, 
they  would  limit  the  idea  of  usefulness  to  that  which 
we  call  moral  goodness. 

We  have  no  objection  to  Utilitarians  who  use  the 
word  "useful"  in  this  narrow  meaning.  Yet  we  would 
advise  them  to  be  careful  lest  the  meaning  of  their 
words  be  misunderstood.  The  average  man  is  not 
accustomed  to  use  the  word  "useful"  in  the  purified 
and  transfigured  meaning  which  it  has  received  at 
the  hands  of  some  noble-hearted  Utilitarians.  The 
average  man  calls  useful  that  which  affords  him  tan- 
gible advantages  of  some  kind  ;  and  common  parlance 
distinguishes  very  well  from  useful  acts  those  which 
are  good.  Our  language  and  the  meaning  of  words  are 
only  an  expression  of  the  instincts  of  our  soul.  Com- 
mon parlance  mirrors  in  this  distinction  between  good 
and  useful,  the  voice  of  man's  conscience  which  very 
often  impels  him  to  acts  that  are  not  useful  to  him  and 
prevent  him  from  doing  what  he  naturally  considers 
as  extremely  useful. 

ii. 

Bentham  goes  very  far  in  the  defense  of  the  Utili- 
tarian principle;  he  maintains  that  the  most  abomin- 
able pleasure  of  a  criminal  act  could  be  justifiable  if  it 
remained  alone.  It  is  to  be  condemned  solely  because 
of  the  evil  consequences  of  the  pain  incurred,  the 
chances  of  which  are  so  great  that  in  comparison  to 
them  the  pleasure  of  a  crime  is  reduced  to  zero. 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  61 

It  is  very  valuable  for  ethical  teachers  to  know  that 
men  of  such  extreme  views  as  Bentham  recognize 
the  overwhelming  evils  consequent  upon  immoral  acts. 
Bentham  in  his  search  after  truth  could  not  discovei 
the  sacred  feelings  of  purely  altruistic  motives  that 
are  often  too  deeply  concealed  in  the  human  heart,  and 
therefore  he  denied  their  existence.  The  truth  is,  that 
should  the  moral  motives  be  lacking  in  their  moral 
purity,  man  would  nevertheless  be  forced  to  act  morally 
from  the  mere  egotistic  interest  of  self-preservation. 
But  this  is  no  reason  for  maintaining  that  moral  acts 
are  always  done  from  a  conscious  or  unconscious  self- 
interest. 

If  Bentham's  views  were  correct,  our  moral  teachers 
ought  to  be  faithful  to  truth,  and  ought  to  appeal  to  the 
egotism  of  mankind  only  and  not  to  the  higher  motives 
of  super-individual  duties.  These  higher  motives  would 
be  at  best  a  self-delusion,  and  it  would  be  immoral  to 
elicit  artificial  and  unnatural  feelings.  Yet  it  cannot 
be  denied  that  an  appeal  to  the  higher  duties  of  man 
is  always  more  successful  than  to  the  lower  desires  of 
selfishness.  The  higher  motives  accordingly  are  live 
presences  in  the  soul  of  man  which,  for  the  reason  that 
they  are  not  always  patent,  cannot  be  disregarded. 

An  ethical  teacher  ought  to  appeal  to  the  highest 
motives  man  is  capable  of.  But  information  con- 
cerning the  futility  of  selfishness  should  at  the  same 
time  not  be  neglected.  It  is  an  important  truth ;  so 
it  ought  not  to  be  omitted.     Every  one  of  us  should 


62  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

know  that  pure  egotism  always  defeats  its  own  ends. 
The  natural  institutions  of  society  are  such  as  to  make 
the  life  of  a  man  who  seeks  his  own  exclusive  advan- 
tage, unbearable  and  full  of  bitterness.  And  if  the  life 
of  an  egotistic  pleasure-seeker  could  be  full  of  un- 
mixed joy,  the  approach  of  death  would  teach  us 
to  look  out  for  something  higher  than  the  gratification 
of  our  fleeting  propensities.  The  effects  of  our  life, 
of  all  our  actions  whether  good  or  evil,  remain,  long 
after  we  have  passed  out  of  existence.  The  exam- 
ples we  set,  the  thoughts  we  have  uttered  live  on 
in  the  souls  of  our  friends  and  our  children.  We 
contribute  in  forming  the  souls  of  the  following  gen- 
erations, and  to  the  extent  that  we  have  done  this  our 
soul-life  will  be  preserved  in  theirs.  A  thoughtless 
man  is  biased  by  the  impressions  of  the  fleeting  mo- 
ment ;  the  ethical  man  however  bears  in  mind  the  im- 
portance of  his  soul-life  after  death. 

There  are  sometimes  dark  moments  in  our  lives 
when  we  do  not  know  how  to  decide,  and  the  decision 
as  to  what  is  right  and  proper  may  be  very  difficult. 
In  such  moments,  we  should  soar  above  the  narrow- 
ness of  the  present  life  and  look  down  upon  our  own 
fate  from  the  higher  standpoint  of  eternity.  Let  us 
in  such  moments  imagine  that  we  had  died  ;  that  we 
are  no  more,  and  that  our  lives  have  long  been  ended. 
While  our  bodies  rest  in  the  grave,  our  deeds,  our 
thoughts,  our  words  continue  to  influence  humanity. 
The  idea  of  eternal  rest  will  calm  our  passions  and 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  63 

soothe  our  anxieties.  When  such  peace  comes  over 
our  soul,  then  let  us  confess  unto  ourselves  what  we 
wish  we  had  done  while  alive.  From  this  standpoint 
we  shall  best  be  able  to  silence  the  tumultuous  desires 
of  the  moment  and  let  our  nobler  self  come  to  the 

front. 

* 
*  * 

Ethics  is  a  practical  science,  and  we  must  never 
lose  sight  of  its  aim,  which  is  to  give  man  motives  for 
doing  right.  Should  we  now  tell  people  that  the  old 
ideas  of  "right  and  wrong"  are  merely  vague  notions 
of  what  is  "  useful  and  obnoxious  "  ?  Should  we  tell 
them  that  they  must  be  guided  by  what  they  would,  ac- 
cording to  their  very  best  knowledge,  consider  as  most 
useful  ?  I  believe  that  ethical  teachers  will  not  be  in- 
clined to  throw  so  lightly  overboard  the  most  valuable 
ideal  of  mankind,  or  to  barter  moral  goodness  for 
material  goodness  ;  for  what  is  "the  useful"  but  ma- 
terial goodness  ? 

The  Utilitarian  makes  moral  goodness  a  sub- 
division of  general  goodness.  By  goodness  he  under- 
stands the  quality  of  being  adapted  to  some  end.  A 
good  apple  is  adapted  for  serving  as  food,  a  good  knife 
is  adapted  for  cutting  ;  so  the  actions  of  man  are  de- 
clared to  be  good  if  they  are  adapted  to  increase  the 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number. 

A  moral  teacher  will  not  take  so  easily  to  Utili- 
tarianism, because  it  slurs  over  the  difference  between 
moral    goodness  and   material    usefulness.      He   will 


64  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

rather  point  out,  that  there  may  be  conflicts  between 
moral  goodness  and  usefulness ;  and  if  such  conflicts 
happen  to  take  place  in  our  soul,  if  a  lie,  according  to 
our  best  knowledge,  promises  to  be  more  useful  than 
the  truth,  he  will  help  us  and  advise  us  not  to  do 
what  appears  as  useful  to  our,  and  perhaps  also  to 
other  people's,  material  comfort  and  well-being,  but  to 
prefer  that  which  is  useful  for  increasing  the  health 
and  nobility  of  our  soul. 

If  ethics  is  based  on  facts,  and  applied  to  facts,  it 
will  recognize  as  a  basic  principle  the  search  for  truth 
and  the  adaptation  to  truth.  Facts  are  the  data  of 
reality  with  which  we  have  to  deal  in  our  experience. 
Truth  is  a  correct  representation  of  facts  in  our  mind. 
An  honest  search  for  truth  is  the  condition  of  all  ethics, 
and  being  faithful  to  truth  includes  all  the  various 
moral  commands,  which  a  system  of  ethics  can  contain. 

So  long  as  we  are  honest  disciples  of  truth,  we  have 
a  good  guide  to  lead  us.  We  may  go  astray,  we  may 
make  mistakes,  yet  we  shall  never  be  so  completely 
lost,  as  to  be  unable  to  rectify  our  course  of  action. 
With  the  love  of  truth  as  our  source  of  inspiration, 
and  the  desire  to  remain  in  accord  with  truth,  we  may 
often  find  occasion  to  regret  not  having  had  more  com- 
plete knowledge,  but  we  shall  never  be  in  the  plight 
of  self-condemnation. 

The  principle  of  truthfulness  is  a  far  more  definite 
and  correct  basis  of  ethics  than  the  principle  of  utility. 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  65 

III.  \ 

Those  who  did  not  feel  inclined  to  accept  the  super- 
naturalistic  theory  of  ethics,  felt  that  an  analysis  of 
the  ethical  motives  ought  to  be  the  first  step  in  the 
foundation  of  ethics  on  a  natural  basis.  The  intention 
was  good,  yet  the  execution  was  made  on  the  hypoth- 
esis that  egotistic  motives  are  natural,  altruistic 
motives  unnatural.  It  was  supposed  that  feelings 
of  pleasure  are  desirable,  they  are  eagerly  sought  for 
by  all  creatures,  and  feelings  of  pain  are  not  desirable, 
they  are  avoided  by  all  creatures.  It  is  a  fact,  how- 
ever, that  some  pleasurable  acts  have  very  painful 
consequences  ;  and  some  painful  acts  have  pleasure- 
able  consequences.  Accordingly,  some  philosophers 
proposed  as  an  explanation  of  moral  actions  the  theory 
that  men  are  always  guided  by  motives  seeking  pleasure 
and  shunning  pain.  Ethics,  they  said,  is  and  ought 
to  be  based  on  a  calculation  of  what  will  in  the  end  be 
most  pleasurable. 

This  theory  is  called  Hedonism.  It  explains  the 
sacrifices  that  one  man  brings  to  relieve  others  of 
pain  on  the  supposition  that  the  idea  of  relieving  his 
fellow-beings  of  pain  gives  him  so  much  pleasure  as 
to  fully  overbalance  the  pains  he  suffers.  This  may, 
occasionally,  be  true,  although  it  need  not  be  true. 
The  explanation  is  inadequate,  for  it  is  certain  that 
there  are  cases  in  which  the  pleasurable  emotion  that 
accompanies  such   noble  ideas  is  not  the  motive  of 


66  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

the  act.  If  a  feeling  of  pleasure  accompanies  a  noble 
act  of  painful  sacrifice,  it  is  an  unexpected  enjoyment, 
an  incidental  effect,  but  it  was  not  the  purpose  for  which 
the  act  was  performed.     Thus  the  explanation  explains 

nothing. 

* 
*  * 

It  is  possible  that  those  who  believe  in  a  future 
life  in  Heaven  where  they  expect  to  be  rewarded  for 
their  virtues  exercised  here  upon  earth,  may  be  guided 
by  the  motive  that  the  future  joy  is  preferable  to  the 
present  pain.  This  motive  might  account  for  the 
firmness  of  Johannes  Huss ;  although  it  seems  to  me, 
that  it  does  not  sufficiently  account  for  it.  But 
how  can  we  explain  the  martyrdom  of  unbelievers, 
who,  like  Giordano  Bruno,  suffer  a  painful  death  for 
their  convictions  without  any  possible  expectation  of 
pleasurable  returns.  Giordano  Bruno  could  by  no 
means  expect  that  future  ages  would  pay  homage  to 
him  as  a  martyr  of  free  thought.  His  death  was  by 
no  means  a  great  event  in  his  time ;  it  excited  little  or 
no  comment,  and  no  one,  with  the  exception  of  a  few 
isolated  savants,  had  sympathy  with  him.  It  is  beyond 
dispute,  that  no  consideration  of  pleasure  or  pain  en- 
tered into  his  mind,  but  simply  love  of  truth  irrespect- 
ive of  any  consequence.  Adolf  Lasson  says  in  the 
introduction  to  Bruno's  essay  on  "The  Cause,  the 
Principle  and  the  One  "  : 

"  Bruno  had  a  profoundly  pious  heart,  full  of  enthusiasm  for 
every  thing  holy.     He  had  in  all  his  adventures  not  freed  himself 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  67 

from  his  attachment  to  the  faith  of  his  childhood,  and  from  the 
reverence  for  the  authority  he  had  long  respected.  So  long  as  his 
religious  sentiment  was  appealed  to.  he  was  ready  to  yield.  Yet 
his  judges,  according  to  the  usual  method  of  inquisitors,  attempted 
to  persuade  him  of  his  errors  by  scientific  arguments,  and  hoped 
so  to  force  him  to  recant.  But  he  did  not  find  himself  refuted, 
and  he  could  not  abjure  his  philosophy  without  renouncing  truth. 
Thus  he  deluded  himself  and  his  judges  for  some  time  with  the 
false  hope  of  being  able  to  recant ;  he  demanded  again  and  again 
new  respites  for  deliberation. 

' '  What  tortures  this  once  so  serene  and  self-confident  man  must 
have  suffered  in  this  deep  and  inner  struggle,  deserted  by  all  the 
world  and  alone  in  the  hands  of  his  jailors " 

' '  The  year  in  which  Bruno  was  burned  (Febr.  9th,  1600),  was  a 
jubilee  year.  Millions  of  pilgrims  visited  Rome,  but  there  was 
no  one  among  them  who  had  sympathy  with  his  lamentable  death. 
The  only  person  from  whose  venomous  and  heinous  report  we 
know  some  particulars  about  the  history  of  Giordano  Bruno's 
death,  is  that  spiteful  Scioppius,  called  canis  grammaticus ,  a  prot- 
estant  renegade." 

*  * 

Hedonist  philosophers,  in  their  eagerness  to  lay  a 
natural  basis  for  ethics,  overlook  several  points  of  great 
importance.  Above  all  they  overlook  the  fact  that  the 
data  of  ethics  are  not  isolated  feelings,  but  a  com- 
plex of  feelings,  bearing  upon  the  relations  in  which 
man  stands  to  the  world  and  to  his  fellow  beings. 

Bentham  speaks  of  pleasurable  feelings  as  being 
always  good  so  long  as  they  remain  isolated  and  un- 
connected with  evil  consequences.  This  betrays  a 
fundamental  misunderstanding  as  to  the  nature  of 
ethics.    Single  and  isolated  feelings  are  the  data  of 


68  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

reflex  actions,  but  they  cannot  constitute  any  basis  of 
ethics.  The  feelings  we  have,  are  different  in  inten- 
sity, degree,  and  kind,  and  all  together  in  their  total- 
ity form  our  life.  Because  they  are  different,  we  must 
have  a  criterion  by  which  to  judge  them.  We  main- 
tain that  there  is  a  criterion  which  does  not  depend 
upon  whether  they  are  pleasurable  or  painful.  It  is 
this  criterion  of  ethics  which  enables  us  to  gauge  their 
moral  worth.  The  data  of  ethics  are  motives  of  ac- 
tion, and  the  object  of  ethics  is  to  find  a  standard  by 
which  to  estimate  these  motives. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  make  pleasure  and  pain  the 
standard  of  moral  estimation.  And  indeed  ethics  have 
been  invented  in  order  to  counterbalance  the  power 
of  the  many  motives  that  allure  man  to  immoral  acts. 
If  there  were  no  principle  above  the  feelings  of  pleas- 
ure and  pain  according  to  which  we  must  regulate  our 
actions,  we  ought  to  say  that  the  ideal  of  ethics  is  an 
impossibility.  For  ethics  introduces  a  criterion  for 
judging  about  the  worth  of  motives  irrespective  of  the 
feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  that  may  accompany 
the  intended  actions  of  these  motives. 

The  answer  of  Hedonists  to  these  objections  as  a 
rule  consists  in  complaints  of  being  misunderstood. 
They  maintain,  that  not  the  intensity  and  quantity  of 
pleasure  has  to  be  considered,  but  the  the  kind  and 
nature  of  the  pleasure  only.  The  nobler  and  higher 
kinds  of  pleasure  are  preferable  to  the  lower  kinds. 
Very  well !  If  the  quality  of  the  pleasure  is  that  which 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  69 

makes  its  value,  we  must  consider  the  standard  with 
which  this  "quality''  is  to  be  determined  as  the  crite- 
rion of  ethics,  but  not  the  pleasure  itself.  The  pleasure 
might  be  exceedingly  great  or  small,  if  its  quality 
be  such  as  to  range  high  according  to  the  ethical 
standard  it  would  outweigh  the  greatest  quantities  and 
intensities  of  lower  pleasures.  And  if  the  accompany- 
ing pleasure  were  absent  altogether,  would  that  not 
leave  the  action  just  as  moral  ? 

The  duty  of  ethics  accordingly  would  be  to  de- 
termine the  nature  of  that  higher  quality  of  human 
motives  and  make  it  so  strong  that  it  will  overrule  in 
our  hearts  all  fear  of  pain  and  desire  for  pleasure. 

An  anecdote  is  told  about  a  little  village  urchin  who 
was  dressed  in  black  for  attending  a  funeral.  The  boy 
wanted  to  wear  his  red  jacket  and  weepingly  said :  "  If 
I  can't  wear  my  red  jacket,  the  whole  funeral  will  give 
me  no  pleasure."  How  childish  is  this  expression, 
and  it  would  be  barbarously  rude  if  a  man  who  knows 
the  seriousness  of  the  occasion  could  think  in 
this  way.  Will  Hedonists  be  ridiculous  enough  to 
maintain  that  the  boy  ought  to  wear  black,  because 
that  color  being  more  appropriate  ought  to  give  him 
a  higher  kind  of  pleasure  ? 

Any  normal  man  would  be  shocked  at  himself,  if 
under  solemn  and  grave  circumstances,  he  should  dis- 
cover himself  regulating  his  actions  according  to 
the  principle  of  gaining  more  or  less  pleasure.  Nay, 
even  the  consideration  of  a  higher  kind  of  pleasure  in 


70  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

cases  where  no  pleasure  at  all  is  involved,   would  be 
incompatible  with  true  morality. 

Hedonism,  accordingly,  would  be  correct  only  if 
we  understand  by  pleasure  that  attitude  of  independ- 
ence and  self  control  which  raises  man  above  pleasures 
and  pains. 

In  addition  to  all  these  objections,  we  have  to  re- 
mark that  pleasure  and  pain  are  by  no  means  simple 
and  definite  feelings  so  that  they  could  be  employed 
as  a  standard  for  an  objective  estimate  of  action. 
That  which  gives  happiness  being  different  according 
to  age,  temperament,  hereditary  character,  and  habits, 
the  plan  to  make  happiness  the  aim  of  life  has  no 
meaning.  A  pleasure  to  one  person  is  very  often  an 
abomination  to  another.  One  man  finds  his  happiness 
in  natural,  and  another  in  unnatural  enjoyments.  One 
man  is  pleased  with  a  rational  use  of  his  energies, 
while  another  delights  in  follies  or  even  in  vices.  We 
can  educate  men  to  find  pleasure  in  war  or  in  peace- 
ful pursuits,  in  intoxication  or  in  sobriety,  in  smoking 
or  chewing,  in  fishing  or  swimming,  in  playing  mis- 
chievous tricks  or  in  performing  noble  deeds. 

* 

Pleasure  has  erroneously  been  identified  with 
growth,  and  pain  with  decay.  If  that  were  so,  child- 
bearing  ought  to  be  the  greatest  pleasure  ;  and  death 
the  greatest  pain.  But  it  is  a  fact  that  all  growth 
produces  disturbances,  and  thus  in  most  cases  it  causes 
pain.     Teething  is  a  growth,  but  it  gives  no  pleasure 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  71 

to  babes.  Death  in  itself,  however,  is  no  pain  ;  only 
the  resistance  of  man's  vitality  against  the  decay  of 
death  is  painful.  The  struggle  of  death  being  over 
there  is  no  pain,  but  a  peaceful  fading  away  of  con- 
sciousness. Death  in  itself  is  no  more  painful  than 
sleep. 

The  fact  is,  that  pleasures  consist  always  in  the 
satisfaction  of  wants,  and  wants  are  either  natural  or 
artificial.  If  our  nature  has  become  accustomed  to  cer- 
tain wants,  the  amount  of  pleasure  in  satisfying  them 
depends  upon  the  intensity  of  the  wants.  Pains  are  either 
wants  unsatisfied  or  other  disturbances  that  are  per- 
ceived by  consciousness.  Growth  as  well  as  decay  may 
produce  disturbances,  both  accordingly  can  become 
causes  of  pain.  If  then  the  greatest  amount  of  pleasure 
were  to  be  considered  the  purpose  of  life,  we  ought 
to  educate  ourselves  to  such  wants  as  are  noble  and 
elevating,  such  as  widen  the  range  of  our  soul- life,  and 
make  man  greater,  kinder,  and  more  powerful.  In  that 
case,  however,  not  the  sum  or  the  amount  of  pleasure 
would  have  to  be  considered  as  ethical,  but  the  kind 
of  pleasure.  Before  we  make  happiness  the  aim  of 
life,  we  must  let  ethics  so  educate  us  that  the  most 
imperative  want  of  our  soul  will  be  the  performance 

of  our  duties. 

* 
*  * 

Man  has  a  natural  desire  for  activity.  This  desire 
is  natural  because  man  is  a  living  machine  freighted 
with  vital  energy ;  the  desire  to  use  this  energy  is  ever 


72  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

present.  In  case  man  does  not  spend  his  energy  in 
useful  work,  his  natural  want  for  activity  will  compel 
him  to  do  something,  never  mind  what.  To  a  man 
who  has  or  who  knows  of  no  duties,  the  motives  which 
promise  to  give  him  pleasure  will  become  the  strongest; 
they  will  direct  his  energies,  as  it  were,  in  the  line  of 
least  resistance.  Hence  rises  the  so-called  natural 
desire  for  pleasure.  But  this  so-called  natural  desire 
for  pleasure  is  the  greatest  danger  for  a  man.  And 
wherever  we  investigate  the  methods  of  progress 
we  shall  find  that  it  is  far  from  taking  place  in  the  line 
of  least  resistance.  On  the  contrary  almost  every  pro- 
gress leads  in  the  line  of  greatest  resistance.  The 
development  in  the  line  of  least  resistance  leads  to  in- 
evitable ruin. 

Hence  it  follows  that  the  greatest  blessing  for  a 
man  is  to  have  duties  which  coerce  him  to  perform 
some  useful  work.  Rich  people  who,  without  becom- 
ing exactly  criminal,  can  allow  themselves  to  let  their 
action  follow  the  line  of  least  resistance,  are  in  a  most 
dangerous  plight.  "  How  hardly  shall  they  that  have 
riches,"  attain  a  normal,  not  to  say  a  strong,  devel- 
opment of  their  souls  !  Those  that  are  rich,  that  can 
live  well,  that  can  live  for  the  sake  of  enjoying  life, 
should  for  the  sake  of  their  own  soul-life  impose  upon 
themselves  heavy  duties,  as  heavy  as  they  can  bear. 
They  should  educate  their  children  so  that  they  feel 
unhappy  unless  they  have  great  duties  to  perform. 
The  moral  worth  of  a  man  does  not  depend  upon  the 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  73 

amount  of  pleasure  he  provides  for  himself  and  others, 

but  upon  the  amount  and  scope  and  weight  of  duty 

he  is  able  to  carry. 

*  * 

We  have  made  a  brief  survey  of  the  most  important 

issues  between  the  old  religious  and  the  irreligious 
conceptions  of  ethics,  between  the  moral  views  of  the 
believer  and  those  of  the  unbeliever.  We  have  seen 
that  the  unbeliever  was  right  in  the  one  main  point 
which  induced  him  to  criticise  and  overthrow  the 
old  system  of  ethics.  His  attempts  to  base  ethics 
upon  a  natural  basis  are  justifiable,  yet  the  believer  was 
right  upon  the  whole  in  all  single  points  of  dispute  as 
regards  the  substance  of  ethical  injunctions. 

It  is  perhaps  natural  that  the  dogmatic  moralist 
with  all  the  traditional  experience  of  past  ages  in  his 
favor  should  have  arrived  at  the  truth  so  far  as  the  prac- 
tical execution  of  ethics  is  concerned.  All  the  differ- 
ent theories  which  were  invented  to  deny  the  properly 
ethical  spirit  of  super-individual  motves  in  morality  are 
exploded.  We  have  to  recognize  the  fact  that  there  are 
motives  active  in  the  soul  of  man,  higher,  greater  and 
nobler  than  egoistic  desires.  Yet  although  the  moral 
motives  are  to  be  recognized  as  super-individual  factors 
of  man's  soul-life,  they  are  by  no  means  supernatural. 

IV. 

All  religions  are  systems  of  ethics ;  and  ethics  by 
the  very  fact  that  it  teaches  man  how  to  regulate  his 


74  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

conduct  is  a  religion.  Every  religion  comes,  or  pre- 
tends to  come,  as  a  salvation.  It  throws  light  upon 
the  world  around  us  in  which  we  live  and  thus  it  aids 
us  in  our  endeavors  to  escape  from  the  miseries  caused 
by  our  ignorance  and  folly. 

The  religion  of  science  like  all  other  religions  comes 
to  the  rescue  of  man.  It  is  true  that  the  truths  of  sci- 
ence appear  at  first  sight  to  be  destructive.  They 
destroy  the  illusions  of  a  childish  faith  which  has 
become  dear  to  us.  But  truth,  be  it  ever  so  sad,  is  the 
only  means  that  can  cure  the  ills  of  life.  If  there  is 
any  salvation  it  must  be  gained  by  truth  and  by 
boldly  facing  the  truth.  If  truth  cannot  help,  nothing 
can,  nothing  will  help.  A  salvation  by  illusions  is 
like  the  joy  of  intoxication.  It  is  neither  lasting  nor 
is  it  wholesome,  and  when  it  is  gone  it  will  leave  us 
sadder  than  before.     Instead  of  helping,  it  will  harm. 

Among  all  the  philosophies  with  which  I  became 
acquainted,  there  is  one  that  at  a  certain  period  of  my 
life  attracted  me  most  powerfully;  it  is  that  of  Arthur 
Schopenhauer,  the  great  pessimist.  Schopenhauer 
describes  the  misery  of  life  in  most  vivid  colors,  and 
what  makes  him  so  impressive,  is  that  he  does  it 
without  exaggeration.     He  says  : 

"  Having  awakened  to  life  from  the  night  of  unconsciousness, 
the  will  finds  itself  as  an  individual  in  an  endless  and  boundless 
world  among  innumerable  individuals,  all  striving,  suffering,  erring; 
and  as  though  passing  through  an  ominous,  uneasy  dream,  it  hur- 
ries back  to  the  old  unconsciousness.    Until  then,  however,  its  de- 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  75 

sires  are  boundless,  its  claims  inexhaustible,  and  every  satisfied 
wish  begets  a  new  one.  No  satisfaction  possible  in  the  world  could 
suffice  to  still  its  longings,  put  a  final  end  to  its  cravings,  and  fill 
the  bottomless  abyss  of  its  heart.  Consider,  too,  what  gratifica- 
tions of  every  kind  man  generally  receives  :  they  are  usually  nothing 
more  than  the  meagre  preservation  of  this  existence  itself,  daily 
gained  by  incessant  toil  and  constant  care,  in  battle  against  want, 
with  death  forever  in  the  van.  Everything  in  life  indicates  that 
earthly  happiness  is  destined  to  be  frustrated  or  to  be  recognized 
as  an  illusion.  The  conditions  of  this  lie  deep  in  the  nature  of 
things.  Accordingly,  the  life  of  most  of  us  proves  sad  and  short. 
The  comparatively  happy  are  usually  only  apparently  so,  or  are, 
like  long-lived  persons,  rare  exceptions — left  as  a  bait  for  the  rest. 
"  Life  proves  a  continued  deception,  in  great  as  well  as  small 
matters.  If  it  makes  a  promise,  it  does  not  keep  it,  unless  to  show 
that  the  coveted  object  was  little  desirable.  Thus  sometimes  hope, 
sometimes  the  fulfilment  of  hope,  deludes  us.  If  it  gave,  it  was 
but  to  take  away.  The  fascination  of  distance  presents  a  paradise, 
vanishing  like  an  optic  delusion  when  we  have  allowed  ourselves 
to  be  enticed  thither.  Happiness  accordingly  lies  always  in  the 
future  or  in  the  past ;  and  the  present  is  to  be  compared  to  a  small 
dark  cloud  which  the  wind  drives  over  a  sunny  plain.  Before  it 
and  behind  it  all  is  bright,  it  alone  casts  a  shadow.  The  present 
therefore  is  forever  unsatisfactory;  the  future  uncertain  ;  the  past 
irrecoverable.  Life  with  its  hourly,  daily,  weekly,  and  yearly 
small,  greater,  and  great  adversities,  with  its  disappointed  hopes 
and  mishaps  foiling  all  calculation,  bears  so  plainly  the  character 
of  something  we  should  become  disgusted  with,  that  it  is  difficult 
to  comprehend  how  any  one  could  have  mistaken  this  and  been 
persuaded  that  life  was  to  be  thankfully  enjoyed,  and  man  was  des- 
tined to  be  happy.  On  the  contrary  the  everlasting  delusion  and 
disappointment  as  well  as  the  constitution  of  life  throughout, 
appear  as  though  they  were  intended  and  calculated  to  awaken  the 
conviction  that  nothing  whatever  is  worthy  of  our  striving,  driving, 


76  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

and  wrestling, — that  all  goods  are  naught,  the  world  bankrupt  at 
all  ends,  and  life  a  business  that  does  not  pay  expenses, — so  that 
our  will  may  turn  away  from  it. 

"The  manner  in  which  this  vanity  of  all  objects  of  the  will 
reveals  itself,  is,  in  the  first  place,  time.  Time  is  the  form  by 
means  of  which  the  vanity  of  things  appears  as  transitoriness ; 
since  through  time  all  our  enjoyments  and  pleasures  come  to 
naught ;  and  we  afterward  ask  in  astonishment  what  has  become 
ol'  them.  Accordingly  our  life  resembles  a  payment  which  we  re- 
ceive in  copper  pence,  and  which  at  last  we  must  receipt.  The 
pence  are  the  days,  death  the  receipt.  For  at  last,  time  proclaims 
the  sentence  of  nature's  judgment  upon  the  worth  of  all  beings  by 
destroying  them. 

'  And  justly  so  ;  for  all  things  from  the  void 
Called  forth,  deserve  to  be  destroyed. 
T'were  better,  then,  were  naught  created.'— Goethe. 

' '  Age  and  death,  to  which  every  life  necessarily  hurries,  are  the 
sentence  of  condemnation  upon  the  will  to  live,  passed  by  nature 
herself,  which  declares  that  this  will  is  a  striving  that  must  frus- 
trate itself.  'What  thou  hast  willed,'  it  says,  'ends  thus;  will 
something  better  ! '  ' 

"  The  lessons  which  each  one  learns  from  his  lifeoconsist,  on 
the  whole,  in  this,  that  the  objects  of  his  wishes  constantly  delude, 
shake,  and  fall ;  consequently  they  bring  more  torment  than  pleas- 
ure, until  at  length  even  the  whole  ground  upon  which  they  all 
stand  gives  way,  inasmuch  as  his  life  itself  is  annihilated.  Thus 
he  receives  the  last  confirmation  that  all  his  striving  and  willing 
were  a  blunder  and  an  error. 

'  Then  old  age  and  experience,  hand  in  hand, 
Lead  him  to  death,  and  make  him  understand, 
After  a  search  so  painful  and  so  long 
That  all  his  life  he  has  been  in  the  wrong. 

"Whatever  may  be  said  to  the  contrary,  the  happiest  moment 
of  the  happiest  mortal  is  still  the  moment  he  falls  asleep,   as  the 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  77 

unhappiest  moment  of  the  unhappiest   mortal    the   moment  he 
awakens. 

' '  Lord  Byron  says  : 

'  Count  o'er  the  joys  thine  hours  have  seen, 
Count  o'er  thy  days  from  anguish  free, 
And  know,  whatever  thou  hast  been, 
'Tis  something  better  not  to  be.'  "  * 

"  It  is  indeed  incredible  how  stale  and  empty  are  the  fates  of 
most  people,  how  dull  and  heedless  are  all  their  feelings  and 
thoughts.  Their  lives  consist  of  flabby  longing,  and  pining  of 
dreamy  reeling  through  the  seven  ages  to  death,  and  this  is  ac- 
companied with  a  number  of  trivial  thoughts.  They  are  like 
clocks  wound  up  to  go  and  do  not  know  why.  Each  time  when  a 
man  is  born  the  clock  is  wound  up  again  to  play  off  the  same  hack- 
neyed tune,  bar  for  bar,  measure  for  measure,  with  unimportant 
variations."! 

Yet  is  there  not  some  hope  that  in  the  course  of 
evolution  humanity  may  attain  a  state  of  perfect  ad- 
justment, so  that  every  man  can  enjoy  undisturbed  hap- 
piness ?  Even  that  hope  is  a  flattering  illusion  of  op- 
timistic thinkers  ;  it  can  never  be  fulfilled.  Our  wants 
are  unlimited,  and  happiness  depends  upon  the  satis- 
faction of  our  wants.  Happiness,  accordingly,  is  rela- 
tive, and  Schopenhauer  justly  likens  it  to  a  fraction, 
the  denominator  of  which  represents  our  desires  and 
the  numerator  their  gratifications.  Every  progress 
allows  the  increase  of  both. 

Schopenhauer's  pessimism  is  not  exaggerated.  His 
dreary  description  of  life  is  a  faithful  portrayal  of  the 
facts  of  reality  as  they  must  appear  from  the  standpoint 

*  Schopenhauer,  W.  a.  W.  u.  V.,  Vol.  II,  Chap.  46. 
t  Ibid.,  W.  a.  W.  u.  V.,  Vol.  I,  p.  379. 


78  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

of  egotism.  The  man  who  seeks  exclusively  his  own,  will 
be  disappointed  wherever  he  goes.  His  very  pleasures 
turn  either  into  gall  or  the  disgust  of  satiety.  If  the 
satisfaction  of  desires  is  recognized  as  the  supreme 
and  only  purpose  of  life,  man  will  in  the  most  fortunate 
case,  if  Mephistopheles  gives  him  the  opportunity  of 
unlimited  enjoyment,  exclaim  with  Faust  : 

"  Thus  in  desire  I  hasten  to  enjoy, 
And  in  enjoyment,  pine  to  feel  desire." 

A  man  who,  like  Faust,  can  satisfy  all  his  desires, 
is  truly  in  the  hands  of  Satan,  as  Goethe  in  his  great 
philosophical  allegory  demonstrates.  Only  a  strong 
character,  as  is  Faust,  who  yearns  for  a  higher  life  can 
overcome  all  the  temptations.  He  tastes  of  the  plea- 
sures of  life  and  finds  them  shallow.  There  is  no  sat- 
isfaction for  the  longing  of  his  soul  in  any  one  of  them. 
Yet  as  soon  as  Faust  abandons  the  standpoint  of  ego- 
tism, he  finds  a  satisfaction  which  he  had  never  ex- 
pected. He  forgets  the  impetuous  desire  for  pleas- 
ures in  a  great  work  that  he  undertakes  for  human- 
ity. He  finds  that  satisfaction  lies  not  in  the  aim 
solely,  but  in  the  effort  to  reach  the  aim  ;  not  in  lib- 
erty, but  in  attaining  and  deserving  liberty  ;  not  in  the 
harmonious  enjoyment  of  life,  but  in  being  the  master 
of  one's  fate,  in  building  one's  own  life  and  making  it 
harmonious : 

"  Yes  1    To  this  thought  I  hold  with  firm  persistence  ; 
The  last  result  of  wisdom  stamps  it  true  : 
He  only  earns  his  freedom  and  existence, 
Who  daily  conquers  them  anew." 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  79 

Faust  has  become  too  old  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  labor 
himself,  but  he  feels  eternity  breathing  through  his 
soul.  His  work  will  live  after  him  and  be  a  blessing 
unto  thousands  : 

*•  The  traces  cannot  of  mine  earthly  being 
In  aeons  perish, — they  are  there  I — 
In  proud  forefeeling  of  such  lofty  bliss, 
I  now  enjoy  the  highest  moment, — this  I " 

Faust  had  pledged  his  life  to  Mephistopheles  as 
soon  as  he  should  enjoy  a  moment  of  satisfaction.  The 
moment  is  come  and  Faust  dies.  But  that  which 
gave  him  this  satisfaction  was  none  of  Satan's  gifts. 
It  was  none  of  the  pleasures  of  egotism.  It  was  a 
higher  kind  of  pleasure  which  has  nothing  in  common 
with  that  which  is  generally  called  pleasure.  For  it 
is  a  satisfaction  of  the  powerful  super-individual  yearn- 
ings of  the  soul.  And  this  is  the  only  happiness  that 
man  can  attain. 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  builds  his  system  of  ethics 
upon  the  supposition  that  "  conduciveness  to  hap- 
piness is  the  ultimate  test  of  perfection  in  a  man's 
nature."  He  quotes  Aristotle's  view,  that  the  proper 
work  of  man  "  consists  in  the  active  exercise  of  the 
mental  capacities  conformably  to  reason,"  and  that 
"the  supreme  good  of  man  will  consist  in  performing 
this  work  with  excellence  or  virtue ;  herein  he  will 
obtain  happiness."  Mr.  Spencer  blames  Aristotle  for 
"seeking  to  define  happiness  in  terms  of  virtue  in- 
stead of  defining  virtue  in  terms  of  happiness,"  and  he 


80  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

seriously  attempts  to  justify  the  opinion,  that  if  im- 
moral acts  caused  agreeable  sensations,  we  would  not 
call  them  crimes. 

There  is  a  great  difference  between  pleasures  and 
the  peace  of  soul  that  a  good  conscience  alone  can 
give.  Mr.  Spencer  classes  both  as  "pleasurable  sen- 
sations" and  makes  them  the  test  of  ethics.  The 
happiness  of  which  Aristotle  speaks  consists  in  the 
satisfaction  of  having  done  one's  duty,  which  has 
nothing  in  common  with  any  "pleasurable  sensa- 
tion "  ;  for  it  is  no  sensation  and  has  as  little  to  do 
with  sense-activity  as  for  instance  has  our  satisfaction 
at  the  correctness  of  a  logical  judgment.  Mr.  Spen- 
cer might  with  the  very  same  arguments  he  uses  for 
his  theory  of  ethics,  declare  that  the  ultimate  test  of 
logical  truth  is  its  " conduciveness  to  happiness." 
Those  logical  arguments,  he  might  say,  which  cause 
pleasurable  sensations  are  correct,  those  which  have 
pain-giving  effects  are  incorrect ;  and  the  same  holds 
good  for  all  the  departments  of  human  activity  and 
the  truths  of  scientific  inquiry.  But  who  would  main- 
tain that  the  solution  of  a  mathematical  problem  is 
right  in  so  far  and  because  it  gives  pleasure  to  him 
who  has  solved  it?  I  know  of  circle  squarers  who 
derive  a  greater  satisfaction  from  their  most  ridicu- 
lous blunders  than  any  discoverer  or  inventor  possibly 
can  attain  by  most  important  and  useful  discoveries. 
Yet  a  moral  act,  we  are  told,  is  good  solely  because 
and  in  so  far  as  it  produces  pleasurable  sensations. 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  81 

Goethe  who,  like  Aristotle,  defines  happiness  in 
terms  of  virtue,  objects  most  strongly  against  any  other 
kind  of  happiness.  In  the  second  part  of  Faust  the 
young  emperor  is  described  not  as  vicious,  but  as  a 
man  desirous  to  enjoy  himself ;  and  Faust  pronounces 
a  very  severe  judgment  about  a  tendency  of  finding 
virtue  in  happiness  instead  of  happiness  in  virtue. 
He  says : 

Enjoyment  makes  us  gross, 

Geniessen  macht  gemein. 

If  pleasurable  sensations  were  the  standard  ac- 
cording to  which  we  have  to  gauge  the  ethical  worth 
of  actions,  they  would  form  the  quintessence  of  ethics 
and  a  saying  like  that  of  Goethe's  would  be  extremely 
immoral.  Yet  it  is  not  so  !  Is  there  any  one  who 
denies  that  enjoyment  and  the  hankering  after  enjoy- 
ment weaken  the  character  ?  To  measure  the  ethical 
worth  of  actions  by  pleasurable  sensations  is  not  su- 
perficial ;  it  is  radically  erroneous .  We  might  just  as 
well  let  the  judge  give  his  decisions  in  court  according 
to  the  principle  that  his  sentence  must  produce  a  sur- 
plus of  pleasurable  feelings  in  all  the  parties  concerned. 

Nature  has  not  intended  man  to  live  for  the  mere 
enjoyment  of  life.  All  egotism  will  in  the  end  defeat 
itself.  Man's  life  has  a  meaning  only  if  he  lives  the 
higher  life  of  super-individual  aspirations.  The  indi- 
vidual must  cease  to  consider  himself  as  an  individual ; 
he  must  consider  himself  as  a  steward  of  the  soul-life 
of  mankind. 


82  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

Every  one  of  us  has  at  his  birth  and  through  his 
education  received  a  rich  and  most  valuable  inheri- 
tance from  his  fathers,  and  it  stands  in  every  one's 
power  to  increase  the  spiritual  treasure  of  human  soul- 
life  which  he  has  received.  The  question,  Is  life  worth 
living,  accordingly,  depends  exclusively  on  the  pur- 
pose to  which  life  is  devoted.  Life  is  not  worth  living 
if  a  man  seeks  his  own,  if  he  uses  his  rich  inheritance 
like  the  prodigal  son  and  wastes  his  substance  to  get 
as  much  pleasure  as  possible  out  of  the  treasures  that 
his  fathers  have  gathered.  However,  life  is  worth 
living  if  but  the  aim  of  life  is  high  enough  to  give 
value  to  the  work  of  life. 

Pessimism  has  taught  that  life  from  the  standpoint 
of  a  pleasure-seeker  has  no  value ;  if  we  expect  a  sat- 
isfaction of  our  egotistic  desires,  life  will  not  be  worth 
its  own  troubles.  Life  can  acquire  value  only  by  the 
use  to  which  it  is  put.  If  our  days  are  empty  of  any 
action  worthy  to  be  done,  then  they  are  indeed  spent 
as  a  tale  that  is  told,  although  they  may  be  four-score 
years  or  more.  Our  actions  only  can  and  must  give 
value  to  the  days  of  our  life.  Yet  is  their  strength 
labor  and  sorrow ;  for  a  life  worth  being  lived  is  one 
that  is  full  of  active  aspirations  for  something  better 
and  higher.* 

*  The  ethics  here  presented  I  have  called  in  former  publications  of  mine, 
"Meliorism."  The  word  Meliorism  has  been  used  by  some  authors  as  a  modi- 
fied optimism,  as  something  that  is  midway  between  optimism  and  pessi- 
mism. By  other  authors  the  same  term  has  been  employed  in  the  sense  that 
humanity  though  at  present  not  in  a  state  of  happiness,  will  nevertheless 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  83 

The  ethical  life  accordingly  affords  indeed  the  only 
salvation  for  man,  and  the  old  religions  have  been  re- 
ligions of  salvation  to  the  extent  that  they  have  helped 
man  to  raise  himself  above  his  egotism.  The  old  re- 
ligions are  not  wrong ;  they  contain  all  of  them  this 
all-important  truth.  Yet  the  truth  is  wrapped  in 
myths  ;  and  the  time  has  come  that  we  are  no  longer 
satisfied  with  myths.     The  apostle  says  : 

' '  When  I  was  a  child  I  spake  as  a  child,  I  understood  as  a 
child,  I  thought  as  a  child,  but  when  I  became  a  man,  I  put  away 
childish  things." 

Mankind  has  passed  through  the  phase  of  child- 
hood in  which  it  could  be  taught  only  by  myths  and 
parables.     As  says  St.  Paul : 

"  And  I,  brethren,  could  not  speak  unto  you  as  unto  spiritual, 
but  as  unto  carnal,  even  as  unto  babes  in  Christ. 

1 '  I  have  fed  you  with  milk,  and  not  with  meat :  for  hitherto  ye 
were  not  able  to  bear  it,  neither  yet  now  are  ye  able.  " 

We  do  not  intend  to  abolish  the  truth  of  the  old 
religions,  but  to  purify  them  from  their  mythological 
character.  We  do  not  come  to  destroy,  but  to  fulfil. 
Therefore,  the  solution  of  the  ethical  problem  in  the 
sense  indicated,  will  not  endanger,  but  will  revive 
church  life.     It  will  make  all  things  new. 

reach  by  and  by  such  an  existence,  in  which  all  miseries  will  be  impossible. 
The  Meliorism  here  proposed  fully  accepts  the  truth  of  pessimism,  that  life 
is  not  worth  its  own  troubles  if  we  live  merely  for  the  enjoyment  of  life. 
Meliorism  places  the  value  of  life  in  ideals  that  transcend  the  narrow  limits 
of  individual  existence.  The  greater,  the  stronger,  the  more  earnest  are  the 
ideals  that  animate  the  soul  of  a  man,  the  more  valuable  will  be  his  life  and 
the  more  will  his  life  be  worth  living. 


84  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

The  ethical  movement  thus  cannot  help  bringing 
us  a  new  religion.  And  the  new  religion  of  ethics  will 
not  be  a  new  creed  as  are  the  old  dogmatic  religions, 
but  a  religion  of  facts,  a  religion  of  science. 

The  creeds  of  old  are  crumbling  ; 

And  were  their  revelation 
The  only  hope  in  living, 

Life  would  be  desolation. 
But  lo !  a  new  religion 

Bursts  from  the  germs  decaying  ; 
A  new  faith  in  our  bosoms 

Is  growing,  light-displaying 

Great  truths  with  broader  outlook 

New  missions  have  created. 
By  purified  Religion 

Our  souls  are  elevated. 
New  aims,  new  hopes,  new  doctrines, 

Old  prophecies  fulfilling ! 
And  through  our  hearts  is  rapture 

Of  progress  warmly  thrilling. 

We  do  not  combat  freedom 

Of  art,  nor  that  of  science. 
Nay,  both  with  our  religion 

Are  joined  in  firm  alliance. 
Though  high,  our  aspiration 

Is  yet  concrete  and  real. 
To  render  life  more  noble 

Is  our  sublime  ideal. 

Of  this  denomination 

Are  they,  in  life's  confusion, 
Who  further  human  progress 


THE  THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  85 

And  sweep  away  illusion  ; 
Who  have  ideals  dearer 

Than  self  and  self-existence, 
And  love  them,  although  knowing 

Their  vast,  enormous  distance. 

Thinkers  who  muse  and  ponder, 

Instructors  theoretic ; 
And  poets  whose  ideas 

Are  radiantly  prophetic ; 
The  warrior,  who  for  Freedom 

Fights  and  for  Freedom  dieth  ; 
The  great,  whose  noble  fortune 

With  their  souls'  greatness  vieth  ; 

The  hand  which  with  heart's  trouble 

For  wife  and  children  toileth  ; 
The  man  who  doth  his  duty 

E'en  if  his  fate  him  foileth  ; 
And  he  who  kindly  comforts 

The  sick,  who  gladly  shareth 
His  bread  with  his  poor  neighbor, 

Our  badge  and  symbol  beareth. 


DR.  CARUS  ON  "THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM." 


BY    W.    M.    SALTER. 


The  capital  point  under  discussion  in  this  little 
volume  is  the  basis  of  ethics.  Dr.  Carus  is  mistaken 
in  saying  in  the  Preface  that  it  was  in  consequence  of 
an  editorial  on  "The  Basis  of  Ethics  and  the  Ethical 
Movement"  in  The  Open  Court,  that  he  was  invited  to 
deliver  these  lectures.  It  was  at  my  suggestion  that 
the  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Chicago  Society  for 
Ethical  Culture  extended  to  him  the  invitation,  and 
my  feeling  simply  was  that  so  interesting  a  set  of  phi- 
losophical ideas  as  Dr.  Carus  was  advancing  in  The 
Open  Court  should  have  a  hearing  viva  voce,  as  well 
as  through  the  printed  page.  Dr.  Carus  accepting, 
I  announced  his  lectures  on  my  own  concluding  Sun- 
day, asking  our  members  and  friends  to  give  them  at- 
tention and  careful  consideration.  Inasmuch,  how- 
ever, as  Dr.  Carus  has  taken  the  occasion  incidentally 
to  reinforce  his  earlier  criticism  upon  the  Ethical 
Movement ;-  to  emphasize  the  differences  (real  or  sup- 
posed) between  himself  and  those  of  us  who  are  active 
in  this  movement ;  and  indeed  to  take  us  somewhat 
severely  to  task,  it  becomes  proper  and,  perhaps,  nec- 
essary that  I  should  say  something  by  way  of  reply. 

First,  let  me  endeavor  to  understand  as  nearly  as 
I  can  what  Dr.  Carus  means.  For  our  Ethical  Socie- 
ties the  case  is  a  grave  one,  in  his  judgment.  There 
is  something  we  are  to  do  of  a  more  pressing  nature  j 
if  we  do  not  heed  the  call,  we  shall  "pass  out  of  ex- 


A  CRITICISM  BY  W.  M.  SALTER.  87 

istence. "  We  are  not  to  "rest  satisfied  with  nega- 
tions"; we  should  cease  a  "  non-committal  policy  "  ; 
should  "speak  out  boldly  and  with  no  uncertain 
voice. "  We  are  reminded  of  our  proper  place  ;  for, 
says  Dr.  Carus  with  something  of  a  prophet's  impres- 
siveness,  "There  is  one  point  you  ought  to  under- 
stand well :  The  ethical  movement  will  work  for  the 
progress  of  mankind  whatever  you  do."  Indeed  he 
gives  us  such  a  sense  of  our  insignificance  that  we  are 
led  to  feel  that  more  for  our  own  sake  than  for  the 
cause  of  progress  we  should  apply  ourselves  to  the  all- 
important  task ;  since  the  cause  of  progress  will  be 
served  in  any  case. 

This  task  is  to  answer  the  question,  What  is  the 
basis  of  ethics  ?  Assuming  that  the  ethical  movement 
was  started  because  dogmatic  religion  no  longer  serves 
as  such  a  basis,  he  asks,  What  new  basis  do  we  offer  ? 
I  confess  to  having  had  some  difficulty  in  finding  out 
just  what  the  author  means  by  "basis"  in  this  rela- 
tion. Speaking  generally,  it  is  declared  to  be  "the 
philosophical  foundation  upon  which  ethics  rests,  "and 
so  "the  reason  why  man  should  regulate  his  actions 
in  a  certain  way";  it  is  "a  philosophical  view  back" 
of  ethics.  We  get  light  from  a  concrete  illustration, 
namely,  the  old  religion  which  once  served  as  a  basis, 
the  'reason  why'  being  found  in  'the  will  of  God.' 
Every  religion  is  really,  according  to  Dr.  Carus,  "a 
conception  of  the  world  applied  to  practical  life";  it 
differs  from  philosophy  simply  in  that  such  a  world- 
conception  is  treated  practically  and  is  endorsed  by  a 
whole  society  (instead  of  single  thinkers).  The  basis 
of  ethics  thus  turns  out  to  be  a  certain  conception  of 
the  world  or  "theory  of  the  universe";  it  corresponds 
to  what  is  called  philosophy  or  theology ;  indeed,  our 


88  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

author  makes  the  broad  statement:  "The  ethical 
stimulus  has  been  implanted  into  man  by  religion,"* 
and  he  adds  with  sufficient  vigor,  "any  ethics  with- 
out a  philosophical  view  back  of  it  is  no  ethics,  but 
ethical  sentimentality." 

What  "basis  of  ethics"  does  Dr.  Carus  himself 
present  ?  For  it  is  not  mere  criticism  that  he  offers  ; 
indeed,  the  criticism  of  the  Ethical  Societies  is  but  in- 
cidental, and  the  author's  evident  intention  is  to  pre- 
sent a  positive  solution  of  "the  ethical  problem,"  i.  e., 
to  point  out  the  true  basis  of  ethics.  "  Religion,"  he 
declares,  "  will  remain  a  conception  of  the  world  that 
serves  as  a  regulative  principle  of  action.  Yet  this  con- 
ception will  cease  to  be  the  product  of  an  instinctive 
imagination,  it  will  become  a  scientific  system  of  cer- 
tain truths  that  have  to  be  examined  and  proved  by 
the  usual  methods  of  scientific  enquiry"  (the  italics 
are  mine).  What  then  is  the  scientific  world-concep- 
tion, the  true  basis  of  ethics  ?  I  confess  to  having 
been  completely  taken  aback,  when  as  I  read  on  I  dis- 
covered that  Dr.  Carus  declined  to  answer  the  ques- 
tion, contenting  himself  with  vaguely  saying  that  the 
true  philosophy  will  be  one  which  is  in  accordance 
with  facts,  which  seems  equivalent  to  saying  that  the 
scientific  system  will  be  a  scientific  system.  The  dif- 
ferent philosophies  are  mentioned,  viz.,  "materialism 
and  spiritualism,  realism  and  idealism,  monism  and 
agnosticism,"  and  the  author  actually  approves  of 
Professor  Adler's  proposition  that  an  ethical  move- 
ment should  not  commit  itself  to  any  of  them.     Does 

*  How  much  foundation  such  a  statement  has  as  matter  of  history  is* tol- 
erably well  known  to  students  of  Sociology  and  Primitive  Culture.  I  would 
commend  to  every  interested  reader  the  article  on  "Ethics  and  Religion,"  by 
the  learned  Professor  C  H.  Toy,  of  Harvard  University,  in  the  Popular  Scitnce 
Monthly  April  (or  May),  1890. 


A  CRITICISM  BY  W.  M.  SALTER.  89 

any  reader  wonder  that  I  am  at  a  loss  to  know  why  Dr. 
Cams  should  have  taken  the  attitude  to  our  societies 
which  he  has,  almost  twitting  us  on  our  lack  of  cour- 
age, suggesting  that  our  ethics  is  but  "ethical  senti- 
mentality," and  saying  that  if  the  ethical  societies  do 
not  increase  as  they  ought  to,  it  is  because  they  have 
no  definite  opinion,  because  they  lack  a  foundation, 
trying  to  be  broad  and  becoming  vague  (x.  xi)?  What 
I  had  at  least  hoped  for  was  an  exposition  of  the  way 
in  which  the  monistic  world-conception  would  serve 
as  a  basis  of  ethics ;  for  to  me  personally  at  any  rate 
and,  I  think,  to  many  more  this  would  have  been  of 
considerable  interest.  But  monism  is  classed  along  with 
agnosticism,  and  materialism  as  one  of  the  "thought- 
constructions  of  theorizing  philosophers,"  (16.  17); 
so  that  after  all  the  high  notes,  the  vigorous  charging 
and  counter-charging,  we  are  left  with  the  barren 
dictum,  "The  new  ethics  is  based  upon  facts,  and  is 
applied  to  facts."  Taking  this  into  account  I  am 
not  at  all  sure  that  I  know  what  Dr.  Carus  means  by 
a  "basis  of  ethics,"  and  as  it  is  not  wise  to  criticise  till 
one  knows  what  he  is  criticising,  I  will  forbear  criti- 
cism. I  will  not  say  that  the  author  is  not  clear  as  to 
what  he  means,  but  generally  speaking  the  remark  of 
The  Ethical  Record  which  he  quotes  seems  to  have 
faesh  illustration  :  "  We  think  there  is  some  lack  of 
clearness  as  to  what  a  basis  of  ethics  means." 

There  are,  however,  two  distinct  questions  :  What 
is  the  true  world  conception,  upon  which  every  spe- 
cial science  may,  in  a  broad  and  rather  loose  sense,  be 
said  to  be  based  ;  and  secondly,  what  is  the  ultimate 
principle  in  ethics  itself  ?  The  second  question  might 
be  more  distinctly  stated  as  follows  :  Not  what  is  the 
basis  of  ethics,   in  the  sense  of  "  a  philosophical  view 


90  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

back  "  of  it  (a  theology  or  philosophy),  but  what  is 
the  basic  principle  in  ethics  ?  Ethics,  in  the  popular 
sense,  being  a  system  of  rules  for  conduct,  it  is  neces- 
sary, if  it  is  to  be  treated  scientifically,  that  there 
should  be  some  supreme  rule,  by  their  agreement  or 
disagreement*  with  which  all  lesser  rules  should  be 
judged.  Now  the  most  charitable  construction  I  can 
put  on  Dr.  Carus's  method  of  proceedure  is  that  he  has 
confused  these  two  questions ;  and  indeed,  in  the  last 
two  chapters  of  the  book  he  more  or  less  leaves  the 
realm  of  world-conceptions  and  devotes  himself  to  the 
humbler  question  of  the  standard  (or  what  I  have 
called  the  supreme  rule)  of  right  action.  Yet  in  the 
treatment  of  this  second  question,  I  am  sorry  to  say 
that  I  find  the  author's  thought  more  or  less  confused 
and  inconsistent.  Ethics,  it  is  repeatedly  insisted, 
must  be  based  on  facts  ;  yet  in  one  clear-sighted  pas- 
sage he  says,  "Ethics  is  our  attitude  toward  the  facts 
of  reality  "  (the  italics  are  mine).  The  latter  remark 
seems  to  imply  that  the  same  facts  may  be  looked  at 
from  different  attitudes  ;  yet  if  so,  how  are  the  facts 
themselves  to  decide  which  attitude  we  shall  take  ?  It 
is  true,  as  Dr.  Carus  happiiy  says,  that  "all  knowledge 
can  be  formulated  as  an  ethical  prescript."  For  ex- 
ample, the  knowledge  that  friction  produces  fire  finds 
its  practical  application  in  the  ethical  rule  :  In  case 
you  want  fire,  produce  it  by  friction.  But  the  facts 
in  the  case  do  not  in  the  slightest  determine  whether 
we   shall    produce    fire ;    we    may    contemplate    the 

*  This  rule,  it  is  needless  to  say,  would  itself  be  interpreted  or  "  based  "  in 
terms  of  the  world-conception  or  theory  of  the  universe  which  one  holds,  just 
as  the  first  principles  of  the  other  sciences  would  be ;  the  theist  would  inter- 
pret them  in  one  way,  the  monist  in  another,  etc.;  but  the  first  principles  of 
all  special  sciences  qua  special  sciences  are  peculiar  to  themselves;  otherwise 
taken,  they  would  be  identical,  i.  e.,  be  the  ultimate  principles  or  principle 
of  the  universe  itself. 


A  CRITICISM  BY  W.  M.  SALTER.  gi 

facts  with  purely  speculative  curiosity  and  do  noth- 
ing, or  we  may  have  an  aversion  to  fire  and  so  do 
nothing,  or  we  may  wish  fire  and  then  we  shall  pro- 
duce it  by  the  method  indicated.  It  is  evident  that 
not  all  the  knowledge  of  all  the  facts  of  the  universe 
would  by  itself  lead  to  moral  action,  or  indeed  to  ac- 
tion of  any  kind ;  so  that  it  would  be  more  accurate, 
and  so  more  clarifying  to  the  mind,  to  say  that  ethics 
should  face,  regard,  or  know  the  facts  of  the  universe 
rather  than  to  say  that  it  should  be  based  upon  them. 
Evidently  the  root-question  in  ethics  is,  what  should 
we  wish  ?  Once  knowing  what  we  wish,  the  know- 
ledge of  the  facts  and  the  laws  of  nature  is  valuable 
to  us  ;  and  once  knowing  what  we  should  wish,  ac- 
quaintance with  such  facts  and  laws  becomes  ethically 
valuable  and  we  have  a  standard  for  our  entire  con- 
duct. It  is  at  this  point  that  I  find  Dr.  Carus's  views 
radically  insufficient ;  indeed,  his  ethics  seems  a  some- 
thing "in  the  air."  "Jf,"  he  says,  "you  wish  to  ex- 
ist, obey  reason, "(italics  are  my  own).  But  the  very 
question  is,  not  what  or  whether  we  wish,  but  what  we 
should  wish  ?  To  say,  "If  you  wish  fire,  produce  it 
by  friction,"  does  not  say  whether  we  shall  so  produce 
it;  to  tell  us,  "In  order  to  build  a  house,  observe  the 
laws  of  gravitation,"  does  not  call  us  to  observe  the 
laws  of  gravitation;  to  say,  "If  you  wish  to  exist, 
obey  reason,"  puts  upon  us  no  obligation  to  obey  rea- 
son. It  is  true  most  persons  do  wish  to  live  and  in 
consistency  therewith  we  may  well  say  that  they  should 
act  in  such  and  such  a  manner  ;  but  if  any  one  says, 
I  do  not  care  to  live,  moral  obligation,  according  to 
this  view,  ceases  to  have  any  application  to  him.  If 
any  one  says,  I  do  not  care  about  my  health,  the  laws 
of  health  are  meaningless  to  him  ;  if  another  says,   I 


92  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

do  not  care  about  my  family,  the  whole  of  family- 
ethics  loses  its  validity  for  him.  It  has  long  been 
plain  to  me  that  resting  ethics  on  our  matter-of-fact 
wishes  or  instincts  is  not  establishing  ethics,  but  un- 
dermining it  and  leaving  it  a  something  "  in  the  air." 
There  must  be  a  rational  consideration  and  rational 
settlement  of  the  question,  What  of  our  desires  or 
wishes  or  instincts  have  a  right  to  rule  in  us?  before 
there  can  be  any  such  thing  as  a  scientific  ethics. 
Notwithstanding,  however,  this  lack  of  thorough- 
ness in  Dr.  Carus's  treatment  of  the  question,  his  dis- 
cussion of  some  of  the  different  standards  of  right  and 
wrong  is  interesting.  He  defends  the  naturalness  of 
altruistic  and  social  motives,  against  those  who  hold 
that  only  egotistic  motives  are  natural  to  man.  He 
goes  too  far,  it  appears  to  me,  in  identifying  ethics 
with  the  social  duties,  there  being  as  much  rational 
foundation  for  an  "  ought  "  in  relation  to  one's  self  as 
in  relation  to  others.  He  conducts  an  excellent  po- 
lemic against  those  who  would  find  in  pleasure  or 
happiness  the  end  of  all  action,  though  he  surely  does 
an  injustice  to  Utilitarianism  in  saying  that  "it  slurs 
over  the  difference  between  moral  goodness  and  ma- 
terial usefulness."  The  standard  of  good  and  bad 
which  he  appears  to  reach  (after  sundry  physiological 
and  psychological  observations)  is  '*  the  development 
of  human  soul  life  ";  whatever  tends  to  preserve  and 
promote  this  is  good,  while  all  efforts  to  the  contrary 
are  bad.  By  "soul-life  "  is  meant  the  soul-life  of  the 
whole  race,  including  all  its  future  generations.  But 
is  not  this  rather  vague  ?  Is  not  the  standard  an  un- 
certain one?  "Soul-life,"  we  are  told,  is  made  up  of 
representations  of  the  surrounding  world  and  of  man's 
relations  thereto,  and  includes  an  increasing  power 


A  CRITICISM  BY  IV.  M.  SALTER.  93 

over  nature  along  with  an  increasing  knowledge.  But 
do  we  not  require  to  know  what  type  of  soul-life  we 
shall  seek  to  further  and  promote  ?  Persons  of  large 
knowledge  and  ample  power  over  nature  may  be 
of  one  kind  or  another :  they  may  be  modest  or 
vain,  friendly  or  unfriendly,  truthful  or  false,  chaste 
or  licentious,  public-spirited  or  selfish.  In  follow- 
ing the  injunction  to  preserve  and  promote  soul-life, 
should  we  not  have  our  minds  directed  to  the  sort 
of  soul-life  that  is  truly  desirable  ?  Dr.  Carus  does, 
indeed,  speak  vaguely  of  "the  standard  of  human 
soul-life,"  and  elsewhere  uses  the  expression  "  health 
and  nobility  of  our  soul,"  but  without  indicating  what 
he  means.  The  point  is  of  importance  because,  as 
the  author  in  substance  says,  the  effects  of  all  our  ac- 
tions whether  good  or  evil  remain,  long  after  we  have 
passed  out  of  existence,  because  the  examples  we  set 
and  the  thoughts  we  utter,  whether  good  or  bad,  live 
on  in  the  souls  of  our  friends  and  our  children,  and  the 
motive  for  living  for  eternity,  of  which  the  author 
makes  impressive  use,  would  seem  to  appeal  as  much 
to  the  bad  man  who  wishes  to  perpetuate  his  badness, 
as  to  the  good  man  who  wishes  to  promote  soul-life  of 
a  different  type.  I  do  not  say  that  these  difficulties 
are  insuperable,  and  simply  record  my  impression  of 
the  author's  failure  to  deal  with  them. 

In  still  another  sense  of  the  word  "basis,"  Dr. 
Carus  proposes  the  principle  of  truthfulness  as  a  basis 
of  ethics.  In  fact,  so  much  "Zweideutigkeit  "  in  the 
use  of  terms,  I  think  I  have  rarely  seen  in  any  other 
ostensibly  scientific  treatise.  It  is  difficult  for  me  to 
understand  further  how  Dr.  Carus  could  proceed  so 
carelessly  in  treating  of  ethical  "theories."  Intui- 
tionalism is  identified  with  supernaturalism,  and  Paley 


94  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

on  the  strength  of  his  theology  is  called  an  intuition- 
alist,  while  he  was  in  fact  one  of  the  founders  of  Utili- 
tarianism. Hedonism  is  treated  separately  from  Utili- 
tarianism, although  every  form  of  Utilitarianism  has 
been  hedonistic,  modern  utilitarianism  being  simply 
universalistic  hedonism. 

I  have  spoken  of  two  distinct  questions,  which  Dr. 
Carus  seems  to  confuse  ;  there  is  a  third  which  he 
fails  to  distinguish  from  the  others,  and  in  the  treat- 
ment of  which  I  am  glad  for  his  sake  to  say  that  he 
falls  into  a  happy  inconsistency.  This  relates  to  the 
motive  for  regulating  our  conduct  according  to  the 
standard  which  has  been  supposably  discovered.  It 
is  one  thing  to  know  what  is  the  true  world-theory, 
another  to  know  what  is  the  standard  of  right,  another 
to  know  the  true  motive  for  regarding  that  standard. 
The  position  which  I  have  always  taken  (and  I  think 
all  the  other  ethical  lecturers  have  taken),  is  that  when 
we  once  really  know  what  right  is,  there  is  no  other 
course  for  us  but  to  obey  it,  simple  reverence  for  the 
right  being  the  only  true,  the  only  moral  motive.  We 
have  to  most  carefully  study  what  the  right  is,  but 
once  knowing  it  our  only  attitude  is  (i.  e.,  should  be) 
obedience.  To  ask  why  we  should  do  the  right  is 
meaningless,  it  is  to  go  out  of  the  moral  region  alto- 
gether. Now  when  Dr.  Carus  proposes  the  question, 
"Why  must  I  feel  bound  by  any  'right'  or  moral 
law,"  when  he  says  that  if  we  demand  of  a  man  "that 
he  refrain  from  doing  wrong  and  be  guided  by  what  is 
right,  we  are  bound  to  give  him  a  reason  why,"  he 
seems  to  join  with  those  who  are  not  satisfied  with  the 
moral  motive,  and  after  reading  those  remarks  in  the 
opening  pages  of  his  volume,  I  observed  with  particu- 
lar closeness   the  subsequent  course  of  his  argument 


A  CRITICISM  BY  IV.  M.  SALTER.  95 

to  see  what  "reason  "  or  "why"  he  would  give.  Yet 
he  had  already  casually  spoken  of  the  "motive  to  do 
right";  and  what  was  my  surprise  and  gratification 
to  find  him  later  on  speaking  distinctly  of  the  "aspir- 
ation to  live  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  moral  law," 
(p.  37);  of  the  "moral  motives  in  the  moral  purity,"  (p. 
61);  and  boldly  saying  that  "an  ethical  teacher  ought 
to  appeal  to  the  highest  motives  man  is  capable  of," 
(p.  61.)  In  fact,  Dr.  Carus  gives  no  "reason  why"  in 
the  sense  of  a  motive  beyond  the  moral  motive ;  and 
is  well  aware  that  so  to  do  would  be  not  to  explain, 
but  to  degrade  morality.  Yet  if  so,  what  necessity 
was  there  for  him  to  take  such  an  attitude  of  antagon- 
ism to  us?  We  too  are  trying,  in  the  measure  of  our 
ability,  to  plant  (or  better,  to  develop)  the  moral  mo- 
tive in  the  souls  of  men.  Dr.  Carus  said,  addressing 
the  Chicago  Ethical  Society,  "You  may  say  it  matters 
not  why  a  man  leads  a  moral  life,  so  that  his  life  be 
moral."  This  is  a  grotesque  description  of  our  posi- 
tion. The  motive  of  right  conduct  is  what  makes  it 
moral ;  if  that  has  been  said  once,  it  has  been  said  a 
hundred  times  on  the  Chicago  platform. 

To  conclude  then  this,  I  fear,  already  too  long 
article  :  It  is  true  that  the  ethical  movement  has  not 
committed  itself  to  a  particular  world-theory ;  it  leaves 
its  members  and  lecturers  free  to  adopt  whatever  theory 
most  approves  itself  to  their  reason;  instead  of  setting 
up  a  standard  of  philosophical  orthodoxy  as  Dr.  Carus 
seems  to  propose  (though  he  fails  at  the  critical  mo- 
ment), it  believes  that  philosophical  systems  should 
have  a  free  field  and  no  favor  and  that  that  one  should 
survive  whose  claims  prove  the  strongest  in  the  strug- 
gle for  existence — and  all  within  the  fold  of  an  ethical 
fellowship,  held  together  by  community  of  moral  aim. 


96  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

Dr.  Carus,  I  am  sorry  to  see,  has  not  outgrown  the 
sectarian  principle  of  the  churches  and  would  appar- 
ently give  us  another  sect  as  "exclusive"  and  "in- 
tolerant" as  any  in  the  past,  though  (Gottlob  !)  it  will 
slay  with  the  sword  of  the  spirit  and  not  with  the  arm 
of  flesh.  Secondly,  it  is  not  true  that  the  ethical  lec- 
turers have  not  furnished  a  "basis"  of  ethics"  in  the 
sense  of  a  standard  of  right  and  wrong  j  each  of  them 
has  done  so  and  estimated  all  particular  duties  by  their 
relation  thereto ;  and  although  on  some  points  of  spec- 
ulative significance  all  may  not  be  agreed,  they  are 
sufficiently  so  for  practical  sympathy  and  co-opera- 
tion— certain  great  duties  being  recognized  by  all 
alike.  Our  highest  aim  is  to  make  men  autonomous 
in  their  moral  conduct,  as  indeed  Dr.  Carus  thinks  we 
should,  (p.  49,)  apparently  forgetting  his  earlier  chal- 
lenge that  if  we  no  longer  believe  in  the  supernatural 
God,  we  should  give  account  of  "  that  God  "  who  gives 
us  authority  to  preach  (xii).  What  is  more,  any  of 
us  may  believe  in  the  "Supernatural  God,"  if  so  it 
seems  reasonable  for  him  to  do  ;  the  movement  is  by 
no  means  committed  to  Anti-Supernaturalism,  as  he 
seems  to  think,  whatever  were  the  motives  of  some  of 
those  active  in  the  beginning,  and  it  has  quite  another 
reason  for  being  than  that  which  Dr.  Carus  ascribes  to 
it.*  Thirdly,  as  to  the  much  abused  "basis"  in  still 
another  possible  meaning,  namely,  of  a  motive  for  the 
regulation  of  one's  life,  we  have  from  the  beginning 
recognized  the  same  "basis"  which  Dr.  Carus  sug- 
gests, viz.,  the  motive  to  do  right,  the  aspiration  to 
live  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  moral  law. 

*  That  reason  is  stated  in  the  concluding  chapter  of  my  Ethical  Religion  : 
and  still  more  simply  and  clearly  and  convincingly  in  the  first  two  chapters 
of  Dr.  Stanton  Coit's  just  published  Die  Ethische  Bewegnng  in  der  Religion. 
(Leipsic  :  O.  K.  Reisland). 


MR.  SALTER  ON  "THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM." 


BY    DR.    PAUL    CARUS. 


Mr.  Salter  thinks  that  I  have  not  properly  under- 
stood the  position  of  the  leaders  of  the  ethical  move- 
ment. But  Mr.  Salter's  reply  is  good  evidence  that 
I  did  not  misunderstand  them.  He  says:  "It  is  not 
true  that  the  ethical  lecturers  have  not  furnished  a 
basis  of  ethics  in  the  sense  of  a  standard  of  right  and 
wrong  ;"  and  yet  he  takes  pains  to  explain  that  by  this 
basis  of  ethics  he  understands  certain  ethical  rules, 
and  especially  the  supreme  ethical  rule,  but  not  the 
reason  of  his  ethical  rules  which  finds  expression  in 
a  philosophical  or  religious  view  back  of  ethics.  The 
latter  alone  can  properly  be  called  a  basis  of  ethics, 
and  all  the  ethical  teachers  agree  that  that  which  we 
call  the  basis  of  ethics  is  not  needed.  They  look  upon 
it  as  of  mere  speculative  significance. 

Mr.  Salter  fails  to  see  the  indispensability  of  a 
philosophical  or  religious  view  back  of  ethics  ;  he 
fails  to  see  that  it  alone  can  give  character  to  ethics, 
it  alone  can  change  the  instinctive  morality  of  our 
conscience  into  truly  rational  and  self-conscious 
ethics. 

Conscience  and  the  moral  law  are  not  so  absolute 
as  Mr.  Salter  in  his  book  declares  them  to  be.  Re- 
ligion and  ethics  have  developed  :  the  facts  of  an  er- 
ring conscience  as  well  as  of  the  religious  superstitions 
prove  that  both  have  grown  from  experience.  Both 
religion  and  ethics  have  developed  together ;  they  are 
twins. 


98  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

When  saying  religion  and  ethics  have  grown 
from  experience,  I  mean  that  the  stern  facts  of  life 
have  taught  us  what  desires  should  be  suppressed 
and  what  wishes  should  rule  supreme.  The  facts  of 
life  themselves  have  taught  us  our  attitude  toward 
our  surroundings  ;  they  have  taught  us  the  moral  laws. 

It  appears  that  the  "moral  law"  has  a  different 
meaning  with  Mr.  Salter  than  with  me.  The  moral 
law,  whenever  I  use  the  word,  is  simply  a  formulation 
of  the  lessons  taught  us  by  experience.  Moral  laws 
are — like  the  laws  of  hygiene — statements  of  those 
conditions  which  will  keep  our  sentiments  and  motives 
in  perfect  health. 

Mr.  Salter  knows  no  •  reason  why '  for  his  moral  law, 
and  he  imagines  that  to  give  a  reason  why  "would  be 
not  to  explain  but  to  degrade  morality."  *  In  this  way 
ethics  is,  in  Mr.  Salter's  mind,  inseparably  intertwined 
with  mysticism. 

Our  intention  is  indeed  to  explain  morality,  and 
here  arises  our  conflict  with  the  policy  pursued  by  the 
ethical  lecturers.  We  consider  scientific  enquiry  into 
the  reason  why  of  ethics,  not  as  a  degradation,  but  as 
a  duty.    The  ethical  lecturers  do  not  acknowledge  the 

*  Mr.  Salter  writes  in  a  marginal  note  on  the  proof  of  this  article  : 

"You  must  be  aware  that  I  use  this  language  in  another  connect  ion:  viz., 
in  speaking  of  the  motive  for  right-doing." 

I  am  accustomed  to  distinguish  between  motive  and  reason.  (See  Funda- 
mental Problems,  p.  80,  lines  24—25.)  Motive  is  the  cause  that  effects  an 
action.  A  cause  in  the  domain  of  human  action  is  called  motive,  for  it  is  that 
which  makes  the  will  move.  I  distinguish  between  motive  and  reason,  but  I 
cannot  think  of  a  motive  without  a  reason.  A  motive  is  a  cause  that  consists 
of  an  idea,  the  idea  acting  as  an  irritant  or  stimulus  upon  a  man,  thus  pro- 
voking him  to  action.    The  contents  of  this  idea  is  called  reason. 

I  maintain  that  the  motive  to  do  this  or  that  must  have  a  content.  This 
content  is  its  reason.  The  rule  '  do  that  which  is  right "  (or  the  intention  "  I 
wish  to  do  that  which  is  right")  is  without  practical  value,  unless  I  know  what 
is  right.  In  order  to  know  what  is  right  I  must  ascertain  it,  and  I  can  do  so 
only  by  enquiring  after  the  reason  why  it  is  right.  Thus  the  '  reason  why  '  is 
inevitable  whatever  standpoint  we  take. 


IN  REPL  Y  TO  MR.  SAL  TER.  99 

'  reason  why '  presented  by  orthodox  theology.  They  are 
therefore  bound  to  give  a  new  reason  why.  If  they  re- 
fuse to  do  so,  their  whole  movement  is  founded  on  sand. 

It  is  an  old  experience  which  perhaps  most  of  us 
who  have  sought  for  light  and  endeavored  to  under- 
stand our  own  ideals  and  aspirations  have  felt,  that 
every  enthusiasm,  above  all  religious  enthusiasm,  re- 
gards science  and  all  close  scrutiny  with  suspicion. 
The  relentless  dissections  of  exact  analysis  appear  as 
a  sacrilege. 

The  reader  will  feel  in  Mr.  Salter's  reply  the  un- 
easiness caused  by  our  procedure.  He  invites  us  to 
present  our  opinion,*  but  he  resents  a  clear  statement 
of  our  differences,  f  This  statement  of  our  differences 
may  have  been  emphatic,  but  I  feel  confident  that  it 

*  Mr.  Hegeler  in  a  letter  of  May  8th,  1890,  wrote  :  "  In  the  last  number  of 
The  Open  Court  that  reached  me,  I  find  Dr.  Carus  has  defined  our  position 
towards  Ingersoll  and  his  followers,  and  also  that  towards  the  Societies  for 
Ethical  Culture.  I  believe  the  article  was  written  by  him  already  some  time 
ago,  and  the  publication  was  delayed  by  our  hesitancy  to  open  what  I  will 
call  civilized  war  upon  you.  I  have  told  the  Doctor  already,— a  long  while 
ago,— that  it  was  our  duty  to  do  this." 

So,  also,  in  a  letter  of  June  4th,  Mr.  Hegeler  wrote  :  "  We  ought  to  clear 
our  differences  of  opinion  for  the  general  good.  You  are  an  influential  public 
teacher,  and  I  certainly  spend  a  large  amount  of  money  for  the  same  object — 
and  avoidance  of  waste  and  also  the  reduction  of  mental  as  well  as  physical 
struggle  or  war  to  the  smallest  possible  limit  (but  not  the  avoidance  of  the 
struggle)  belongs  in  my  opinion  to  the  essence  of  Ethics.  The  energy  thereby 
saved  we  have  to  use  for  a  'building  up.'  " 

To  this  Mr.  Salter  replied,  on  June  8th  :  "  I  agree  with  you  entirely  that 
we  should  endeavor  to  clear  up  our  differences  ....  Nothing  but  preoccupa- 
tion and  lack  of  time  have  prevented  me  heretofore  from  explaining  myself  at 
length  to  you.  Indeed,  I  hoped  that  when  my  book  came  out,  giving  my  views 
at  such  length,  I  should  have  the  benefit  of  criticism  from  you  and  Dr.  Carus. 
I,  by  no  means,  count  my  present  views  as  final,  as  indeed  I  say  in  my  preface. 
And  I  wish  to  learn  and  assimilate  all  of  positive  truth,  which  you  give  in 
The  Open  Court— and  I  have  already  gained  help  from  it.  So  please  criticise 
me  in  public  or  in  correspondence — and,  at  least  in  the  summer,  I  will  agree 
to  answer  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  and  I  will  always  attentively  read  and 
consider." — [Published  with  Mr.  Salter's  permission.] 

t  Mr.  Salter  says  in  a  marginal  note :  "  I  did  not  invite  you  to  criticize  the 
movement  in  your  public  lectures  ;  still  you  had  a  perfect  right  to  do  so,  and 
I  am  not  sorry." 


ioo  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

was  not  made  so  as  to  be  offensive,  for  I  have  at  the 
same  time  not  concealed  my  respect — nay,  my  admira- 
tion for  the  efforts,  the  seriousness,  and  the  noble 
ideals  of  the  ethical  societies. 

Mr.  Salter  is  embarrassed  by  our  criticism,  be- 
cause he  neither  feels  the  need  of  a  basis  of  ethics, 
nor  does  he  feel  urged  to  have  a  scientific  explanation 
of  it.  Ethics  regarded  as  unexplainable,  appears  to 
him  greater,  nobler,  and  holier  than  if  it  were  ex- 
plained. Yet  we  can  assure  Mr.  Salter  that  morality 
will  not  be  degraded  by  any  explanation.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  will  rise  in  its  purest  and  holiest  dignity. 

Mr.  Salter  considers  the  demands  of  the  conscience 
as  an  ultimate  fact ;  it  is  to  him  " the  unmovable  rock" 
upon  which  he  bases  the  ethical  movement.  He  asserts 
the  independence  of  morality  from  religion  as  well  as 
science ;  he  attempts  to  make  morality  absolute.  If  a 
gardener,  in  this  way,  makes  the  tree  independent  of 
its  roots,  he  becomes  a  wood-cutter;  he  will  deprive 
the  tree  of  the  conditions  of  its  life. 

If  Mr.  Saltpr  would  ask  himself  how  he  had  come 
into  the  possession  of  the  ethical  stimulus,  he  would 
soon  be  urged  to  travel  the  same  path  with  us. 

The  ethics  of  mysticism  is  only  the  prophesy  of 
ethics  based  on  science.  It  is  the  bud's  promise  of  a 
fruit.  It  is  like  astrology  which  will  mature  into 
astronomy.  The  astrologer  has  set  his  heart  on  the 
mystic  element  of  his  profession  ;  it  alone  possesses 
in  his  mind  the  charm  of  beauty,  and  he  watches  with 
great  grief  how  the  bud  loses  that  beauty  while  it 
ripens  into  a  fruit. 

Before  proceeding  to  the  main  subject  of  our  con- 
troversy, which  refers  to  the  question  of  the  dispensa- 
bility or  indispensability  of  a  basis  for  ethics,   I  shall 


IN  REPLY  TO  MR.  SALTER.  101 

briefly  dispose  of  a  few  side  issues  of  less  concern.  In 
so  far  as  they  are  side  issues  I  might  pass  them  over 
in  silence.  But  it  appears  that  they  presuppose  prin- 
ciples which  are  of  great  ethical  significance. 

THE  ETHICAL  IMPORT  OF  CRITICISMS. 

As  to  the  occasion  of  the  three  lectures,  I  am  told 
that  my  article,  "  The  Basis  of  Ethics  and  the  Ethical 
Movement,"  was  not  the  cause  which  suggested  to  the 
speaker  and  the  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Society  for 
Ethical  Culture  at  Chicago,  the  idea  of  extending  the 
invitation  to  me.  The  invitation  was  tendered  with- 
out any  special  motive,  and  would  have  been  tendered 
even  if  that  article  had  never  been  written.*  I  con- 
fess that  I  was  under  the  impression  that  the  society 
wanted  me  to  explain  our  views  with  special  reference 
to  their  own  position.  It  is  a  principle  of  The  Open 
Court  to  solicit  criticism,  and  we  expect  that  the  same 
principle  animates  every  one  who  is  eager  to  find  out 
the  truth.  We  believe  that  the  truth  can  be  estab- 
lished only  by  a  square  fight,  where  ideas  are  pitted 
against  ideas  in  fair  and  honest  controversy.  We  do 
not  want  to  intrude  upon  the  world  with  our  private 
and  personal  pet  theories.  We  want  to  bring  out  the 
truth.  If  our  views  are  wrong,  we  want  to  be  refuted, 
and  if  we  are  refuted,  we  shall  give  up  those  ideas 
which  we  have  recognized  as  errors. 

Mr.  Salter  says,  "the  ethical  movement  believes 
that  philosophical  systems  should  have  a  free  field  and 
that  that  one  should  survive  whose  claims  prove  the 
strongest  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  and  all  within 
the  fold  of  an  ethical  fellowship  held  together  by  a 

*In  the  present  edition  of  The  Ethical  Problem  the  words,  "In  conse- 
quence of  this  article ' '  (p.  ii,  ist  ed.)  tiave  been  replaced  by  the  clause  "soon 
after  the  publication  of  this  article"  (see  p.  is,  present  edition). 


102  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

community  of  moral  aim."  Very  well  then,  we  act 
accordingly  :  we  propose  a  certain  view  and  struggle 
for  it.  Yet  we  do  not  enter  the  lists  vainly  or  merely 
for  the  sake  of  controversy.  We  do  not  struggle  for 
something  which  is  indifferent,  for  we  maintain  that  it 
is  the  most  important  question  with  which  the  members 
of  the  ethical  societies  can  concern  themselves. 

There  is,  at  present,  a  fashionable  tendency  to  con- 
sider every  struggle,  whatever  be  its  nature,  as  bad. 
War,  competition,  emulation,  criticism,  are  considered 
as  more  or  less  barbaric  forms  of  one  and  the  same 
principle — the  principle  of  strife  ;  and  this  principle  of 
strife  is  denounced  as  the  source  of  all  evil.  The 
abolition  of  all  strife,  it  is  expected,  will  usher  in  the 
beginning  of  a  millennium.  Whatever  may  be  true 
in  this  view,  we  see  no  other  possibility  of  arriving  at 
truth  than  by  struggling  for  it,  and  the  struggle  for 
truth  appears  to  us  as  a  duty. 

The  weapon  in  the  struggle  for  truth  is  criticism. 
If  we  believe  we  are  in  possession  of  truth,  let  us  expose 
our  opinion  to  the  criticism  of  those  competent  to  crit- 
icise. If  we  differ  in  opinion,  let  us  compare  our 
opinions  and  investigate  as  to  which  opinion  is  nearest 
the  truth.  The  invitation  to  speak  before  the  Ethical 
Society,  was  made  with  the  special  understanding  that 
we  were  to  propose  our  view  on  the  ethical  problem  ; 
and  it  would  not  have  been  proper  to  ignore  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Ethical  Societies  entirely.  I  should  be 
sorry  to  "have  taken  an  occasion,  incidentally,  to  re- 
inforce an  earlier  criticism  " — if  that  criticism  was  not 
welcome.  Having  stated  a  difference  of  opinion,  it 
seemed  to  me,  that  a  further  explanation,  a  justifi- 
cation was  demanded.  Could  I  have  acted  other- 
wise   since,    after    all,    criticism    and    counter    criti- 


,     IN  REPLY  TO  MR.  SALTER.  103 

cism  are  the  sole  means  of  arriving  at  truth  ?  And 
then,  our  struggle  for  truth  is  not  a  personal  fight 
between  our  private  views  in  which  you  or  I  should 
hope  to  come  out  victorious.  Our  struggle  for  truth 
is  rather  a  co-operation,  in  which  every  one  of  us  con- 
tributes his  share  of  insight  and  tries  to  free  himself 
from  the  errors  that  might  be  mixed  up  with  a  par- 
tially correct  conception  of  truth. 

Mr.  Salter  is  mistaken,  when  he  speaks  of  ''an  atti- 
tude of  antagonism  "  towards  the  ethical  societies  on 
our  part.  We  do  not  intend  to  antagonize  the  ethical 
societies ;  on  the  contrary,  we  intend  to  promote  their 
welfare  ;  and  we  therefore  call  attention  to  that  which 
we  consider  as  their  most  urgent  and  indispensa- 
ble duty.  It  is  their  duty  to  build  their  house  upon 
a  rock,  so  that  it  will  withstand  the  rain  and  the 
winds.  Our  antagonism,  if  our  attitude  is  to  be  charac- 
terized by  that  name,  is  an  antagonism  arising  from 
a  common  interest,  from  a  religious  zeal  for  the  same 
great  cause,  from  a  desire  that  the  ethical  societies 
shall  not  neglect  the  one  thing  that  is  needed,  that 
they  shall  have  been  founded  to  stay  for  good,  to 
prosper,  to  increase,  and  to  conquer. 

INTUITIONALISM  AND  SUPERNATURALISM. 

Mr.  Salter  blames  me  for  "  carelessness  in  treating 
of  ethical  theories  ;  "  he  says,  that  I  identify  Intuition- 
alism with  Supernaturalism.     Mr.  Salter  adds : 

"  And  Paley  on  the  strength  of  his  theology  is  called  an  intu- 
itionalist,  while  he  was,  in  fact,  one  of  the  founders  of  utilitari- 
anism." 

Undoubtedly  Paley  was  one  of  the  founders  of 
utilitarianism.  His  theory  is  characterized  in  his  own 
words  as  follows : 


io4  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

"  God  Almighty  wills  and  wishes  the  happiness  of  his  creat- 
ures." 

Paley  is  a  utilitarian  with  reference  to  the  purpose 
and  aim  of  ethics.  He  is  generally  characterized  as 
"a  theological  utilitarian";  nevertheless  I  do  not  hes- 
itate to  class  him  among  the  intuitionalists,  "on  the 
strength  of  his  theology"  as  Mr.  Salter  rightly  re- 
marks. *  Professor  Sidgwick  (in  the  Encyclopaedia 
Britannica,  vol.  viii,  p.  606)  describes  Paley's  views  in 
the  following  words : 

"  To  be  obliged  is  to  be  '  urged  by  a  violent  motive  resulting 
from  the  command  of  another  ';  in  the  case  of  moral  obligation  the 
command  proceeds  from  God,  and  the  motive  lies  in  the  expecta- 
tion of  being  rewarded  and  punished  after  this  life." 

Intuitionalism  if  it  means  anything  means  that  the 
moral  command  comes  to  us  in  some  unaccountable 
way  mysteriously  and  directly  from  some  sphere  beyond. 
I  confess  myself  guilty  of  identifying  "intuitional- 
ism with  supernaturalism."  Everybody  who  main- 
tains that  the  basic  view  of  intuitionalism  is  true,  is 
in  my  opinion  .to  be  classed  as  an  intuitionalist.  If 
the  sense  of  duty,  the  moral  ought,  the  idea  of  right 
or  wrong  of  conscience  or  whatever  we  call  it,  is  an 
unanalysable  fact,  if  our  knowledge  of  it  comes  to  us 
not  through  experience,  but  through  some  mystical 
process  concerning  which  philosophy  and  science  can 
give  no  information,  we  are  confronted  with  a  dualistic 
theory.     We  have  in  that  case  to  deal  with  a  world- 

*  Whether  Paley  is  represented  as  an  intuitionalist  or  in  the  usual  way  as 
"  a  theological  utilitarian,"  does  not  in  the  least  affect  the  subject  of  our  con- 
troversy. I  selected  his  name,  because  his  works  are  still  read  and  better 
known  than  those  of  other  theological  teachers  of  ethics.  I  confess  openly 
that  I  should  not  have  mentioned  him  as  one  of  "the  representative  authors 
of  intuitionalism,"  and  have  therefore  in  the  present  edition  of  The  Ethical 
Problem,  suppressed  his  name  by  omitting  the  passage  in  which  it  occurs.  I 
do  not,  however,  cease  to  count  Paley  among  intuitionalists. 


IN  REPLY  TO  MR.  SALTER.  105 

conception  recognizing  the  existence  of  certain  facts, 
which  are  of  a  totally  different  character  from  all  the 
other  facts.  Whatever  name  we  may  be  pleased  to 
give  such  a  conception,  it  is  and  will  remain  super- 
naturalism  or  at  least  extra-naturalism. 

I  look  upon  intuitionalism  in  ethics  and  upon  its 
philosophical  correlative  supernaturalism,  as  a  kind  of 
scientific  color  line.  Any  one  who  attempts  a  concilia- 
tion between  supernaturalism  and  naturalism  is  a  su- 
pernaturalist,  and  every  one  who  attempts  a  concilia- 
tion between  intuitionalism  and  other  ethical  views, 
is  an  intuitionalist. 

Are  not  all  intuitionalists  at  the  same  time  utili- 
tarians, in  so  far  as  they  expect  that  in  the  end  the 
good  will  be  rewarded  and  the  bad  will  be  punished  ? 
We  can  reconcile  intuitionalism  with  utilitarianism,  if 
utilitarianism  means  that  in  the  end  the  good  will  be 
rewarded  and  the  bad  will  be  punished.  But  we  can- 
not reconcile  intuitionalism  with  any  theory  that  con- 
siders conscience  as  being  of  a  natural  growth,  so  that 
it  can  be  analysed  and  scientifically  explained. 

Utilitarianism  is  that  theory  which  explains  the 
good  in  terms  of  the  useful,  and  thus  misleads  people 
to  identify  the  useful  and  the  good.  If  utilitarianism 
means  that  the  consequences  of  good  deeds  are  some- 
how always  useful,  (perhaps  not  useful  to  ourselves,  but 
useful  to  somebody,  and  though  perhaps  not  useful  in 
the  present,  yet  useful  in  the  future,)  I  shall  not  hesitate 
to  range  myself  among  the  utilitarians,  however  strongly 
I  protest  against  any  identification  of  the  useful  and 
the  good,  against  making  the  usefulness  of  a  deed  the 
test  of  its  moral  goodness,  and  still  more  against  de- 
fining the  good  in  terms  of  pleasure. 


io6  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

UTILITARIANISM    AND    HEDONISM. 

As  a  further  carelessness  in  treating  of  ethical  theo- 
ries, Mr.  Salter  mentions  the  distinction  made  be- 
tween utilitarianism  and  hedonism.     Mr.  Salter  says : 

"  Hedonism  is  treated  separately  from  utilitarianism  although 
every  form  of  utilitarianism  has  been  hedonistic,  modern  utilitar- 
ianism being  simply  universalistic  hedonism." 

I  have  deliberately  treated  hedonism  and  utili- 
tarianism as  separate  theories,  because  I  consider  it 
necessary  to  make  a  distinction  between  them.  Hedon- 
ism proposes  the  pleasurable,  and  utilitarianism  the 
useful  as  the  ultimate  test  of  ethics.  These  two  prop- 
ositions are  in  my  opinion  by  no  means  congruent. 
Most  utilitarians,  it  is  true,  (I  hesitate  to  say  "all" 
utilitarians,)  define  the  useful  as  that  which  affords 
the  greatest  amount  of  pleasure.  I  see,  nevertheless, 
sufficient  difference  between  the  useful  and  the  pleas- 
urable. The  term  useful  comprehends  many  things 
or  processes  which  cause  much  pain  and  produce  little 
pleasure. 

While  we  uncompromisingly  reject  hedonism,  we 
see  a  possibility  of  reconciliation  with  utilitarianism, 
provided  the  utilitarians  drop  for  good  the  principle 
of  hedonism,  and  exclude  from  the  term  useful  all  those 
transient  advantages  (generally  considered  as  useful) 
which  occasionally  come  to  man  in  consequence  of 
bad  actions — for  instance  wealth  gained  by  fraudulent 
means.  In  short  there  can  be  no  objection  to  utilitar- 
ianism if  we  limit  the  term  useful  strictly  to  that  kind 
of  usefulness  which  is  the  inevitable  consequence  of 
good  actions,  provided  we  agree  concerning  a  further 
definition  of  good.  Consider,  however,  that  the  main 
motive  perhaps  of  all  immoral  actions  is  the  presumed 
usefulness,  and  so  far  as  the  acting  individual  is  con- 


IN  REPLY  TO  MR.  SALTER.  107 

cerned,  not  unfrequently  the  actual  usefulness  of  the 
consequences  attending  immoral  actions,  and  you  will 
confess  that  it  is  one  of  the  most  important  duties  of 
ethics  to  set  us  on  our  guard  against  the  temptations  of 
an  imagined  utility,  and  to  inform  us  that  what  appears 
useful  is  not  always  useful,  that  what  is  useful  now, 
may  become  very  obnoxious  in  the  future,  and  that  what 
is  useful  to  one  individual  may  be  detrimental  to  others. 
There  are  many  phases  of  the  useful  which  ethics  can- 
not and  does  not  recommend,  and  we  must  have  a 
criterion  for  that  kind  of  usefulness  which  is  desirable. 
This  criterion  alone  is  the  standard  of  moral  good- 
ness ;  and  the  character  of  every  ethics  depends  upon 
what  is  to  be  considered  as  this  criterion. 

It  is  characteristic  of  almost  all  utilitarian  systems 
(if  they  enter  into  the  subject  at  all)  that  this  crite- 
rion is  nothing  that  transcends  the  usual  conception 
of  utility.  The  criterion  of  utilitarianism  is  usually 
defined  as  the  greatest  happiness  for  the  greatest  num- 
ber. Wherever  a  conflict  arises  between  two  or  more 
things  that  are  useful,  utilitarians  propose  to  give 
preference  to  the  greater  amount  of  usefulness :  the 
quantity  of  usefulness  has  to  decide,  not  the  quality. 

Quantity  or  intensity  of  happiness,  and  quantity  of 
usefulness,  can  as  little  constitute  moral  goodness  as  a 
majority  vote  can  in  moral  questions  decide  as  to  what 
is  right  or  wrong.  If,  however,  the  quality  of  different 
kinds  of  utility  were  to  be  considered  as  the  determin- 
ing factor  of  goodness,  the  useful  as  such  would  cease 
to  be  the  ultimate  criterion  of  ethics,  and  that  quality 
would  have  to  be  considered  as  the  ultimate  test  of 
goodness  which  makes  this  or  that  act  ethically  pre- 
ferable. 

So  long  as  this  quality,  which  gives  to  one  kind  of 


108  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

acts  with  useful  consequences  the  value  we  call  moral 
goodness,  is  not  singled  out  as  the  characteristically 
moral  feature,  I  shall  continue  to  maintain  that  utili- 
tarianism, and  most  so  hedonistic  utilitarianism,  slurs 
over  the  difference  between  moral  goodness  and  ma- 
terial usefulness. 

MONISM    AND    THE    ETHICAL    MOVEMENT. 

Mr.  Salter  says  : 

"  What  I  had  at  least  hoped  for,  was  an  exposition  of  the  way 
in  which  the  monistic  world-conception  would  serve  as  a  basis  of 
ethics,  for  to  me  personally  at  any  rate,  and  I  think,  to  many  more, 
this  would  have  been  of  considerable  interest  ;  but  monism  is 
classed  along  with  agnosticism  and  materialism  as  one  of  the 
thought-constructions  of  theorizing  philosophers." 

My  lectures  on  the  ethical  problem  were  intended 
to  discuss  the  principle  of  ethics  and  its  dependence 
upon  a  conception  of  the  world.  They  were  not  in- 
tended as  an  exposition  of  the  ethics  of  positivism  or 
of  monism.  It  is  not  an  exhaustive  work  on  ethics, 
but  a  modest  pamphlet  ventilating  the  problem  of  eth- 
ics. Nevertheless,  the  solution  of  the  ethical  problem 
is  sufficiently  indicated  so  that  the  reader  can  form  a 
clear  conception  as  to  the  basis,  the  construction,  the 
plan  and  the  scope  of  that  system  of  ethics  which  we 
defend.  But  Mr.  Salter  should  not  be  astonished  to 
find  monism  classed  along  with  agnosticism  and  ma- 
terialism among  the  world-conceptions  of  theorizing 
philosophers.  Are  there  not  many  philosophies  pre- 
tending to  be  monistic  ?  Shall  we  accept  whatever 
goes  by  the  name  of  monism  ?  Or  is  it  advisable  to 
warn  against  all  philosophies  except  our  own  ?  Our 
own  view  is  certainly  not  exempt  from  criticism.  It  has 
to  be  classed,  and  I  have  purposely  classed  it  among 
the  theories  to  be  criticised.     It  must  be  considered 


LV  REPLY  TO  MR.  SALTER.  109 

as  a  mere  theory,  until  its  character  as  being  a  state- 
ment of  systematized  facts  is  proved. 

A  distinction  must  be  made  between  1)  the  posi- 
tive and  monistic  philosophy  that  is  growing  now  in  the 
minds  of  men,  and  2)  the  monism  and  positivism  which 
we  represent.  There  are  a  great  number  of  philos- 
ophers and  scientists  who  work  in  the  same  line  as  our- 
selves, and  many  truths  are,  with  more  or  less  lucidity, 
pronounced  independently  by  different  scholars,  some- 
times in  terms  which  seem  to  contradict  one  another. 
I  am  sure  that  if  we  did  not  contribute  to  the  growth 
of  this  monistic  world-conception,  it  would  neverthe- 
less develop.  We  do  not  create  it ;  it  is  not  an  inven- 
tion of  ours  to  which  we  have  any  patent  right.  All 
we  can  do  is  to  hasten  its  development  to  mature  its 
growth,  to  concentrate  the  many  different  aspirations 
that  tend  to  the  same  aim. 

Should  the  special  work  we  are  doing  in  exhibiting 
our  monistic  view  of  the  universe  happen  to  be  radi- 
cally wrong,  it  will  pass  away.  The  constructive  work 
we  have  been  doing  will  in  that  case  be  transient,  and 
its  usefulness  will  be  confined  to  having  served  as  a 
stimulus  to  thought. 

The  monistic  philosophy  that  is  growing  in  man- 
kind is  an  ideal.  Our  special  and  individual  view  is 
an  attempt  to  work  out  the  realization  of  the  ideal. 
But  the  fact  that  we  consider  our  view  as  an  attempt 
to  realize  the  ideal  philosophy  of  the  future,  does  not 
raise  our  special  representation  and  elaboration  of  it 
above  criticism. 

A  similar  discrimination  must  be  made  between 
the  ethical  movement  and  the  ethical  societies.  There 
is  an  ethical  movement  preparing  itself  among  man- 
kind,   and    the    ethical    societies    are   one    important 


no  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

symptom  of  this  movement,  but  they  are  not  the 
sole  symptom.  *  The  ethical  movement  is  percep- 
tible also  in  the  churches  ;  it  is  perceptible  in  the 
Secular  Unions  and  in  the  political  life  of  our  nation. 
The  ethical  societies,  it  seems  to  me,  might  become 
and  they  ought  to  become  the  centre  of  the  ethical 
movement ;  and  they  would  become  its  centre,  if  they 
understood  the  signs  of  the  times. 

The  ethical  movement  and  the  new  philosophy  of 
positive  monism  are  closely  allied  with  each  other. 
Indeed,  I  consider  them  as  the  two  main  character- 
istic features  of  the  spiritual  life  of  the  future.  Posi- 
tive monism  in  order  to  be  complete,  must  be  practic- 
ally applied,  it  must  become  a  religion.  It  becomes 
a  religion  by  bringing  about  an  ethical  movement 
which  bases  morality  on  the  facts  of  life,  so  that  the 
ethics  of  supernaturalism  are  replaced  by  natural 
ethics. 

The  ethical  movement  cannot  refuse  to  go  hand 
in  hand  with  the  philosophy  of  the  times.  It  need  not 
commit  itself  to  this  or  that  particular  representation 
of  monism,  but  it  must  upon  the  whole  recognize  the 
basic  principles  of  the  coming  religion  of  positive  mo- 
nism ;  for  if  it  does  not,  the  movement  will  be  of  no 
avail,  and  can  be  of  no  use  to  future  generations  to 
whom  the  old  and  antiquated  views  have  passed  away. 

Our  desire  is  to  make  the  leaders  of  the  ethical 
society  understand  that  this  is  the  vital  problem  of  the 
day.  And  here  we  come  to  the  main  point  of  our  con- 
troversy; viz.,  the  question  whether  we  can  have  ethics 
without  having  a  basis  of  ethics. 


IN  REPLY  TO  MR.  SALTER.  m 

THE    BASIS    OF  ETHICS    AND  THE    LEADING  PRINCIPLE 
IN    ETHICS. 

Mr.  Salter  says  that  I  confound  two  questions  : 

"  [First,]  what  is  the  true  world-conception,  upon  which  every 
special  science  may,  in  a  broad  and  rather  loose  sense,  be  said  to 
be  based  ;  and  secondly,  what  is  the  ultimate  principle  in  ethics 
itself  ?  The  second  question  might  be  more  distinctly  stated  as 
follows  :  Not  what  is  the  basis  0/" ethics,  in  the  sense  of  "a  philo- 
sophical view  back  "  of  it  (a  theology  or  philosophy),  but  what  is 
the  basic  principle  in  ethics  ?  Ethics,  in  the  popular  sense,  being 
a  system  of  rules  for  conduct,  it  is  necessary,  if  it  is  to  be  treated 
scientifically,  that  there  should  be  some  supreme  rule,  by  their 
agreement  or  disagreement  with  which  all  lesser  rules  should  be 
judged." 

It  appears  to  me  that  I  do  not  confound  these  two 
questions ;  yet  I  am  confident  that  I  see  their  intimate 
connection.  Our  proposition  is  that  the  leading*  prin- 
ciple in  ethics  must  be  derived  from  the  philosophical 
view  back  of  it.  The  world-conception  a  man  has,  can 
alone  give  character  to  the  principle  in  his  ethics. 
Without  any  world-conception  we  can  have  no  ethics 
(i.  e.,  ethics  in  the  highest  sense  of  the  word).  We 
may  act  morally  like  dreamers  or  somnambulists,  but 
our  ethics  would  in  that  case  be  a  mere  moral  instinct 
without  any  rational  insight  into  its  raison  d'etre. 

If  there  is  any  difference  between  morality  and 
ethics,  it  is  this,  that  morality  is  the  habit  of  acting  in 
a  certain  way  which,  according  to  our  view  of  the  world 
we  live  in,  is  considered  as  good  ;  while  ethics  (the 
science  of  morality)  is  the  conscious  recognition  of  the 
reasons  which  make  an  action  good  or  bad.  A  bear 
that  sacrifices  her  life  in  the  defense  of  her  cubs  acts 
morally  according  to  our  view  ;  but  her  action  is  mainly 

*  The  word  "leading  "  appears  to  me  preferable  to  "  basic  "  in  this  con- 
nection. 


H2  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

the  result  of  impulse.  The  morality  of  animals  appears 
almost  as  a  blind  reflex  action  when  compared  to  the 
conscious  self-sacrifice  of  an  ethical  man  who  acts  de- 
liberately, knowing  the  reason  why. 

If  I  rightly  understand  Mr.  Salter's  proposition, 
the  Societies  for  Ethical  Culture  should  according  to 
my  terminology  be  called  "Societies  for  Moral  culture. " 

Mr.  Salter  indeed  emphasises  this  idea  in  the  chap- 
ter of  his  Ethical  Religion  to  which  he  calls  my  atten- 
tion.    He  says  : 

"  The  basis  of  our  movement  is  not  a  theory  of  morality,  but 
morality  itself."     (p.  302.) 

Is  not  Mr.  Salter's  meaning  this  ?  "  Practical  mo- 
rality must  be  the  object  (and  not  the  basis)  of  the  eth- 
ical movement.  Theories  have  no  value  unless  they 
are  made  practical  by  application."  If  this  is  Mr. 
Salter's  theory  we  agree  with  him,  but  we  should  add  : 
"No  practical  work  can  efficiently  be  done  without 
a  theory.  The  result  of  the  work  will  greatly  de- 
pend upon  having  the  right  theory." 

In  another  passage  Mr.  Salter  says  : 

"  We  do  not  propound  new  views  of  the  Universe.  We  wish 
rather  a  new  sense  of  duty."    (p.  292.) 

Are  not  Christian  and  Jewish  preachers  constantly 
at  work  to  make  our  sense  of  duty  more  sensitive  ?  If 
that  is  Mr.  Salter's  meaning,  he  does  the  same  work 
that  all  honest  clergymen  are  doing.  David  cried  for 
the  renewal  of  a  right  spirit  within  him  (Psalm  li,  10), 
and  Ezekiel  described  his  work  with  the  words  : 

"  A  new  heart  also  will  I  give  you  and  a  new  spirit  will  I  put 
within  you.     (36,  26.) 

For  preaching  "a  new  sense  of  duty"  in  the  sense 
of  an  unceasing  moral  progress  and  of  a  constant  re- 


IN  REPLY  TO  MR.  SALTER.  113 

newal  of  moral  purposes,  there  would  have  been  no 
need  of  leaving  the  churches.  Yet  if  by  a  new  sense 
of  duty  is  meant  an  entirely  new  morality,  different  in 
kind  from  the  old  morality,  how  can  it  be  proposed 
unless  the  basis  of  ethics  be  radically  changed  at  the 
same  time,  or  at  least  differently  applied  ?  In  no  case 
can  we  ignore  it. 

I  do  not  doubt  but  that  humanity  has  made  a  great 
moral  progress,  I  do  not  doubt  but  that  the  average 
morality  among  our  grandchildren  will  be  higher  than 
is  the  average  morality  of  the  present  age,  but  I  am 
also  firmly  confident  that  we  shall  have  to  preach 
the  same  morality  over  again  to  later  generations. 
The  substance  of  our  morality  will  not  be  changed. 
That  which  must  be  changed  is  our  conception  of  mo- 
rality, in  so  far  as  it  is  to  be  based  not  upon  a  supernat- 
ural authority,  but  upon  the  authority  of  natural  laws. 
We  have  to  free  ourselves  from  the  ethics  of  supernat- 
uralism,  we  must  overcome  the  mysticism  of  the  in- 
tuitionalists'  view ;  we  must  be  led  out  into  clearness. 
If  we  understand  morality,  its  natural  conditions,  its 
growth  and  purpose,  we  shall  the  better  be  prepared 
to  obey  the  moral  commands. 

The  most  important  moral  rules  are  not  to  be  altered. 
So  far  as  I  can  see,  some  of  them  will  be  altered  as  little 
as  our  arithmetical  tables  can  be  changed.  Our  sense 
of  duty  may  become  more  enlightened  and  more  sensi- 
tive, but  its  contents  will  remain  about  the  same.  If 
we  read  the  properly  moral  injunctions  of  Confucius, 
or  of  Epictetus  and  Marcus  Aurelius,  or  of  the  Hebrew 
prophets,  are  they  not,  aside  from  a  few  odd  expres- 
sions due  to  the  speech  of  their  time  or  to  awkward 
translation,  quite  as  modern  as  the  sermons  of  a  lec- 
turer of  the  societies  for  ethical  culture  ?     There  is 


1 14  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

the  same  earnestness,  the  same  impressiveness,  the 
personal  tone  of  fatherly  instruction,  the  appeal  to  the 
noblest  motives  of  the  understanding  and  the  heart. 

How  is  it,  that  these  old  books  have  remained  so 
modern  ?  Because  the  subject  of  their  exhortations 
is  ever  new,  and  the  same  things  have  to  be  repeated 
again  to  every  generation. 

Mr.  Salter  says  that  the  ethical  movement  is  not 
devoted  to  antisupernaturalism.  Supernaturalists  not 
only  believe  in  a  supernatural  deity,  they  also  base 
their  ethics  on  the  revelation  of  a  transcendent  God. 
Every  attempt  at  humanizing  ethics  must  from  the 
standpoint  of  supernaturalism  be  considered  as  a 
superstitious  presumption,  and  1  have  strong  doubts 
whether  any  serious  believer  in  supernaturalism  will 
ever  join  an  ethical  society.  One  kind  of  supernatural- 
ism only  can  be  imagined  to  be  compatible  with  the 
views  propounded  by  the  ethical  lecturers,  viz.,  that 
in  which  the  idea  of  God  has  no  practical  meaning. 
He  alone,  to  whom  his  belief  in  supernaturalism  is 
ethically  indifferent,  will  agree  with  Mr.  Salter  that  the 
ethical  societies  are  not  devoted  to  antisupernatural- 
ism. 

Mr.  Salter  looks  upon  supernaturalism,  and  indeed 
upon  any  other  basis  of  ethics  not  as  a  real  basis,  but 
as  a  mere  interpretation  of  ethics.  He  speaks  of  first 
principles  in  ethics,  but  how  does  he  come  into  their 
possession,  unless  he.  derives  them,  if  not  consciously, 
then  unconsciously,  from  his  conception  of  the  world  ? 
The  leading  principle  of  ethics  must  always  be  the  ex- 
pression of  a  conception  of  the  world.  This  is  the 
point  Mr.  Salter  does  not  recognize.  If  he  recognized 
it,  he  would  not  so  repeatedly  complain  about  a  lack 
of  clearness  as  to  what  a  basis  of  ethics  means. 


IN  REPLY  TO  MR.  SALTER.  115 

FACTS,    HOW    THEY    TEACH. 

It  has  been  emphasized  in  the  three  lectures  on 
The  Ethical  Problem  that  ethics  must  be  based  on 
facts.  With  reference  to  this  principle  Mr.  Salter 
says  : 

"  What  then  is  the  scientific  world-conception,  the  true  basis 
of  ethics  ?  I  confess  to  having  been  completely  taken  aback,  when 
as  I  read  on  I  discovered  that  Dr.  Carus  declined  to  answer  the 
question,  contenting  himself  with  vaguely  saying  that  the  true  phi- 
losophy will  be  one  which  is  in  accordance  with  facts,  which  seems 
equivalent  to  saying  that  the  scientific  system  will  be  a  scientific 
system." 

The  principle  that  the  new  ethics  must  be  based  on 
facts,  is  certainly  so  obvious  that  it  must  appear  as  a 
self-evident  redundant  truism.  So  all  the  most  complex 
arithmetical  theories  may  be  shown  to  be  mere  equa- 
tions, they  are  tautologies  which  will  appear  to  every 
one  who  understands  them,  just  as  self-evident  as 
the  equation  i-f-i  =2.  And  yet  it  is  sometimes  quite 
difficult  to  analyze  and  understand  such  a  simple  prop- 
osition as  that  ethics  must  be  based  on  facts. 

Although  Mr.  Salter  considers  the  proposition -that 
"the  scientific  world-conception,  the  true  basis  of 
ethics,"  must  be  based  on  facts  as  sufficiently  obvious 
as  to  be  tautological,  he  makes  objection  to  it  as 
being  something  in  the  air.     He  says  : 

' '  It  has  long  been  plain  to  me  that  resting  ethics  on  our  mat- 
ter-of-fact wishes  or  instincts  is  not  establishing  ethics,  but  under- 
mining it  and  leaving  it  a  something  "  in  the  air." 

Does  Mr.  Salter  mean  that  "basing  ethics  on  facts  " 
denotes  an  exact  imitation  of  the  facts  we  experience  ? 
Does  he  think,  that  if  we  witness  a  murder,  we  are 
thereby  invited  to  commit  a  murder  also? 


n6  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

I  said  (as  Mr.  Salter  declares  "in  one  clear-sighted 
passage  ")  that 

' '  Ethics  is  not  ready  made,  it  is  not  the  one  or  the  other  fact 
among  all  the  realities  of  the  universe.  Ethics  is  our  attitude  to- 
ward the  facts  of  reality.     (The  Ethical  Problem,  p.  18.) 

With  reference  to  this  statement  Mr.  Salter  says : 

"  The  latter  remark  seems  to  imply  that  the  same  facts  may 
be  looked  at  from  different  attitudes  ;  if  so  how  are  the  facts  them- 
selves to  decide  which  attitude  we  shall  take  ?  " 

Certainly  we  can  take  different  attitudes  toward 
facts.  But  the  proper  attitude  toward  facts  can  be 
learned  from  the  facts  alone.  Facts  teach  us  for  in- 
stance the  laws  of  health.  Mr.  Salter  suggests  that 
any  one  might  say,  "  I  do  not  care  about  my  health." 
But  in  that  case  the  laws  of  health  are  not  (as  Mr. 
Salter  declares,)  meaningless  to  him.  He  will  soon 
find  out  the  meaning  of  the  laws  of  health.  Facts  will 
teach  him  to  care  for  his  health,  and  if  he  does  not, 
nature  will  soon  deprive  him  of  health  and  life. 

I  happen  to  know  a  sad  case  of  my  own  experience. 
A  strong  and  healthy  young  man,  a  jovial  companion 
and  of  social  habits,  defied  the  laws  of  health,  and 
could  do  so  for  some  time  on  account  of  his  strength 
and  youth.  I  plainly  remember  that  he  once  said  to 
me  almost  in  the  same  words  in  which  Mr.  Salter 
puts  it :  "I  do  not  care  about  the  laws  of  health,  nor 
do  I  care  for  a  long  life.  It  is  not  pleasant  to  grow 
so  very  old.  I  would  rather  live  so  as  to  please  myself, 
even  though  my  life  be  shorter  by  ten  years."  A 
year  elapsed  and  he  fell  sick  never  to  recover  again. 
His  parents  buried  him  in  the  bloom  of  his  life. 

Facts  are  not  mute  ;  they  teach  us.  Our  knowl- 
edge of  facts  is  called  experience,  and  from  knowledge 
of  facts  alone  the  principles  of  action  can  be  derived. 


IN  REPLY  TO  MR,  SALTER.  117 

Mr.  Salter  is  far  from  basing  ethics  upon  the  solid 
ground  of  facts.  He  combines  with  ethics  the  idea 
that  it  must  be  something  absolute.  In  his  lecture, 
"Is  There  Anything  Absolute  About  Morality?"  he 
says  : 

"  If  by  morality  is  meant  only  the  actual  conduct  of  men,  we 
have  plainly  to  negative  our  question,  and  say  there  is  nothing  ab- 
solute about  morality,  since  the  conduct  of  men  has  been  after  any 
but  a  fixed,  unvarying  type."     (pp.  83,  84.) 

Mr.  Salter  finds  the  absolute  of  morality  in  con- 
science. The  commands  of  conscience,  Mr.  Salter 
declares,  are  absolute.  But  have  there  not  been  erring 
consciences  which  prove  that  conscience  is  anything 
but  an  absolute  authority  ?  Mr.  Salter  evades  the  dif- 
ficulty by  declaring  that  the  inquisitors  and  other  men 
who  committed  crimes  in  perfect  faith  that  they  were 
doing  a  good  work,  had  no  conscience  at  all.  Concern- 
ing the  barbarous  treatment  of  the  Canaanites,  he 
goes  so  far  as  to  maintain : 

1 '  I  doubt  if  Moses,  or  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  Israeli tish 
legend  ever  seriously  asked  himself,  What  is  right  ?"     (p.  91.) 

In  a  certain  sense  there  is  something  absolute  in 
ethics,  although  we  should  not  call  it  "  absolute."  We 
should  prefer  to  say,  there  is  something  objective  in 
ethics ;  and  the  objective  element  in  ethics  makes  it 
possible  for  ethics  to  become  a  science  and  for  moral- 
ity to  be  based  on  science  i.  e.,  a  systematized  state- 
ment of  facts. 

THE  MORAL  LAW  AND  MORAL  RULES. 

For  the  sake  of  clearness  let  us  distinguish  be- 
tween the  moral  law  and  moral  rules.  By  the  moral 
law  we  understand  a  law  of  nature  which  is  as  rigid 
and  objective  as  are  all  other  laws  of  nature.     By 


n8  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

moral  rules  we  understand  the  formulation  of  certain 
commands,  based  upon  a  more  or  less  comprehensive 
knowledge  of  the  moral  law. 

The  moral  law  operates  in  nature  with  the  same 
unfailing  exactness  as  does,  for  instance,  the  law  of 
gravitation.  If  a  stone  is  without  support,  it  falls  to 
the  ground  whether  we  wish  it  to  fall  or  not.  If  the 
members  of  a  society  infringe  upon  the  moral  law, 
they  will  reap  the  evils  consequent  thereupon.  The 
course  of  events  follows  with  the  same  necessity  in  the 
one  case  as  in  the  other,  in  the  realms  of  inorganic  as 
well  as  of  organized  nature. 

Organized  nature  develops  feeling,  and  feeling  de- 
velops mind.  The  acts  of  beings  endowed  with  mind 
take  place  with  the  same  necessity  in  a  given  situa- 
tion, as  does  the  fall  of  a  stone  under  certain  circum- 
stances. But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  aside  from 
the  intensity  of  impulsive  force  in  the  different  inclina- 
tions for  this  or  that  course  of  action,  the  intelligence 
of  beings  endowed  with  mind  has  become  the  main 
factor  in  the  determination  of  their  acts.  A  cannon 
ball,  shot  under  exactly  the  same  circumstances,  will 
take  exactly  the  same  course,  and  a  man  of  a  certain 
character  will  be  guided  by  the  same  motives  in  ex- 
actly the  same  way.  But  we  must  bear  in  mind,  that 
if  the  same  man  happens  to  come  a  second  time  into 
the  same  situation,  he  is  no  longer  the  same  man. 
The  former  experience  has  modified  his  character,  be 
it  ever  so  little.  He  has  profited  by  that  experience 
either  for  a  repetition  or  an  avoidance  of  the  act.  And 
the  more  he  has  profited  by  experience,  the  freer  he 
will  become,  i.  e.,  the  less  will  he  be  dependent  upon 
the  situation,  and  the  more  decisive  will  be  his  intelli- 
gence in  determining  his  will. 


IN  REPLY  TO  MR.   SALTER  119 

The  method  of  intelligent  action  is  that  of  formu- 
lating knowledge  of  natural  laws  in  the  shape  of  com- 
mands. All  knowledge  is  a  description  or  systematized 
formulation  of  natural  facts ;  and  all  intelligent  action 
is  an  application  of  knowledge.  If  we  pursue  certain 
purposes,  how  can  we,  for  our  own  use  as  well  as  for 
the  education  of  others,  state  our  knowledge  better 
than  in  the  shape  of  rules  ?  The  rules  of  architecture 
help  us  in  the  construction  of  a  house.  But  these 
rules  of  architecture  are  nothing  but  the  knowledge 
of  building  materials  and  of  the  methods  of  combin- 
ing them  to  provide  people  with  dwellings.  The 
rules  of  morality  help  us  in  building  up  our  lives,  so 
that  our  individual  existence  is  not  antagonistic  to  the 
growth  of  society ;  but  it  furthers  the  development  of 
humanity  in  the  sphere  of  our  activity,  and  will  after 
our  death  continue  to  be  a  blessing  unto  mankind. 
But  the  rules  of  morality  are  based  upon  the  moral 
law  not  otherwise  than  the  rules  of  architecture  are 
derived  from  our  knowledge  of  natural  facts.  The 
rules  we  set  up,  may  be  right  or  wrong,  they  can  show 
a  greater  or  smaller  comprehension  of  the  nature  of 
things,  at  any  rate  they  are  ultimately  based  upon  the 
facts  of  nature,  and  alone  by  an  investigation  of  the 
facts  of  nature  can  we  become  assured  of  their  truth. 

THE    GROWTH    OF    CONSCIENCE. 

Mr.  Salter  in  declaring  that  ethics  cannot  be 
based  on  facts,  does  not  sufficiently  appreciate  the 
truth  that  experience  actually  teaches  man.  Man  is 
educated  in  the  severe  school  of  natural  facts,  ruled 
by  the  unalterable  law  of  cause  and  effect.  Man's 
whole  existence  and  also  his  moral  existence,  his  con- 
science is  a  product  of  this  education. 


120  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

Is  conscience  truly  beyond  the  pale  of  science  ? 
If  it  were,  we  should  have  to  accept  the  mysticism 
of  its  existence.  Let  us  see  how  man's  conscience 
originates. 

A  child  observes  the  behavior  of  his  parents,  he 
listens  to  their  instruction.  He  imbibes  almost  un- 
consciously with  his  first  impressions  the  ethical  na- 
ture of  his  mother.  He  notices  the  disdain  of  his 
father,  for  instance,  when  somebody  told  him  a  lie, 
he  witnesses  the  contempt  with  which  the  liar  was 
alluded  to  or  thought  of.  All  these  many  experiences 
are  implanted  into  the  soil  of  an  inherited  disposition 
which  has  come  down  from  ancestors,  swayed  by  the 
same  motives  and  acting  in  a  similar  way. 

Whenever  a  temptation  arises  to  tell  a  lie,  all  the 
memories  of  former  experiences  that  are  of  a  similar 
nature  will  be  more  or  less  dimly  awakened.  Not  the 
moral  injunctions  of  his  parents  and  teachers  alone 
will  be  awakened,  but  also  the  evil  examples  of  his  bad 
comrades.  There  is  perhaps  one  among  them  who  lied 
and  he  succeeded  with  his  lie  :  he  extricated  himself 
by  a  lie  out  of  an  awkward  situation.  Such  instances 
are  dangerous,  for  they  corrupt  the  souls  of  the  weak. 
Yet  there  is  most  likely  also  another  instance  of  some 
one  who  heaped  shame  upon  himself ;  the  lie  was  found 
out  and  his  plight  was  changed  from  bad  to  worse.  In 
addition  to  these  reminiscences  other  considerations 
awaken,  such  as  :  Even  if  the  lie  be  not  found  out,  I 
should  in  the  future  have  to  class  myself  among  liars  ! 

Conscience  is  by  no  means  a  simple  and  unanalyz- 
able  fact  ;  it  is  not  at  all  one  single  voice.  Conscience 
is  the  combined  experience  of  innumerable  lessons, 
taught  us  by  our  teachers'  injunctions  and  by  ob- 
servation of  surrounding  events. 


v  IN  REPLY  TO  MR.   SALTER.  121 

Conscience  is  as  little  a  faculty,  having  a  special 
seat  or  organ  in  the  brain  as  is  for  instance  memory, 
imagination,  or  will,  or  any  other  abstract  concept 
designating  a  special  attitude,  phase,  or  quality  of  the 
mind.  The  term  "conscience"  is  an  abstraction 
which  covers  a  special  group  of  psychical  activities. 
Conscience  in  any  other  sense  is  a  ghost,  and  to  be- 
lieve in  it  is  a  superstition.  It  does  not  appear  that 
Mr.  Salter  adopts  the  ghost-idea  of  conscience,  but  it 
seems  to  me  that  he  fails  to  see  what  conscience  ac- 
tually is.  By  conscience  we  understand  the  sum-total 
of  all  those  impulses  which  serve  for  the  regulation  of 
human  action.  But  there  is  no  conscience  that  de- 
mon-like lives  as  a  mysterious  being  somewhere  in  the 
abodes  of  the  soul. 

If  man's  life  consisted  of  single  and  isolated  mo- 
ments, he  would  have  no  choice  but  to  obey  the  im- 
pulse cf  the  moment.  Since  his  life  consists  of  mo- 
ments that  are  coherent  forming  all  together  a  unity, 
and  since  before  obeying  an  impulse  that  prompts  to 
action,  man  can  and  will  have  to  take  into  considera- 
tion other  impulses,  a  choice  is  offered  and  he  will 
naturally  choose  to  follow  that  impulse  which  prom- 
ises the  greatest  amount  of  pleasure.  This  is  the  be- 
ginning of  rational  action.  Man's  life,  however,  is 
not  only  a  complex  unity  of  many  coherent  moments, 
it  is  also  interwoven  with  the  lives  of  his  fellow- 
beings.  His  actions  affect  others ;  and  in  whatever 
way  he  affects  others,  they  will  again  affect  him. 
The  principles  of  his  conduct  are  brought  home  to 
him.  He  may  try  to  evade  the  consequences  of  his 
actions.  Exceptionally  he  may  apparently  succeed, 
but  not  in  the  long  run.  He  can  as  little  escape  the 
consequences  of  his  actions  as  he  can  annul  any  law 


122  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

of  nature.  His  life  is  intimately  bound  up  with  the 
lives  of  all  his  fellow  beings  ;  and  sooner  or  later  the 
truth  will  dawn  upon  him  that  his  life  is  only  the  part 
of  a  greater  whole.  He  will  die,  but  the  greater  whole 
will  contiue,  and  the  worth  of  his  life  will  have  to  be 
judged  in  the  end  by  that  which  remains  of  his  actions 
after  death.  He  will  hear  the  men  praised  whose 
lives  were  a  blessing  to  mankind,  he  will  see  their 
deeds  continue  working  good  and  perhaps  preserving 
their  individual  memory.  He  will  learn  to  detest  the 
man  who  leaves  an  inheritance  of  curses.  The  ex- 
amples of  the  one  as  well  as  the  other  are  most  im- 
pressive and  will  contribute  much  in  forming  the  con- 
science of  man's  soul. 

Conscience  does  not  well  up  from  a  mysterious 
source,  but  it  grows  from  natural  conditions,  and  for 
that  reason  it  is  not  at  all  infallible.  The  conscience 
of  a  man  well  instructed  and  surrounded  by  noble 
examples,  is  different  from  the  conscience  of  the  un- 
educated. The  conscience  of  a  savage  is  often  grossly 
mistaken.  The  most  shameful  acts  are  performed 
often  against  all  natural  inclinations  not  for  the  sake 
of  gaining  some  personal  advantage  but  solely  because 
they  are  erroneously  considered  as  "right." 

In  a  certain  sense  it  is  proper  to  proclaim  that  man 
should  obey  the  behests  of  his  conscience ;  but  con- 
science is  not  one  special  voice  in  man.  It  cannot  be 
compared  to  a  person,  although  figuratively  we  may 
call  it  the  God  in  us,  the  prophetic  soul,  or  the  judge 
of  our  actions.  It  is  not  rounded  off  as  are  individual 
beings ;  but  consists  of  many  thoughts,  the  mean- 
while accusing  or  excusing  one  another  (Rom  2,  15). 

One  most  essential  part  of  man's  conscience  must 
be  the  sincere  desire  to  criticize  the  different  proposi- 


IN  REPLY  TO  MR.   SALTER.  123 

tions  of  conscience.  Conscience  must  not  be  blind, 
but  its  principle  feature  must  be  that  of  examination. 
And  exact  examination  is  not  possible  without  knowl- 
edge. Thus  it  is  an  essential  principle  of  a  well  di- 
rected conscience  to  aspire  for  more  knowledge,  for 
more  light,  so  as  to  be  able  to  judge  the  better.  A 
healthy  conscience  is  constantly  growing. 

It  cannot  be  denied,  that  upon  the  whole  the  voices 
of  conscience,  i.  e.,  those  impulses  which  lift  man 
above  the  transient  advantages  and  the  petty  egotism 
of  his  limited  individual  interests,  naturally  tend  to 
preserve  his  soul ;  they  find  approbation  by  his  fellow 
men  and  let  him  partake  of  the  superindividual  life  of 
humanity.  According  to  natural  law  the  immoral 
element  of  humanity  is  constantly  discarded  as  unfit 
to  survive.  However,  the  moral  aspirations  that  tend 
to  bring  man  into  harmony  with  the  conditions  of  his 
existence  especially  with  the  social  relations  of  man- 
kind, preserve  his  soul,  and  must  in  this  way  very 
soon  acquire  a  greater  strength  than  the  lower  desires 
of  his  animal  nature. 

The  impulses  of  man's  animal  nature,  hunger, 
thirst,  acquisitiveness  of  all  kinds,  i.  e.,  the  impulses 
arising  from  the  wants  of  his  individual  existence,  ap- 
pear to  originate  within  himself,  they  are  considered 
as  expressions  of  his  individual  existence.  But  the 
superindividual  voices  of  his  conscience  seem  to  come 
to  him  from  the  outside  of  his  surroundings.  They 
teach  him  to  restrain  the  animal  impulses  and  to  set 
himself  in  accord  with  those  conditions  which  are  more 
comprehensive  and  more  lasting  than  his  individual 
existence.  They  bring  him  in  union  with  that  greater 
whole  of  which  his  individual  existence  is  but  a  small 
part  and  a  transient  phase. 


124  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

In  this  way  the  many  promptings  to  action  in  the 
soul  of  man  are  mainly  divided  into  two  classes :  the 
first  we  call  egotistic  motives  ;  they  urge  man  to  follow 
his  natural  appetites ;  and  the  second  we  will  call  the 
superindividual  aspirations  ;  they  keep  man's  natural 
appetites  in  check  and  teach  man  regard  for  the 
greater  whole  to  which  he  belongs.  The  former  ap- 
pear to  him  as  expressions  of  his  individual  will  and 
the  latter  as  manifestations  of  an  outside  power  higher, 
nobler,  and  stronger  than  himself.  The  latter  alone 
form  that  which  is  generally  called  conscience.  Con- 
science, accordingly,  is  justly  considered  as  invested 
with  authority  and  its  promptings  appear  naturally  in 
the  shape  of  commands. 

The  recognition  of  this  authority  for  the  purpose 
of  regulating  conduct  in  accordance  with  its  laws,  is 
the  beginning  of  all  ethics ;  and  thus  it  is  this  authority 
which  represents  the  basis  of  ethics. 

The  authority  which  finds  expression  in  man's 
conscience,  however,  is  by  no  means  beyond  the  scope 
of  science.  We  can  investigate  it  and  we  must  in- 
vestigate it.  The  more  we  understand  its  origin,  the 
better  we  shall  be  able  to  judge  of  its  importance  and 
the  less  we  shall  be  liable  to  be  guided  astray  by  an 
erring  conscience. 


SCIENCE  AND  ETHICS. 


To  base  ethics  on  facts,  to  derive  the  rules  of  our 
attitude  toward  facts  from  experience,  to  shape  our 
ideals,  not  from  the  airy  stuff  of  something  beyond 
the  ken  of  science,  but  in  accordance  with  laws  de- 
rived from  reality,  this  is  (as  I  said  in  my  first  lecture) 
the  line  of  demarcation  between  the  old  and  the  new 
ethics.  Mr.  Salter  by  rejecting  science  places  him- 
self upon  the  antiquated  ground  of  intuitionalism.  I 
know  that  he  rejects  the  old  fashioned  supernatural- 
ism,  but  indeed  his  view  (if  expressed  with  consist- 
ency) ought  to  appear  as  supernaturalism.     He  says  : 

"Conscience  is  not  knowledge, — for  knowledge  is  of  what  is, 
and  conscience  is  the  thought  of  what  ought  to  be." 

And  in  other  passages  (p.  304)  : 

"These  moral  laws  of  our  being  are  so  close  and  constitu- 
tional to  us  that  the  very  existence  of  virtue  is  bound  up  with  a 
recognition  of  them." 

"Who  can  give  a  reason  for  the  supreme  rule  ?  Indeed,  no 
serious  man  wants  a  reason.  The  supreme  command  appeals 
immediately  to  the  human  mind  ;  it  is  an  assertion  of  the  human 
mind." 

"  Amiel,  '  the  sweet-souled  Genevan  mystic, '  says  :  '  It  is  not 
history  which  teaches  righteousness  to  the  conscience  ;  it  is  con- 
science which  teaches  righteousness  to  history.  The  actual  is 
corrupting  ;  it  is  we  who  rectify  it  by  loyalty  to  the  ideal.'  " 

Might  these  expressions  not  occur  in  any  work  of 
an  intuitionalist  ?     Is  not  in  this  way,  by  considering 


126  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

conscience  as  something  that  lies  beyond  the  pale  of 
science,  beyond  the  knowable  realm  of  natural  facts, 
mysticism  introduced  as  an  essential  element  of  moral- 
ity? And  indeed,  Mr.  Salter  does  not  approve  of  it 
that  "morality  is  thought  to  be  without  mystery." 
There  is  a  dualism  lurking  in  Mr.  Salter's  ethics,  as 
if  the  moral  order  were  something  radically  different 
from  the  order  of  this  world : 

"Though  it  [morality]  warns  us  and  commands  us,  it  does  so 
in  that  supreme  act  in  which  we  warn  and  command  ourselves  ; 
it  is  the  utterance  of  the  God  in  us,  of  the  '  prophetic  soul '  in 
which  we  all  share,  and  signifies  that  we  are  part  and  parcel  of 
another  order  of  things  than  that  which  we  can  see  and  handle, 
and  are  rooted  in  somewhat  firmer  than  the  earth,  and  more  an- 
cient, more  venerable  than  the  heavens." 

There  is  no  objection  to  defining  morality  in  poet- 
ical terms  as  "the  utterance  of  God"  (i.  e.,  the  im- 
manent God)  or  as  the  "prophetic  soul,"  but  it  is  not 
another  order  of  the  world.  Morality  is  based  upon, 
it  is  creating  a  better  state  of  things  by  conforming  to 
the  order  of  this  very  same  world  in  which  we  live. 

The  moral  law  is  not  considered  by  Mr.  Salter  as 
the  highest  natural  law,  higher  than  other  natural 
laws ;  but  it  is  said  to  be  above  or  outside  of  nature. 
Mr.  Salter  says : 

"The  moral  sentiment  dwarfs  Nature,  it  goes  out  to  that 
which  is  beyond  Nature." 

In  consistency  with  his  view  that  the  moral  senti- 
ment goes  out  to  that  which  is  beyond  nature,  Mr. 
Salter  rejects  science  as  a  basis  of  ethics.     He  says  : 

' '  Agnosticism  is  no  more  than  a  confession  of  the  limitations 
of  our  knowledge.  But  what  we  do  not  know  is  hardly  a  basis 
for  action.  .  .  .  Nor  is  science,  teaching  us  positively  what  we  do 
know,  a  sufficient  guide  for  us.  I  will  yield  to  none  in  my  admi- 
ration and  wonder  before  the  world  which  science  has  revealed  to 


SCIENCE  AND  ETHICS.  127 

us.  How  has  space  widened  and  time  grown  infinite,  and  how 
does  one  law  seem  to  hold  in  its  grasp  the  mighty  movements  of 
systems  and  the  least  tear  that  trickles  down  a  child's  face  !  It  is 
a  universe,  majestic,  solemn,  m  the  midst  of  which  we  live,  and  it 
would  seem  to  suggest  to  us  great  and  solemn  thoughts  as  to  what 
our  own  lives  should  be.  , 

"But  when  I  turn  from  Nature  to  consider  human  life  and 
the  order  of  human  society,  my  reverence  in  one  way  lessens 
rather  than  grows  deeper.  The  science  that  reports  faithfully, 
philosophically  the  varied  facts  of  our  human  existence  is  not  al- 
together a  pleasant  page  to  read.  History,  which  is  one  branch 
of  the  science  of  man,  tells  of  animalism,  of  brutal  selfishness, 
of  towering  wrongs,  of  slow-returning  justice,  often  of  a  blind  in- 
furiated justice,  that  punishes  the  innocent  and  leaves  the  guilty 
free.  And  observation — statistics,  which  is  nothing  else  than  sci- 
entific observation — reveals  almost  as  many  things  that  ought 
not  to  be  as  things  which  should  be.  Statistics  of  crime  are  just 
as  much  science  as  would  be  statistics  of  peace  and  order, — sta- 
tistics of  prostitution  as  truly  scientific  as  those  of  family  purity, 
of  poverty  as  truly  as  those  of  comfort  and  competence. 

"  What  science  teaches  must  invariably  be  accepted  as  fact, 
but  it  may  none  the  less  provoke  moral  repulsion  and  rebellion. 
We  may  say  to  some  of  the  facts,  '  You  have  no  right  to  be  !'  Yes, 
the  very  end  of  our  scientific  observation  may  sometimes  be  to 
render  such  observation  in  the  future  impossible, — that  is,  to  de- 
stroy the  facts.  Plainly,  then,  science  is  not  ultimate.  It  tells  us 
simply  what  is  ;  it  tells  us  nothing  of  what  ought  to  be.  What 
ought  to  be, — that  is  reported  to  us  by  a  higher  faculty  than  that 
of  scientific  observation  ;  it  is  an  assertion,  a  demand  of  the  con- 
science. 

"  Here,  then,  is  to  my  mind  the  true  basis  of  our  movement, — 
not  the  old  religions ;  not  religion  itself,  in  the  popular  under- 
standing of  that  term  ;  not  agnosticism,  though  as  matter  of  fact 
some  of  us  may  be  agnostics ;  not  science,  though  the  facts  of 
science,  every  one  of  them,  should  have  our  recognition.  It  is 
something  deeper  and  more  ancient,  I  might  say,  than  any  of 
these  :  it  is  the  rock  of  conscience,  the  eternal  laws  that  announce 
themselves  in  man's  moral  nature.  .  .  .  Conscience,  in  a  word, 
ushers  us  into  an  ideal  realm. " 


128  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

The  ideal  realm  is  nothing  that  stands  in  contra- 
diction to  the  facts  of  life.  Ideals  which  do  not  con- 
form to  the  laws  of  nature  derived  from  facts,  are 
mere  dreams.*  Ideals  must  be  based  on  science,  in 
order  to  be  realizable  ;  and  ideals  that  are  unrealiz- 
able, impossibilities,  are  mirages,  but  not  ideals. 

Mr.  Salter  has  a  wrong  and  too  limited  conception 
of  science  ;  he  takes  science  to  mean  knowledge,  viz., 
a  mere  understanding,  of  facts,  but  he  excludes  from 
his  definition  "our  judgment  upon  facts."     He  says  : 

"  In  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  science — the  science  of  man 
as  truly  as  any  other — knows  nothing  of  right  and  wrong,  but  only 
of  what  is  ;  of  facts,  and  the  law  of  their  connection.  To  the 
pure  understanding,  virtue  and  vice  do  not  exist.  These  notions 
arise  in  virtue  of  our  judgment  upon  facts  ;  and  the  organ  of  that 
judgment  is  other  than  that  by  which  we  learn  of  and  explain  the 
facts  themselves  :  men  call  it  Conscience." 

The  sole  purpose  of  science  is  the  application  of 
science.  As  Mr.  Salter  rightly  says:  "For  man  is 
not  only  to  know,  but  to  do  and  to  achieve."  We 
study  nature,  and  science  exists  for  doing  and  achiev- 
ing. In  order  to  do  and  to  achieve  we  must  know. 
Knowledge  is  the  basis  of  any  achievement,  not  only 
in  practical  business  for  manufacturing,  invention  etc., 
but  also  for  moral  life.  There  is  no  conscience  without 
knowledge,  there  is  no  Gewissen  without  Wissen.  Con- 
science is  not  a  faculty  that  exists  prior  to  knowledge 
of  facts,  but  it  develops  from  a  comprehension  of 
facts,  from  a  knowledge  of  the  consequences  of  human 
action.     Mr.  Salter  says  (p.  37)  : 

M  It  is  strange,  when  we  bear  in  mind  the  ideal  nature  of 
morality,  to  hear  that  morality  must  be  based  upon  facts.  Mor- 
ality is  not  really  a  question  of  facts,  but  of  the  right  of  facts  to 
be,   of  their  correspondence  with  a  standard  of  the  mind.  .  .  . 

*  See  above,  pp.  19  and  23. 


SCIENCE  AND  ETHICS.  129 

Base  morality  on  facts  ?  Which  facts  ?  There  are  innumerable 
facts,  an  induction  from  which  would  only  give  us  immorality. 
The  good  facts,  then  ?  But  plainly,  this  is  moving  in  a  circle.  In 
truth,  there  is  nothing  on  which  to  base  morality.  We  do  not  so 
much  find  it,  as  demand  it  in  the  world. 

Can  anyone  derive  from  evils  and  the  consequences 
of  evils,  rules  of  iniquity  ?  The  facts  that  ought  not  be, 
speak  loud,  very  loud  ;  they  speak  with  no  uncertain 
voice,  and  morality  is  preached  mainly  on  account  of 
such  facts  as,  like  the  innocent  Abel's  blood,  cry 
out  to  heaven !  Suppose  that  a  murderer  has  no 
conscience  to  guide, him,  will  not  the  results  of  his 
crime  teach  him  a  most  impressive  lesson  ?  The  re- 
sults of  his  crime  will  set  him  thinking,  so  that  he 
will  ask  himself :  Was  it  right  to  slay  my  brother  ?  The 
evils  of  immorality  and  the  consequences  of  these 
evils  are  a  most  powerful  stimulus  for  asking  the  ques- 
tion what  is  right  and  what  is  wrong  ?  Man  has  to 
face  the  facts  of  life  and  has  to  find  out  the  right  way 
of  salvation  by  experience.  His  experience  appears 
first  as  a  dim  instinct,  often  erring  and  sometimes 
hitting  upon  the  right  thing.  Yet  there  is  no  other 
guide,  no  supernatural  revelation,  no  intuitional  fac- 
ulty (in  the  sense  of  intuitionalism),  no  direct  com- 
mands that  might  'appeal  immediately  to  the  human 
mind.' 

Mr.  Salter  may  not  call  himself  an  intuitionalist, 
but  he  takes  the  standpoint  of  intuitionalism.  He 
does  not  call  his  world-conception  supernaturalism  ; 
but  it  is  supernaturalism.  While  the  Unitarians, 
following  Theodore  Parker,  are  seriously  at  work  to 
" rationalize  religion,"  while  many  Jewish  rabbis  rec- 
ognize the  truth  of  monism  and  therewith  ackowledge 
the  immanence  of  God,  the  leaders  of  the  ethical  so- 


130  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

cieties  remain  upon  the  dualistic  standpoint  of  extra- 
naturalism. 

It  is  true  the  leaders  of  the  ethical  societies  have 
dropped  the  old  fashioned  terminology  of  super- 
naturalism.  Yet  their  ethics  is  as  supernatural  as  the 
old  conception  of  an  extramundane  deity.  The  idea 
of  God  is  replaced  by  the  ethical  command,  but  the 
latter  has  remained  as  mysterious  and  transcendent, 
extramundane  and  extranatural  as  was  the  Jehovah  of 
old-fashioned  dogmatism. 


THE  AUTHORITY  OF  THE  MORAL  LAW. 


Conscience  is  not  so  much  an  authority  itself,  as 
it  is  representative  of  an  authority.  It  represents  the 
authority  of  the  moral  law  in  the  world,  which  is  no  less 
a  reality  than  all  the  other  natural  laws.  Mr.  Salter 
in  a  most  enthusiastic  lecture  on  the  higher  law  con- 
taining much  that  is  true,  asks  the  question  : 

' '  Whence  comes  the  authority  of  this  law  that  is  within  and 
over  us  ?  " 

Mr.  Salter  continues  : 

"The  ordinary  answers  seem  to  me  here  entirely  to  fail  .... 
the  last  answer  as  to  the  sources  of  the  authority  of  the  higher  law 
fails  as  truly  as  the  first.  In  fact  there  is  no  answer  ;  there  are 
no  sources  for  that  supreme  authority." 

The  Israelites  conceived  the  authority  of  the  moral 
law,  the  power  that  makes  for  righteousness,  under 
the  allegory  of  a  powerful  ruler  of  nature,  as  a  great, 
personal  being,  as  a  legislator  who  had  revealed  his 
wise  orders  to  Moses.  And  through  the  mouth  of 
Moses,  the  God  of  the  Old  Testament  is  said  to  have 
characterized  himself  in  the  following  words  : 

"  I  the  Lord  thy  God  am  a  jealous  God,  visiting  the  iniquity  of 
the  fathers  upon  the  children  unto  the  third  and  fourth  generation 
of  them  that  hate  me  ;  and  showing  mercy  unto  thousands  of  them 
that  love  me,  and  keep  my  commandments." 

That  God  is  jealous  means  he  is  intolerant.  He 
enforces  his  will  and  suffers  no  one  to  live  who  at- 
tempts permanently  to  resist  his  will. 


i32  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

The  God  of  Science  is  just  as  jealous,  just  as  in- 
tolerant as  the  God  of  the  Old  Testament.  The  laws 
of  nature  are  firm,  unalterable,  irrefragable,  and  omni- 
potent. The  will  of  God  is  described  to  be  "  stead- 
fast forever,"  and  his  dominion  over  the  world*  is 
proclaimed  to  be  eternal.  It  is  only  by  obedience 
to  the  immutable  laws  of  nature  that  we  can  live.  The 
Psalmist  says : 

' '  Unless  thy  law  had  been  my  delights,  I  should  then  have 
perished  in  mine  affliction."    (119,  92.) 

Who  can  doubt  that  nature  enforces  her  laws  rigor- 
ously, that  she  ruthlessly  punishes  him  who  does  not 
regard  them,  but  that,  on  the  other  hand,  (to  use  the 
poetical  phrase  of  the  Bible,)  she  is  "plenteous  in 
mercy  "  to  him  who  loves  her,  who  studies  her  secrets 
and  obeys  her  commandments  ?  Certainly,  the  laws 
of  nature  are  not  deities,  and  the  moral  order  of  the 
world  is  not  a  person.  But  they  are,  nevertheless,  ob- 
jective realities  just  the  same. 

We  have  ceased  to  believe  in  Demeter,  but  we 
have  not  ceased  tilling  the  ground.  And  if  we  ask, 
Who  is  it  that  taught  man  to  till  the  ground  ?  we 
do  not  hesitate  to  answer,  "It  is  experience;  the  facts 
of  life  have  taught  man  to  sow  and  to  harvest  the 
fruits  of  the  earth."  The  myth  of  Demeter  is  not 
wrong,  it  is  simply  an  allegory ;  and  the  myth  of  a 
personal  God  having  spoken  to  Moses  out  of  a  fiery 
bush  contains  great  truths,  but  we  must  bear  in  mind 
that  the  truths  contained  in  the  Mosaic  religion  are 
wrapped  in  poetry.  And  science  can  just  as  much 
explain  ethics  and  the  moral  law,  and  the  authority 
of  moral  obligations,  as  it  can  derive  the  rules  of 
agriculture  from  the  facts  of  nature. 

*  Daniel  6,  26. 


THE  AUTHORITY  OF  THE  MORAL  LAW.         133 
1 

It  is  true  as  Mr.  Salter  says,  "Science  teaches  us 
that  which  is,  but  Ethics  that  which  ought  to  be." 
But  that  which  ought  to  be,  must  be  based  upon  that 
which  is  ;  else  it  will  not  stand. 

What  is  the  ought  ?  The  ought  is  that  into  which 
the  is  has  the  tendency  to  change.     It  is  the  is  to  be. 

A  Unitarian  friend  of  mine  compares  in  this  re- 
spect ethics  to  obstetrics.  Ethics  cannot  at  individual 
pleasure  create  ideals  of  morality,  all  it  can  do  is  to 
find  out  the  tendency  of  life  and  to  assist  in  bringing 
the  is  to  be  to  birth.  The  authority  upon  which  ethics 
is  based,  he  says,  is  not  a  person,  but  we  can  repre- 
sent it  as  a  person.  We  can  symbolize  its  activity  as  if 
it  consisted  of  personal  actions,  and  that  is  the  method 
by  which  the  various  religions  teach  ethics. 

In  fine,  the  authority  according  to  which  moral 
ideals  must  be  shaped,  is  not  subjective,  but  objec- 
tive. It  is  not  to  be  sought  for  in  the  realms  of  abso- 
lute principles,  but  must  be  modeled  in  conformity 
with  existing  facts  and  with  the  eternal  laws  that 
science  abstracts  from  existing  facts. 

Ethical  ideals  that  are  not  based  on  facts,  are  like 
the  mirage  in  the  desert.  The  mirage  may  be  more 
beautiful  than  the  oasis,  but  he  goes  astray  who  ven- 
tures to  follow  it. 

THE  THREE  PHASES  OF  ETHICAL  DEVELOPMENT. 

There  are  three  phases  or  periods  in  the  ethical 
development  of  mankind.  Like  all  phases  of  evolution 
they  are  not  sharply  divided ;  one  passes  over  into  the 
next  gradually.  Their  development  is  nevertheless 
sufficiently  marked  to  be  noticeable. 

The  first  period  begins  with  the  dawn  of  civilized 


134  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

life  and  culminates  in  the'establishment  of  authorita- 
tive dogmatism.  The  transition  to  the  second  period 
is  marked  by  the  breakdown  of  this  authoritative  dog- 
matism. The  second  period  is  the  substitution  of  the 
individual  conscience  in  the  place  of  dogmatism.  It 
culminates  in  the  recognition  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
moral  ought,  and  of  the  freedom  of  conscience.  The 
transition  to  the  third  period  is  the  result  of  the  con- 
flicts produced  by  the  arbitrary  nature  of  the  vari- 
ous conceptions  of  duty. 

If  man's  conscience  is  to  be  considered  as  the  ul- 
timate court  of  appeal  we  can  have  no  objective 
standard  of  right  and  wrong.  That  which  is  wrong 
according  to  my  conscience,  may  be  right  according 
to  the  conscience  of  others.  How  shall  we  decide  ? 
It  is  obvious  that  we  want  an  objective  standard  of 
morality.  Without  an  objective  standard  of  morality 
we  shall  sink  into  moral  anarchy,  where  the  will  of 
the  individual  is  the  sole  test  of  what  is  right  or  wrong. 

Accordingly  ethics  is  in  need  of  an  authority  to 
decide  the  conflict  between  two  consciences  or  the 
conflict  between  two  different  commands  in  the  con- 
science of  one  and  the  same  man. 

Must  we  return  to  the  old  dogmatism  of  the  first 
period?  We  shall  not;  for  we  have  outgrown  mythol- 
ogy, and  shall  never  return  to  the  creeds  of  the  old 
religions.  But  we  need  not  think  of  returning  to  the 
old  views,  we  can  progress  to  a  higher  view.  We  have 
now  better  means  than  our  ancestors  had  for  recog- 
nizing the  authority  upon  which  the  moral  ought  rests. 
Our  knowledge  of  nature  and  of  the  laws  of  nature 
has  grown  sufficiently  for  us  to  be  able  to  account  for 
the  necessity  as  well  as  the  natural  growth  of  morality. 
The  authority  upon  which  the  moral  commands  are 


THE  AUTHORITY  OF  THE  MORAL  LAW.         135 

based  can  be  scientifically  investigated  and  explained 
no  less  than  the  other  facts  of  nature. 

The  first  period  is  represented  by  the  Mosaic  law,  by 
Roman  Christianity,  and  similar  institutions  of  author- 
itative dogmatism.  The  second  period  is  represented 
by  certain  phases  and  ideals  of  the  Reformation,  the 
overthrow  of  Roman  authority,  and  the  recognition  of 
the  liberty  of  conscience.  The  third  period  is  the  re- 
ligion of  the  future,  which  is  near  at  hand.  It  is  the 
basing  of  ethics  upon  the  firm  ground  of  facts.  It 
is  the  recognition  of  an  authority  the  nature  of  which 
can  be  explained  by  science.  It  is  the  establishment 
of  the  religion  of  science. 

This  religion  of  science  is  not  only  the  fulfilment 
of  the  old  religions ;  it  is  also  the  realization  of  that 
ideal  which  has  been  called  natural  religion.  If  the 
societies  for  ethical  culture  had  been  founded  to  rep- 
resent this  view,  they  would  grow  like  the  mustard 
seed  ;  the  seed  would  soon  be  the  greatest  among 
herbs  and  become  a  tree  so  that  the  birds  of  the  air 
would  come  and  lodge  in  the  branches  thereof. 

Mr.  Salter  does  not  approve  of  what  he  calls  "set- 
ting up  a  standard  of  philosophical  orthodoxy."  He 
says  : 

' '  Dr.  Cams,  I  am  sorry  to  see,  has  not  outgrown  the  secta- 
rian principle  of  the  churches,  and  would  apparently  give  us 
another  sect  as  '  exclusive  '  and  '  intolerant '  as  any  of  the  past, 
though  (Gottlob)  it  will  slay  with  the  sword  of  the  spirit  and  not 
with  the  arm  of  flesh." 

It  lies  in  the  nature  of  ethics  to  establish  an  au- 
thority, and  every  authority  is  in  a  certain  sense  ex- 
clusive and  intolerant.  An  ethical  teacher,  in  my 
mind,  cannot  help  being  ' '  exclusive"  and  ' '  intolerant, " 
if   "intolerant"  means  the  confidence  that  there   is 


i36  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

but  one  truth.  Or  shall  any  kind  of  ethics  have  the 
same  right  ?  Can  anybody  violate  a  law  if  only  his 
conscience  impels  him  to  ignore  that  law  ?  and  can 
truth  be  tolerant  of  error  ?  or  can  we  have  different 
kinds  of  truth  which,  although  contradictory  among 
themselves, may  be  of  equal  value? 

The  ideal  of  tolerance  (as  the  word  is  commonly 
used)  means  that  we  use  no  other  weapons  in  the  de- 
fense of  our  opinion  than  the  sword  of  the  spirit,  but  it 
does  not  mean  that  any  and  every  error  has  the  same 
right  as  demonstrable  truths. 

It  would  be  intolerant  to  make  a  certain  belief  the 
condition  for  being  admitted  to  a  religious  society ; 
but  it  is  not  intolerant  for  anybody,  neither  for  so- 
cieties nor  for  individuals,  to  have  a  definite  and  out- 
spoken opinion.  Nor  would  the  leaders  of  the  Ethical 
Societies  commit  themselves  to  intolerance  and  ex- 
clusiveness  by  declaring  what  they  understand  by 
ethics.  We  maintain  that  they  cannot  properly  teach 
ethics  without  knowing  what  ethics  means.  In  order 
to  know  what  ethics  means,  they  must  define  the  idea 
of  moral  goodness,  and  they  cannot  define  the  idea  of 
moral  goodness  without  proposing  a  basis  of  ethics. 
If  that  is  intolerant  sectarianism,  they  have  in  our 
opinion  to  become  intolerant  sectarians.  But  definite- 
ness  of  opinion  is  neither  intolerance  nor  sectarian- 
ism, so  long  as  an  opinion  remains  exposed  to  scien- 
tific criticism,  so  long  as  in  the  struggle  for  truth  its 
upholders  slay  only  with  the  sword  of  the  spirit  and  not 
with  the  arm  of  flesh.  To  have  no  opinion  and  to  de- 
clare that  officially  the  Societies  for  Ethical  Culture 
do  not  intend  to  have  an  opinion,  is  not  tolerance,  but 
indefiniteness. 

Conventionalism  may  be  a  sufficient  raison  d'etre 


THE  AUTHORITY  OF  THE  MORAL  LAW.         137 

for  formalities,  ceremonies,  and  customs  ;  but  it  is  not 
a  sufficient  basis  for  ethics.  And  a  reformatory  move- 
ment such  as  the  Societies  for  Ethical  Culture  aspire 
to  inaugurate,  cannot  take  deep  root  if  it  is  planted 
on  the  stony  ground  of  conventionalism. 

The  intolerance  of  the  first  period  is  an  intolerance 
of  assumed  authority,  but  the  intolerance  of  the  re- 
ligion of  science — if  intolerance  it  can  be  called — is 
the  sovereignty  of  demonstrable  truth.  Truth  is  one 
from  eternity  to  eternity,  and  there  is  no  other  truth 
beside  that  one  and  sole  and  immutable  truth.  Truth 
is  that  Deity  which  suffers  no  equal.  Like  Jehovah 
in  the  Decalogue,  Truth  pronounces  as  its  first  com- 
mandment : 

"Thou  shalt  have  no  other  gods  before  me." 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  OF  THE  DISCUSSION. 


REJOINDER  BY  MR.   W.    M.    SALTER. 

# 

Nothing  but  extreme  preoccupation  has  hindered  my  noticing 
earlier  Dr.  Carus's  replies  to  my  comments  on  his  book  ( The  Ethical 
Problem).  I  do  not  doubt  his  sincerity  in  wishing  to  come  to  an 
understanding,  and  with  this  desire  in  my  own  mind  I  offer  the  fol- 
lowing remarks. 

Dr.  Carus  says  that  the  Ethical  teachers  agree  that  what  he 
calls  the  basis  of  ethics  is  not  needed.  Now  all  that  we  are  agreed 
about  is  that  such  a  basis  is  not  to  be  laid  down  as  a  necessary  part 
of  the  Ethical  movement — as  something  to  which  all  members  of 
the  movement  pledge  themselves.  But  any  individual  in  the  move- 
ment can  hold  to  such  a  basis,  can  feel  the  need  of  it  and  even 
maintain  that  without  it  there  can  be  no  rational  ethics.  This 
opinion  may  be  held  ;  the  only  requirement  is  that  there  shall  be 
tolerance  of  other  opinions.  If  one  does  not  feel  that  he  can  be- 
long to  a  society  with  others  who  think  differently  (whether  as  to 
the  specific  basis  or  as  to  the  need  of  a  basis  in  general)  he  of  course 
leaves  the  society — or  does  not  join  it  in  the  first  place.  For  ex- 
ample, I  myself  believe  that  a  true  world-conception  is  of  great 
importance,  though  I  could  not  call  it  "a  basis  of  ethics,"  as  Dr. 
Carus  does  ;  I  am  in  search  of  such  a  conception,  and  what 
elements  of  it  I  have  already  gained,  those  who  hear  me  know ; 
but  I  can  respect  others  who  are  following  different  lines  from  my 
own  and  am  glad  to  call  them  my  brothers  in  an  ethical  fellowship. 

Dr.  Carus  says  that  the  Ethical  lecturers  do  not  acknowledge 
the  '  reason  why,'  presented  by  orthodox  theology.  By  this  '  reason 
why  '  he  means  the  will  of  God.  But  any  of  us  might  regard  what- 
ever is  right  as  the  will  of  God,  if  he  chose  to.  The  opinion  of 
any  member  to  this  effect  we  should  have  no  right  to  challenge. 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  OF  DISCUSSION.        139 

Basing  the  right  on  the  will  of  God  is,  however,  another  matter  ; 
and  I  think  Dr.  Carus  is  unjust  to  orthodox  theology  in  assuming 
that  it  does  so.  Many  are  the  theologians  who  regard  God's  will 
as  identical  with  what  is  right ;  the  few  are  those  who  regard  God's 
will  as  the  author  of  it.  Can  Dr.  Carus  instance  another  theologian 
of  repute,  besides  Dymond,  who  did  so  ?  There  may,  of  course, 
be  others,  but  I  do  not  happen  to  know  of  them,  but  even  so  ex- 
treme an  opinion  we  should  not  have  the  right  to  exclude,  so  long 
as  it  did  not  injuriously  influence  actual  conduct.* 

Hence  my  own  controversy  with  Dr.  Carus  will  be  hereafter 
purely  in  my  personal  capacity.  It  would  be  thoughtlessness  and  ar- 
rogance for  me  to  allow  all  the  windings,  questionings,  hesitancies, 
affirmations  of  my  own  mind  in  a  controversy  like  the  present  one 
to  be  regarded  as  representative  of  the  Ethical  movement.  In 
speaking  of  the  aim  and  nature  of  the  Ethical  fellowship,  I  do 
speak  for  the  movement  and  am  answerable  to  it ;  but  in  discuss- 
ing questions  of  Ethical  philosophy  I  speak  solely  for  myself  and 
am  answerable  to  no  one. 

Dr.  Carus  says  that  I  know  no  '  reason  why '  for  my  moral 
law  (as  he  is  pleased  to  term  it),  and  that  I  imagine  that  to  give  a 
reason  why  "would  be  not  to  explain  but  to  degrade  morality." 
With  all  wish  to  be  charitable,  I  cannot  acquit  Dr.  Carus  of  amis- 
use  of  my  language  in  this  connection.  A  '  reason  why '  in  the 
sense  of  an  ultimate  standard  of  right  and  wrong  I  have  expressly 
admitted  to  be  necessary.  But  after  the  standard  has  been  found 
and,  by  the  use  of  it,  the  right  in  a  concrete  case  determined,  the 
question  is  sometimes  asked,  why  should  we  do  the  right,  which  is 
equivalent  to  asking  why  should  our  will  be  regulated  by  any 
'  ought '  whatever  ?  My  answer  was  that  we  should  do  the  right 
out  of  reverence  for  the  right  and  it  appears  to  me  that  Dr.Carus's 
language  implied  the  same  view.     '  Reason  why '  is  ambiguous  ; 

*  Dr.  Carus  thinks  that  our  societies  should  be  called  "  Societies  for  Moral 
Culture."  I  have  sometimes  thought  that  I  should  myself  prefer  such  a 
designation,  simply  because  it  sounds  less  technical.  But  Dr.  Carus's  dis- 
tinction between  morals  and  ethics  appears  to  me  arbitrary;  no  unthinking, 
conventional,  or  merely  reflex  action  can  properly  be  called  moral.  Again, 
Dr.  Carus  sees  no  need  for  our  leaving  the  churches,  in  case  it  is  duty  simply 
that  we  are  concerned  for,  since  the  churches  also  are  concerned  for  the  same 
thing.  But  is  not  Dr.  Carus  aware  that  almost  no  Christian  church  would  re- 
ceive a  person  to  membership  on  the  strength  of  a  moral  aim  and  purpose 
alone,  that  besides  this,  requirement  is  made  of  a  confession  in  some  theolog- 
ical creed  ? 


i4o  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

it  may  refer  to  standard  and  it  may  refer  to  motive.  A  motive  is 
always,  in  one  sense,  a  reason,  but  in  a  very  different  sense  from 
that  in  which  a  standard  is  a  reason.  A  motive  is  a  feeling,  a  de- 
sire ;  a  standard  is  an  object  of  thought.  Now  there  is  what  I  call 
a  properly  moral  motive — the  desire  to  do  what  is  right  or  to  live 
in  harmony  with  one's  reason  or  to  obey  one's  highest  thought ; 
these  are  but  different  expressions  for  the  same  feeling.  In  its  full- 
ness the  moral  motive  is  beautifully  expressed  by  George  Eliot,  in 
her  description  of  Dorothea  (mMiddlemarch):  "  She  yearned  toward 
the  perfect  right,  that  it  might  make  a  throne  within  her  and  rule 
her  errant  will."  Asking  for  another  motive  beyond  the  moral 
motive  practically  means,  what  shall  I  gain  by  right  action,  what 
selfish  advantage  shall  I  have  from  it  ? — but  action  under  such 
motives  is  not  moral  action  at  all,  and  appealing  to  such  motives 
(i.  e.,  furnishing  such  reasons)  is  not  explaining  morality,  but  de- 
grading it.  Hence  Dr.  Carus's  language  as  to  my  '  mysticism  '  is 
wide  of  the  mark.  He  thinks  that  like  other  enthusiasts,  I  regard 
"  science  and  all  close  scrutiny  with  suspicion,"  and  that  "  the  re- 
lentless dissections  of  an  exact  analysis  appear  as  a  sacrilege."  I 
am  actually  amused  at  these  words  ;  for  it  is  just  the  absence  of 
close  scrutiny  into  his  ideas  and  exact  analysis  of  them  that  I 
thought  I  observed  in  Dr.  Carus.  The  clear  distinction  of  things 
that  differ,  the  avoidance  of  vague  and  ambiguous  language  are 
surely  the  first  (or.  at  least  an  indispensable)  step  towards  the 
scientific  understanding  of  any  subject. 

This  inexactness  still  appears  in  Dr.  Carus's  use  of  the  term 
"Intuitionalism."  "This  view,"  he  says,  "  if  it  means  anything, 
means  that  the  moral  command  comes  to  us  in  some  unaccountable 
way,  mysteriously  and  directly  from  some  sphere  beyond."  Not  so. 
Intuitionalism,  as  used  by  Professor  Sidgwick  (to  whom  Dr. Carus 
refers  and  than  whom  there  is  no  better  authority)  does  not  refer  to 
the  source  of  the  moral  command  at  all,  but  to  the  immediate  way 
in  which  we  are  supposed  to  know  that  certain  things  are  duties. 
The  obligation,  to  tell  the  truth,  for  example,  is  regarded  by  In- 
tuitionalists  as  a  matter  of  direct  perception,  not  as  an  inference 
or  deduction  from  some  other  obligation.  Intuitionalism  is  not 
necessarily  theological  or  supernaturalistic  ;  and  on  the  other  hand 
utilitarianism  even  egoistic  utilitarianism  may  be  supernaturalistic, 
as  it  was  in  the  hands  of  Paley.  Yes,  the  evolutionary  theory  of  Dr. 
Carus,  if  we  give  this  name  to  the  view  that  progress,  and  not 
happiness,  is  the  supreme  end,  is  just  as  capable  of  being  ultimately 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  OF  DISCUSSION.        141 

interpreted  in  a  theological  or  supernaturalistic  manner  ;  the  rule, 
work  for  progress,  for  the  development  of  human-soul  life,  may 
be  interpreted  as  a  Divine  command  as  readily  as  any  other  rule. 
In  fact,  almost  all  the  Ethical  theories  may  be  "  intuitionalist "  in 
Dr.  Carus's  vague  use  of  the  term. 

As  to  the  distinction  between  Utilitarianism  and  Hedonism,  I 
acknowledge  that  Dr.  Carus  has  the  right  to  make  it,  if  etymology 
and  not  scientific  usage  are  to  determine  such  matters.  The  use- 
ful and  the  pleasant  are  certainly  two  distinct  conceptions.  Utili- 
tarianism has  always  said  that  the  useful  was  determined  by  its  re- 
lation to  the  pleasant  ;  but  abstractly  speaking,  anything  is  useful, 
which  serves  an  end,  whatever  that  end  may  be.  I  have  not  called 
myself  a  Utilitarian,  but  I  have  been  accustomed  to  say  that  I 
sympathized  with  Utilitarianism  so  far  as  it  opposed  the  claim  of 
Intuitionalists  to  settle  special  duties  by  means  of  ready-made  in- 
tuitions ;  but  not  in  so  far  as  it  made  happiness  or  pleasure( whether 
individual  or  general)  the  final  end.  Practically,  as  I  think  Mr. 
Hegeler  was  aware,  I  regard  progress  as  a  better  standard  than 
happiness.  Whether  it  be  an  ultimate  standard  is  another  ques- 
tion, and  I  think  it  can  hardly  be  that,  since  progress  (if  it  be  more 
than  mere  movement)  implies  some  idea  of  a  goal  in  the  direction 
of  which  progress  takes  place.  Utilitarianism,  however,  as  every 
moral  theory  worthy  of  the  name,  distinguishes  between  moral 
goodness  and  material  usefulness.  Only  a  theory  which  sunk  ethics 
to  the  level  of  mechanics  would  fail  to  do  this.  Bentham  himself 
says  :  "  Beneficence  apart  from  benevolence  is  no  virtue  ;  it  is  not 
amoral  quality — it  belongs  to  a  stock  or  stone,  as  well  as  to  a  hu- 
man being." 

Failure  to  think  out  the  implications  of  what  he  says  seems  to 
me  to  mark  Dr.  Carus's  assertion  that  the  stern  facts  of  life  teach 
us  what  desires  should  be  suppressed  and  what  wishes  should  rule 
supreme.  I  do  not  question  the  value  of  such  experience  as  a 
teacher — but  all  on  one  condition,  namely,  that  we  wish  to  live, 
and  more  than  that,  that  we  wish  others  to  live.  Apart  from  such 
a  wish,  immorality  is  as  consistent  with  the  "  stern  facts  of  life" 
as  morality.  The  fundamental  problem  of  ethics  is  deeper  than  Dr. 
Carus  imagines;  and  it  is  because  he  does  not  seem  to  me  to  go  to  the 
roots  of  things, that  his  ethics  appear  to  be  "  something  in  the  air." 
So  far  as  I  can  see,  it  is  a  purely  hypothetical  or  conditional  morality 
that  he  gives  us  ;  if,  for  example,  we  wish  for  health,  he  says  in 
substance  we  must  regard  the  conditions  of  health — and  aside 


*42  TlfE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

from  such  a  wish  obligation  has  no  meaning.  The  facts  are,  of 
course,  the  same  whether  we  so  wish  or  not  ;  I  do  not  question  that 
many  a  "jovial  companion  "  has  been  "  buried  in  the  bloom  of 
life."  The  real  question  is,  was  there  any  obligation  upon  such  an 
one  to  care  for  his  life — not  did  he  feel  it  or  even  could  he  be  made 
to  feel  it,  but  did  it  (the  obligation)  exist  ? 

Dr.  Carus  does  not  make  a  careful  statement  of  my  views  as 
to  the  absoluteness  of  morality.  I  do  not  say  that  conscience  is 
absolute.  It  appears  to  me  necessary  to  distinguish  between  con- 
science and  the  moral  law,  just  as  we  do  between  science  and  the 
facts  and  laws  of  which  science  takes  cognizance.  I  fully  admit 
the  "  facts  of  an  erring  conscience"  to  which  Dr.  Carus  alludes. 
So  physical  science  has  varied  and  often  erred  in  the  past  ;  but 
we  do  not  therefore  conclude  that  there  have  been  no  unvarying 
physical  laws.  Why  is  it  not  possible  to  allow  that  conscience  is 
a  development  and  by  no  means  infallible,  and  yet  hold  that  there 
is  an  unvarying  objective  moral  law  ?  The  real  absolute  of  moral- 
ity is  in  the  objective  principles,  not  in  conscience  or  the  subjec- 
tive sense  of  them.  This  I  have  brought  out  in  the  very  lecture 
from  which  Dr.  Carus  quotes,  and  which  perhaps  he  had  not  time 
to  read  to  the  end  (vide  pp.  94  to  10 1  of  Ethical  Religion).  Yet  by 
the  moral  law  I  have  in  mind  something  quite  different  from  a 
mere  formulation  of  natural  sequences  (though  I  agree  with  Dr. 
Carus  in  holding  them  to  be  necessary  and  unvarying)  ;  I  mean  a 
commandment,  a  rule,  an  imperative — and  the  special  moral  rules 
are  so  many  applications  of  the  fundamental  rule  to  the  various 
special  departments  and  situations  of  life.  I  have  recently  given 
my  views  on  the  important  distinction  between  physical  law  and 
moral  law  in  The  New  Ideal  (Boston),  June  and  October. 

Dr.  Carus  recognizes  the  distinction  between  the  leading 
principle  in  ethics  and  the  philosophical  view  back  of  ethics.  He 
however  holds  that  such  a  leading  principle  must  be  derived  from 
the  philosophical  view.  This,  so  far  as  the  words  go,  is  perfectly 
clear  and  consistent.  But  before  I  can  be  sure  of  what  they  mean, 
I  feel  that  I  need  an  illustration  of  how  the  derivation  takes  place. 
It  was  because  I  thought  that  Dr.  Carus  would  give  us  such  an 
illustration  that  I  took  up  "  The  Ethical  Problem  "  with  such  in- 
terest. I  have  already  recorded  my  disappointment  ;  since  not 
only  did  he  not  derive  his  ethics  from  his  "  monism,"  but  he 
classed  monism  as  one  of  the  many  "thought-constructions  of 
theorizing  philosophers, "  to  which  it  was  not  wise  for  an  ethical 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  OF  DISCUSSION.        143 

movement  to  commit  itself.  If  then,  as  Dr.  Cams  says,  ' '  without 
a  world-conception  we  can  have  no  ethics,"  it  is  difficult  to  avoid 
the  conclusion  that  he  has  not  given  us  any  ethics  himself.  Will 
he  not  try  to  show  in  what  way  the  principle  of  "  truthfulness" 
or  that  of  "  the  development  of  human  soul-life  "  is  to  be  derived 
from  Monism — that  is,  in  what  way  different  from  that  in  which 
it  could  be  derived  from  Theism  or  from  Materialism  ? 

As  to  the  "ethical  stimulus"  in  my  own  case,  I  have  not  the 
slightest  doubt,  and  acknowledge  it  reverently,  that  whatever  I  have 
of  it  is  largely  due  to  the  influences  of  home  and  of  the  religious 
faith  in  which  I  was  nurtured.  But  that  faith  did  not  include  the 
view  that  God  was  the  author  of  right  and  wrong  ;  and  so  when 
my  theistic  confidence  was  disturbed,  the  foundations  of  morality 
were  not  shaken.  The  Divine  will  was  one  with  whatever  was 
right,  according  to  my  early  teaching — and  such  a  view  made  it 
perhaps  easier  to  do  the  right,  just  as  it  is  often  easier  for  a  child 
to  do  some  task,  if  the  parent  askes  it  ;  but  duty  was  not  made  to 
rest  on  the  Divine  will.  At  bottom  the  faith  in  which  I  was  brought 
up  was  an  ethical  faith  (just  as  prophetic  Judaism  was  an  ethical 
faith).  I  mean  that  it  was  a  view  of  the  universe  dominated  by 
ethical  elements.  Apart  from  the  idea  of  a  just,  righteous  and 
loving  God,  this  view  would  have  had  little  ethical  value  and  im- 
parted little  ethical  stimulus.  It  was  justice,  righteousness,  love 
that  had  my  central  reverence,  that  have  it  still. 

II. 
ANSWER  TO  MR.    SALTER  BY  DR.    P.   CARUS. 

The  basic  difference  between  Mr.  Salter's  and  our  own  posi- 
tion will  be  pointed  out  in  the  Concluding  Remarks  to  our  dis- 
cussion. I  refrain  here  from  answering  Mr.  Salter's  reply  in  a 
detailed  exposition.  Mr.  Salter  repeats  his  objections,  and  in  or- 
der to  be  explicit  we  should  have  to  repeat  the  arguments  set 
forth  in  former  articles.  We  shall  confine  ourselves  to  a  few  con- 
cise remarks  on  six  points : 

1)  We  not  only  believe  that  'a  basis  of  ethics  is  needed,'  but 
also  that  it  has  to  be  laid  down  as  a  necessary  part  of  any  ethical 
movement,  that  is  started  for  preaching  morals.  No  system  of 
morals  can  exist  without  a  basis.  And  who  will  preach  morals  with- 
out a  clear  and  a  systematic  conception  of  ethics  ? 

2)  Mr.  Salter  distinguishes  between  two  theological  concep- 
tions the  one  "basing  the  right  on  the  will  of  God ",  the  other  re- 


144  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

garding  "  God's  will  as  identical  with  what  is  right."  The  distinc- 
tion appears  to  us  irrelevant,  and  has  no  connection  with  our 
present  discussion. 

3)  Mr.  Salter  accuses  me  of  a  misuse  of  his  language  where  I 
refer  to  his  speaking  of  '  the  reason  why '  of  the  moral  law. 
After  a  careful  consideration  of  the  case,  I  find  that  the  misrepre- 
sentation of  Mr.  Salter's  view  is  entirely  due  to  a  lack  of  clearness 
on  his  part.     The  passage  in  question  runs  as  follows  : 

"  In  fact,  Dr,  Carus  gives  no  '  reason  why  '  in  the  sense  of  a  motive  be- 
yond the  moral  motive ;  and  is  well  aware  that  to  do  so  would  be  not  to  ex- 
plain but  to  degrade  morality." 

I  interpreted  this  sentence  in  the  light  of  another  passage  of 
Mr.  Salter's : 

"  Who  can  give  a  reason  for  the  supreme  rule  ?  Indeed,  no  serious  man 
wants  a  reason." 

Mr.  Salter  in  his  present  article  explains  the  passage  under 
consideration  in  the  following  way  : 

"  A  '  reason  why '  in  the  sense  of  an  ultimate  standard  of  right  and  wrong  I 
have  expressly  admitted  to  be  necessary.    But  after  the  standard  has  been 

formed the  question  is  sometimes  asked,  Why  should  we  do  the  right  ?" 

etc. 

What  Mr.  Salter  understands  by  this  second  Why,  which  rises 
after  the  first  Why  has  been  settled,  he  explains  in  this  way  : 

"  Asking  for  another  motive  beyond  the  moral  motive  practically  means  : 
What  shall  I  gain  by  right  action,  what  selfish  advantage  shall  I  have  from  it?" 

We  admit  that  to  ask  the  question  ' '  What  selfish  advantage 
shall  I  have  from  ethics  ? "  would  not  be  to  explain  but  to  degrade 
morality.  But  we  must  confess  that  this  idea  never  occurred  to 
us.  Thus  in  the  passage  under  consideration,  we  had  no  idea 
that  Mr.  Salter  could  understand  by  '  reason  why  '  an  exclusively 
egoistic  motive.  If  he  meant  that,  he  should  have  said  so.  With 
all  due  appreciation  of  Mr.  Salter's  charitableness,  we  do  not  feel 
the  need  of  it,  because  we  are  confident  that  if  there  was  any  mis- 
use of  language,  it  was  not  made  by  us,  and  we  are  not  to  blame 
for  it. 

Aside  from  the  question  of  priority  in  the  misuse  of  language, 
the  objection  we  have  to  make  against  Mr.  Salter  still  holds 
good,  in  so  far  as  Mr.  Salter  maintains  in  other  passages,  especially 
in  his  book,  that  there  is  no  reason  for  the  supreme  rule  in  ethics. 
He  actually  and  repeatedly  declines  to  derive  the  moral  ought  from 
the  facts  of  experience,  and  thus  he  imagines  that  that  something 
from  which  morality  grows  lies  outside  the  pale  of  science. 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  OF  DISCUSSION.        14$ 

We  maintain  that  no  standard  is  ultimate.  Every  standard 
of  right  and  wrong  has  to  be  derived  from  the  facts  of  reality. 
We  investigate  the  laws  of  nature,  of  social  development,  of  a 
healthy  evolution  of  the  soul,  and  our  standard  of  morality  is 
nothing  more  or  less  than  conformity  to  these  laws. 

If  the  question  is  asked  of  a  moral  teacher,  ' '  Why  should  we 
do  the  right, "  this  in  our  mind  can  mean  only,  ' '  Why  should  we 
obey  those  rules  which  you  lay  down  as  right  ?" 

Mr.  Salter  says  :  ' '  We  should  do  the  right  out  of  reverence 
for  the  right."  Of  course,  we  must  have  reverence  for  that  which 
we  should  do.  That  which  we  should  do,  must  be  regarded  as 
the  highest  we  can  think  of.  What  we  wish  to  do,  must  not  be 
suffered  to  be  taken  into  consideration  where  it  conflicts  with  that 
which  we  should  do.  But  considering  the  fact  that  we  call  that 
which  we  should  do  ' '  the  right  ",  the  prescript  "  to  do  the  right 
out  of  reverence  for  the  right "  appears  from  our  standpoint,  as 
tautological. 

4)  I  do  not  at  all  deny  that  the  Intui  tionalist  considers  conscience 
as  "  a  matter  of  direct  perception  ";  yet  at  the  same  time  I  main- 
tain that  the  Intuitionalist  considers  the  moral  sense,  the  ought, 
duty,  conscience,  or  whatever  it  may  be  called,  as  "  a  fundamental 
notion,  ultimate  and  unanalyzable  ".  This  is  the  very  expression 
of  Professor  Sidgwick.  Science,  it  is  supposed,  cannot  analyze 
conscience,  it  cannot  explain  its  origin,  and  thus  its  existence 
must  remain  a  mystery  to  us.  See  Professor  Sidgwick's  latest 
article  on  the  subject,  "Some  Fundamental  Ethical  Controver- 
sies "in  Mind,  October,  1889. 

5)  I  read  Mr.  Salter's  article  "  Obligation  and  the  Sense  of  Ob- 
ligation "  in  The  New  Ideal,  where  he  compares  duty  with  the  phys- 
ical law.  Mr.  Salter  fails  to  make  a  distinction  between  the  ob- 
jective moral  law  in  Nature,  on  the  one  hand,  which  is  a  physical 
law  as  much  as  gravitation,  and  duty  on  the  other  hand ;  the  latter 
being  the  subjective  formulation  of  our  obligation  to  conform  to 
the  moral  law.     Mr.  Salter  says  : 

"  Duty  is  like  gravitation  in  that  it  is  objective  and  yet  unlike  it,  in  that 
it  (duty;  is  an  ideal,  rule,  or  command,  and  not  a  necessarily  acting  force." 

The  question  arises,  What  is  objective  and  what  is  subjective 
in  duty.     Mr.  Salter  says  : 

"  The  sense  of  obligation  is  just  what  appears  to  me  to  need  to  be  clearly 
distinguished  from  the  reality  0/ obligation  itself."* 

*  The  italics  are  Mr.  Salter's  own. 


146  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

This  "  reality  of  obligation  itself"  is  an  unclear  idea  ;  yet  I 
find  that  it  appears  in  Mr.  Salter's  book  under  different  names 
again  and  again.  So  long  as  Mr.  Salter  feels  satisfied  with  this 
idea,  he  will  naturally  think  that  the  cause  of  all  our  differences  lies 
in  a  failure  on  my  part  to  think  out,  as  he  says,  the  implications  of 
my  assertion  that  ethics  must  be  based  on  facts.  Mr.  Salter's 
"reality  of  obligation  itself"  is  a  something  that  is  not  found 
among  and  cannot  be  derived  from  facts.* 

6)  Mr.  Salter  again  expresses  his  disappointment  at  my  treat- 
ment of  the  Ethical  Problem.     He  says  : 

"  Not  only  did  he  not  derive  his  ethics  from  his  '  Monism  '  but  he  classed 
Monism  as  one  of  the  many  '  thought-constructions  of  theorizing  philosoph- 
ers to  which  it  was  not  wise  for  an  ethical  movement  to  commit  itself,  "t 

I  have  purposely  avoided  the  terms  "  Positivism  as  well  as 
Monism  "  because  it  is  not  these  particular  ' '  isms  "  we  fight  for, 
but  the  ideas  that  generally  go  by  these  names.  The  word  Mo- 
nism can  help  nothing.  It  is  not  from  a  name  that  we  expect  sal- 
vation. 

It  would  be  ridiculous  to  demand  that  our  presentation  of 
Monism  or  of  Positivism  should  be  adopted  either  by  the  Ethical 
Societies  or  by  any  one  without  critical  examination.  Accordingly 
we  class  monism  among  those  systems  that  have  to  be  examined. 
But  we  demand  that  certain  truths  be  recognized  which  considered 
as  philosophical  principles  are  generally  known  as  positivism  and 
monism.  Positive  ethics  I  have  briefly  characterized  as  "the 
principle  of  truthfulness."  Truth  is  agreement  with  facts.  We 
must  base  our  conduct  unswervingly  upon  a  correct  conception  of 
facts.  This  implies  on  the  one  hand  that  we  should  shirk  no  effort, 
trouble,  or  struggle  to  comprehend  truth,  and  on  the  other  hand 
that  we  should  never  attempt  to  belie  either  ourselves  or  others. 
The  ethics  of  Monism  urges  us  to  heed  the  most  important  truth 
in  the  realm  of  facts,  namely,  the  oneness  of  all-existence.  The  ethics 
of  Monism  teaches  us  to  consider  man  as  a  part  of  the  whole  uni- 
verse. The  moral  man  aspires  to  conform  to  the  All  and  to  the 
laws  of  the  All  ;  he  longs  to  be  one  with  the  power  in  which  we 
live  and  move  and  have  our  being.  In  obedience  to  this  impulse 
man's  soul  grows  ;  it  becomes  more  and  more  a  microcosm  within 
the  macrocosm. 

*  For  a  further  explanation  see  the  end  of  the  Concluding  Remarks  to  our 
discussion. 

t  My  answer  to  this  objection  is  given  in  the  article  :  "  The  Moral  Law 
and  Moral  Rules,''  p.  117  supra. 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  OF  DISCUSSION.        147 


SUMMARY. 

Making  a  call  of  late  on  Mr.  W.  M.  Salter,  I  enjoyed  with 
him  a  conversation,  in  which  we  tried  to  understand  one  another, 
in  order  to  arrive,  if  not  at  an  agreement,  yet  at  a  clear  statement 
of  our  differences.  Mr.  Salter  complained  of  my  presentation  of 
the  case,  that  I  did  not  make  distinctions  which  were  necessary  to 
properly  comprehend  his  position  and  that  of  the  societies  for 
Ethical  Culture.  He  did  not  object  to  '  'a  basis  of  ethics. "  Whereupon 
I  said  that  the  leaders  of  the  Ethical  Societies  are  perfectly  right  in 
not  wanting  to  pledge  their  members  to  any  religious  or  philosophical 
belief,  yet  they  must  themselves  have  a  ground  to  stand  on  ;  they 
cannot  preach  ethics  without  a  basis  of  ethics,  for  every  ethical 
rule  is  the  expression  of  a  world-conception.  By  implication  then, 
an  ethical  movement  after  all  rests  on  a  philosophical  basis. 

On  my  saying  that  the  ethics  of  a  spiritualist,  of  a  materialist, 
of  a  believer  in  theism,  of  an  Agnostic,  of  a  Christian,  a  Jew,  a  Mo- 
hammedan and  a  Buddhist,  actually  differ,  and  that  they  must 
differ,  Mr.  Salter  replied  that  "  it  was  true,  they  might  differ,  but  it 
was  very  possible  that  im  Grossen  und  Ganzen  they  might  agree. 

We  take  exception  to  this.  Even  the  different  denominations 
of  the  same  religion,  for  instance  Protestants  and  Catholics,  have 
different  ethics.  I  do  not  deny  that  certain  ethical  rules  are  re- 
garded as  binding  by  all  the  religious  teachers  of  the  world  ;  there 
is  a  "common  conscience,"  (to  use  Prof.Adler's  term,)  developing 
in  mankind,  but  is  not  this  common  conscience,  so  far  as  it  is  not 
a  mere  incidental  concurrence,  the  expression  of  a  common  world- 
conception  ?  A  common  world-conception  (viz.,  a  positivism  or  a 
systematized  statement  of  the  facts,  founded  upon  scientific  inves- 
tigation) is  preparing  itself  in  humanity  and  together  with  it  we 
can  observe  the  evolution  of  the  ethics  of  positivism,  viz.,  of  ethics 
in  agreement  with  facts,  an  ethics  that  can  be  analyzed  and  com- 
prehended by  science. 

But  this  kind  of  ethics  (positive  ethics)  is  found  insufficient 
by  Mr.  Salter.  He  maintains  that  the  ethical  problem  lies  deeper 
than  scientific  inquiry  can  reach.  "  Granted  that  the  knowledge 
of  facts  is  the  basis  of  ethics,"  he  said,  "  there  is  a  basis  below 
this  basis.  In  studying  facts,  we  are  influenced  by  a  purpose  ; 
we  have  some  end  in  view,  and  we  study  facts  and  conditions  in 
order  that  we  may  know  how  we  shall  attain  that  end.  The  deeper 
question  is,  then,  What  is  the  true  end  ?   And  the  bottom  obliga- 


i48  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

tion  is  to  regard  and  seek  this  end,  when  it  is  once  rationally  de- 
termined. What  are  our  matter-of-fact  wishes  is  a  secondary 
matter." 

Before  answering  the  question  as  to  this  so-called  deeper  ob- 
ligation I  would  ask  and  answer  another  question.  What  is 
meant  by  "  obligation  ?  "  Obligation  is  simply  a  statement  of  ours  ; 
it  is  the  formulation  of  facts  for  special  practical  purposes,  very 
appropriately  put  in  the  shape  of  a  prescript.  The  obligation 
formulated  with  reference  to  the  facts  of  our  existence,  and  the  con- 
ditions of  our  existence,  is  already  the  bottom  obligation  ;  there  is 
not  a  second  bottom  beneath  it. 

In  that  case  Mr.  Salter  says,  "your  ethical  commands  are  hy- 
pothetical ;  they  are  conditioned  by  the  wish  to  be  in  harmony 
with  society;  the  wish  to  be  in  conformity  with  the  conditions 
of  nature  ;  the  wish  for  life." 

Certainly,  the  ethical  rules  are  in  this  sense  conditioned  ;  for 
all  we  can  say  about  the  ethical  ought  is  to  state  the  facts  as  they 
are  :  the  man  who  does  not  care  for  being  a  useful  member  of  so- 
ciety, or  who  does  not  care  for  his  physical,  mental  and  moral 
health,  who  does  not  care  for  going  to  the  wall  and  whose  actions 
are  expressions  of  this  indifference,  he  will  do  harm  to  his  fellow- 
beings  and  he  will  be  doomed  to  perdition.  His  soul  so  far  as  it  is 
possible  will  be  blotted  out,  and  his  life  will  become  a  curse  to 
humanity.  These  are  the  facts  and  the  moral  ought  is  a  state- 
ment of  such  and  kindred  facts  for  pastoral  purposes,  or  as  a  help 
for  self-education. 

Here,  it  appears,  lies  the  ultimate  divergency  between  Mr.  Sal- 
ter's view  and  our  view.  Mr.  Salter  finds,  or  believes  he  finds,  an 
obligation  of  absolute  authority  beyond  facts  and  beyond  the  realm 
of  science.  We  cannot  see  that  an  obligation  outside  of  the  pro- 
vince of  positive  facts,  the  obligation  of  an  absolute  authority  has 
any  meaning. 

This  ethical  view  will  naturally  appear  to  him  who  holds  it, 
deeper  than  positivism  and  broader  than  monism.  To  the  monist 
however  it  must  appear  dualistic,  to  the  positivist  metaphysical, 
to  the  man  of  natural  science,  supernatural.  The  former  stand- 
point recognizes  a  profundity  where  the  latter  finds  a  vagary. 


THE  OUGHT  AND  THE  MUST. 


BY  JOHN   MADDOCK. 


Dr.  Carus,  in  his  book  on  the  ethical  problem,  truth- 
fully states  that  "ethics  must  have  a  basis  to  rest 
upon."  What  is  true  of  everything  else  in  the  uni- 
verse is  true  of  ethics — there  is  a  foundation  for  ethics. 
As  there  is  but  one  basis  for  all  things  from  the  stand- 
point of  monism,  moral  fruit  has  the  same  basis  as 
material  fruit.  If  the  tree  is  good,  its  fruit  is  good. 
But  the  basis  of  the  fruit  is  not  the  tree;  neither  is  the 
basis  of  morals  the  man.  The  basis  of  both  is  that 
subtle  power  which  resides  in  every  atom,  in  every 
form.  Both  are  rooted  in  the  "All."  Morals  are  not 
acquired,  they  are  evolved  ;  and  to  affirm  to  this  truth 
is  to  establish  the  doctrine  of  Monism  upon  a  scienti- 
fic basis. 

The  conflicting  ideas  which  are  expressed  upon  the 
ethical  subject  are  caused  by  not  reasoning  from  the 
right  premise.  Philosophers  have  reasoned  from  the 
tree  instead  of  the  root.  All  things  in  nature  are  the 
results  of  certain  combinations.  Material  fruit  is  the 
result  of  the  combined  influences  of  the  rain,  the  earth, 
the  sun,  and  the  specific  nature  of  the  tree.  All  these 
have  their  roots  in  natural  law.  Moral  fruit  is  the  re- 
sult of  the  combined  influences  of  the  Church,  the 
State,  and  the  intelligence  and  power  of  the  individual; 
and  all  these  have  their  roots  in  natural  law — in  the 


150  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

"All,"  they  all  proceed  from  one.  There  are  different 
influences  exerted  in  and  upon  men,  but  they  are 
maintained  by  the  same  power,  so  that  no  man  can 
boast  of  his  morality  any  more  than  the  vine  can  boast 
of  its  grapes.  "Ought"  is  not  the  word  from  the 
standpoint  of  evolution  and  monism ;  whatever  de- 
gree of  moral  quality  is  in  a  man,  he  must  express  it 
according  to  the  combination  of  organism  and  environ- 
ment. 

There  is  no  alternative  ;  the  laws  of  nature  make 
no  mistakes.  With  the  basis  of  fire  and  gunpowder  we 
have  nothing  to  do,  but  we  can  play  a  part  in  the 
combination  of  an  explosion  when  some  circumstance 
demands  it.  So  of  ethics ;  we  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  basis,  but  we  become  a  part  of  the  combina- 
tion for  moral  evolution  when  we  are  consigned  by 
natural  law  to  our  specific  places.  We  do  not  bear 
the  root,  but  the  root  bears  us.  The  hands  of  the 
clock  do  not  move  the  works,  but  the  works  move  the 
hands.  From  the  standpoint  of  evolution  and  mon- 
ism, we  stand  in  the  same  relation  to  the  "All,"  as 
the  hands  do  to  the  works  of  a  clock. 

Monism  and  evolution  must  not  be  confounded  by 
separating  man  from  the  universe,  and  giving  him 
self-determining  power.  This  may  do  for  religion,  but 
it  will  not  do  for  science.  By  religion  man  has  been 
condemned  ;  by  science  he  is  justified.  Ethical  so- 
cieties are  not  possible  [except]  when  a  number  of 
persons  desire  to  organize  for  the  purpose  of  creating 
an  environment  in  which  they  will  enjoy  themselves 
the  most,  and  influence  one  another  to  "live  justly  and 
walk  uprightly."  The  best  people,  therefore,  will  be 
found  there.  Instead  of  artificial  morality — the  pro- 
duct of  the  whip  and  threat  of  religion — there  will  be 


THE  OUGHT  AND  THE  MUST.  151 

real,  natural  morality  according  to  the  principles  of 
science. 

The  basis  of  an  ethical  society  is  a  number  of  good 
people,  and  the  basis  of  good  people  is  the  powerful 
"All "  which  reigns  in  all  things.  As  a  safe  cannot  be 
unlocked  until  the  right  combination  is  found,  so  ethi- 
cal societies  will  not  be  in  a  flourishing  condition  until 
the  natural  combination  is  complete.  There  must  be 
affirmation  ;  due  credit  must  be  given  to  the  power  in 
the  universal  "All."  Scientific  affirmation  must  take 
the  place  of  the  superstitious. 


THE  OUGHT  AND  THE  MUST 


Science  knows  of  no  arbitrariness  in  nature ;  science 
meets  with  dire  necessity  everywhere.  Indeed,  science 
is  possible  only  in  so  far  as  the  laws  of  nature  are  ir- 
refragable and  immutable. 

The  scientist  who  makes  the  facts  of  human  moral- 
ity the  object  of  his  investigation,  can  make  no  excep- 
tion. He  also  must  recognize  the  rigidity  of  law  in 
the  actions  of  man,  and  if  he  does  not,  he  is  no  scien- 
tist. 

Suppose  there  were  no  law  in  human  action,  but 
arbitrary  irregularity,  so  that  the  same  motives  affect- 
ing the  same  character  under  exactly  the  same  cir- 
cumstances need  not  result  (as  from  the  standpoint  of 
science  we  must  assume  that  they  do)  in  a  definite 
action,  or  the  inhibition  of  an  action,  but  might  pro- 
duce results  entirely  undeterminable  even  to  an  om- 
niscient spectator  who  knew  every  secret  spring,  every 
cog  and  wheel  in  the  soul-mechanism  of  man :  Sup- 
pose there  existed  any  freedom  of  will  in  the  sense  of 
such  an  arbitrariness  (a  view  which  is  generally  called 
indeterminism)  :  in  that  case,  there  would  be  no 
science  of  morality ;  ethics  as  a  science  would  be  an 
impossibility.  But  if  science  is  true  and  if  monism, 
the  unitary  conception  of  the  world  is  true,  man's  ac- 
tivity can  form  no  exception  in  the  great  household  of 
nature.  Man  also  must  be  considered  as  a  part  of 
nature,  and  man's  activity,  his  moral  actions  no  less 


THE  OUGHT  AND   THE  MUST.  153 

1 

than  his  immoral  actions,  as  strictly  determined  by 
law. 

Mr.  Maddock  (taking  his  standpoint  on  the  ground 
of  science,  which  is  strict  determinism,)  is  perfectly 
justified  in  declaring  that  "we  do  not  bear  the  root, 
but  the  root  bears  us.  The  hands  of  the  clock  do  not 
move  the  works,  but  the  works  the  hands." 

Accepting  the  principle  of  determinism  as  correct, 
must  we  at  the  same  time  accept  Mr.  Maddock' s  con- 
clusion that  "ought  is  not  the  word  .  .  .  ;  whatever 
degree  of  moral  quality  is  in  a  man,  he  must  express 
it  according  to  the  combination  of  organism  and  en- 
vironment." 

Nature's  laws  are  rigid.  The  crystal  forms  itself, 
if  no  disturbing  influences  interfere,  with  minutely  ex- 
act regularity.  And  furthermore,  every  disturbing  in- 
fluence alters  the  formation  of  the  crystal  in  exact 
agreement  with  law.  This  is  no  exception  to  the  law, 
it  is  a  confirmation  of  it.  The  evolution  of  feeling 
beings  is  also  regulated  by  law.  The  development  of 
the  soul  of  mankind  shows  the  same  necessity  of  natural 
law  as  does  the  formation  of  a  crystal,  and  every  dis- 
turbing influence  affects  the  growth  of  humanity  with 
precisely  the  same  regularity  as  in  the  lower  domains 
of  natural  processes.  Man  has  become  a  rational  being 
of  necessity — of  the  very  same  unavoidable  necessity 
by  which,  for  instance,  the  shape  of  the  fixed  stars 
and  their  planets  becomes  spheroidal. 

Having  become  a  rational  being  man  can  compre- 
hend his  situation,  he  can  understand  the  laws  of  na- 
ture, and  with  the  help  of  his  knowledge  of  the  laws 
of  nature,  he  can  forecast  the  result  of  processes  that 
take  place  around  him.  The  knowledge  man  acquires 
thus  becomes  the   most  important  factor  of  his  ex- 


i54  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

istence  ;  and  the  great  advantages  which  accrue  to  man 
from  making  a  more  and  more  extensive  use  of  knowl- 
edge, become  a  stimulus  to  develop  strongly  the  ten- 
dency of  obeying  the  rational  advice  which  we  can  de- 
rive from  experience.  It  is  knowledge  which  discloses 
to  man  that  in  his  individual  existence  he  is  only  a 
part  of  a  greater  whole,  and  that  he  individually  can 
live  and  prosper  only  when  the  community  to  which  he 
belongs  is  in  a  state  of  health.  The  life  of  human  so- 
ciety carries  and  nourishes  the  life  of  the  individual ; 
the  part  derives  its  existence  from  the  whole,  as  the 
single  cells  of  our  body  are  sustained  so  long  as  the 
whole  organism  is  vigorous  and  healthy.  Knowledge 
accordingly  creates  the  ought,  and  the  ought  is  nothing 
that  supersedes  or  stands  in  contradiction  to  the  must; 
it  is  a  comprehension  of  the  must,  and  this  compre- 
hension finds  expression  in  the  ethical  command  of  an 
ought.  The  formulation  of  the  ought  accordingly  is  in 
the  course  of  nature  the  necessary  result  of  comprehen- 
sion becoming  a  factor  in  the  further  development  of 
man. 

The  must  of  nature  is  not  suspended  by  the  ought  ; 
yet  it  is  utilised.  The  curse  only  that  under  unfavor- 
able conditions  attaches  to  the  must,  is  taken  away. 
Man  as  a  rational  being,  learns  to  avoid  the  disturbing 
influences  in  the  formation  of  his  soul,  and  human  so- 
ciety can  attain  to  a  higher  perfection.  The  ought  of 
ethics  accordingly  must  be  based  upon  the  must  of 
science.  A  careful  investigation  of  the  is  will  give  us  in- 
formation about  the  is  to  be.  The  ethical  teacher  on  the 
ground  of  his  comprehension  of  the  is  to  be,  formulates 
the  stimulus  working  in  the  right  and  desirable  direc- 
tion in  the  moral  command  of  the  ought,  and  raises  his 
warning  voice  to  call  attention  to  the  evil  consequences 


THE  OUGHT  AND   THE  MUST.  155 

of  any  disturbing  influences  that  may  unfavorably  af- 
fect the  pure  formation  of  the  is  to  be. 

It  is  in  this  sense  that  we  declare,  "  Ethics  must 
be  based*  on  facts  and  must  be  applied  to  facts."  The 
ought  can  be  stated  only  on  the  ground  of  a  careful 
consideration  of  the  must.  The  ought  stands  not  in 
contradiction  to  the  must,  but  it  expresses  the  must  as 
the  is  to  be  in  its  purity,  if  the  disturbing  influences 
are  avoided. 

The  preaching  of  the  ought  has  become  a  factor  in 
the  development  of  mankind,  and  the  better  we  un- 
derstand its  nature  the  more  effective  will  the  factor 
of  ethical  aspirations  be. 

Man's  morals  are  not  acquired,  as  Mr.  Maddock 
says,  they  are  evolved.  It  is  true,  that  "  from  the 
standpoint  of  evolution  and  monism,  we  stand  in  the 
same  relation  to  the  All,  as  the  hands  do  to  the  works 
of  a  clock."  Yet  the  simile  is  insufficient  in  one  re- 
spect. The  hands  produce  no  reaction  upon  the  works  ; 
they  cannot  regulate  its  movement.  With  reference 
to  this  ability,  man  must  be  compared  to  the  regula- 
tor ;  for  man,  although  evolved  in  nature  as  a  part  of 
nature,  does  react  upon  the  natural  conditions  under 
which  he  has  been  evolved.  He  modifies,  not  the  or- 
der of  nature,  not  the  laws  of  nature,  but  the  state  of 
nature  by  which  he  is  surrounded. 

The  moral  ought  is  the  regulator  in  the  mechan- 
ism of  the  human  soul ;  and  our  ethical  institutions, 
our  schools  and  churches  form  the  regulator  in  the 
clockwork  of  society. 

The  moral  ought  does  as  little  demolish  or  over- 

*  Mr.  Maddock  says  :  "  The  basis  of  an  ethical  society  is  a  number  of  good 
people."  We  prefer  to  call  a  number  of  good  people,  viz.,  people  whose  in- 
ention  is  that  of  being  good,  the  elements  of  an  ethical  society. 


156  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

come  the  principle  of  determinism  as  the  regulator  in 
a  clock  anihilates  the  irrefragability  of  mechanical 
laws. 

Ethics  demands  obedience  to  the  moral  law,  but 
this  obedience  is  no  servitude  ;  it  is  rather  a  liber- 
ation from  the  evils  of  immoral  action.  If  in  an  im- 
pulse of  anthropomorphism  so  natural  to  man,  he  rep- 
resents the  must  of  natural  law  as  a  stern  ruler  and 
an  inexorable  master,  he  will  symbolize  his  ethical 
impulse  in  the  idea  of  a  Savior  and  a  Redeemer  who 
leads  him  out  of  the  house  of  bondage  into  a  state 
of  freedom. 

Freedom  in  the  sense  of  arbitrary  action  undeter- 
mined by  law  has  no  sense.  If  freedom  means  any- 
thing, it  means  the  victory  of  the  rational  stimulus 
over  the  irrational  impulses,  so  that  the  curse  of  the 
must  is  changed  into  a  blessing.  The  law,  being  com- 
prehended, becomes  a  part  of  ourselves,  and  the  man 
in  whom  the  ought  of  ethics  has  become  the  supreme 
rule  of  action,  which  controls  all  his  motives ;  the 
moral  man  alone  is  the  truly  free  man.  Being  in  har- 
mony with  the  law,  he  ceases  to  be  the  slave  of  ne- 
cessity. Ethics  is  manumission,  and  the  ethical  man 
feels  himself  not  a  serf  but  a  child  of  nature,  as  Paul 
says  in  his  letter  to  the  Galatians  : 

"We  are  not  the  children  of  the  bond  woman,  but  of  the 
free." 


LEADING  PRINCIPLES  IN  ETHICS. 


BY  F.    M.    HOLLAND. 


The  declaration  of  the  editor  of  The  Open  Court,  (see 
supra  p.  in,)  that  "The  leading  principle  of  ethics 
must  always  be  the  expression  of  a  conception  of  the 
world,"  is  so  true  and  important,  that  I  wish  to  indi- 
cate what  sort  of  a  conception  is  needed  for  this  great 
purpose.  And  I  am  particularly  glad  to  take  up  the 
subject  in  a  paper  whose  editor  holds  with  me,  that 
the  true  test,  which  is  to  enable  us  to  tell  what  is  right 
or  wrong,  must  be  sought  in  the  idea  of  usefulness, 
rather  than  in  that  of  pleasure. 

It  has  seemed  to  me  for  many  years  that  Utili- 
tarians, while  doing  much  to  place  moral  laws  upon  a 
firm  scientific  basis,  above  all  vagaries  of  individual 
caprice  and  vicissitudes  of  sectarian  dogma,  have  at- 
tributed far  too  much  ethical  value  to  man's  desire  for 
pleasure  and  happiness.  The  tramp  would  say,  "I 
am  much  more  happy  than  if  I  were  hard  at  work ; 
and  I  make  no  one  less  happy,  for  people  like  to  be 
generous."  The  lazy  and  licentious  savages  on  the 
Sandwich  Islands  seemed  perfectly  happy.  Who  of 
us  would  follow  all  the  ways  to  make  ourselves  hap- 
pier, which  our  neighbors  would  recommend  ?  The 
cannibal's  happiness  is  not  like  the  missionary's ; 
neither  is  the  book-worm's  like  the  prize-fighter's;  nor 
the  school-boy's  like  his  grand-mother's  ;  nor  the  art 


158  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

critic's  like  the  trapper's  ;  nor  the  rake's  like  the  phil- 
anthropist's. Human  ideas  of  happiness  differ  so 
widely,  that  it  is  as  hard  to  bring  them  together  into 

one  theory  as  to  make  a  rope  out  of  sand. 

* 
*  * 

The  Utilitarians  are  right,  however,  in  looking  for 
the  leading  moral  principle  in  the  relations  of  man  to 
man.  Whatever  duties  the  individual  has  towards 
himself  and  towards  the  lower  animals,  are  included 
in  those  moral  laws  which  originate  in  his  relations  to 
other  human  beings.  This  is  proved  by  such  facts  as 
that,  "moral"  and  "ethical"  are  derived  from  the 
Greek  and  Latin  words  for  "customary."  The  same 
is  the  case  with  the  word  translated  "just"  and 
"righteous"  in  the  New  Testament;  "justice"  comes 
from  the  Sanskrit  verb  "yu"  to  "bind,"  and  "right" 
from  the  Aryan  verb  "rag,"  or  "rak,"  to  "make 
straight";  "virtuous"  originally  meant  "manly," 
"honest,"  "honorable,"  and  "wicked"  "like  a  witch". 
Morality  got  not  only  its  name,  but  its  power  from 
the  fact  that  men  have  insisted  on  its  observance  from 
the  beginning,  as  the  necessary  condition  of  social  ex- 
istence. 

Men  and  women  cannot  exist  except  in  society ; 
and  society  cannot  exist  without  some  observance  of 
moral  laws.  Any  community  would  go  to  pieces,  if 
the  members  did  not  respect  each  others'  rights,  re- 
lieve each  others'  necessities,  and  abstain  from  pro- 
voking each  others'  passions.  Thus  justice,  benevo- 
lence, and  self-control  are  conditions  of  social  exist- 
ence ;  and  thus  they  become  primary  virtues,  which 
all  men  and  women  desire  to  have  practiced  towards 
them,  and  which  they  know  they  ought  to  practice 
themselves.  As  Leslie  Stephens  says,  {Science  of  Ethics, 


LEADING  PRINCIPLES  IN  ETHICS.  159 

chapter  viii,  sec.  39,)  "The  moral  law  being,  in  brief, 
conformity  to  the  conditions  of  social  welfare,  con- 
science is  the  name  of  the  intrinsic  motives  to  such 
conformity."  I  might  add  that  both  the  strength  and 
the  disinterestedness  of  conscience  may  be  readily  ac- 
counted for,  when  we  consider  how  long  these  condi- 
tions of  social  existence  have  been  observed,  and  how 
earnestly  their  observance  has  been  insisted  upon  by 

priests,  heads  of  families,  and  other  rulers. 

* 
*  * 

What  I  wish  particularly  to  point  out,  however,  is 
that  the  idea  of  social  existence,  while  having  the  ad- 
vantage of  being  more  definite  than  that  of  happiness, 
labors  with  it  under  the  disadvantage  of  insufficiency. 
It  is  correct  as  far  as  it  goes  ;  but  it  does  not  go  far 
enough  to  furnish  all  the  highest  moral  ideas.  The 
suppression  of  tramps  and  drunkards  has  not  been 
found  absolutely  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  so- 
cial existence,  even  in  the  United  States  ;  and  the  na- 
tives of  the  Sandwich  Islands  might  have  kept  up  their 
filthy  habits  for  thousands  of  years,  without  dying  out. 
It  is  easier  to  point  out  this  difficulty  than  to  remove 
it ,  but  I  hope  I  shall  be  able  at  least  to  suggest  a 
method  of  solution. 

These  natives,  and  other  savages,  are  actually  dy- 
ing out ;  and  the  reason  is  that  they  cannot  stand 
competition  with  races  which  are  more  faithful  to  what 
I  would  call  conditions  of  social  progress.  I  mean,  in 
the  first  place,  such  advanced  forms  of  justice,  benev- 
olence, and  self-control  as  go  beyond  the  mere  re- 
quirements of  social  existence,  and  improve  perpetual- 
ly under  the  stimulus  of  competition.  Thus,  civilized 
nations  recognize  sobriety  and  veracity  as  necessary 
parts  of  self-control  and  justice;  and  benevolence  has 


»6o  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

but  recently  been  so  far  enlarged  as  to  include  human- 
ity to  lower  animals.      Not  even  agnostics  doubt,  as 

Paul  did,  whether  men  have  duties  towards  oxen. 

* 

*  * 

In  the  second  place,  I  mean  some  moral  ideas 
which  are  of  later  origin  than  the  three  primitive  ones, 
but  almost  as  old  as  human  history.  Here  I  would  place 
chastity,  patriotism,  and  physical  culture,  qualities 
which  have  done  much  to  make  one  community  more 
fit  to  survive  than  another,  ever  since  competition  be- 
gan. The  advantage  of  having  little  children  cared 
for  carefully  is  so  great  as  to  cause  all  nations  that 
have  risen  above  barbarism  to  insist  on  matrimonial 
fidelity;  and  the  tendency  of  unchastity  to  weaken 
virtue  and  encourage  vice  has  been  fully  recognized 
by  Christianity.  This  religion  did  not  pay  so  much 
respect  as  its  predecessors  to  patriotism  or  physical 
culture,  but  modern  thought  insists  that  care  for  health 
and  love  of  country  are  as  necessary  for  individual  per- 
fection as  for  social  progress. 

* 

*  * 

The  third  and  highest  group  of  virtues  is  peculiar- 
ly modern,  except  in  so  far  as  two  of  its  members, 
mental  culture  and  love  of  personal  liberty,  were  ex- 
alted in  pagan  Athens  to  a  place  which  they  lost  after 
the  establishment  of  Christianity.  All  that  can  be  said 
of  their  value,  in  promoting  chastity,  patriotism,  phy- 
sical culture,  self-control,  justice,  and  benevolence,  is 
equally  true  of  another  great  virtue,  whose  importance 
has  been  sadly  ignored  by  teachers  of  religion  and 
morality.  Study  of  the  tendency  of  indolence  and  ex- 
travagance to  produce  crime,  and  of  the  aid  given  by 
industry,  economy,  foresight,  and  enterprise  to  the 
development  of  qualities  universally  acknowledged  to 


LEADING  PRINCIPLES  IN  ETHICS.  161 

be  highly  virtuous,  justifies  my  giving  thriftiness 
a  place  among  our  most  sacred  duties.  All  other 
virtues  have  become  easier  and  commoner,  as  life  has 
been  made  more  comfortable  than  ever  before,  espec- 
ially for  the  poor.  These  latter  now  enjoy  comforts 
and  luxuries  which  were,  until  recently,  beyond  their 
reach ;  and  this  gain  is  due,  partly  to  other  men's  in- 
creasing thriftiness,  and  partly  to  the  help  given  them 
by  practical  philanthropists.  Philanthropy  differs 
from  benevolence  in  requiring  the  assistance  of  men- 
tal culture.  Love  of  liberty,  thrift,  mental  culture,  and 
philanthropy  characterize  our  most  advanced  civiliza- 
tion, and  guarantee  future  progress.  And  by  progress 
I  mean  movement  from  the  primitive  condition  of 
mankind  toward  our  present  civilization  and  thence 
onward  in  the  same  direction. 


A  TEST  OF  CONDUCT. 


BY    F.    M.   HOLLAND. 


In  a  previous  article  I  tried  to  show  that  a  practi- 
cable and  accurate  test,  to  show  what  is  right  or  wrong, 
may  be  found  in  the  conditions  of  social  existence  and 
progress.  In  other  words,  I  hold  that  actions  which 
tend  to  help  mankind  to  exist  and  advance  are  morally 
right,  that  those  which  tend  to  destroy  the  existence 
of  our  race,  or  even  to  check  its  progress,  are  morally 
wrong,  and  that  those  which  have  no  tendency  either 
way,  are  neither  right  nor  wrong.  Motives,  of  course, 
are  virtuous  or  vicious,  according  as  they  are  meant 
to  produce  actions  by  which  social  progress  is  pro- 
moted or  checked  ;  no  action  which  does  not  proceed 
from  virtuous  motives  can  be  right ;  but  an  act  which 
is  so  prompted  may  be  morally  wrong,  as  is  the  case 
with  persecution,  not  to  mention  other  conscientious 
errors  which  will  soon  be  pointed  out. 

Calling  this  test  practicable  does  not  mean  that  it 
ought  to  be  substituted  for  conscience  as  a  daily  guide. 
When  conscience  bids  us  be  generous,  chaste,  or 
honest,  it  is  morally  safer,  as  a  rule,  for  us  to  obey 
promptly  and  disinterestedly,  than  for  us  to  sit  down 
to  calculate  the  probability  that  this  particular  action 
will  prove  conducive  or  detrimental  to  social  progress. 


A   TEST  OF  CONDUCT.  163 

And  so,  when  I  want  to  know  what  time  it  is,  I  usually 
prefer  looking  at  my  watch,  to  making  the  journey 
necessary  to  consult  a  clock  regulated  by  the  Cam- 
bridge Observatory.  When  I  happen  to  pass  such  a 
clock,  however,  I  am  very  glad  to  see  whether  my 
watch  differs  from  it ;  and  I  always  know  which  is  in 
the  wrong.  So  if  we  feel  any  doubt  whether  we  ought 
to  feed  a  tramp,  or  help  wreck  a  liquor  saloon,  or  re- 
sist force  with  force,  or  take  a  vow  of  celibacy,  we 
cannot  be  sure  that  we  are  acting  virtuously,  unless 
we  choose  some  guide  less  subject  to  be  perverted  by 
passion  and  prejudice,  than  conscience. 

The  test  I  propose  does  not  justify  the  encourage- 
ment of  mendicancy  by  thoughtless  charity,  or  the 
wanton  disturbance  of  the  public  peace.  It  permits 
both  nations  and  individuals  to  defend  themselves  ; 
but  it  condemns  wars  of  conquest,  as  likely  not  only 
to  retard  the  general  progress,  but  to  curse  the  con- 
querors with  retaliation  from  abroad  and  despotism  at 
home. 

Thus  this  test  shows  its  accuracy  by  censuring 
nothing  universally  acknowledged  to  be  virtuous,  and 
sanctioning  nothing  generally  considered  vicious.  What 
I  claim  most  confidently  for  it,  is  its  capacity  to  furnish 
a  full  code  of  duties.  As  I  repeat  the  list  already 
given,  I  will  try  to  arrange  them  in  the  order  justified 
by  their  fitness  to  promote  social  progress.  And  first, 
should  come  a  virtue  which  has  been  insisted  upon  by 
all  rulers  and  teachers  from  the  very  beginning,  which 
is  still  required  peremptorily  of  all  the  members  of  so- 
ciety, and  which  has  also  the  peculiar  merit  of  not 
being  liable  to  excess.  All  this  is  true  of  no  virtue  but 
justice. 

The  only  danger  about  recognizing  the  rights  of 


i64  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

others  is  that  of  failing  to  do  so  fully.  If  I  give  my 
neighbor  more  than  his  due,  I  act  unjustly  towards 
myself  or  some  other  member  of  society.  Whatever 
is  just  is  obligatory ;  and  whatever  is  not  just  is  un- 
just. 

In  the  same  way,  when  we  enlarge  the  definition 
of  justice  so  far  as  to  include  veracity,  we  find  not  only 
that  whatever  is  not  true  is  under  condemnation  be- 
cause it  is  false,  but  also  that,  when  I  tell  my  neigh- 
bor all  he  is  entitled  to  hear,  and  nothing  more,  I 
comply  fully  with  the  requirements  of  social  progress, 
as  well  as  with  those  of  the  law  of  justice. 

It  may  be  noticed  that  I  agree  more  closely  with 
ancient  than  modern  moralists,  in  placing  justice  above 
benevolence ;  but  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  this  last 
virtue  is  so  liable  to  be  carried  to  excess  that  it  ought 
to  stand  lower  than  justice,  though  among  other  du- 
ties which  are  constantly  obligatory  on  all  the  mem- 
bers of  society,  within  the  limits  marked  out  by  the 
conditions  of  social  progress. 

Thriftiness  is  so  liable  to  be  carried  to  excess,  that  it 
has  been  regarded  with  little  favor  by  Christian  moral- 
ists ;  and  its  cultivation  ought  to  be  kept  in  strict  and 
constant  subordination  to  that  of  justice.  It  must,  how- 
ever, be  remembered  that  one  of  the  most  uniform 
characteristics  of  criminals  is  incapacity  for  success 
in  business  or  even  for  steady  work,  and  also  that 
thrifty  nations  have  been  highly  virtuous  in  all  other 
respects,  as  well  as  very  successful  in  making  progress. 
The  states  in  our  own  Union  which  have  a  peculiarly 
industrious,  frugal,  and  enterprising  population  can 
show  the  largest  amount  of  benevolence,  patriotism, 
and  scholarship,  as  well  as  the  smallest  taint  of  law- 
lessness,   dishonesty,    drunkenness     unchastity,    and 


A  TEST  OF  CONDUCT,  165 

other  gross  vice.  An  honest  and  thrifty  nation,  family, 
or  individual,  is  so  much  more  likely  than  a  thriftless 
one  to  be  virtuous,  and  not  vicious,  that  I  should 
place  thriftiness  second  in  the  scale  of  duties  ;  while 
the  danger  of  excess  will  be  sufficiently  guarded  against 
by  keeping  justice  high  above  it,  and  giving  the  next 
below  to  benevolence,  a  virtue  absolutely  necessary  to 
social  progress,  if  only  to  provide  adequate  care  for 
young  or  temporarily  disabled  members  of  society. 

This  reason  also  makes  the  maintenance  of  the 
family  tie  so  important,  that  we  may  give  the  fourth 
place  to  chastity,  which  has  the  farther  advantage  of 
greatly  promoting  the  culture  of  all  other  good  quali- 
ties. This  last  is  also  true  of  the  kindred  virtue,  self- 
control,  especially  when  we  define  it  as  including  tem- 
porance. 

Having  thus  filled  five  places,  we  must  certainly 
give  the  next  one  to  physical  culture.  Utter  neglect 
of  this  duty  would  soon  make  it  impossible  to  practise 
any  other ;  and  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that 
healthy  people  are  generally  much  more  thrifty,  be- 
nevolent, honest,  patriotic,  intelligent,  fond  of  liberty, 
and  capable  of  self-control  than  invalids  are.  The 
care  now  given  by  civilized  governments  to  make  all 
the  surroundings  of  daily  life  healthy,  for  the  poor  as 
well  as  the  rich,  ensures  not  only  rapid  progress  in 
civilization,  but  steady  moral  improvement. 

Then  last  come  duties  which  are  not  required  of  all 
the  members  of  society,  but  are  highly  obligatory  on 
those  men  and  women  who  are  capable  of  performing 
them.  Here,  in  order  of  relative  importance,  may  be 
placed  love  of  liberty,  mental  culture,  patriotism,  and 
philanthropy.  All  four  are  very  liable  to  be  carried  to 
excess  j  and  their  manifestation  should  be  carefully  re- 


166  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

stricted  by  the  claims  of  higher  duties,  especially  jus^ 
tice. 

First  among  these  four,  I  put  love  of  liberty,  be- 
cause lack  of  this  virtue  was  the  main  cause  of  the 
decay  of  classic  civilization.  The  capacity  of  vigorous 
rulers  to  promote  social  progress,  and  the  liability  of 
anarchy  to  check  it,  are  so  great  as  often  to  cause  the 
establishment  of  despotism  ;  but  this  has  always  been 
found,  sooner  or  later,  to  be  incompatible  with  further 
progress.  The  most  highly  advanced  communities 
need  most  to  have  their  influential  members  love  liberty 
with  a  zeal  ever  on  the  watch  against  oppression. 

Mental  culture  seems  to  be  somewhat  less  impor- 
tant, and  not  so  necessary  as  physical  culture,  self-con- 
trol, and  other  qualities  which  must  always  be  added 
in  order  to  make  it  permanently  useful,  and  which 
have  proved  extremely  beneficial  where  it  has  been 
utterly  lacking.  I  cannot  insist  too  strongly  on  the 
fact  that  the  life  and  strength  of  society  lies  mainly  in 
its  thrifty,  honest,  and  healthy  members.  All  its  mem- 
bers ought  to  do  their  utmost  to  belong  in  this  class ; 
but  all  cannot  be  scholars,  patriots,  or  philanthropists. 

Patriotism  is  much  more  generally  obligatory  at 
election  times  in  this  country  than  during  the  rest  of 
the  year  ;  and  there  are  many  countries  which  scarcely 
permit  its  manifestation  in  time  of  peace,  as  well  as 
some  rulers  who  give  it  no  opportunity  of  legitimate 
exercise,  except  in  insurrection.  Those  of  our  own 
citizens  who  are  constantly  in  charge  of  our  national 
interests  are  under  so  great  moral  responsibility,  that 
patriotism  rises  for  them  to  a  very  high  place  in  the 
rank  of  duties. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  philanthropy  for  the  few 
who  are  able  to  practice  it  successfully  ;  but  it  must 


A   TEST  OF  CONDUCT.  167 

be  remembered  that  this  requires  not  merely  wealth, 
leisure,  and  earnestness,  but  also  sound  judgment, 
high  business  capacity,  and  thorough  acquaintance, 
not  only  with  the  evils  actually  existing  in  society,  but 
with  the  actual  working  in  times  past  of  various  insti- 
tutions and  reforms.  There  are  few  ways  in  which 
one  can  do  so  much  good  as  in  philanthropy,  or  so 
much  mischief. 

Those  who  ignore  the  claims  of  justice,  self-control, 
thriftiness,  love  of  liberty,  and  mental  culture,  cannot 
attempt  philanthropy  except  to  its  discredit  and  to  the 
public  injury.  There  is  no  space  left  to  dwell  on  what 
may  be  done  by  wise  and  just  philanthropists,  espe- 
cially in  diminishing  poverty,  which  has  been  danger- 
ously increased  by  thoughtless  and  lavish  benevolence. 
Highest  in  honor  among  the  men  and  women  who 
carry  society  onwards  and  upwards  are  these  philan- 
thropists. 


A  CRITICISM  BY  PROF.  FRIEDRICH  JODL 


In  your  work  "  The  Ethical  Problem  "  I  have  read 
much  with  the  heartiest  approval,  and  with  admiration 
of  your  frequently  so  happy,  popular  style  of  expres- 
sion. Other  things  there  were,  however,  that  neither 
met  my  approval,  nor  were  intelligible  to  me. 

As  the  two  points  in  your  views  with  respect  to 
which  this  was  most  the  case,  let  me  cite  your  polem- 
ical attitude  towards  Hedonism,  and  your  reference  to 
nature  as  a  moral  standard.  What  you  oppose  as 
Hedonism  may  deserve,  indeed,  your  attacks ;  but  I 
know  of  no  author  since  La  Rochefoucauld  and  Hel- 
vetius  that  has  advocated  such  a  hedonism. 

The  principle  of  general  welfare  as  a  criterion  of 
the  ethical  value  of  character  and  acts,  has,  so  far  as  I 
can  see,  been  entirely  neglected  by  your  criticism. 
And  how  we  can  hope  to  overcome  the  old  orthodox 
conception  of  ethics,  without  representing  the  new 
scientific  ethics  as  eudemonism,  I  do  not  know.  Let 
man,  in  his  most  virtuous  conduct  and  in  his  most 
heroic  acts,  seek  his  happiness,  on  condition  only  that 
it  take  place  in  a  manner  and  with  means  that  are 
qualified  also  to  promote  the  happiness  of  others. 
The  whole  question  simply  is,  to  teach  men  to  seek 
happiness  in  the  right  way.  Happiness  itself  need 
not  therefore  be  eliminated  from  their  thoughts.  And 
this   conscious   striving  after  happiness  is  the  very 


A  CRITICISM  BY  PROF.  FRIED  RICH  JODL.       169 

characteristic  also  that  distinguishes  human  conduct 
from  all  natural  phenomena.  Nature  is  wholly  dis- 
regardful  of  individuals ;  she  merely  creates,  pro- 
duces in  the  greatest  possible  abundance,  and  thus 
maintains  herself  in  equilibrium.  What  sacrifices  this 
may  cost,  the  destruction  caused  by  it,  is  of  no  con- 
sequence. Her  procedure  is  the  type  of  what  we  may 
characterize  as  colossally  brutal  immorality.  But  her 
human  victims  gradually  came  to  speech  and  thought : 
the  whole  history  of  morality  is  to  me  nothing  but  a 
growth  of  nature  out  and  beyond  itself,  an  aspiration 
to  replace  natural  laws  by  the  laws  of  rational  will,  to 
win  for  every  living  being  his  rights  to  put  into  the 
blind-mechanical  play  of  natural  forces  the  soul  of  a 
purpose — eudemonism.  How  much  have  we  already 
won,  how  much  yet  remains  ?  Reason  and  will,  how- 
ever, are  still  too  feeble,  we  still  copy  too  much  "our 
good  mother  nature,"  confide  ourselves  only  too  will- 
ingly to  her  guidance,  and  we  constantly  have  to  ex- 
perience that  what  she  wants  and  what  we  want  are 
two  wholly  different  things. 

There  are  many  passages  in  my  Geschichte  der 
Ethik  which  represent  my  views  perhaps  more  pre- 
cisely and  fully  than  I  have  done  here.  Yet  I  state 
them  here  again,  because  our  common  cause,  it  seems 
to  me,  demands  unity  on  this  very  point. 


IN  ANSWER  TO  PROFESSOR  JODL. 


Prof.  Friedrich  Jodl  advances  two  points  in 
which  he  cannot  agree  with  the  views  presented  in 
The  Ethical  Problem.  First  he  criticises  my  polemical 
attitude  towards  Hedonism,  and  secondly  he  declares 
that  Nature  cannot  be  considered  as  a  moral  standard. 
Concerning  the  latter  point,  I  have  to  say  that  the  de- 
meanor of  Nature  (if  we  use  the  poetical  licence  of  per- 
sonifying her)  cannot  be  and  I  suppose  never  has 
been  proposed  as  a  model  for  imitation.  Nature  is 
neither  moral  nor  immoral,  but  Nature  and  Nature's 
laws  are  that  immutable  power  conformity  to  which 
makes  man  moral.  In  this  sense  alone  can  Nature  be 
said  to  be  the  moral  standard,  and  ethics  must  be 
grounded  upon  our  knowledge  of  Nature. 

What  we  say  of  Nature  holds  good  also  for  the 
theological  conception  of  that  power  in  which  we  live 
and  move  and  have  our  being.  There  is  no  pleading 
with  God  (Job  16,  21);  no  entering  into  judgment  with 
him  (Job  34,  23) ;  no  multiplying  words  against  him 
(Job  34,  37).  The  apostle  says:  "O  man,  who  art 
thou  that  repliest  against  God?  Shall  the  thing  formed 
say  to  him  that  formed  it,  Why  hast  thou  made  me 
thus?"  In  short  God  is  neither  moral  nor  immoral ; 
he  is  the  standard  of  morality.  It  would  be  a  poetical 
licence  to  speak  of  God  as  being  moral,  for  morality  is 


IN  ANSWER  TO  PROFESSOR  JODL.  171 

obedience   to  his  commands,  or  conformity  to  his  im- 
mutable will. 

Professor  Jodl  says : 

"The  whole  history  of  morality  is  to  me  nothing  but  a  growth 
of  Nature  out  and  beyond  itself  ;  an  aspiration  to  replace  natural 
laws  by  the  laws  of  rational  will." 

It  appears  that  Professor  Jodl  has  a  different  con- 
ception of  Nature  from  what  we  have.  I  see  no  pos- 
sibility of  replacing  natural  laws  or  growing  beyond 
Nature.     Says  Shakespeare: 

"  Yet  nature  is  made  better  by  no  mean, 
But  nature  makes  that  mean  ;  so,  over  that  art, 
Which,  you  say,  adds  to  nature,  is  an  art, 
That  nature  makes 

This  is  an  art 

Which  does  mend  nature — change,  rather ;  but 
The  art  itself  is  nature  I" — Winter's  Tale, 

Concerning  our  objections  to  Hedonism,  Professor 
Jodl says : 

"How  we  can  hope  to  overcome  the  old  orthodox  conception 
of  ethics  without  representing  the  new  and  scientific  ethics  as 
eudemonism,  I  do  not  know." 

This  passage  corroborates  my  conviction  that  he- 
donism and  utilitarianism  were  put  forth  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  old  orthodox  conception  of  ethics,  which 
declares  that  the  ethical  motive  in  man,  conscience  or 
the  sense  of  duty,  is  of  supernatural  origin.  The  ortho- 
dox as  well  as  their  antagonists  believe  that  the  pur- 
suit of  happiness  alone  is  natural ;  the  natural  man 
seeks  pleasure  and  shuns  pain.  The  presence  of 
higher  motives,  accordingly,  is  considered  by  the  or- 
thodox believer  as  a  proof  of  supernaturalism,  while 
his  adversary  feels  constrained  to  deny  their  existence. 

It  appears  to  me  that  the  old  orthodox  conception 
of  ethics  (religious  ethics)  contains  a  truth  which  the 


172  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

hedonistic  ethics  (irreligious  ethics)  does  not  contain. 
The  old  orthodox  conception  of  ethics,  although  rep- 
resented in  mythological  allegories,  is  nevertheless 
based  upon  the  facts  of  life.  It  has  grown  naturally ; 
and  its  main  mistake  is  that  it  represents  some  natural 
facts  the  origin  of  which  it  did  not  understand,  as 
supernatural  interferences  ;  it  misinterprets  facts  ;  it 
has  not  as  yet  developed  from  the  phase  of  a  belief  in 
magic  into  a  scientific  conception. 

Hedonistic  ethics,  on  the  other  hand,  must  appear 
as  artificial.  It  represents  ethics  as  eudemonology, 
i.  e.  the  science  of  attaining  the  greatest  possible 
maximum  of  pleasure  over  pain,  and  it  goes  on  to  ex- 
plain that  the  peace  of  soul  following  the  perform- 
ance of  duty  is  a  satisfaction  much  greater  than  all  the 
pleasures  of  the  world.  True,  but  it  is  this  kind  of 
explanation  which  appears  artificial  to  me. 

Brutus  condemned  his  sons  to  death  and  had  them 
executed,  because  he  considered  it  as  his  duty.  We 
may  doubt  whether  it  really  was  his  duty,  but  he 
certainly  did  it  because  he  considered  it  as  his  duty; 
and  who  will  deny  that  it  was  a  most  painful  duty 
which  gave  pleasure  to  nobody  and  contributed  noth- 
ing to  the  general  happiness  of  Rome  ;  it  only  tended 
to  preserve  that  spirit  of  Roman  sternness  which  made 
the  Romans  fit  not  only  to  conquer  but  also  to  rule  the 
world,  and  to  evolve  for  the  first  time  in  history  an  in- 
ternational code  of  laws  and  a  standard  of  justice. 
The  Romans  suffered  much  from  the  impulse  natural 
to  them ;  and  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  they  never 
attained  a  greater  happiness  than  other  nations.  If 
happiness  is  the  ultimate  test  of  morality,  Cyrene  was 
superior  in  morality  to  Sparta,  and  Sybaris  to  Athens. 

Can  we  say  that  the  Spartans,  or  the  Romans  were 


IN  ANSWER  TO  PROFESSOR  JODL.  173 

prompted  in  their  actions  by  a  desire  for  pleasure,  that 
sternness  was  a  pleasure  to  them  ?  I  should  say  that 
we  cannot.  Is  the  fighting  cock  impelled  to  fight  by 
a  desire  for  pleasure,  and  does  the  pleasure  of  fighting 
really  outweigh  in  his  opinion  the  pains  of  his  wounds 
and  the  fear  of  danger  when  confronted  with  superior 
enemies  ?  It  appears  to  me  that  in  animals  as  well  as 
in  man  there  are  many  impulses  the  motives  of  which 
rise  from  the  nature,  from  the  character  of  the  creature, 
which  cannot  be  explained  as  a  pursuit  of  happiness. 
The  fighting  cock  must  fight  under  given  circum- 
stances because  it  is  his  nature.  Certain  structures 
are  in  his  brain  that  impel  him  to  fight.  Does  the 
stone  fall  to  the  ground  because  it  gives  it  pleasure,  or 
doesn't  it  rather  fall  because  it  must  fall  in  agreement 
to  its  nature  ?  How  often  does  it  happen  that  a  man 
follows  an  irresistible  impulse,  although  he  knows  that 
it  will  give  him  pain.  Thus  it  happens  that  men  of 
good  intentions  commit  evil  actions,  and  rascals  some- 
times act  morally,  in  spite  of  themselves ;  not  at  all 
with  the  desire  to  avoid  pain  or  to  gain  pleasure,  but 
simply  because  the  impulse  to  act  in  this  way  lives  in 
their  soul.  It  is  a  part  of  their  nature,  and  under 
given  circumstances  they  cannot  help  letting  that  im- 
pulse pass  into  act,  even  though  they  know  that  they 
will  have  to  regret  the  effects  of  the  deed.  It  will  in 
many  persons  take  a  long  time  and  much  exercise  of 
will  till  this  knowledge  acquires  sufficient  strength  as 
a  motive  for  prohibiting  actions  which  will  be  regretted. 
Every  science  deals  with  a  certain  province  of  na- 
ture or  it  limits  its  inquiries  to  a  special  abstraction. 
Thus  mechanics  deals  with  motions.  Purely  me- 
chanical motions  do  not  even  exist.  The  mechanical 
aspect  of  motions  excludes  many  properties  which  are 


174  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

inseparably  connected  with  the  things  in  motion.  But 
the  method  of  abstraction  is  a  limitation,  indispensable 
to  science ;  it  is  the  method  by  which  alone  we  can 
comprehend  the  world.  Ethics,  it  appears  to  me  is 
no  less  limited  to  a  peculiar  aspect  and  to  a  special 
province,  than  are  for  instance  zoology,  botany,  or 
mathematics,  geodesy,  etc.  Ethics  deals  with  all  those 
impulses  of  the  soul  which  in  the  popular  expression  are 
comprised  under  the  name  of  duty,  conscience,  the 
ought,  or  moral  sense.  Obedience  to  these  impulses 
is  sometimes  pleasurable,  sometimes  painful ;  yet 
whether  they  are  accompanied  with  pleasure  or  pain 
is  of  secondary  importance  in  ethics.  The  pleasurable 
and  painful  elements  in  man's  actions  do  not  belong 
to  the  abstraction  of  ethics.  They  need  not  and  they 
cannot  be  excluded  from  ethics,  but  they  are  of  sec- 
ondary importance  and  do  not  constitute  the  properly 
moral  element.  We  might  just  as  well  speak  of  colors 
when  discussing  mechanical  laws.  We  may  say  that 
yellow  gold  will  outweigh  an  equal  mass  of  white 
silver.  But  the  yellowness  of  gold  and  the  whiteness 
of  silver  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  weight.  Thus 
pleasure  and  pain  are  qualities  which  are  inseparably 
connected  with  moral  actions,  and  it  is  certainly 
advisable  to  consider  their  relation  to  the  strength  of 
motives.  Yet  to  search  in  them  for  the  standard  of 
morality  would  be  as  wrong  as  to  set  up  yellowness 
as  a  unit  of  weight. 

The  investigations  of  modern  psychology,  it  ap- 
pears to  me,  throw  much  light  upon  the  mechanical 
apparatus  of  soul-activity.  An  impulse  placed  into 
the  mind  of  a  man  by  suggestion  prompts  to  action 
with  the  same  necessity  as,  for  instance,  a  wound-up 
spring  exercises  a  pressure  and  sets  a  clock  in  motion. 


IN  ANSWER  TO  PROFESSOR  JODL.  175 

For  example  a  hypnotized  subject  receives  the  sug- 
gestion to  stab  one  of  the  physicians  present ;  a  piece 
of  card-board  is  given  her  instead  of  a  dagger  and  she 
commits  the  deed  with  the  imaginary  weapon.  The 
stabbed  physician  pretends  to  be  dead,  and  the  woman 
is  asked  why  she  committed  the  murder.  "  He  was  a 
bad  man,"  she  answered.  "But  is  that  a  sufficient 
reason  to  kill  a  man?"  the  woman  was  asked.  "In 
this  case  it  is,"  she  said,  "for  he  attempted  to  assault 
me. "  The  action  is  done  because  the  impulse  exists  ; 
the  motives  are  often  invented  afterwards ;  and  the 
attempt  to  explain  all  actions  as  intended  to  pursue 
happiness  appears  to  me  as  such  an  after-invention. 
A  scientific  explanation  should  show  how  the  different 
impulses,  and  especially  how  the  ethical  impulses, 
that  which  we  have  defined  as  superindividual  mo- 
tives, develop.  If  we  are  to  define  the  feeling  attend- 
ing the  performance  of  something  that  could  not  be 
avoided,  not  only  as  satisfaction  but  even  as  happi- 
ness, in  that  case  only  should  we  have  to  concede  that 
all  ethical  aspirations  are  pursuits  of  happiness.  The 
Buddhist  monk  who  does  not  believe  in  personal  im- 
mortality, and  inflicts  most  cruel  tortures  upon  him- 
self to  atone  for  the  sin  of  existence  would  in  that 
case  have  to  be  said  to  pursue  happiness.  Pursuit  of 
happiness  would  then  be  identical  with  any  kind  of 
action. 

If  the  happiness  attained  or  attainable  were  to  be 
considered  as  the  standard  of  measurement  for  thev 
morality  of  actions,  we  should  have  to  call  the  prepara- 
tion for  a  ball  extremely  moral.  Likewise,  if  the  utility 
of  an  act  were  to  be  considered  as  the  standard  of 
measurement,  the  invention  of  the  sewing  machine 
would  as  such  be  a  moral  act.     I  do  not  deny  that  the 


176  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

wish  to  spread  joy  and  also  the  aspiration  to  make 
oneself  useful  are  moral ;  but  neither  the  happiness 
nor  the  usefulness  attainable  by  this  or  by  that  act  con- 
stitutes the  properly  moral  element.  The  properly 
moral  element  is  an  entirely  different  kind  of  abstrac- 
tion. It  consists  of  those  motives  or  impulses  to  action 
which  regulate  conduct,  not  from  the  egotistic  stand- 
point, but  from  the  standpoint  of  a  greater  whole,  to 
which  the  person  who  acts  belongs. 

Is  there  any  doubt  about  progress  being  a  law  of 
the  development  of  the  human  race  ?  It  can  fairly  be 
assumed  that  all  the  aspirations  which  serve  the  pro- 
gress of  the  race,  are  to  be  considered  as  moral  im- 
pulses. Nevertheless,  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  pro- 
gress will  bring  more  happiness.  One  thing  is  sure  : 
Progress  will  bring  more  comforts,  and  together  with 
an  increase  of  comforts,  it  brings  more  wants.  Life 
having  more  wants  causes  greater  troubles  in  satisfy- 
ing the  wants.  If  there  is  any  increase  of  happiness, 
there  will  certainly  be  a  greater  increase  in  sensitive- 
ness to  pain  ;  and  the  condition  of  a  savage  who  feels 
no  need  to  cover  his  nakedness,  is  enviable  in  com- 
parison to  the  wretchedness  of  a  civilized  man,  if  he 
fails  somehow  in  his  struggle  for  existence.  If  happi- 
ness is  to  be  considered  as  the  standard  of  measure- 
ment for  morality,  I  doubt  greatly  whether  it  would 
not  be  more  moral  to  keep  humanity  in  a  state  of 
childhood  and  ignorant  innocence.  Pessimism  indeed, 
as  represented  by  Schopenhauer  and  his  followers, 
considers  the  development  of  individual  life  as  the 
original  sin,  as  the  initial  fa ux  pa s,  the  first  wrong  step 
of  the  "will  to  live."  Sin,  according  to  Germany's 
neo-Buddhistic  philosopher,  is  individual  existence, 
and  the  meed  of  sin  is  all  the  evils   of   individual 


IN  ANSWER  TO  PROFESSOR  JODL.  177 

existence,  pain,  old  age,  and  death,  and  the  happi- 
ness aspired  for  is  a  mere  illusion. 

If  happiness,  or  joy,  or  pleasure,  were  indeed  the 
standard  of  morality,  I  am  inclined  to  say,  that  it  would 
be  better  if  the  All  were  a  mere  play  of  unfeeling  forces, 
developing  and  dissolving  again  solar  systems  in  their 
luminous  grandeur  without  evolving  feeling  and  think- 
ing beings  on  the  surface  of  planets.  The  problem  in 
ethics,  however,  it  appears  to  me,  is  not  how  to  set 
up  a  standard  of  morality  of  our  own  in  contradiction 
to  the  laws  of  nature,  but  how  to  conform  to  the  laws 
of  nature.  Science  leads  to  Monism,  and  Monism 
teaches  us  to  consider  ourselves  as  a  part  of  nature. 
The  standard  of  morality  cannot  be  derived  from  man's 
likes  or  dislikes  ;  it  cannot  be  based  upon  the  separate- 
ness,  the  individuality,  of  his  existence.  Ethics  can 
rest  only  upon  the  recognition  of  natural  laws.  We 
must  know  how  nature  operates  in  the  universe,  how 
nature  produces  us,  how  she  moulds  us,  and  we  must 
comprehend  that  all  our  individual  actions  are  acts  of 
nature. 

If  God  is  defined  as  the  All  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  cos- 
mos of  orderly  laws,  we  shall  find  that  the  old  orthodox 
morality  contains  more  truth  than  might  appear  from 
the  standpoint  of  an  unbeliever.  Hedonism,  Utili- 
tarianism, Eudemonism,  or  any  other  system  that 
has  arisen  in  opposition  to  the  old  orthodox  ethics 
of  the  dogmatic  religions,  represent  an  important 
phase  in  the  further  evolution  of  ethical  ideas,  but 
for  the  mere  sake  of  overcoming  their  adversary  they 
discard  together  with  the  errors  of  supernaturalism, 
the  valuable  truth  that  is  contained  in  the  ethics 
of  the  old  religions.  The  merits  of  these  ethical 
systems  of  opposition  should  not  be  underrated ;  but 


178  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

it  appears  to  me  that  they  have  not  solved  the  prob- 
lem. We  must  search  for  a  solution  of  the  ethical 
problem  in  a  higher  synthesis  of  the  old  ethics  of  or- 
thodox religion,  and  the  oppositional  ethics  of  all  the 
different  happiness-theories.  It  is  this  higher  synthesis 
which  we  have  attempted  to  present  in  our  solution  of 
the  Ethical  Problem. 


RELIGION  AND  SCIENCE-THEIR  INCON- 
GRUITY. 


A  CRITICISM. 


BY  ROBERT  LEWINS,    M.   D. 


'*  To  say  I  have  changed  my  opinion, 
is  only  to  say  I  am  wiser  to-day  than  I 
was  yesterday." — Pope. 

Having  recently  read,  with  much  interest  and  profit, 
Dr.  Carus's  Fundamental  Problems  and  Lectures  on 
Ethics,  I  am  desirous,  with  his  sanction,  and  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  noble  sentence  which  closes  the 
preface  to  the  latter  work :  ' '  Criticisms  are  solicited 
from  all  who  dissent  from  its  views  ;  wherever  any 
one  will  convince  me  of  error,  he  will  find  me  ready 
to  change  my  opinion  and  to  accept  the  truth  what- 
ever it  be," — to  offer  a  few  but  crucial  objections  to 
his  in  many  respects  harmonious  world-scheme.  I  shall 
be  very  brief  as  the  points  at  issue  are  quite  simple 
and  self-evident. 

I  base  all  I  have  to  say  on  Positive  Science,  which, 
in  our  Jin  de  siecle  age  at  all  events,  entirely  eliminates 
"Spiritualism  "  of  every  shade,  and  brings  us  face  to 
face  with  the  purest  (its  gainsayers  term  it  crudest) 
Materialism,  or  Somatism.  I  think  a  very  little  reflec- 
tion ought  to  convince  all  who  have  overcome  preju- 
dice and  superstition  to  see  that  the  interaction  be- 


180  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

tween  an  immaterial  and  material  entity,  from  their 
incompatibility,  is  logically  unthinkable. 

Spirit  or  Anima  was  to  the  Ancients  really  material, 
being  prefigured  as  a  thin  vaporous  substance  like  the 
hypothetical  ether  of  modern  chemistry  and  physics. 
Plato  insists  that  our  souls  are  made  of  the  same  ma- 
terial as. the  fixed  stars,  which  alone  is  Materialism 
unmasked.  So  that  when  Greek  Philosophy  speaks 
of  animism,  it  can  note  something  quite  different  from 
what  our  Religion  labels  "Spirit." 

My  position  is  that  the  union  or  eirenicon  of  Science 
and  Religion  is  impossible.  Just  as  that  of  Matter 
and  Anima.  And  that  where  Religion  is  Science  and 
Reason  are  not,  and  vice  versa. 

I  prefer  arguing  the  point  in  dispute  on  physio- 
logical data,  the  offspring  of  the  century,  now  verging 
to  its  close,  in  which  we  live.  At  one  fell  coup  we  thus, 
in  the  simplest  and  most  naive  manner,  get  entirely 
scot-free  of  the  dual  distinction  between  soul,  which 
is  only  another  word  for  life,  like  Psyche,  and  body. 
Dr.  Carus  appears  to  me  to  make  too  much  use  of  the 
compound  epithet  "Soul-Life,"  which  at  best  is  only 
tautology.  Define  Life,  as  Medicine,  now  the  science 
of  human  nature  itself,  does,  as  the  sum  of  the  organic 
functions,  and  a  consistent  Monism,  unifying  Self  and 
the  Cosmos,  i.  e.  subject  and  object,  is  the  self-evident 
result.  It  is  the  identification  of  Being  and  Thinking, 
only  reached  by  a  short  cut  as  compared  with  the 
Kantian,  Hegelian,  or  all  other  Metaphysics.  Kant 
denying  Ding  an  sich  exactly  hits  the  mark.  Only  he 
is  not  consistent  with  his  principle.  Indeed  it  is  difficult 
to  make  out  his  real  meaning,  for  ehrlich  as,  in  general, 
he  was,  he  still  practised  a  certain  mental  reservation, 
as  he  himself  during  his  most  energetic  period,  con- 


RELIGION  AND  SCIENCE— THEIR  INCONGRUITY.   181 

fesses  in  a  letter  to  Moses  Mendelsohn.  As  Goethe 
says,  Gefiihl  ist  Alles,  and  Gefiihl  and  Bewusstsein,  or 
Consciousness,  are  synonymes.  Till  an  object  is  sub- 
jectived  by  entering  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  it 
can  have  no  rational  value  and  is  as  non-existent  to 
a  sentient  being  after  it  has  sown  its  intellectual  wild 
oats. 

And  this  apodeixis  alone  proves  my  case  that  there 
is,  and  can  be  no  other  "outer"  world  than  our  senses, 
of  which  Thought  is  a  mode  made  for  us.  We  are 
thus  at  once  both  creator  and  creation  in  the  only 
sphere,  relational  or  phenomenal,  to  which  we  have  ac- 
cess. Religion  haunts  the  Absolute  sphere,  and  that 
is  quite  out  of  our  lines  as  utterly  inaccessible  to  hu- 
man thought.  The  mere  fact  that  all  percepts  and 
concepts  are  produced  in  a  human  mind  (brain)  ought 
to  convince  us  that  higher  than  humanity  and  ulti- 
mately Egoity,  Man  and  the  Ego  cannot  range.  God 
therefore,  like  every"  thing  "  (concept)  else,  must  be 
a  brain-made  phenomenon  and  the  only  noumenon,  if 
we  care  to  use  these  now  familiar  terms  which  is  non- 
essential, is  Oarself. 

Pope,  in  the  fourth  book  of  the  Dunciad,  is  very 
severe  on  this  lapse  from  Absolutism.  And  yet  it  is 
really  his  own  theory  in  his  Essay  on  Man,  when  he 
traces  Heaven  to  the  passion  of  pride  and  Hell  to  that 
of  spite.  I  could  argue  this  question  in  other  ways, 
indeed  have  done  so  in  former  years  ad  nauseam.  Even 
on  transcendental  grounds  from  the  Omnipresence  of 
Deity,  which  as  Pantheistic  practically  forecloses  all 
Personal  Divinity,  or  form  of  Divine  Worship.  But 
the  above  argument  seems  all-sufficient.  Regard  Life 
as  organized  function  and  Death  as  its  exhaustive  and 
cessation  and  the  immemorial  fallacy  of  the  impossible 


1 82  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

interaction  of  soul,  or  mind,  on  Matter  is  dissipated 
at  one  blow  as  by  a  thunderbolt.  Nothing  ever  really 
dies  but  only  changes  its  form — and  the  constituents 
of  our  present  bodies  are  as  eternal  as  are  Suns  and 
Planets.  No  real  distinction  differentiates  Time  and 
Eternity,  Space  and  Immensity.  And  both  Concepts, 
like  all  others,  have  no  other  source  that  we  can  hope 
or  fear  to  reach,  than  Ourself. 

It  is  clear  from  modern  Chemistry  that  no  parti- 
tion separates  the  organic  and  inorganic  worlds.  And 
therefore,  putting  aside  all  the  modern  sciences,  we 
reach  the  physiological  (non-spiritual)  result  equally 
well  on  the  data  of  Newtonian  cosmology.  The  es- 
chatological  colophon  of  the  Attraction  of  Gravity  is 
to  make  matter  active,  not  passive  and  inert.  No 
foreign  factor  or  "Spirit  "  is  therefore  needed  to  "ani- 
mate "  what  by  an  inseparable  Vis  Insita  is  already  ca- 
pable of  doing  its  own  work.  And  Deity  inter  alios 
omnes  is  thus  an  illogical  superfluity,  must  be  so  if 
Self  be  all  in  all. 

Natural  Religion,  of  which  Voltaire  and  other 
sceptics  of  the  eighteenth  century  were  votaries  seems 
a  retrogression  from  the  higher  "revealed"  ones, 
which  were  evidently  the  well-meant,  but  to  us  now- 
a-days,  futile  and  immoral  attempts  of  humanitarian  en- 
thusiasts like  Christ  and  Mahomet — to  supplant  the 
cruel  "God  or  Law  of  Nature  "  by  a  Being  with  whom, 
on  certain  terms  fatal  indeed  to  human  dignity  and 
progress  a  modus  vivendi  became  possible. 

Mr.  Darwin  traces  all  the  different  species  of  ani- 
mals and  plants  from  a  few  originally  called  into  be- 
ing by  a  Creator.  But,  in  a  letter  to  Sir  Joseph 
Hooker,  he  subsequently  retracts  that  rash  assertion 
and  expresses  lasting  regret  that  he  had  ever  so  far 


RELIGION  AND  SCIENCE— THEIR  INCONGRUITY.   183 

truckled  {sic)  to  vulgar  opinion  as  to  have  broached 
so  unscientific  a  genesis  of  living  beings.  It  conflicts 
entirely  with  the  real  Principles  of  Evolution — as 
does  Mr.  Spencer's  cryptic  Agnosticism  of  the  Un- 
knowable. 


SCIENCE  AND  RELIGION. 


IN  ANSWER  TO  DR.   LEWINS'S  CRITICISM. 


BY  DR.  PAUL  CARUS. 


Dr.  Robert  Lewins  is  one  of  the  most  original 
thinkers  of  the  present  day  ;  but  being  original  he  uses 
a  terminology  of  his  own,  and  it  may  sometimes  be 
difficult  to  understand  his  meaning.  He  characterises 
his  view  as  Hylo-idealism,  which  appears  to  me  simi- 
lar to  Monism  to  the  extent  that  it  has  been  invented 
for  the  purpose  of  combining  the  truths  of  idealism  as 
well  as  realism. 

The  soul,  certainly,  can  no  longer  be  considered 
as  a  material  being.  Yet  "  soul "  is  not  quite  so  iden- 
tical with  "life"  as  Dr.  Lewins  declares.  We  cannot 
think  of  a  soul  without  its  having  life.  Similarly  we 
cannot  think  of  matter  without  its  being  mass.  Soul 
and  life,  matter  and  mass,  are  abstractions,  different 
in  kind,  each  of  which  in  a  certain  sense  covers  the 
same  sphere.  The  physicist  may  very  well  speak  of 
the  mass  of  a  certain  piece  of  matter  and  the  life  of  a 
certain  soul.  Soul  is  not  life  and  nothing  but  life. 
Soul  is  life  of  a  certain  kind.  We  can  speak  of  soul- 
life  with  the  same  propriety  that  we  speak  of  the  move- 
ment of  a  mechanism,  though  a  mechanism  is  move- 
ment of  a  special  kind.  If  life  is  as  Dr. Lewins  says,  "or- 


SCIENCE  AND  RELIGION.  185 

ganized  function,"  would  it  be  wrong  to  speak  of  the 
functions  of  an  organism  ? 

The  application  of  Goethe's  words  "Gefuhl  ist 
Alles,"  as  made  by  Dr.  Lewins,  is  very  ingenious,  but 
scarcely  redeemable.  He  says:  "Till  an  object  is 
subjectived  by  entering  the  sphere  of  consciousness, 
it  can  have  no  rational  value,  and  is  as  non-existent 
to  a  sentient  being  after  it  has  sown  its  intellectual 
wild  oats. "  Can,  for  instance,  bacilli  so  long  as  they 
do  not  "enter  the  sphere  of  consciousness,"  be  re- 
garded as  non-existent  to  sentient  beings? 

Dr.  Lewins  understands  by  religion  the  absence  of 
science  and  reason.  He  says  :  "  Religion  haunts  the 
absolute  sphere,  and  that  is  quite  out  of  our  lines  as 
utterly  inaccessible  to  human  thought."  Similarly 
philosophy  was  formerly  supposed  to  haunt  the  realm 
of  the  absolute.  The  religion  of  the  absolute  has  been 
given  up  just  as  much  as  the  philosophy  of  the  abso- 
lute, but  philosophy  and  religion  will  not  perish  on 
account  of  religious  and  philosophical  errors.  Far 
from  considering  religion  as  antagonistic  to  science, 
we  understand  by  religion  the  practical  application 
of  science  ;  it  is  the  regulation  of  life  in  accord  with 
our  conception  of  the  world. 


MR.  GOLDWIN  SMITH  ON  MORALITY  AND 
RELIGION. 


Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  discusses  the  ethical  question 
in  an  article  in  the  Forum,  entitled  "Will  Morality 
survive  Religion  ?  "  He  presents  no  definite  solution 
but  sufficiently  indicates  one,  and  that  is  a  denial  of 
the  question ;  between  the  lines  we  read  the  answer, 
Morality  will  not  survive  Religion.     He  says  : 

"The  withdrawal  of  religious  belief  must,  however,  one  would 
think,  have  begun  to  operate,  and  some  observers  may  be  in  a  po- 
sition to  say  what  the  effect  is  and  how  far  philosophy  or  science 
has  been  able  to  fill  the  void.  As  the  twilight  of  theism  and  Chris- 
tianity still  lingers,  nobody  expects  a  sudden  change.  Least  of  all 
does  anybody  expect  a  sudden  outbreak  of  immorality  among  phi- 
losophers, whose  minds  are  elevated  by  their  pursuit  and  in  whom 
the  coarser  appetites  are  sure  to  be  weak  ;  so  that  the  sensitive- 
ness which  men  of  this  class  are  apt  to  show,  whenever  a  connec- 
tion is  suggested  between  religious  and  moral  agnosticism,  is  out 
of  place." 

Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  illustrates  his  position  vividly 
by  presenting  to  us  "some  specimens  of  the  moral  as 
well  as  of  the  religious  agnostic."  The  murderer  Bir- 
chall  is  described  in  the  following  words  : 

"  As  he  was  the  son  of  a  clergyman  and  had  been  well  brought 
up,  he  must  have  been  thoroughly  enlightened,  and  cannot  have 
been  led  into  crime  by  anything  like  the  brutal  ignorance  of  moral 
law  which  is  often  the  heritage  of  the  gutter  child.     Nor  does  it 


MR.  GOLD  WIN  SMITH  ON  MORALITY,  187 

seem  that  evil  passion  of  any  kind  was  overpoweringly  strong  in 
him.  The  attempts  of  the  enemies  of  capital  punishment  to  make 
out  a  case  of  moral  insanity  were  in  this  case  more  faint  than 
usual.  It  even  appears  that  there  was  an  amiable  side  to  his 
character.  His  college  companions  liked  him.  He  seems  to  have 
been  a  loving  husband,  and  there  was  something  touching  and  al- 
most heroic  in  the  effort  which  he  successfully  made,  while  he  was 
awaiting  execution,  to  master  the  fear  of  death  and  to  write  his 
autobiography  for  the  benefit  of  his  wife.  The  autobiography,  it 
is  true,  is  nothing  more  than  the  vulgar  record  of  a  fast  under- 
graduate's life  at  an  inferior  college  ;  but  this  does  not  detract  from 
the  nerve  shown  in  writing  it,  and  in  illustrating  it  with  comic 
sketches,  beneath  the  shadow  of  the  gallows.  He  only  happened 
to  have  occasion  for  his  friend's  money.  It  is  possible  that  if 
Birchall,  instead  of  being  sent  to  college — where  a  youth  of  his 
stamp  was  sure  to  be  idle,  and,  being  idle,  to  become  dissipated — 
had  been  set  to  regular  work  in  an  office  under  a  strong  chief,  he 
might  have  gone  decently  through  life,  though  he  would  have  been 
a  very  selfish  man.  But  he  was  a  thorough-going  agnostic  in 
morals  as  well  as  in  religion.  Evidently  he  felt  not  a  twinge  of 
remorse  for  what  he  had  done.  No  doubt  he  cursed  his  own  care- 
lessness in  having,  when  he  was  destroying  all  the  proofs  of  iden- 
tity on  the  corpse,  overlooked  the  cigar  case,  the  name  written  on 
which  gave  the  fatal  clew  ;  but  the  recollection  of  having  killed  a 
confiding  friend  for  his  money  evidently  gave  him  no  more  con- 
cern than  as  if  he  had  slaughtered  a  bear  for  its  skin.  Bred  a  gen- 
tleman, he  admirably  preserved  his  dignity  and  impressiveness  of 
manner  when  standing  at  bay  against  his  pursuers,  and  he  showed 
the  same  qualities  for  the  two  months  during  which  a  whole  com- 
munity was  staring  at  him  through  the  bars  of  his  cage,  when  the 
least  sign  of  weakness  would  have  been  at  once  proclaimed.  When 
he  was  sentenced,  he  remarked,  with  a  philosophy  which  appears 
to  have  been  genuine,  that  life  is  short  for  all,  and  that  there  is 
not  much  difference  between  a  term  of  a  few  months  and  one  of  a 
few  years.  He  might  have  added  that  he  would  make  his  exit 
from  life  more  nearly  without  pain  than  ninety-nine  men  out  of  a 
hundred." 

A  similar  striking  case  is  found  in  the  person  of 
William  Palmer,  the  Rugeley  murderer,  who  also,  Mr. 
Goldwin  Smith  says,  "was  evidently  a  perfect  moral 


1 88  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

agnostic.     He  behaved  at  his  trial  as  if  he  had  been 
watching  a  game  of  chess,  showed  not  the  slightest 
sign  of  remorse,  and  met  death  with  perfect  apathy, 
if  not  with  Birchall's  genteel  composure." 
Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  adds  : 

' '  As  moral  agnostics  these  men  were  low  specimens  of  a  char- 
acter of  which  the  great  Napoleon  was  the  highest.  .  .  .  He  (Napo- 
leon) was  simply  'The  Prince'  of  Machiavelli,  that  prophet  of 
moral  agnosticism."* 

The  present  situation  is  described  in  the  following 
words : 

"Religious  agnosticism  is  gaining  ground,  not  so  much  per- 
haps in  America  as  in  Europe,  because  America  is  less  speculative 
than  Europe  and  because  free  churches  do  not  provoke  sceptical 
criticism  so  much  as  establishments  ;  but  everywhere  religious  ag- 
nosticism is  manifestly  gaining  ground.  Are  we  to  expect  a  cor- 
responding growth  of  moral  agnosticism  ?  We  shall  not  have  a 
crop  of  Birchalls  and  Palmers,  still  less  of  Napoleons  ;  but  may 
we  not  have  a  crop  of  men  who  will  regard  morality  as  a  super- 
stition or  a  convention,  and  will  do  what  suits  their  own  interest  ? 

*Ibeg  to  differ  in  some  respects  from  this  view  concerning  Napoleon's 
character.  Napoleon's  success  is  not  due  to  his  unprincipled  egotism  and  un- 
scrupulousness ;  it  is  due  to  the  actual  services  he  rendered  to  his  nation  and 
to  humanity  in  general.  He  may  be  considered  as  a  "  scourge  of  God  "  but 
even  as  such  he  was  the  most  indispensable  man  of  his  era.  He  was  a  scourge 
to  Germany,  but  his  achievements  in  having  swept  out  of  existence  so  many 
antiquated  institutions  and  principalities,  especially  in  having  broken  to 
pieces  the  old  rotten  Roman-Teutonic  Kaiser-humbug,  so  as  to  make  a  regen- 
eration of  Germany  possible,  alone  made  his  career  a  great  blessing  to  Ger- 
many which  outweighs  all  the  innumerable  injuries  and  suppressions  he 
caused  her.  Let  us  not  look  to  the  vices  of  a  man  to  explain  his  success.  I 
am  inclined  to  declare  a  priori  that  a  successful  man  must  have  some  virtues 
which  are  the  causes  of  his  success,  and  if  he  has  great  vices,  it  is,  to  say  the 
least,  probable  that  his  virtues  will  eclipse  his  vices.  The  effects  of  the  vir- 
tues will  remain,  the  effects  of  his  vices  will  disappear  in  time. 

Does  Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  believe  in  Machiavelli  ?  I  do  not  believe  in 
Machiavelli.  The  great  king  who  wrote  the  "  Ami- Machiavelli  "  has  refuted, 
not  only  in  words  but  also  in  deeds,  the  theory  that  unprincipled  rascality  is  the 
best  policy  for  a  king  to  maintain  himself  upon  a  throne.  It  is  due  to  Frederick 
the  Great's  maxim  that  "the  king  is  the  first  servant  of  the  state"  which 
proved  a  live  presence  with  almost  all  his  successors,  that  a  scion  of  his 
family  now  occupies  the  imperial  throne  of  Germany. 


MR.  GOLD  WIN  SMITH  ON  MORALITY.  189 

Greece,  after  the  fall  of  her  religion,  had  the  moral  anarchy  de- 
picted by  Thucydides  and  ascribed  by  him  to  that  fall.  She  had 
the  moral  agnosticism  of  the  Sophists.  Rome,  after  the  departure 
of  the  religious  faith  to  which  Polybius,  in  a  famous  passage,  as- 
scribes  her  public  morality,  had  the  immorality  of  the  Empire.  On 
the  decline  of  the  Catholic  faith  in  Europe,  ensued  the  moral  ag- 
nosticism of  the  era  impersonated  in  Machiavelli.^  In  each  case, 
into  the  void  left  by  religion  came  spiritual  charlatanry  and  phys- 
ical superstition,  such  as  the  arts  of  the  hierophant  of  Isis,  the 
soothsayer,  and  the  astrologer — significant  precursors  of  our  mod- 
ern '  medium.' " 

We  feel  inclined  to  say,  this  is  a  very  pessimistic 
diagnosis  of  the  future,  but  we  are  told  : 

"There  is  nothing  pessimistic  in  this ;  no  want  of  faith  in  the 
future  of  humanity,  or  in  the  benevolence  of  the  power  by  which 
human  destiny  is  controlled.  The  only  fear  suggested  is  that  so- 
ciety may  have  a  bad  quarter  of  an  hour  during  the  transition,  as 
it  has  had  more  than  once  before." 

A  '  bad  quarter  of  an  hour '  for  humanity  may  mean 
the  ruin  of  nations  !  Was  the  pessimism  of  Tacitus 
unjustified  because  other  nations  arose  in  a  grander 
glory  after  the  ignominious  ruin  of  Rome  that  followed 
its  moral  decline  ?  Pessimism  means  to  us  that  we 
ourselves  and  our  nation  will  see  this  •  bad  quarter  of 
an  hour,'  and  if  it  comes  it  will  be  terrible  to  all  con- 
cerned. It  will  come  like  a  deluge  to  sweep  away  the 
innocent  and  the  good  together  with  the  guilty. 

Pessimism  in  any  other  sense  is  not  justified.  The 
world  is  such  that  if  the  nation  to  whom  by  natural 
advantages  the  future  of  humanity  seems  to  be  en- 
trusted, shows  herself  unwilling  or  unable  to  fulfil  her 
mission,  other  nations  will  arise  and  take  her  place. 
We  Americans  especially  are  more  inclined  than 
others,  and  I  do  not  deny  that  in  some  respects  our 
hope  is  justifiable,  to  consider  ourselves  as  the  chil- 
dren of  promise.     But  at  the  same  time  we  are  apt  to 


igo  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

forget  that  our  mission  implies  duties.  It  is  not  enough 
to  say,  "We  have  Abraham  to  our  father."  The  chil- 
dren of  promise  must  be  worthy  of  their  duties ;  if 
they  are  not  they  will  be  rejected.  Yet  as  to  the 
whole,  as  to  the  evolution  of  mankind,  there  is  no 
need  of  being  pessimistic.  "For  I  say  unto  you  that 
God  is  able  of  these  stones  to  raise  up  children  unto 
Abraham."  Evolution  will  not  be  checked  because  we 
prove  unfit  to  carry  the  torch  of  progress.  We  shall, 
in  that  case,  go  to  the  wall  and  the  torch  will  be 
handed  to  others. 

And  here  we  come  to  the  point  of  disagreement 
with  Mr.  Goldwin  Smith.     He  says  : 

"  Evolution  is  not  moral,  nor  can  morality  be  educed  from  it. 
It  proclaims  as  its  law  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  and  the  only  proof 
of  fitness  is  survival." 

Evolution,  it  is  true,  is  in  a  certain  sense,  "  a  quasi- 
mechanical  and  necessary  process";  it  "will  fulfil  it- 
self without  effort  or  sacrifice"  on  my  part,  or  on  your 
part,  or  on  the  part  of  any  individual.  Yet  in  another 
sense,  evolution  is  not  a  merely  mechanical  process;* 
nor  can  it  fulfil  itself  without  the  effort  or  sacrifice  of 
mankind.  The  question  is  not  whether  my  help  is  in- 
dispensable for  evolution  to  fulfil  itself,  the  question 
is  whether  my  soul  will  enter  into  the  evolutionary 
movement,  or  to  use  a  biblical  term,  whether  I  shall 
enter  into  life  eternal,  as  an  element  representing  an 

*  Every  motion  is  mechanically  explainable,  or  in  other  words,  every  mo- 
tion can  be  described  in  mechanical  formulas,  i.  e.  there  is  a  uniformity  of 
motions  which  can  be  formulated  in  the  laws  of  mechanics.  Evolution  con- 
sidered as  a  movement  sweeping  onward  over  the  life  of  mankind  is  a  mechan 
ical  process.  But  the  mechanical  aspect  of  natural  processes  is  only  one  side  ; 
it  does  not  cover  the  whole  of  reality.  Not  even  the  fall  of  a  stone  can  be  con- 
sidered as  a  purely  mechanical  process.  See  the  author's  remarks  on  the  sub- 
ject in  "Fundamental  Problems"  (p.  115  et  seqq.),  "Can  the  World  be 
Mechanically  Explained  ? "  and  his  article  "  Some  Questions  of  Psycho- 
Physics,"  The  Monist  No.  3,  p.  401. 


MR.  GOLDWIN  SMITH  ON  MORALITY,  191 

upward  or  as  one  representing  a  downward  pull.  To 
speak  of  a  single  individual  as  helping  evolution  is 
something  like  helping  God  in  governing  the  world. 
The  individual  does  not  come  into  consideration  at  all 
from  an  ethical  standpoint,  but  that  alone  which  is 
represented  in  the  individual. 

Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  still  recognises,  particularly 
with  regard  to  the  gentler  virtues,  the  influence  of  re- 
ligion upon  our  code  of  ethics.     He  says  : 

"  There  is  no  saying  how  much  of  theism,  or  even  of  Chris- 
tianity, still  mingles  with  the  theories  of  agnostics.  When  the 
agnostic  assumes  that  the  claims  of  the  community  are  superior  to 
those  of  the  individual,  when  he  uses  such  a  term  as  '  conscien- 
tious, '  and  even  when  he  speaks  with  reverence  of  an  '  eternal 
source  of  energy  and  force, '  careful  scrutiny  of  his  expressions 
might  discover  a  trace  of  theism." 

Certainly,  there  is  a  trace  of  theism  in  any  kind  of 
morality,  even  if  the  expression  "the  eternal  source  of 
energy  "  be  rejected.  We  at  least  do  most  emphat- 
ically reject  it  as  a  dualistic  and  a  meaningless  phrase. 
Nevertheless,  morality  means  obedience  to  some  law 
higher,  grander,  and  nobler  than  our  individual  in- 
terests. The  recognition  of  the  authority  of  this  law 
is  the  kernel  of  all  religion,  it  is  also  the  truth  con- 
tained in  the  idea  of  God. 

Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  says  : 

"  The  saying  that  if  God  did  not  exist  it  would  be  necessary 
to  invent  him,  was  very  smart  but  very  silly.  Nothing  can  be  done 
for  us  by  figments.  Whosoever  will  be  saved,  before  all  things  it 
is  necessary  that  he  keep  his  allegiance  to  the  truth." 

With  this  we  perfectly  agree.  Nothing  can  be  done 
for  us  by  figments.  But  if  all  the  nations  that  cease 
to  believe  in,  and  at  the  same  time  also  cease  to  obey, 
the  authority  of  the  moral  law,  irredeemably  go  to  the 
wall,  can  that  moral  law  be  considered  as  a  figment  ? 


i92  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

We  may  consider  the  personification  of  the  moral  law 
as  a  figment,  and  we  have  good  reason  to  do  so,  but 
if  by  God  is  understood  that  objective  reality  in  the 
world  which  by  the  penalty  of  extinction  enforces  a 
certain  kind  of  conduct,  we  may  expect  no  serious 
contradiction  when  we  maintain  that  the  existence  of 
God  can  be  scientifically  proved. 

It  is  a  matter  of  course  that  the  God  of  science  is 
not  like  the  God  of  the  heathenish  religions,  not  even 
like  the  good  Lord  of  pagan  Christianity  who  can  be 
bribed  by  flattery  and  prayer,  and  still  less  like  the 
benevolent  and  philanthropic  God  Father  of  Deism.  He 
is  an  inflexible  law,  immutable,  irrefragable,  eternal ; 
stern  toward  transgressors  and  kind  toward  those  who 
keep  his  commandments.  If  Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  will 
consider  God  in  this  sense  as  a  natural  law,  or  rather 
as  the  law  of  nature,  as  that  in  nature  which  is  as  it 
is,  in  the  Pentateuch  called  by  the  expressive  name 
Javeh,  as  that  which  we  cannot  model  at  pleasure,  but 
to  which  we  must  model  ourselves  in  order  to  live  and 
to  continue  to  live — he  will  find  that  God  is  at  the 
bottom  of  evolution  also ;  he  will  find  that  morality 
indeed  can  and  must  be  educed  from  it.  It  is  true 
that  evolution  proclaims  as  its  law  the  survival  of  the 
fittest.  But  who  in  the  long  run  of  millenniums  are 
the  fittest  if  not  those  that  conform  to  that  stern  author- 
ity, to  the  law  of  nature,  to  the  order  of  the  cosmos,  to 
that  all-power  of  which  we  are  a  part  which  has  created 
us  and  still  maintains  our  life, — to  God. 

If  Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  means  to  say  that  ethics 
without  religion  is  a  failure  and  will  remain  a  failure, 
we  agree  with  him  perfectly.     He  says  : 

"With  misgivings,  conscious  or  unconscious,  about  religion, 
came  the  desire  of  finding  a  sanction  for  morality  independent  of 
theology  ;  in  other  words,  moral  philosophy." 


MR.  GOLDWIN  SMITH  ON  MORALITY.  193 

He  adds  that  all  those  moral  philosophers  "whose 
philosophy  has  been  practically  effective,  from  So- 
crates downward,  have  been  religious  and  have  re- 
garded their  philosophy  as  the  ally  and  confirmation 
of  religion."  This,  I  grant,  is  true  if  religion  is  used 
in  the  broad  sense  we  use  it,  and  not  in  the  sense  of 
a  creed  which  declares  that  religiosity  consists  in  a 
blind  belief  of  traditional  dogmas. 

Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  quotes  approvingly  a  passage 
from  his  late  friend  Mr.  Cotter  Morison,  whom  he 
calls  "the  most  thorough-going  of  agnostics."  Mr. 
Morison  says  : 

"Virtue  may,  and  possibly  will,  bring  happiness  to  the  vir- 
tuous man  ;  but  to  the  immoral  and  the  selfish,  virtue  will  probably 
be  the  most  distasteful  or  even  painful  thing  in  their  experience, 
while  vice  will  give  them  unmitigated  pleasure." 

This  is  true,  and  being  true  it  suffices  to  explode 
any  kind  of  hedonism  which  would  fain  make  us  be- 
lieve that  happiness  is  the  consequence  of  virtue,  and 
that  virtue  must  be  explained  as  that  which  gives 
pleasure  or  produces  happiness.  The  quotation  is 
valuable  because  it  comes  from  an  agnostic.  Agnostics 
not  being  able  to  found  ethics  upon  something  which 
they  do  not  know  and  which  they  consider  as  unknow- 
able, have  attempted  to  explain  morality  as  that  which 
is  conducive  to  happiness.  If  ethics  cannot  be  de- 
duced from  happiness  or  that  which  causes  happiness, 
how  can  we  explain  it  ? 

Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that 
all  other  attempts  of  teaching  or  explaining  morality 
contain  religious  elements,  and  he  is  right.    He  says  : 

"Where  they  take  as  their  foundation  the  authority  of  con- 
science, the  categorical  imperative,  or  the  command  of  nature,  it 
is  clear  that  they  are  still  within  the  circle  of  theism." 


r94  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

He  adds  these  two  propositions  which,  it  appears, 
he  believes  to  be  equivalent :  "  Nature,"  he  says,  "  is 
an  unmeaning  expression  without  an  author  of  nature, 
or  rather,  it  is  a  philosophical  name  of  God."  The 
former  proposition  we  reject  as  a  decided  non  sequitur; 
the  latter  we  accept.  As  soon  as  we  consider  nature, 
the  world-order,  the  laws  of  the  evolution  of  life  in 
their  moral  importance,  we  are  confronted  with  the 
true  kernel  of  religious  truth  ;  their  recognition  is  the 
kernel  of  the  God-idea,  for  God  if  it  means  anything 
is  the  moral  authority  whose  will  must  be  done. 

Agnosticism  is  an  untenable  and  a  practically  use- 
less philosophy.  Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  says,  "The  pro- 
fession of  safe  acquiescence  in  ignorance  may  sound 
very  philosophic."  But  it  is  not ;  and  he  has  our  full 
assent  when  he  says  : 

"The  generation  after  next  may  perhaps  see  agnosticism, 
moral  as  well  as  religious,  tried  on  a  clear  field.  By  that  time, 
possibly,  science,  whose  kingdom  seems  now  to  have  come,  will 
have  solved  in  her  own  way  the  mystery  of  existence  ;  at  least  so 
far  as  to  provide  us  with  a  rule  of  life,  personal  and  social." 

We  also  believe  that  the  kingdom  of  science  seems 
now  to  have  come.  But  if  it  comes,  in  what  way  and 
by  whose  authority  does  it  come  ?  It  comes  in  the  or- 
dinary course  of  evolution  by  the  authority  of  the  God 
of  the  religion  of  science.  It  comes  after  all  as  a  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest  in  spite  of  Mr.  Goldwin  Smith's 
denunciation  of  the  law  of  evolution.  This  is  so  pal- 
pable that  no  words  need  be  lost  about  it.  Yet  Mr. 
Goldwin  Smith's  argument  is  so  strong  that  we  shall 
have  to  add  a  few  further  explanations. 

Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  says  : 

"The  tiger  has  been  as  much  evolved  as  the  lamb;  and  the 
most  noxious  of  human  beasts,  if  he  can  hold  his  own  in  the  strug- 


MR.  GOLD  WIN  SMITH  ON  MORALITY,  195 

gle  for  existence,  at  whatever  expense  to  his  fellows,  has  as  good 
a  right  to  existence  as  Socrates." 

Here  we  have  to  make  two  objections. 

First  we  have  to  repeat  what  we  have  said  again 
and  again  on  other  occasions:  that  this  famous  com- 
parison so  often  employed  to  contrast  the  immoral 
evil-doer  with  the  moral  martyr  does  not  correctly  rep- 
resent the  nature  of  the  problem.  The  tiger  is  not 
more  immoral  than  the  lamb ;  on  the  contrary,  if  the 
tiger  represents  the  active  energetic  fighter  who  in  the 
struggle  for  existence  holds  his  own,  while  the  lamb 
represents  the  passive  sufferer  who  is  too  weak-headed 
to  face  his  foe,  the  tiger  is  more  moral  than  the  lamb 
and  it  serves  the  lamb  right  that  he  succumbs  to  the 
victor.  There  is  no  morality  in  ovine  indolence.  Mor- 
ality is  not,  as  it  is  often  supposed  to  be,  merely  the 
omission  of  certain  grosser  or  more  refined  crimes,  of 
different  sins,  bad  habits,  and  pecadilloes ;  true  mor- 
ality is  not  passive,  it  is  active,  it  consists  in  the 
achieving  and  doing  of  that  which  is  our  duty  to  do 
for  ourselves  and  for  mankind,  which  latter  is  only  a 
wider  range  of  our  nobler  self. 

Our  second  objection  to  Mr.  Goldwin  Smith's  argu- 
ment is  that  "human  beasts"  can  not  hold  their  own. 
They  are  constantly  being  eliminated  by  the  natural 
selection  of  evolution. 

We  agree  with  Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  when  he  says : 
"It  is  absurd  to  say  that  a  life  of  self-denial  and  en- 
durance, ending  in  martyrdom,  is  happiness" — for  the 
law  of  morality  cannot  be  educed  from  man's  yearning 
for  happiness — and  in  a  certain  sense  we  also  agree 
to  the  clause  he  adds — "unless  there  is  a  compensa- 
tion beyond."  Morality  as  a  factor  in  life  and  in  evo- 
lution, as  a  law  of  nature,  cannot  be  understood  unless 


196  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

we  rise  above  the  sphere  of  the  individual.  Egotism 
is  not  morality,  and  moral  actions  are  those  which  are 
consciously  or  unconsciously  performed  with  an  out- 
look beyond  the  narrow  interests  of  the  individual  in 
time  and  space.  Moral  motives  are  superindividual. 
I  purposely  do  not  call  them  altruistic,  because  altru- 
ism does  not  seem  to  me  the  proper  moral  view ;  it 
simply  replaces  the  interests  of  the  own  ego  by  those 
of  other  egos.  The  superindividual  aspect  however 
makes  humanity  and  its  ideals,  the  natural  laws  of 
social  justice  and  the  moral  law  of  the  world,  parts  of 
the  individual  and  it  is  not  the  individual  but  these 
superindividual  parts  of  his  soul  which  will  survive. 

Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  is  not  yet  free  from  the  indi- 
vidualism of  our  time.  He  seems  to  expect  that  mor- 
ality and  happiness  shall  be  doled  out  to  the  individ- 
ual in  equal  proportions.  He  introduces  the  following 
instance  : 

"A  man  acquires  a  great  estate  by  fraud,  enjoys  it  wisely, 
uses  his  wealth  liberally,  makes  himself  popular,  takes  good  care 
of  his  health,  lives  long,  dies  respected,  and  leaves  healthy  off- 
spring. Freed  by  his  opulence  from  wearing  toil  and  injurious 
exposure,  he  exhibits  all  the  energy,  vivacity,  and  sociability  which 
are  held  out  as  the  rewards  of  a  right  course  of  living.  Morality 
says  that  he  is  miserable,  but  how  can  evolution  condemn  him  ?" 

Evolution  does  condemn  him.  Evolution  will  in 
the  long  run  eliminate  such  types  as  he  is,  as  certain 
as  it  will  eliminate  the  tigers  from  off  the  surface  of 
the  earth. 

Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  continues  : 

' '  Evolutionary  philosophers  give  excellent  precepts  for  healthy 
and  comfortable  living  ;  but  these  precepts  apparently  the  man 
fulfils,  and  thus  he  fulfils  all  righteousness.  They  may  talk  to 
him,  indeed,  of  a  more  perfect  state  of  society  to  be  some  day 
brought  about  by  ethical  science,  in  which  he  would  be  out  of 
place ;  but  he,  having  only  one  life,  takes  the  world  as  he  finds  it, 


MR.  GOLD  WIN  SMITH  ON  MORALITY.  197 

and  makes  the  best  of  it  for  himself.     Why  should  he  sacrifice 
himself  to  the  future  of  humanity  ?" 

Why  should  he  sacrifice  himself  for  the  future  of 
humanity  ?  Because  the  future  of  humanity  is  his 
own  future.  Why  shall  a  boy  sacrifice  the  hours  of 
his  childhood  for  the  future  days  of  his  manhood? 
Why  !  Because  the  man  is  the  continuance  of  the  boy. 
The  objection  may  be  made  that  the  comparison  does 
not  hold  good ;  the  future  generations  of  mankind  are 
not  we  ourselves,  while  the  adult  man  is  the  same 
person  as  the  boy.  What,  however,  does  "the  same 
person"  mean?  The  word  "person"  represents  a 
history,  a  continuance,  nothing  more.  Persons  are 
not  unchangeable  units ;  there  is  not  one  atom  of  the 
boy  left  in  the  man.  Materially  considered  the  adult 
man  is  as  exactly  as  much  and  not  more  different  from 
himself  when  he  was  a  boy,  as  the  present  generations 
of  mankind  are  different  from  the  past  generations, 
for  in  both  instances  the  continuity  is  preserved  in 
exactly  the  same  degree  and  measure. 

It  is  said  that  a  man  "having  only  one  life  takes 
the  world  as  he  finds  it,  and  makes  the  best  of  it  for 
himself."     The  truth  is  man  has  not  "only  one  life." 

"  The  soul  that  rises  with  us,  our  life's  star, 
Hath  had  elsewhere  its  setting 
And  cometh  from  afar." 

Man's  life,  his  humanity,  does  not  consist  of  the 
material  particles  of  his  body.  The  properly  human 
in  man  consists  almost  entirely  of  his  relations  with 
other  men.  His  very  language  is  superindividual,  and 
if  we  could  cut  out  the  superindividual  from  his  brain, 
there  would  remain  a  mere  brute.  There  is  a  great 
truth  in  the  idea  of  immortality,  although  there  need 
not  be  an  immortality  either  of  bodily  resurrection  or 
in  a  purely  spiritual  heaven  beyond. 


i98  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

The  immortality  of  the  soul  is  a  truth  ;  the  immor- 
tality of  the  individual  is  an  error.  We  must  cease  to 
consider  the  ego  of  the  individual  as  a  reality.  It  is 
no  reality  and  the  belief  in  it  is  an  illusion  ;  it  is  the 
veil  of  Maya.  The  antiquated  view  of  regarding  the 
personality  of  a  man  as  an  entity,  as  a  kind  of  mys- 
terious soul-unit,  produces  most  intricate  sham-prob- 
lems ;  but  these  problems  will  disappear  as  soon  as 
the  veil  of  Maya  has  been  lifted  from  our  eyes. 

As  soon  as  we  lose  sight  of  the  truth  that  mankind 
is  one  great  whole  and  that  the  individual  is  a  man 
only  in  so  far  as  mankind  lives  in  him,  we  shall  not  be 
able  to  understand  and  to  account  for  morality.  The 
superindividual  in  man,  whatever  it  may  be  called,  is 
as  much  a  reality  as  is  the  shape  of  his  body,  and  it  is 
the  superindividual  elements  in  man  which  constitute 
his  soul.  The  recognition  of  the  immortality  of  man's 
soul,  not  in  the  old  sense,  but  in  a  scientific  sense,  will 
be  found  to  be  the  only  satisfactory  solution  of  the 
ethical  problem  and  at  the  same  time  of  the  religious 
problem. 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE. 


BV  PROF.  HARALD  HOFFDING. 


If  we  wish  to  discuss  ethical  problems  in  a  fruitful 
manner  and  form  just  judgments  of  ethical  theories, 
we  must  always  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  there  is  not 
merely  one  single  ethical  problem,  but  many.  With 
the  solution  of  one  of  these  problems  the  solution  of 
the  others  is  not  necessarily  given,  and  thinkers  who 
have  treated  a  single  problem  have  not,  in  dealing  with 
that  problem,  always  determined  their  position  with 
reference  to  the  others.  At  all  events,  it  will  be  an 
especial  and  separate  task  to  investigate  the  relation 
to  each  other,  the  reciprocal  dependence  or  independ- 
ence, of  the  different  ethical  problems.  When  we  speak 
of  the  ethical  problem  as  an  especial  philosophical  prob- 
lem, we  must  not  forget  that  upon  closer  examination 
it  resolves  itself  into  a  number  of  different  problems. 

The  reason  of  this  tendency  to  regard  the  ethical 
problem  as  simple  and  indivisible  throughout,  may  be 
partly  sought  in  the  fact  that  philosophical  ethics  did 
not  develop  until  the  positive  religions  had  lost  their 
undisputed  control  over  the  minds  of  men.  Religious 
ethics  is  simple  and  indivisible  by  virtue  of  its  prin- 
ciple.    It  is  founded  on  authority.     Its  contents  are  the 


200  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

revealed  commands  of  authority  ;  the  feeling  which 
impels  us  to  pass  ethical  judgments  is  the  fear  or  rever- 
ence or  love  with  which  men  are  filled  in  the  presence 
of  divine  authority ;  the  same  motives  impel  man  to 
follow  in  his  conduct  the  commands  of  the  authority ; 
and  the  principles  of  the  education  of  individuals  and 
of  the  order  of  society  are  just  as  immediately  given 
by  definite  relation  to  this  authority.  It  is  upon  the 
whole  the  peculiarity  of  positive  religions  and  the  cause 
of  their  great  importance  in  the  history  of  mankind 
that  they  grant  man  satisfaction  in  a  lump  for  all  his 
intellectual  wants.  The  true  believer  has  concentrated 
in  his  belief  his  whole  mental  life  ;  his  belief  is  at  once 
the  highest  science,  the  highest  virtue,  the  highest 
good,  and  the  highest  aesthetics.  Philosophical  ethics 
has  sought  too  long  to  retain  the  simple  unity  which 
is  peculiar  to  religious  ethics.  The  mistakes  of  the 
greatest  philosophical  ethicists  may  be  in  part  traced 
to  this  source.  A  criticism  of  Kant  and  Bentham  would 
more  fully  illustrate  this.  The  fundamental  error — 
one  so  often  found  in  the  science  of  the  past — is  too 
great  a  love  of  simplicity. 

I  shall  try,  in  the  briefest  possible  manner,  to  give 
an  outline  of  the  most  important  ethical  problems. 

Ethical  judgments,  judgments  concerning  good  and 
bad,  in  their  simplest  form  are  expressions  of  feeling, 
and  never  lose  that  character  however  much  influence 
clear  and  reasoned  knowledge  may  acquire  with  re- 
spect to  them.  An  act  or  an  institution  that  could 
awaken  no  feeling  whatsoever  would  never  become  the 
object  of  an  ethical  judgment,  could  never  be  desig- 
nated as  good  or  bad.  And  the  character  of  the  judg- 
ment will  be  dependent  upon  the  character  of  the  feel- 
ing that  dictates  the  judgment.     From  the  point  of 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  201 

view  of  pure  egoism  the  judgment  of  the  same  act  will 
be  wholly  different  from  what  it  is  when  regarded,  say, 
from  a  point  of  view  that  is  determined  by  motives  of 
sympathy  embracing  a  larger  or  smaller  circle  of  living 
beings.  An  ethical  system,  accordingly,  will  acquire 
its  character  from  the  motive  principle  of  judgment  upon 
which  it  builds.  This  motive  principle  is  the  power  that 
originally  and  constantly  again  gives  rise  to  ethical 
judgments. 

If  our  motive  principle  is  to  operate  with  clearness 
and  logical  consequence  it  must  set  up  a  definite  stand- 
ard. A  test-principle  of  judgment  must  be  established 
that  will  furnish  guidance  in  individual  cases  by  en- 
abling us  to  infer  consequences  from  it  in  instances 
where  simple,  instinctive  feeling  fails.  The  natural 
course  will  be  that  the  test-principles  will  correspond 
directly  with  the  motive  principles  at  their  base.  The 
relation  between  the  two  may,  however,  be  more  or 
less  simple.  If  we  fix  upon  the  feeling  of  sympathy  as 
our  basis,  regarding  it  as  the  main  element  of  ethical 
feelings,  it  follows  of  itself  that  the  criterion  we  adopt 
must  be  the  principle  of  general  welfare,  that  is  the 
principle  that  all  acts  and  institutions  shall  lead  to 
the  greatest  possible  feeling  of  pleasure  among  living 
beings.  This  principle  merely  defines  with  greater 
precision  what  is  unconsciously  contained  in  the  feeling 
of  sympathy  and  in  the  instinct  that  springs  from  this 
feeling.  The  same  test-principle  (as  Bentham's  "De- 
ontology," for  example,  shows)  may  also  be  accepted 
as  valid  from  the  point  of  view  of  pure  egoism,  only 
in  this  case  the  relation  between  the  motive  principle 
and  the  test-principle  is  more  indirect.  We  must  in 
this  case  endeavor  to  prove  that  the  happiness  of  others 
is  a  necessary  means  to  our  own  happiness.     Our  own 


202  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

happiness  is  then  the  real  end,  but  in  order  to  reach 
this  end  we  must  take  a  roundabout  course,  and  ethics 
is  the  presentation  of  the  system  of  the  courses  thus 
taken.  Kant  arrives  in  a  different  way  again  at  estab- 
lishing the  happiness  of  others  as  an  end  of  ethics.  It 
would  be  the  business  of  a  special  investigation  to 
determine  the  extent  to  which  this  varying  motivation 
of  the  principle  of  test  must  influence  the  conse- 
quences derivable  from  it. 

A  third  question  is,  By  what  motive  shall  an  indi- 
vidual act  be  determined?  The  motive  to  action  is  not 
necessarily  the  same  as  the  motive  that  dictates  judg- 
ment. The  man  who  is  animated  with  love  for  his  fel- 
low-creatures has  reason  to  rejoice  that  ambition  and 
the  instinct  of  acquisition  constitute  grounds  of  action 
of  so  very  general  a  character ;  in  that  results  become 
thereby  possible  which, — for  such  is  the  unalterable 
character  of  human  nature, — would  otherwise  remain 
unaccomplished.  A  special  investigation  would  have 
to  point  out  whether  cases  occur  in  which  motive  of 
action  and  motive  of  judgment  must  coincide  if  the 
act  is  to  be  approved  of,  and  whether  there  are  not 
motives  to  action  which  would  rob  the  act  of  all  ethical 
character. 

Different  from  the  problems  already  mentioned  is 
the  pedagogic  problem  :  How  can  the  proper  and  nec- 
essary motives  be  developed  in  man?  This  problem 
arises  as  well  with  respect  to  the  motive  principle  of 
judgment  as  with  respect  to  the  motive  principle  of 
action.  It  is  clear  that  between  points  of  view  that 
rest  upon  entirely  different  psychological  foundations, 
(the  one,  for  example,  starting  from  egoism,  the  other 
from  sympathy,  and  the  third  from  pure  reason,)  the 
discussion  can  be  carried  only  to  a  certain  point.    The 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  203 

person  who  with  conscious  logic  makes  himself  the 
highest  and  only  aim  can  never  be  refuted  from  a  point 
of  view  which  regards  every  individual  as  a  member  of 
society  and  of  the  race,  and  therefore  not  only  as  an 
end  but  also  as  a  means.  If  an  understanding  is  to  be- 
come possible,  the  emotional  foundation  adopted  (the 
motive  spring  of  judgment)  must  be  changed  ;  but  the 
change  is  not  effected  by  mere  theoretical  discussion  : 
a  practical  education  is  demanded  in  addition  thereto 
which  life  does  not  afford  all  individuals,  although  our 
inclination  to  make  ourselves  an  absolute  centre  is  al- 
ways obstructed  by  the  tendency  of  society  to  subject 
us  all  to  a  general  order  of  things.  There  is  an  edu- 
cation of  humanity  by  history  the  same  as  there  is  an 
education  of  single  individuals  in  more  limited  spheres. 
This  education  demands  its  special  points  of  view, 
which  are  not  always  directly  furnished  by  general 
ethical  principles.  The  same  is  true  of  the  motive  to 
action.  For  pedagogical  reasons  it  may  be  necessary 
to  produce  or  to  preserve  motives  that  do  not  satisfy 
the  highest  demand,  because  such  motives  are  neces- 
sary transitional  stages  to  the  highest  motives.  Thus, 
ambition  and  the  instinct  of  acquisition  may  be  the 
means  of  attaining  to  true  ethical  self-assertion.  Rev- 
erence for  authorities  historically  given  can  be  of  ex- 
traordinary effectiveness  in  the  development  of  charac- 
ter, since  only  thereby  are  concentration  or  fixity  of 
endeavor  as  well  as  the  power  of  joyful  resignation  ac- 
quired,— without  our  being  able  to  see  in  such  rev- 
erence the  highest  ethical  qualities.  A  ground- color 
in  fact  must  often  be  laid  on  before  the  final,  required 
tint  can  be  applied.  The  law  of  the  displacement  of 
motives  operates  here  which  in  ethical  estimation  gen- 
erally is  of  the  utmost  importance. 


204  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

There  must  still  be  mentioned  here  finally  the  socio- 
political problem.  This  problem  has  reference  to  that 
particular  ordered  arrangement  of  society  which  is  best 
adapted  to  a  development  in  the  direction  of  ethical 
ideals.  As  the  former  problem  leads  inquiry  out  of  the 
domain  of  ethics  into  that  of  pedagogics,  so  this  one 
leads  us  from  ethics  into  political  economy  and  po- 
litical science. 

Although  in  the  present  discussion  I  intend  to  oc- 
cupy myself  only  with  a  single  one  of  these  problems, 
I  have  nevertheless  mentioned  them  all  in  order  that 
the  light  that  I  shall  attempt  to  throw  upon  the  prob- 
lem I  deal  with  may  be  seen  in  its  proper  setting.  As 
will  be  observed  from  what  follows,  the  principle  of 
welfare  will  be  misunderstood  if  the  problem  to  whose 
solution  it  is  adapted  is  confounded  with  any  one  of 
the  other  ethical  problems.  The  systematism  of  ethical 
science  is  still  so  little  advanced  that  it  is  necessary  to 
draw  out  a  general  outline  before  we  pass  on  to  any 
single  feature.  The  value  of  systematism  is  namely 
this,  that  we  are  immediately  enabled  to  see  the  con- 
nection of  the  single  questions  with  one  another  as 
well  as  their  distinctive  peculiarity.  In  ethics  we  are 
not  yet  so  far  advanced. 


i)  If  we  accept  the  principle  of  welfare  as  our  test 
or  criterion  in  judging  of  the  value  of  actions  and  of 
institutions,  these  are  then  good  or  bad  according  as 
in  their  effects  (so  far  as  we  can  trace  them)  they  pro- 
duce a  predominance  of  pleasurable  feeling  or  a  pre- 
dominance of  painful  feeling  in  a  larger  or  smaller 
circle  of  sentient  beings.  Every  action  may  be  com- 
pared to  a  stone  thrown  into  the  water.     The  motion 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  205 

produced  is  propagated  in  large  or  in  small  circles  ; 
and  the  estimation  of  its  value  depends  upon  whether 
it  produces  in  the  places  it  strikes  predominant  pleas- 
ure or  pain.  Just  as  theoretical  science  explains  the 
single  natural  phenomenon  by  its  connection  with  other 
natural  phenomena,  so  ethics  tests  the  single  feeling 
by  its  relation  to  other  feelings  :  the  satisfaction  of  a 
person  acting  over  the  accomplishment  of  the  act  is 
only  then  to  be  called  justifiable  or  good  when  it  does 
not  create  a  disturbance  in  the  pleasurable  feeling  of 
other  beings,  or  when  such  a  disturbance  can  be  proved 
to  be  a  necessary  means  of  a  greater  or  more  extended 
pleasurable  feeling.  This  principle,  as  a  principle  of 
test  or  valuation,  corresponds  directly  with  sympathy 
as  motive  of  judgment.  The  extent  to  which  it  is 
possible  to  accept  this  from  other  points  of  view  I 
cannot  here  investigate  in  detail. 

The  act  of  estimation,  the  testing,  does  not  stop 
at  the  outer  action  but  goes  down  to  the  motives  of 
the  person  acting,  to  the  qualities  of  his  character,  to 
the  whole  inner  life  from  which  the  act  has  sprung. 
This  has  its  ground  in  the  nature  and  significance  of 
the  estimating  judgment.  Ethical  judgments,  in  fact, 
are  in  their  original  and  simplest  form  spontaneous 
expressions  of  feeling.  But  the  great  practical  signifi- 
cance of  such  expressions  of  feeling  lies  in  the  fact 
that  they  operate  decisively  upon  the  will  (upon  the 
individual  will  and  that  of  others)  and  produce  motives 
of  future  action.  Logically,  accordingly,  they  must  be 
directed  towards  the  point  at  which  an  altering  effect 
on  the  power  that  produces  the  act  is  possible,  and 
this  point  lies  precisely  in  the  inner  life,  in  the  char- 
acter of  mind  of  the  person  acting.  For  this  reason 
feelings  and  impulses,  disturbances  and  desires,  are 


206  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

also  judged  of  according  to  the  tendency  which  they 
have  of  producing  acts  and  effects  that  will  increase 
pleasurable  feeling  or  avoid  unpleasurable  feeling  in 
more  extended  or  more  limited  circles. 

Only  by  its  effects  do  we  know  the  power.  We 
form  by  inferences  our  conclusions  as  to  what  takes 
place  in  the  mind  of  a  man,  his  motives  and  his  ca- 
pacity. Goodness  or  greatness  that  never  expressed 
itself  in  action  could  never  become  the  object  of  ethical 
approbation ;  it  would  not  even  exist  in  fact,  but 
would  rest  upon  a  self-deception,  upon  an  illusion. 
At  least  some  inner  activity,  a  longing  and  endeavor 
in  the  direction  demanded  by  the  ethical  principle 
must  manifest  itself.  The  individual  in  self-judgment 
must  often  take  refuge  in  this  inner  activity,  and  any 
deep-going,  unpharisaical  ethical  estimation  will  have 
to  follow  him  there ;  *  but  just  here  do  we  have  a  be- 
ginning of  that  which  is  demanded  by  the  principle  of 
welfare,  except  that  in  consequence  of  individual  cir- 
cumstances its  prosecution  is  impossible. 

Equally  important  as  the  principle  that  we  can 
know  the  power  only  from  the  effects  is  the  other  prin- 
ciple that  the  effect  need  not  appear  at  once.  When 
good  and  great  men  are  so  often  mistaken  by  their 
contemporaries  the  fact  is  explained  by  the  circum- 
stance that  only  a  very  wide-embracing  glance  can 
measure  the  significance  of  their  efforts  and  activity. 
Their  goodness  and  greatness  is  founded  in  the  fact 
that  their  thought,  their  feeling,  their  will,  comprehend 
far  more  than  their  short-sighted  and  narrow-minded 
contemporaries  see.  A  long  time  may  elapse  before 
it  is  possible  for  them  to  be  generally  understood,  and 

•Compare  mjr  article  "The  Laws  of  Relativity  in  Ethics  "  in  the  Inter- 
national Journal  of Rthict,  Vol.  I.  p.  37,  et  seqq. 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  207 

for  what  they  have  done  to  be  assimilated.  It  is  there- 
fore by  no  means  implied  in  the  principle  of  welfare 
that  people  are  to  direct  their  conduct  so  as  to  be  in 
accord  with  impulses  and  wants  which  men  have  at  the 
moment.  The  principle  of  welfare  demands  in  very 
fact  that  we  should  not  shrink  from  the  battle  with 
prejudice  and  with  inertia.  The  best  thing,  often,  that 
we  can  do  for  others  is  to  make  them  feel  that  they 
stand  on  entirely  too  low  a  level  in  their  wishes  and 
wants  and  do  not  make  adequate  demands  generally. 
Thus,  to  take  a  single  instance,  the  great  artist  often 
treads  a  solitary  path  ununderstood  or  even  mistaken 
by  the  great  mass.  Yet  in  so  doing  he  follows,  perhaps 
without  being  aware  of  it,  the  principle  of  welfare, — 
if  he  rigorously  observes  the  demands  of  art.  He  in- 
creases the  mental  capital  of  the  species,  and  gives  it 
a  power  which  later  on  can  operate  in  broad  spheres. 
Only  a  short-sighted  conception  and  application  of 
the  principle  of  welfare  stops  with  the  need  of  the  mo- 
ment and  dismisses  the  consideration  of  the  permanent 
conditions  of  life  and  the  permanent  sources  of  new 
life  and  new  activity.* 

2)  The  principle  of  welfare  simply  furnishes  a  norm 
which  may  be  laid  at  the  foundation  of  the  testing  of 
all  classes  of  actions.  But  it  by  no  means  demands,  as 
has  at  times  been  supposed,  that  consideration  for 
welfare  should  also  be  the  ground  and  motive  for  every 
act.  We  have  recourse  to  general  principles  only  in 
order  to  be  able  to  set  ourselves  aright  in  cases  in 
which  direct  judgment,  instinctive  feeling  cannot  de- 
termine the  question  presented,  that  is  in  cases  of 
doubt,  or  when  we  have  in  view  a  systematic  treatment 

*  This  last  argument  is  taken  from  my  Ethics  (Danish  edition,  P.  94,  Ger- 
man edition,  p.  no. 


208  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

of  ethical  questions.  The  ethical  feeling  may  operate 
quite  involuntarily  and  without  real  ratiocination,  in 
that  we  can  be  moved  directly  by  the  act  (whether 
possible  or  real)  as  it  appears  to  us,  just  as  in  our 
aesthetical  feeling  we  may  without  aesthetical  reason- 
ing be  struck  by  the  beauty  of  a  work  of  art  or  of  a  land- 
scape. Or,  we  follow  with  confidence  the  "unwritten 
laws  "  that  are  contained  in  custom,  in  tradition,  and 
generally  in  so-called  "positive  morality."  And  in 
agreement  precisely  with  the  principle  of  welfare,  is 
immediacy  of  this  kind  to  be  recommended  and  main- 
tained, so  long  as  it  does  not  lead  to  the  neglect  of  real 
problems  and  questions.  It  is  the  state  of  innocence 
out  of  which  no  one  dare  be  wrested  unnecessarily. 
Abstract  principles  become  necessary  aids  when  direct 
reliance  fails  ;  but  frequently  they  can  only  be  applied 
to  individual  concrete  cases  by  the  employment  of  a 
great  number  of  complicated  intermediary  steps,  and 
do  not  easily  acquire  a  practical  influence  upon  the 
will.  Indeed,  the  principle  of  welfare  may  even  de- 
mand quite  different  motives  from  ethical  feeling  or 
devotion  to  the  requirements  of  positive  morality.  It 
is  in  fact  most  beautiful  and  best  that  a  man  should 
care  for  his  wife  and  children  because  he  loves  them 
and  not  because  his  ethical  instinct  requires  it.  Where 
conscious  duty  has  to  be  invoked  in  the  innermost  re- 
lations between  man  and  man,  it  is  as  a  rule  a  sign  of 
an  unfortunate  state  of  affairs.  Perfect  love  dispels 
not  only  fear  but  also  duty. 

In  his  "  Ethics,"  at  page  339,  Wundt  advances  the 
following  objection  to  the  principle  of  welfare  :  "  It  is 
conceivable  that  a  person  should  sacrifice  himself  for 
another ;  it  is  conceivable  that  a  person  should  yield 
up  life  and  possessions  for  definite  ideal  ends,  for  his 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  209 

country,  for  freedom,  for  religion,  for  science.  But  it 
has  never  come  to  pass,  and  never  will,  that  people 
shall  renounce  a  thing  solely  to  increase  the  sum  of 
happiness  of  the  world."  This  objection  overlooks 
the  fact  that  the  principle  of  the  valuation  of  an  act 
that  is  regarded  as  good  need  not  be  the  motive  to  this 
act.  The  thought  and  feeling  of  the  person  acting  may 
stop  very  properly  at  country,  freedom,  or  any  other 
ideal  object,  without  the  person's  instituting  any  formal 
reflections  whatsoever  with  regard  to  the  reasons  of 
the  value  of  the  ideal  ends  for  which  he  sacrifices  him- 
self. But  in  systematic  ethics  or  in  practical  cases  of 
doubt  we  inquire  what  value  and  importance  love  of 
country,  freedom,  poetry,  and  science  possess  for  hu- 
man life.  If,  for  example,  freedom  were  not  a  good 
for  a  people,  the  individual  would  do  wrong  to  sacri- 
fice his  life  for  it.  It  is  never  of  course  a  question  of 
the  abstract  notion  of  welfare  of  and  in  itself,  just  as 
in  a  single  theoretical  problem  it  is  never  a  question 
of  the  abstract  idea  of  cause.  But  in  ethics  we  lay 
down  the  principle  of  welfare  and  in  the  theory  of 
knowledge  the  principle  of  causality ;  endeavoring, 
thus,  to  go  back  through  analysis  to  the  final  assump- 
tions of  our  practical  and  theoretical  intellectual  ac- 
tivity. 

3)  It  is  no  argument  against  the  principle  of  wel- 
fare that  pleasure  must  be  so  often  bought  with  pain. 
Pain  is  in  that  case  only  the  necessary  transitional 
step,  and  the  significance  of  the  principle  of  welfare  is 
precisely  the  requirement  it  makes  that  the  duty  of 
demonstration  shall  rest  on  those  who  maintain  the  ne- 
cessity of  such  an  intermediary  step.  Any  infliction  of 
pain  must  be  supplied  with  a  motive,  whereas  the  feel- 
ing of  pleasure  in  and  of  itself  (that  is  if  its  causes  do 


210  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

not  at  the  same  time  produce  additional  painful  effects) 
is  justified.  The  principle  of  welfare  simply  says  :  Pro- 
duce by  thy  conduct  as  much  pleasure  and  as  little 
pain  as  is  possible  !  The  degree  to  which  it  is  possi- 
ble to  realise  this  demand,  of  this  the  principle  in  and 
of  itself  says  nothing.  A  principle  is  not  subverted  by 
the  difficulties  of  its  application. 

As  experience  teaches,  there  is  a  happiness  that  is 
not  bought  too  dearly  with  pain.  Clara's  song  in 
Goethe's  "Egmont" : 

"Himmelhoch  jauchzend,  zutn  Tode  betrubt  !  " 

has  been  cited  in  disproof  of  the  principle  of  welfare. 
But  let  us  hear  Clara  to  the  end  and  note  the  last  line 
of  the  song,  in  which  she  gives  the  result  of  the  entire 
train  of  her  emotion.     She  says  : 

••  Gliicklich  allein  ist  die  Seele  die  liebt !  " 

The  phenomenon  is  this.  There  is  a  movement  of 
the  heart  and  mind,  a  life  of  feeling,  which  are  joined 
with  a  satisfaction  so  deep  and  great  that  the  powerful 
oscillation  between  pleasure  and  pain  does  not  destroy 
the  total  feeling  of  happiness,  but  strengthens  it.  Two 
psychological  factors  co-operate  here.  The  one  is, 
that  the  pain  (the  dis-pleasure  or  grief),  unless  it  trans- 
cends a  certain  degree,  forms  the  background  of  the 
pleasurable  feeling  and  is  thereby  able  to  intensify  the 
latter.  In  this  very  fact  a  sufficient  motive  lies  to 
choose  conditions  of  this  sort  in  preference  to  such  as 
do  not  stand  so  high  in  intensity  but  are  nevertheless 
conditions  of  more  unmixed  pleasure.  The  other  fac- 
tor is,  that  there  can  be  an  element  of  attraction  even 
in  grief,  simply  because  intense  life,  powerful  move- 
ment, and  the  straining  of  faculties  that  come  with 
it,  produce  of  themselves  satisfaction.     All  exertion  of 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  211 

power  which  is  not  out  of  proportion  is  connected  with 
a  feeling  of  pleasure.  The  feeling  of  pleasure  that  ac- 
companies grief  and  anxiety  asserts  itself  in  the  fact 
that  we  do  not  wish  to  be  transported  out  of  it.  An 
important  element  here  is  also  the  organic  process 
connected  with  every  powerful  state  of  mind  (the  effect 
of  the  condition  of  the  brain  on  the  circulation  of  the 
blood,  on  breathing,  and  on  the  organs  of  digestion), 
granting  that  it  is  not  the  whole  cause. 

When  Auguste  Comte  lost  the  woman  who  exerted 
so  decisive  an  influence  on  the  direction  of  his  mind 
in  the  last  period  of  his  life,  he  said  once  in  an  out- 
burst of  sorrow  evoked  by  her  memory :  "I  owe  it  to 
thee  alone  that  I  shall  not  leave  this  life  without  hav- 
ing known  in  a  worthy  manner  the  best  emotion  of 

human  nature Amid  the  severest  pains  that  this 

emotion  can  bring  with  it  I  have  never  ceased  to  feel 
that  the  true  condition  of  happiness  is,  to  have  filled 
the  heart — though  it  be  with  pain,  aye  with  bitterest 
pain." 

Auguste  Comte  and  Clara  are  accordingly  quite  in 
agreement,  and  the  ethics  of  welfare  is  in  agreement 
with  them  both.  If  we  desire  to  be  wholly  secure 
against  pain  and  anxiety,  then  we  dare  not  love  any- 
thing. But  what  if  love  were  the  greatest  happiness, 
even  though  it  brought  as  much  sorrow  again  with  it ! 
With  powerful  action  and  great  fulness  of  life  come 
also  great  costs,  great  contrasts,  and  great  vibrations. 
Yet  who  has  said  that  the  highest  was  to  be  had  for 
little  expenditure  ? 

The  feeling  of  pleasure  is  the  only  psychological 
criterion  of  health  and  power  of  life.  That  which  in  all 
its  immediate  or  remote  effects  in  all  the  creatures  that 
it  touches  produces  only  pleasurable  feeling,  cannot 


212  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

possibly  be  condemned.  Welfare,  therefore,  in  the 
sense  of  permanent  pleasurable  feeling,  is  the  final 
test- principle  of  action.  Pain  is  everywhere  the  sign 
of  an  incipient  dissolution  of  life.*  This  is  exhibited 
in  the  simplest  manner  in  the  "physical"  pain  that 
arises  through  the  tearing  of  organic  tissue.  But  it 
also  holds  true  of  the  "mental"  pain  that  arises  from 
anxiety,  doubt,  or  repentance.  It  points  to  a  dishar- 
mony between  the  different  forces  and  impulses  of  the 
mind,  a  disharmony  that  can  lead  to  the  dissolution 
of  consciousness.  If  pain  is  a  necessary  intermediary 
step,  the  fact  is  partly  founded  in  the  two  psycho- 
logical laws  above  mentioned,  partly  also  in  the  cir- 
cumstance that  it  means  the  dissolution  of  something 
in  us  that  impedes  a  more  free  and  more  varied  devel- 
opment of  life.  Childbirth  is  accompanied  with  pain 
because  the  new  life  can  only  come  into  the  world  at 
the  cost  of  the  old.  Analogously  the  knowledge  of 
truth  is  often  gained  with  pain  because  prejudices  and 
illusions  must  first  be  shattered.  In  the  pain  of  re- 
pentance a  lower  self  is  dissolved  in  order  that  a  new 
and  higher  self  may  develop. 

4)  A  circumstance  that  has  especially  fostered  the 
opposition  to  the  principle  of  welfare  is  undoubtedly 
the  tendency  to  think  exclusively,  in  connection  with 
the  expression  "pleasurable  feeling,"  of  the  most  ele- 
mentary sensual  forms  of  pleasure.  The  latter  are  not 
excluded  by  the  principle  of  welfare  ;  the  principle, 
however,  takes  all  the  aspects  of  human  character  into 
consideration,  maintaining  that  permanent  pleasurable 
feeling  is  not  to  be  established  with  certainty  if  an  es- 
sential aspect  of  this  character  is  neglected.     The  de- 

*  Compare  my  Psychology  (Danish  edition,  pp.  315-318  ;  German  edition, 
PP-  343-347)- 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE,  213 

feet  of  elementary  feelings  of  pleasure  is  that  for  the 
great  part  they  correspond  to  only  momentary  and 
limited  relations. 

A  being  whose  feeling  is  of  a  purely  elementary 
kind  can  maintain  itself  as  long  as  the  simple  condi- 
tions of  life  to  which  it  is  adapted  do  not  change. 
Thus  some  of  the  lowest  animal  forms  like  the  infu- 
soria and  rhizopods  appear  to  have  existed  throughout 
infinitely  long  periods  of  time  in  exactly  their,  present 
condition.  Here  the  adaptation  to  the  given  conditions 
is  as  good  as  perfect.  The  same  may  be  the  case 
with  beings  that  at  an  earlier  stage  of  their  develop- 
ment ha\e  possessed  more  developed  organs  and 
forms.  Animals  that  live  free  in  their  youth,  after- 
wards however  as  parasites,  lead  a  purely  elementary 
life  and  lose  all  the  nerves  and  muscles  that  do  not  di- 
rectly subserve  this  form  of  existence.  This  is  also  true 
of  man.  Of  the  Fuegians,  whose  wretched  existence 
(wretched  in  our  eyes)  he  portrays  in  vivid  colors 
in  his  "Jourjiey  Around  the  World,"  Darwin  says: 
"There  is  no  reason  for  believing  that  the  Fuegians 
are  diminishing  in  number ;  we  must  therefore  assume 
that  they  enjoy  a  sufficient  measure  of  happiness  (of 
whatever  character  this  may  be)  to  give  life  value  in 
their  eyes.  Nature,  which  makes  habit  an  irresistible 
power  and  its  effects  hereditary,  has  fitted  the  Fuegian 
to  the  climate  and  the  products  of  his  wretched  coun- 
try." Primitive  peoples  of  a  higher  type  even  (and  not 
only  primitive  peoples)  afford  examples  of  an  adapta- 
tion to  conditions  which  excludes  all  motives  to  change 
and  progress.  It  is  dire  necessity  that  has  brought 
man  into  the  path  of  progress.  Where  such  a  compul 
sion  does  not  operate  human  emotional  life  is  condi- 
tioned by  a  narrow  sphere  of  relations  only  and  is  there- 


2i4  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

fore  itself  narrow  and  restricted.  Perhaps  more  com- 
plete, more  unmixed  satisfaction  can  be  obtained  here 
than  would  be  possible  under  more  manifold  and  more 
complicated  circumstances.  A  small  vessel  may  be 
fuller  than  a  large  one  although  it  holds  less.* 

It  might  perhaps  be  objected  to  the  principle  of 
welfare,  that  we  should  really  be  obliged,  in  consis- 
tency with  it,  to  make  ourselves  all  little  vessels,  and 
that  agreeably  to  the  principle  an  existence  limited  to 
the  primitive  necessities  of  life  and  to  purely  elemen- 
tary feelings,  would  stand  just  as  high  as  a  life  taken 
up  with  intellectual  labor  and  the  activity  of  culture, 
or  even  higher,  since  an  existence  of  the  latter  kind 
could  scarcely  be  accompanied  with  so  unmixed  and 
secure  a  well-being,  but  would  be  united  with  trials 
and  efforts  constantly  renewed  and  with  unrest  ever 
recurring.  If — as  it  might  be  suggested — an  existence 
like  that  of  the  Fuegians  appears  poor  and  wretched 
to  us,  since  they  often  suffer  from  scarcity  and  want, 
let  us  take  another  example.  Alexander  von  Humboldt 
came  across  a  tribe  in  South  America  that  lived  from 
banana  trees, — trees  so  fruitful  that  an  acre  of  land 
planted  with  them  would  supply  food  for  fifty  human 
beings.  The  trees  require  no  real  expenditure  of  la- 
bor ;  only  the  earth  about  their  roots  must  be  broken 
with  implements  once  or  twice  a  year.  The  conse- 
quence is  that  the  tribe  is  stupid  and  uncivilised.  But 
the  wants  that  it  has  are  satisfied. 

That  which  would  make  such  a  life  unendurable 
for  us,  the  strong  desire  for  activity,  development,  and 
progress,  this  desire  does  not  exist  at  such  stages.      It 


*  Fieri  potest,  ut  vas  aliquod  minus  majore  plenius  sit,  quamvis  liquoris 
minus  contineat  Cartesius,  Epistola  iv,  Ad  principem  Palatinem  de  sita 
beata. 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  215 

is, — a  fact  that  must  be  remarked, — itself  a  consequence 
of  development  and  progress. 

Whereas  Lamarck  assumed  an  inner,  innate  im- 
pulse to  development  in  all  living  creatures,*  Darwin 
maintains,  on  the  ground  of  experience,  that  develop- 
ment is  invariably  introduced  by  the  influence  of  ex- 
ternal causes.  It  was  a  difficulty  to  Lamarck  how  the 
very  lowest  forms  of  life  could  continue  their  exist- 
ence, why  they  had  not  long  since  developed  to  higher 
stages.  In  Darwin's  theory,  which  takes  into  consider- 
ation the  external  conditions  of  development,  there  is 
no  difficulty  on  this  point.  A  development  that  is  fa- 
vored in  no  way  by  external  circumstances  is  simply 
impossible.  As  regards  human  beings,  the  anthropol- 
ogist Th.  Waitz  has  clearly  proved,  that  the  impulse 
and  desire  of  development  is  itself  a  product  of  devel- 
opment. To  this  effect  he  speaks  in  his  treatise  "The 
Indians  of  North  America,"  page  69  :  "A  people  with- 
out intercourse  and  not  in  competition  with  other  peo- 
ples, a  people  which  supplies  its  natural  wants  with 
relative  ease  or  only  by  overcoming  long  accustomed 
difficulties  regarded  as  inevitable,  directly  from  its 
natural  environment,  and  that  feels  satisfied  therewith 
and  lives  a  happy  life  :  from  such  a  people  it  is  not  to 
be  expected  that  it  will  make  any  endeavors  to  civilise 
itself.  He  that  has  what  he  needs  and  therefore  feels 
satisfied  in  all  respects,  will  not  work ;  people  do  not 
civilise  themselves  voluntarily  in  following  some  noble 
instinct  of  the  heart.  Is  it  different  in  fact  in  our 
modern  society?  Is  not  a  long  period  of  schooling 
and  culture  previously  necessary  to  instil  in  man  an 
interest  for  work  as  work  ?  How  many  are  there  among 

*  The  theory  of  Lamark  is  made  the  sublect  of  an  interesting  criticism 
by  Herbert  Spencer  in  his  Principles  of  Biology,  Part  iii,  Chap,  3. 


216  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

the  so-called  learned  and  cultured  that  make  endeavors 
in  behalf  of  the  education  of  themselves  and  others 
without  they  are  required  !  " 

It  is  peculiar  to  the  state  of  nature  in  contrast  to 
the  state  of  civilisation,  (in  so  far  as  a  distinct  contrast 
may  be  asserted,)  that  in  the  former  the  impulse  to 
change  of  manner  of  life  and  thought  must  come  from 
without,  whereas  in  the  latter  an  impulse  to  progress 
operates  which  be  it  now  powerful  be  it  now  feeble 
never  ceases  entirely  to  operate.  This  difference  is 
analogous  to  that  that  prevails  between  inorganic  and 
organic  existence.  It  is  the  peculiar  character  of  an 
organism  that  the  play  of  forces  is  preserved  in  it  with 
a  certain  independence  of  the  effects  of  the  moment 
and  of  its  immediate  environment.  So  in  civilised 
peoples  an  impulse  is  aroused  to  change  life  in  all  di- 
rections, to  differentiate,  to  shape  it,  and  to  bring  it  to 
a  point  in  every  single  direction.  Spiritual  antennae 
are  grown  which  are  in  never  ceasing  movement. 
Through  this  a  new  species  of  feeling  also  is  possible, 
a  feeling  that  is  determined  not  only  by  the  definite  ends 
that  are  attained  but  which  links  itself  with  the  work, 
with  the  activity  itself  which  is  requisite  to  the  acquisi- 
tion of  these  ends.  Man  is  thereby  become  more  inde- 
pendent and  more  free,  and  his  mental  life,  especially 
his  emotional  life,  has  gained  in  depth  and  intensity, 
it  now  being  no  longer  determined  merely  by  the  ex- 
ternal world,  but  essentially  by  the  forces  that  are 
awakened  in  the  inner  world.  Now  ideal,  and  not 
merely  elementary  feelings  act,  and  higher  demands 
are  made  in  life. 

What  I  wish  to  maintain  here  is  that  the  rise  of 
the  impulse  to  development  is  in  perfect  accord  with  the 
principle  of  welfare.     That  stability  of  the  "state  of 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  217 

nature  "  which  now  appears  to  us  wretched  now  para- 
disian, is  itself  dependent  on  the  stability  of  external 
conditions.  Absolute  stability,  however,  is  not  found 
in  nature.  If  the  immediate  surroundings  do  not 
change,  changes  yet  occur  in  other  localities  of  nature 
and  among  other  creatures,  and  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence then  either  causes  them  to  perish  or  to  change 
in  a  corresponding  manner.  The  beings  that  have 
changed  by  adaptation  will  obtain  a  decided  advantage 
in  the  struggle  for  life  over  those  that  have  remained 
stationary.  This  is  the  fate  of  many  primitive  peoples, 
or  indeed  civilised  peoples,  that  have  remained  sta- 
tionary or  in  a  low  state  of  culture.  Extinction  awaits 
them  when  a  higher  civilisation  approaches. 

What  is  true  of  peoples  and  races  also  holds  good 
for  individuals.  A  perfect  adaptation  to  limited  cir- 
cumstances always  involves  a  danger, — the  danger 
that  the  individual  when  its  conditions  of  life  are 
changed  and  its  horizon  is  enlarged  will  lack  the  inner 
conditions  necessary  to  self-assertion.  Childish  naivete, 
dreaming  phantasy,  sensual  enjoyment,  have  each  their 
rights,  but  they  easily  lead  to  a  condition  of  somnam- 
bulism ;  security  and  happiness  are  always  precarious 
here,  and  on  awakening  the  greatest  helplessness  may 
take  their  place.  Here,  let  us  add,  we  leave  entirely 
out  of  consideration  the  fact  that  such  a  condition 
often  exists  only  at  the  cost  of  other  individuals. 

Welfare,  accordingly,  cannot  be  conceived  as  a 
passive  state  of  things  produced  once  for  all  and  that 
is  not  itself  in  turn  the  point  of  departure  of  new  and 
progressive  development.  Welfare,  in  the  highest  con- 
ception of  it,  must  consist  of  a  condition  in  which 
power  is  gathered  and  rich  possibilities  gained  for  the 
future,  and  which  generates  an  impulse  to  frame  new 


218  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

ends  and  to  begin  new  endeavors.  It  is  a  condition 
that  is  desirable  in  and  of  itself  as  well  as  one  that  con- 
tains the  germ  of  new  desirable  conditions, — a  condi- 
tion therefore  that  is  not  only  an  end  but  also  a  means, 
that  has  value  not  only  as  effect  but  also  as  cause. 
The  feeling  of  pleasure  is  here  directly  bound  up  with 
activity,  work,  development,  the  unfolding  of  forces 
themselves,  and  not  merely  with  the  result  that  is  ob- 
tained by  the  employment  of  the  forces.  Where  such 
feeling  of  pleasure  is  possible  there  much  suffering  is 
endurable  that  at  a  lower  stage  would  be  the  sign  of 
the  dissolution  of  all  life.  Expectation  and  longing, 
privation  and  disappointment  will  not  be  lacking; 
they  will  accompany  with  definite  rhythmical  alterna- 
tion the  joyful  advancement  toward  the  aim  that  man 
has  set  himself ;  but  amid  all  oscillations  the  funda- 
mental direction  and  the  fundamental  activity  will  be 
asserted.  We  will  not  work  to  live,  we  will  not  live  to 
work  ;  but  in  work  will  we  find  life. 

This  is  the  ideal  that  the  principle  of  welfare  holds 
up  to  us  when  thoroughly  reasoned  out.  In  how  far 
it  can  be  realised  is  a  question  that  can  only  be  an- 
swered experimentally  for  the  time  and  the  individual 
in  question.  It  demands  not  only  a  change  of  the 
nature  of  individuals  but  also  of  the  relations  of  so- 
ciety. The  essential  thing  however  is,  that  we  here 
have  a  criterion  by  which  we  are  able  to  test  actions 
and  institutions.  This  criterion  corresponds  to  a  ten- 
dency that  leads  throughout  all  organic  nature,  in  that 
pleasure  as  a  rule  means  life  and  progress,  pain,  re- 
trogression and  death.  The  principle  of  welfare  as- 
serts the  right  of  life  :  every  creature  has  the  right  to 
exist,  to  develop,  and  to  obtain  its  full  satisfaction,  un- 
less greater  pain  is  thereby  produced  to  itself  or  to 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  219 

others.  The  ethics  that  builds  upon  the  principle  of 
welfare  seeks  accordingly  to  continue  the  evolution  of 
nature  in  a  conscious  and  harmonious  manner.  It 
demands  that  means  be  found  which  the  unconscious' 
development  of  nature  have  not  supplied,  and  it  strives 
to  mitigate  or  to  exclude  the  unnecessary  pain  which 
the  struggle  for  existence  brings  with  it.  It  embraces 
a  series  of  problems  from  compassionate  alleviation 
and  assistance  up  to  the  highest  social,  intellectual, 
and  aesthetical  endeavors.  It  is  the  business  of  special 
ethics  to  treat  these  questions  in  detail. 

5)  From  the  fact,  however,  that .  welfare,  properly 
understood,  consists  in  activity  and  development,  it 
does  not  follow  that  vice  versa  activity  and  develop- 
ment are  always  joined  with  welfare  or  lead  to  welfare. 
Because  limitation  of  wants  does  not  always  lead  to 
the  aim  set,  unlimited  variety  of  wants  is  not  neces- 
sarily the  proper  state.  Civilisation  can  assume  forms 
and  enter  on  paths  that  do  not  harmonise  with  the 
principle  of  welfare.  We  find  in  history  accordingly, 
at  times,  distinct  and  decisive  warnings  against  existing 
civilisations.  Thus  it  was  in  Greece  on  the  part  of 
Socrates,  the  Cynics,  and  the  Stoics,  in  the  eighteenth 
century  on  the  part  of  Rousseau,  and  in  our  day  on 
the  part  of  Leo  Tolstoi'.  The  opposition  of  such  great 
minds  should  surely  make  us  watchful. 

I  leave  out  of  consideration  here  the  question  in 
how  far  that  which  we  call  civilisation  can  be  imparted 
to  a  people  forthwith.  The  capacity  for  civilisation 
has,  it  is  true,  been  prematurely  and  overhastily  de- 
nied many  primitive  peoples.*  But  it  is  not  there- 
fore necessarily  a  good  thing  for  a  people  to  give  up 
the  forms  of  life  that  it  has  developed  by  its  own  for- 

*  Compare  my  article  in  the  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  No.  I.  p.  60. 


220  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

tunes  and  endeavors  to  allow  itself  to  be  regulated  in 
accordance  with  forms  and  ideals  that  have  been  de- 
veloped under  entirely  different  circumstances.  Thus 
directly,  even  the  best-founded  and  most  perfect  civili- 
sation cannot  be  communicated.  Waitz  who  expressly 
maintains  that  no  proof  has  been  brought  forward  of 
the  Indian's  incapacity  for  civilisation,  praises  never- 
theless the  Indian  chieftains  who  oppose  the  obtrusion 
of  civilisation  on  their  people,  for  their  love  to  their 
people  and  their  just  comprehension  of  its  true  well- 
being. 

The  reason  why  conflict  can  arise  between  civilisa- 
tion and  welfare  lies  in  the  restiveness  and  restlessness 
of  the  aspirations  of  civilisation.  It  is  the  same  with  it 
as  with  that  spontaneous,  involuntary  impulse  to  move- 
ment that  leads  to  the  use  of  forces  and  of  the  members 
merely  because  sufficient  energy  is  present,  without 
their  use  being  guided  by  the  consideration  of  a  more 
valuable  end,  so  that  the  results  are  accidental.  The 
effort  that  goes  with  civilisation  may  lead  in  part  to 
over-exertion,  to  an  overstraining  of  forces  ;  in  part  (in 
the  case  of  extreme  differentiation)  to  a  one-sided  direc- 
tion of  effort ;  and  partly  to  isolation,  to  the  fragmen- 
tary elimination  of  individual  activities.  In  the  single 
individual  certain  faculties  are  fostered  (in  the  one  in- 
telligence, in  the  other  physical  power  for  work)  at  the 
cost  of  other  faculties ;  the  harmony,  the  capacity  of 
feeling  oneself  as  totality  and  unity  is  lacking.  By 
such  one-sidedness  the  individual  becomes  of  value 
only  as  a  wheel  in  a  great  machine  :  he  serves  merely 
as  a  means,  not  as  an  end.  And  such  a  one-sided  in- 
dividual development  is  connected  with  a  one-sided 
social  development.  The  suppression  of  certain  fea- 
tures of  the  nature  of  the  individual  goes  hand  in  hand 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  221 

with  the  suppression  of  single  estates  and  classes  of 
society.  If  we  identify  civilisation  and  ethics,  without 
qualification,  and  regard  progress  as  a  safer  criterion 
than  welfare,  we  should  overlook  the  fact  that  there 
exists  also  a  social  question.  The  social  question  is  an 
ethical  question  and  at  the  same  time  a  question  of  the 
correction  of  civilisation, — both  by  means  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  welfare.  Would  it  be  right  that  the  products 
of  material  and  ideal  civilisation  should  only  fall  to 
the  share  of  a  small  minority,  while  all  the  rest  should 
not  be  able  to  participate  therein?  This  would  clash 
completely  with  the  ideal  of  society  that  flows  from  the 
principle  of  welfare.  For  the  greatest  welfare  is  pres- 
ent when  every  single  individual  so  develops  himself 
in  an  independent  manner  that  just  by  this  independent 
development  of  his  own  he  assists  others  to  a  similar 
development  from  their  point  of  view.  Then  does 
there  exist  a  harmonious  society  of  independent  personali- 
ties. The  idea  of  such  a  society  is  the  highest  ethical 
idea  that  flows  from  the  principle  of  welfare.  Every  in- 
dividual is  then  a  little  world  for  himself  and  yet  stands 
in  the  most  intimate  reciprocal  connection  with  the 
great  world  of  which  he  is  a  part.  The  individual  serves 
the  race  and  the  race  serves  the  individual.  Every 
position  of  isolation,  every  inequality  in  the  distribu- 
tion of  possessions  and  of  employments  must  be  founded 
in  the  demands  of  the  various  circumstances  and  prob- 
lems of  life,  and  the  faculties  and  impulses  of  each  in- 
dividual shall  be  developed  as  fully  and  richly  as  is 
compatible  with  the  conditions  of  life  of  the  whole  race. 
6)  It  follows  from  the  considerations  presented, 
that  it  is  by  no  means  always  easy  to  apply  the  prin- 
ciple of  welfare  in  individual  cases.  The  particular 
relations  of  the  affairs  in  question  can  be  so  compli- 


222  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

cated  that  we  are  not  able  to  take  a  broad  survey  of 
them  and  foresee  the  results  of  our  interference.  We 
cannot  deduce  a  priori  from  the  principle  of  welfare 
any  system  of  particular  acts,  any  determinate  order 
of  society,  any  civilisation.  Its  value  (like  that  of  the 
principle  of  causality  in  the  theoretical  field)  is  to  pre- 
sent and  to  formulate  problems,  and  to  serve  as  a 
guide  to  their  treatment.  It  is  regulative,  not  con- 
structive. It  presumes  the  immediate  involuntary  life 
of  the  individual  and  of  society,  and  its  function  does 
not  begin  until  the  conscious  discussion  and  treatment 
occurs  of  the  value  on  the  one  hand  of  that  which  has 
thus  been  developed,  and  on  the  other  of  the  manner 
in  which  the  development  shall  be  conducted  in  the 
future.  All  ethics  thus  acquires  an  historical  character. 
We  never — either  in  our  own  individuality  or  in  society 
— commence  from  the  very  beginning,  but  are  always 
obliged  to  start  with  a  definite  foundation  and  to  work 
our  way  further  under  the  guidance  of  the  principles 
and  ideals  that  spring  from  our  nature. 

in. 

i)  In  the  previous  remarks  I  have  essayed  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  principle  of  welfare  which  may  perhaps 
make  clearer  what  was  not  so  distinct  in  my  former 
expositions  ("Ethik,"  Chapters  III  and  VII).  The 
difficulty  always  occurs  in  the  enunciation  of  a  prin- 
ciple, that  a  direct  demonstration  of  its  validity  cannot 
be  given.  Of  so  much  greater  significance  is  it  then  if 
an  indirect  proof  can  be  adduced  by  showing  that  the 
very  ones  who  contest  it  are  themselves  forced  to  em- 
ploy it  and  actually  to  employ  it  without  being  aware 
of  it. 

I  maintain  now  that  Dr.   Paul  Carus  in  his  book 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  223 

"The  Ethical  Problem,"  in  which  he  combats  the  prin- 
ciple of  welfare,  has  not  been  able  to  avoid  giving  such 
an  indirect  confirmation  of  the  validity  of  this  principle. 
Before  attempting  to  show  this  in  detail  I  shall  make  a 
few  remarks  concerning  the  criticism  of  my  "Ethics" 
which  Dr.  Carus  wrote  in  the  first  number  of  The  Mo- 
nist,  and  which  in  an  abbreviated  form  is  also  em- 
bodied in  the  treatise  above  mentioned. 

Dr.  Carus  thinks  that  I  have  practically  surrend- 
ered the  principle  of  welfare  when  I  define  welfare  to 
consist  in  activity.     His  words  are  : 

"If  welfare  is  to  be  interpreted  as  activity,  work,  development ; 
if  this  kind  of  active  welfare  is  the  greatest  good,  whatever  admix- 
ture of  pain  and  whatever  absence  of  pleasurable  feeling  it  may 
have  ;  if  the  greatest  amount  of  a  state  of  continuous  pleasurable 
feeling  is  not  welfare  in  an  ethical  sense,  what  becomes  of  the  util- 
itarian definition  of  welfare  as  pleasurable  feeling  ?  If,  however, 
welfare  is  '  the  state  of  a  continuous  pleasurable  feeling, '  how  can 
we  declare  that  the  life  of  a  pessimistic  philosopher  is  preferable  to 
that  of  a  joyful  fool  ?" 

To  this  I  answer,  that  */ it  could  be  proved  that  in- 
creasing pain  followed  necessarily  on  all  advancement 
of  civilisation  (without  this  pain  being  compensated 
for,  as  Clara's  philosophy  demanded,  by  new  and  pro- 
portionately greater  feelings  of  pleasure),  in  that  case 
it  would  be  impossible  to  combine  civilisation  and  wel- 
fare. But  only  a  pessimistic  dogmatism — which  is 
just  as  current  in  the  atmosphere  of  to-day  as  optimis- 
tic dogmatism — could  assert  this.  What  experience 
teaches  us  is  this,  that  we  find  ourselves  amid  a  devel- 
opment, in  a  line  of  tendencies  the  final  results  of 
which  we  cannot  foresee  but  which  hitherto  have 
evoked  at  many  points  new  forces  and  have  thereby 
opened  new  sources  of  satisfaction.  Everything  that 
arouses  our  greatest  and  most  permanent  pleasurable 


224  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

feeling  has  arisen  within  this  development.  This  jus- 
tifies our  courage  and  our  hope  in  behalf  of  further 
progress,  although  conflict  and  pain  will  as  we  may 
foresee  not  be  wanting,  and  although  the  way  leads 
through  many  deserts.  Experience  alone  can  show 
how  far  we  shall  be  able  to  get.  I  agree  with  Dr.  Carus 
that  "this  world  of  ours  is  not  a  world  suited  to  the 
taste  of  a  pleasure-seeker,"  if  we  understand  by  pleas- 
ure passive  sensual  enjoyment,  an  enjoyment  which  is 
not  united  with  the  rest  and  nourishment  with  which 
not  only  an  immediate  pleasurable  feeling  is  connected 
but  whereby  power  is  also  gathered  for  continued  en- 
deavor. If  so  many  pleasure-seekers  go  through  life 
without  having  their  eyes  opened  to  its  true  signifi- 
cance and  purpose,  this  fact  is  precisely  one  of  the 
things  that  clash  with  the  principle  of  welfare,  for  the 
latter  claims  all  faculties  and  powers,  and  demands 
that  they  that  sleep  be  awakened, — that  is  if  they  really 
possess  useful  faculties.  For  perhaps  the  "joyful  fool " 
cannot  accomplish  more  than  he  does.  Wherefore 
then  disturb  him,  if  his  pleasure  harms  neither  him- 
self nor  others  and  if  his  awakening  will  only  lead  to 
unrest  and  pain  for  himself  and  perhaps  also  for  others? 
I  pointed  out  the  fact  in  my  "Ethics,"*  that  we  can 
determine  by  the  principle  of  welfare  alone  in  what 
cases  we  are  to  destroy  a  state  of  equilibrium  or  shatter 
an  illusion. 

I  have  admitted  the  possibility  of  a  conflict  between 
civilisation  and  welfare.  Wherever  such  a  conflict 
arises,  there,  according  to  my  conception,  appears  an 
ethical  problem,  which  must  be  determined  by  the 
principle  of  welfare,  since  any  order  of  things  or  any 
development  that  brought  with  it  permanent  and  ever- 

*  Danish  edition,  p.  94.    German  edition,  p.  109. 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  225 

lasting  pain  would  be  in  effect  a  dissolution  of  life  it- 
self. Such  pain,  however,  (as  even  pessimistic  phil- 
osophers are  optimistic  enough  to  hope,)  would  de- 
stroy the  will  to  live.  If  we  live  in  spite  of  pain  it  is 
because  there  is  always  a  surplus  of  satisfaction. 

I  give  the  idea  of  welfare  no  arbitrary  extension 
when  I  deny  that  it  should  be  limited  to  denote  a 
passive  condition  produced  once  for  all  time.  For  our 
nature  is  at  no  stage  wholly  complete ;  no  one  condi- 
tion can  stand  therefore  as  definitive.  The  future,  and 
the  new  horizons  opened,  will  make  new  demands  on 
our  capacities  and  our  will,  and  in  the  testing  of  any 
state  of  things  it  must  accordingly  be  a  necessary  point 
of  view  to  establish  whether  in  addition  to  the  direct 
satisfaction  which  it  probably  affords  it  at  the  same 
time  prepares  the  capacities  and  the  possibilities  of  a 
continued  development  answering  to  the  new  relations. 
It  may  be  necessary  to  choose  some  arduous  employ- 
ment which  later  necessarily  brings  with  it  long  con- 
tinued rest  and  inactivity.  Darwin's  struggle  with  his 
feeble  health  is  a  good  example.  The  man  who  from 
love  of  country  or  to  save  a  fellow-being  risks  his  life, 
prefers  the  active  satisfaction  of  a  single  moment  (the 
satisfaction,  namely,  which  he  feels  beforehand  at  the 
thought  of  saving  his  country  or  a  human  life)  to  the 
passive  joys  of  years  and  years.  It  was  such  a  moment 
in  which  Faust  saw  himself  living  in  mind 
"  Auf  freiem  Grund  mit  freiem  Volk  " 
and  which  thereby  made  life  of  value  to  him,  which  all 
the  earthly  gratifications  that  the  demon  was  able  to 
obtain  for  him  could  not  accomplish.  In  the  face  of 
the  pleasure  that  such  a  moment  can  produce  the 
thought  of  pain  and  death  vanishes.  Thus  alone  is 
self-sacrifice  psychologically  intelligible. 


226  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

2)  While  I  cannot  see  that  Dr.  Carus  has  pointed 
out  a  contradiction  in  my  theory  of  welfare,  I  may  fur- 
ther assert  that  he  himself  cannot  without  a  self-contra- 
diction escape  recognising  the  principle  of  welfare. 
Dr.  Carus  indeed,  in  a  certain  sense,  himself  enun- 
ciates this  very  principle.  He  says,  in  the  preface  to 
"The  Ethical  Problem,"  page  iii,  "The  aim  of  ethics 
is  neither  the  welfare  of  self  nor  that  of  other  individ- 
uals, but  of  those  interests  that  are  superindividual." 
The  aim  therefore  is  to  be  welfare,  not  however  the 
welfare  of  individuals  but  of  "superindividual  inter- 
ests." This  strange  expression  is  denned  in  certain 
subsequent  passages  of  the  book.  Dr.  Carus  speaks, 
namely,  later  on,  of  "that  superindividual  soul-life 
which  we  call  society."*  It  is  admitted  in  this,  that 
when  we  speak  of  welfare  we  speak  impliedly  of  soul- 
life.  But  how  can  we  give  to  society  as  such  a  soul- 
life  that  is  different  from  the  soul-life  of  the  single  in- 
dividuals that  have  their  existence  simultaneously  and 
successively  in  that  society?  This  is  merely  a  myth- 
ical and  mystical  personification  of  society,  which  may 
have  arisen  in  the  comparison,  in  many  respects  in. 
structive,  between  society  and  an  organism,  which 
however  can  possess  at  best  a  poetical,  but  no  scien- 
tific, value.  The  idea  of  society,  if  it  is  to  be  scien- 
tifically employed,  must  always  be  so  applied  that  at 
every  point  the  definite  group  of  individuals  which  it 
represents  may  be  established.  The  great  importance 
of  this  idea  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  expresses  the 
common  and  permanent  interests  of  individuals  simul- 
taneously and  successively  existing,  in  opposition  to 
the  interests  of  single  individuals,  or  of  a  smaller 
group,  or  of  a  limited  period  of  time.    Ethical  percep- 

*  Pages  33,  38,  and  40. 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  227 

tion,  (unless  it  starts  from  the  point  of  view  of  egois- 
tical individualism,)  must  apply  its  test  from  the  point 
of  view  of  society.  It  leads  in  this  case  to  the  consi- 
deration of  our  own  and  others'  actions  not  only  with 
respect  to  our  own  individual  circumstances  but  sub 
specie  ceterni  so  to  speak,  that  is  with  respect  to  their 
relation  to  the  great  whole  of  which  not  only  we,  but 
also  other  human  beings  are  parts.  Along  with  the 
educative  power  of  authorities,  it  is  due  to  the  sym- 
pathy in  virtue  of  which  the  individual  causes  to  re- 
echo in  his  own  bosom  the  feelings  of  others,  that 
ethical  ideals  have  been  formed  in  the  human  mind. 
But  as  soon  as  it  is  made  impossible  to  transpose  the 
idea  of  society  into  the  idea  of  individuals  that  live 
under  certain  definite  conditions,  this  idea  contains 
no  instruction  for  us  in  ethical  respects.  No  ethical 
norms  can  in  this  case  be  deduced  from  it.  Emotional 
mysticism  takes  the  place  of  ethical  thought  and  voli- 
tion. 

Such  a  mysticism  has  of  course  its  value.  Power- 
ful emotion  leads  naturally  to  a  state  in  which  all  de- 
finite ideas  recede,  the  mind  becoming  entirely  occu- 
pied by  emotional  feeling.  It  will  furthermore  be 
difficult  to  represent  by  any  adequate  conception  the 
great  multitude  of  human  characters  on  which  our 
conduct  in  given  circumstances  can  acquire  decisive 
influence.  The  expression  "society,"  or  "race,"  char- 
acterises very  well  the  unconcluded  and  the  unsurvey- 
able  in  so  many  of  the  consequences  of  human  methods 
of  action  and  order  of  life,  and  it  will  therefore  not  be 
possible  to  dispense  with  it.  But  transposition  into 
concrete  conceptions  must  always  be  possible.  A  wel- 
fare that  at  one  or  another  stage  is  not  the  welfare  of 
definite  individuals  is  a  self-contradiction,  and  any  act 


228  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

that  at  one  period  or  another  does  not  lead  to  the 
welfare  of  definite  individuals  has  no  value. 

In  Wundt's  "Ethics,"  pages  429  to  431,  the  same 
line  of  thought  is  found  as  this  of  Dr.  Carus.  Public 
well-being  and  progress,  according  to  Wundt,  do  not 
consist  in  the  well-being  of  the  greatest  possible  num- 
ber of  individuals  :  for  the  individual  is  ephemeral  ! 
"However  richly  blest  and  however  perfect  the  indi- 
vidual existence  may  be,  it  is  but  a  drop  in  the  ocean 
of  life.  What  can  individual  happiness  and  individual 
pain  mean  to  the  world  ?  "  I  should  say  to  this  :  Yes,  it 
is  true,  the  ocean  does  not  exist  for  the  sake  of  the  in- 
dividual drops  ;  but  what  is  an  ocean  that  does  not  con- 
sist of  drops  ?  And  is  not  the  whole  ocean  clear  if  every 
single  drop  is  clear  ?    And  only  then  is  it  wholly  clear. 

Just  as  there  are  people  who  cannot  see  the  woods 
for  the  trees,  so  there  are  also  people  who  cannot  see 
the  trees  for  the  woods.  In  ethics  this  method  of  con- 
ception leads  to  the  consideration  of  human  aspiration 
as  the  means  of  superhuman  ends.  Every  ethics  that 
seeks  to  stand  on  a  basis  of  experience  and  remain 
within  the  possibility  of  progressive  verification,  must 
cling  to  the  standpoint  of  "man  with  men."  It  need 
not  for  this  reason  overlook  the  fact,  that  ethical  con- 
duct, like  all  unfolding  of  power,  is  connected  with 
the  universal  world-process. 

3)  Dr.  Carus  also  approaches  the  principle  of  wel- 
fare upon  another,  less  mystical  path.  He  maintains, 
with  great  emphasis,  that  ethics  must  be  based  on 
facts,  on  insight  into  the  real,  the  actual,  order  of  na- 
ture. Our  ideals — this  is  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Carus — 
arise  through  the  wants  which  the  relations  of  reality 
awaken  in  us,  and  must  be  realised  by  the  means 
which  the  relations  of  reality  supply. 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  229 

"The  new  ethics  is  based  upon  facts  and  is  applied  to  facts" 
(p.  18). 

"  Man  wants  something,  so  he  conceives  the  idea  how  good  it 
would  be  if  he  had  it.  .  .  .  Only  by  studying  facts  will  he  be  enabled 
to  realise  his  ideals"  (pp.  19  and  20). 

"  If  you  wish  to  exist,  obey  reason.  Reason  teaches  us  how 
to  regulate  our  actions  in  conformity  with  the  order  of  natural 
laws.  If  we  do  regulate  them  in  conformity  with  the  order  of  nat- 
ural laws,  they  will  stand  ;  otherwise  not.  In  the  former  case  they 
will  be  good,  they  will  agree  with  the  cosmical  conditions  of  ex- 
istence ;  in  the  latter  case  they  are  bad,  they  will  not  agree  with 
the  cosmical  conditions  of  existence  ;  therefore  they  will  necessarily 
produce  disorder  and  evil"  (pp.  31,  32). 

It  appears  to  me  clear  from  this,  that  the  reason 
why  we  must  regulate  our  actions  to  conform  with 
natural  laws,  must  be  the  fact  that  otherwise  they  can- 
not "stand,"  which  is  explained  more  in  detail  in  what 
follows,  to  mean  that  they  are  constituted  to  produce 
"disorder  and  evil," — which  in  its  turn  must  be  surely 
understood  as  meaning  that  disorder  is  itself  an  evil. 
If  disorder  were  no  evil,  and  if  no  further  evils  resulted 
from  actions  which  are  not  "in  conformity  with  the 
order  of  natural  laws,"  what  foundation  would  Dr. 
Carus  in  that  case  be  able  to  give  his  ethics?  I  wholly 
agree  with  Dr.  Carus  that  our  conduct  if  it  is  to  be 
ethical  must  support  itself  upon  as  profound  a  compre- 
hension of  the  relations  of  reality  as  physical  science, 
psychology,  and  social  science  alone  can  furnish.  But 
this  requirement  can  only  be  made  good  through  and  by  the 
principle  of  welfare.  It  has  validity  only  for  the  person 
who  wills  that  his  conduct  shall  "stand "  and  produce 
no  evil,  either  in  extended  or  in  limited  circles.  If 
pain  and  death  were  not  evils,  this  requirement  would 
have  no  validity. 

To  judge  from  his  somewhat  indefinite  expressions 
one  might  suspect  in  Dr.  Carus  here  a  votary  of  ego- 


230  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

istic  hedonism,  were  it  not  that  a  number  of  other  pas- 
sages in  his  book  exclude  this  suspicion. 

However,  it  seems  quite  clear  to  me  that  his 
final  criterion  must  coincide  with  the  principle  of  wel- 
fare. His  ethics  is  an  ethics  of  expediency,  in  that  his 
ultimate  criterion  is  the  influence  of  actions  on  the  life 
of  mankind. 

4)  Dr.  Carus  justly  emphasises  the  relation  of  ethics 
to  our  world-conception  at  large.  But  this  connection 
does  not  mean  that  ethics  can  be  derived  by  deduction 
from  a  philosophical  system  previously  given.  Ethics 
is  an  independent  discipline  which  starts  from  its  own 
peculiar  assumptions  (which  cannot  of  course  stand  in 
contradiction  to  other  established  assumptions),  al- 
though it  is  obliged  to  make  much  use  of  the  results 
furnished  by  other  sciences.  Ethics  has  an  independ- 
ent foundation  in  the  laws  of  feeling  and  volitional 
life,  just  as  the  theory  of  knowledge  has  its  foundation 
in  the  laws  of  sensations  and  perceptions.  In  con- 
formity with  the  law  of  economy,  (which  must  prevail 
in  science  even  though  it  should  not  prevail  in  nature,) 
we  must  restrict  the  established  postulates  of  the  single 
sciences  to  the  least  possible  limit.  If  after  doing  this 
agreement  between  the  single  sciences  finally  occurs, 
this  result  will  be  all  the  more  valuable. 

According  to  Dr.  Carus  ethics  is  to  be  derived  now 
from  a  philosophical  total  world-conception,  as  ac- 
cording to  his  view  ("The  Ethical  Problem,"  p.  71)  it 
originally  arose  through  the  influence  of  the  positive 
religions.*  Very  weighty  objections  can  be  made  in 
my  opinion  against  this  latter  assumption.    It  is  a  fact 

*  Dr.  Carus  expresses  himself  differently  in  The  Open  Court  (1890,  p.  1549) 
where  religion  and  ethics  are  called  twins  ;  whereas  in  The  Ethical  Problem 
the  latter  is  the  daughter  of  the  former. 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  231 

that  the  lower  a  religion  stands  the  less  ethical  char- 
acter it  possesses,  and  the  very  lowest  religions  it  is 
probable  possess  no  ethical  value  whatever.  The  ques- 
tion then  arises  how  religion  gradually  acquired  its 
ethical  character.  The  ethical  ideas  which  were  per- 
ceived in  the  nature  of  the  deity  must  have  had  a 
natural  origin,  and  this  origin  can  be  sought  only  in 
the  life  of  man  with  men.  The  ethical  norms  and 
ideas  developed  themselves  here  spontaneously  and 
have  been  just  as  spontaneously  projected  or  hyposta- 
tised  as  the  attributes  of  divinity.  In  the  history  of 
the  religion  of  Greece  we  can  see  clearly  exhibited  the 
development  of  gods  as  powers  of  nature  to  gods  as 
the  expression  of  an  ethical  order  of  nature.  Compare 
for  instance,  the  Dodonaean  and  the  Homeric  Zeus 
with  the  Zeus  that  appears  in  the  ideal  belief  of  iEschy- 
lus.  The  experiences  are  made  in  human  life  that  lead 
to  the  formation  of  divine  ideals.  Gods  grow  better 
and  more  gentle  according  as  men  themselves  grow 
better  and  gentler.  Religious  conceptions  are  idealised 
experiences.  If  religion  is  a  factor  in  the  development 
of  ethics  it  is  because  man  conceives  and  represents 
his  essential  ideals  in  a  religious  form.  The  move- 
ment proceeds  therefore  from  experience  to  expe- 
rience ;  that  which  acts  on  nature  is,  as  Shakespeare 
says,  always  an  art  that  has  been  produced  by  nature 
itself.  How  could  man  understand  the  meaning  of  the 
ethical  qualities  attributed  to  his  deities  if  he  were  not 
acquainted  to  some  extent  with  these  qualities  through 
experience  ? 

That  which  distinguishes  philosophical  from  theo- 
logical ethics  is  not  the  fact  that  the  former  is  con- 
structed on  the  basis  of  some  philosophical  system  and 
the  latter  upon  ecclesiastical  dogmatism,  but  the  fact 


232  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

that  philosophical  ethics  brings  out  into  full  conscious- 
ness the  psychological  basis  upon  which  ethical  life 
has  actually  always  more  or  less  indirectly  builded,  and 
draws  all  the  consequences  implied  in  this.  In  this  it 
furnishes  an  independent  contribution  to  a  philosoph- 
ical system. 

5)  It  seems  to  me  to  be  perfectly  justified,  that  the 
distinguished  men  who  lead  the  Ethical  Societies  keep 
these  institutions  as  independent  as  possible  not  only 
of  all  definite  dogmatic  tendency  ol  thought  but  also 
of  all  unnecessary  philosophical  hypotheses  and  specu- 
lations. With  respect  to  what  concerns  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  ethics  itself,  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  prac- 
tical ethicist  to  occupy  any  definite  point  of  view, 
although  it  would  be  very  fortunate  if  he  were  ac- 
quainted with  the  discussion  of  these  principles  and 
could  take  part  in  an  independent  manner  in  the  same. 
He  who  proposes  to  teach  applied  mathematics  or  em- 
ploy it  in  practice  need  not  begin  with  a  definite  posi- 
tion with  respect  to  the  nature  and  origin  of  mathe- 
matical principles.  So  also  in  ethics  there  is  a  complete 
group  of  ideas  and  endeavors  which  are  independent 
of  the  manner  in  which  the  first  principles  are  con- 
ceived. The  essential  thing  for  the  Ethical  Societies 
is,  (as  Dr.  Stanton  Coit  has  said  in  his  beautiful  book 
"  Die  Ethische  Bewegung  in  der  Religion,")  agreement 
as  to  the  methods  of  development  of  character  and  as 
to  the  type  of  character  to  be  developed. 

Dr.  Carus  can  have  really  nothing  to  object  to  in 
this  method  of  conception,  inasmuch  as  it  is  his  con- 
viction that  in  the  passage  from  the  supernatural  to 
the  natural  establishment  of  ethics  the  "substance  of 
our  morality "  will  not  be  changed.  In  an  article  in 
The  Open  Court,  at  page  2575,  he  says  :  "The  most  im- 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  WELFARE.  233 

portant  moral  rules  are  not  to  be  altered Some 

of  them  will  be  altered  as  little  as  our  arithmetical  table 
can  be  changed."  In  this  passage  less  importance  for 
the  contents  of  ethics  is  attributed  to  the  various  points 
of  view  than  I  should  be  obliged  to  assign.  Yet  all  the 
sooner  should  Dr.  Carus  really  admit  that  the  Ethical 
Societies  have  added  to  their  other  services  that  of 
holding  a  proper  course  between  the  different  dogmatic 
and  philosophical  systems. 

6)  This  last  dispute  it  appears  to  me  also  testifies 
to  the  expediency  of  distinguishing  between  the  differ- 
ent ethical  problems.  By  so  doing  Dr.  Carus  would 
also  have  been  more  just  in  his  position  with  regard  to 
utilitarianism.  The  latter  has  not  arisen  so  much  from 
the  impulse  to  supply  a  motive  for  ethical  conduct  as 
from  the  impulse  to  acquire  an  absolute  criterion.  It 
is  true  the  powerful  influence  of  Hobbes  and  Locke 
brought  it  about  that  many  of  the  later  utilitarians  em- 
braced the  egoistic  theory ;  but  by  their  side  marched 
another  group  of  utilitarian  ethicists  (among  the  earlier, 
Bacon,  Cumberland,  Shaftesbury,  and  Hutcheson) 
who  did  not  subscribe  to  this  theory.  So  far  as  I  know, 
Hutcheson  was  the  first  with  whom  the  furmula  occurs: 
"The  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number." 
These  very  historical  facts  show  how  important  it  is  in 
the  treatment  of  ethical  problems  to  apply  the  maxim 
"Divide  et  impera  !"  I  have  therefore  prefaced  this 
my  apology  for  the  principle  of  welfare  by  calling  at- 
tention to  the  relative  and  mutual  independence  of 
ethical  problems. 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS  AN  OBJECTIVE 
REALITY. 


I.     TWO  DEFINITIONS  OF  GOOD. 

While  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  in  his  "Data  of 
Ethics"  may  be  considered  as  the  most  persuasive 
and  popular,  Prof.  Harald  Hoffding,  it  appears  to  me, 
is  the  most  scholarly  and  learned  expounder  of  that 
ethical  theory  which  bases  morality  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  greatest  happiness  for  the  greatest  num- 
ber. The  Monist  No.  I  contained  (pp.  139- 141)  a 
criticism  of  mine  on  Professor  Hoffding's  Ethics,  and 
Professor  Hoffding's  article  which  originally  appeared 
in  No.  4  of  The  Monist  is  in  part  a  further  exposition 
of  his  views,  and  in  part  an  answer  to  my  criticism, 
which  is  here  reproduced  as  follows : 

Harald  Hoffding,  Professor  at  the  University  of 
Copenhagen  is  a  representative  thinker  among  ethical 
scholars.  Unhesitatingly  he  takes  his  stand  upon  the 
real  facts  of  life  and  attempts  to  construct  a  system  of 
ethics  which  shall  be  a  science  among  the  other  sci- 
ences. Professor  Hoffding  says  in  the  preface  of  his 
ethics  :* 

"  If  we  see  the  snow-covered  peaks  of  a  mountain  range  from 
a  far  distance,  they  seem  to  hover  in  the  air.  Not  until  we  ap- 
proach do  we  discover  plainly  that  they  rest  upon  solid  ground.    It 

*  The  pages  of  the  quotations  refer  to  the  German  edition. 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  235 

is  the  same  with  ethical  principles.  In  the  first  enthusiasm  one 
imagines  that  a  place  should  be  assigned  to  them  above  the  reality 
of  nature  and  life.  On  further  reflection  and  after  a  long  expe- 
rience, which  must  perhaps  be  dearly  bought,  we  discover  that  the 
ethical  principles  can  regulate  life  only  if  they  have  really  pro- 
ceeded from  life." 

Professor  Hoffding  is  in  a  certain  sense  a  utilita- 
rian. The  influence  of  utilitarian  systems  upon  his 
mode  of  thought  can  be  traced  throughout  the  whole 
work,  and  it  is  this  influence  perhaps  to  which  the 
Danish  Professor  owes  his  positive  standpoint  as  well 
as  the  scientific  method  of  his  procedure.  Neverthe- 
less he  differs  from  the  ordinary  utilitarian  school  and 
prefers  to  characterise  his  system  as  an  ethics  of  gen- 
eral welfare.     He  says  : 

"  The  so-called  utilitarianism, — that  ethical  conception  which 
has  been  founded  mainly  by  Bentham, — has  the  merit  of  having 
for  the  first  time  energetically  propounded  the  principle  of  welfare. 
Yet  Bentham  has  detracted  from  his  cause  by  proceeding  from  a 
psychological  theory  which  considers  consciousness  as  a  sum  of 
ideas  and  feelings,  and  dissolves  society  into  a  number  of  individ- 
uals. The  import  of  pleasurable  and  painful  feelings  for  the  con- 
tinuous and  general  welfare  cannot  be  established  by  a  mere  pro- 
cess of  calculation. "  (P.  37.) 

Professor  Hoffding  opens  the  first  chapter  of  his 
work  with  the  following  sentence  : 

"Ethical  judgments  contain  a  valuation  of  human  actions. 
.  .  .  The  criterion  of  the  ethical  valuation  is  the  contents  of  ethics." 

If  life  consisted  of  isolated  sovereign  moments, 
every  one  of  them  would  have  an  equal  right,  and  no 
one  would  be  obliged  to  resign  in  favor  of  any  other 
moment.  No  valuation,  no  discrimination  would  be 
required.  But  the  life  of  each  individual,  as  well  as 
the  life  of  society,  makes  up  a  "life-totality,"  and  we 
possess  a  conception  of  this  life-totality.  "If  the  state 
of  feeling  in  a  single  moment  agrees  with  the  concep- 


236  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

tion  of  the  life-totality,  a  new  feeling  arises  which  is 
determined  by  this  mutual  relation.  .  .  .  The  ethical 
valuation  is  conditioned  by  this  feeling."  (P.  27.)  Tak- 
ing this  ground,  Professor  Hoffding  defines  good  and 
bad  in  the  following  way  : 

"'Good'  accordingly  becomes  that  which  preserves  the  life- 
totality  and  gives  fulness  and  life  to  its  contents;  'bad,'  on  the 
contrary,  that  which  has  more  or  less  the  tendency  to  dissolve  or 
to  limit  the  life-totality  and  its  contents.  Bad  accordingly  is  the 
single  moment,  the  separate  impulse  in  its  revolutionary  isolation 
from  the  rest  of  life.  ..."  (P.  29.) 

"  The  Bad,  therefore,  is  egotism  in  its  various  degrees  and  va- 
rious forms.  And  the  verdict  about  it  will  be  the  severer  the  more 
conscious  this  egotism  is." 

Utilitarianism  as  a  rule  has  been  hedonistic.  Utili- 
tarians have  proposed  as  the  criterion  of  an  ethical 
valuation  the  consequences  of  an  act ;  if  the  conse- 
quences give  more  pleasure  than  pain,  it  is  said  to  be 
good ;  if  they  are  attended  with  more  pain  than  pleas- 
ure, it  is  said  to  be  bad.  In  the  above  quoted  defini- 
tions by  Professor  Hoffding  there  is  no  trace  of  hedon- 
ism, and  I  should  consider  an  ethical  system  based 
upon  these  definitions  as  being  in  strong  opposition  to 
hedonism.  But  Professor  Hoffding  appears  to  have 
been  so  strongly  biased  by  the  influence  of  hedonistic 
utilitarianism,  that  he  introduces  again  its  fundamen- 
tal idea,  which  identifies  the  good  with  the  pleasur- 
able. Although  he  objects  to  employing  the  terms 
"utility"  and  "happiness,"  "because  they  are  liable 
to  lead  to  misunderstandings  and  have  indeed  done 
so  ";  although  he  declares  that  "momentary  feelings  of 
pleasure  and  pain  are  no  sure  criterion  for  the  total 
state"  (p.  37);  although  for  such  reasons  he  proposes 
the  word  welfare,  saying,  "by  the  word  'welfare'  I 
think  of  everything  which  serves  to  satisfy  the  wants 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  237 

of  human  nature  in  its  whole  entirety";  still  Professor 
Hoffding  again  returns  to  hedonism  by  limiting  the 
idea  "welfare"  to  the  hedonistic  conception  of  good- 
ness. He  defines  welfare  as  "a  continuous  state  of 
pleasurable  feelings."  (P.  98.) 

Thus  we  are  presented  with  two  definitions  of  what 
constitutes  the  criterion  of  an  ethical  valuation :  (1) 
that  which  promotes  the  life-totality,  and  (2)  that 
which  produces  a  continuous  state  of  pleasurable  feel- 
ing. 

These  two  definitions  are  in  many  respect  harmo- 
nious, but  on  the  other  hand  they  may  come  into  con- 
flict ;  and  if  they  come  into  conflict,  which  of  the  two 
is  to  be  sacrificed  ?  Supposing  that  a  contemplation 
of  the  evolution  of  organised  life  should  teach  us  that 
the  development  of  a  "life-totality"  is  not  at  all  a 
pleasurable  process  ;  that  on  the  contrary  it  is  attended 
with  excessive  and  innumerable  pains.  Inorganic  na- 
ture so  far  as  we  can  judge  is  free  from  pain.  The 
isolated  atom,  we  may  assume,  exists  in  a  state  of  in- 
difference. Supposing  now  that  pain  could  be  proved 
to  increase,  the  higher  we  rise  in  the  development  of 
a  life-totality;  supposing  that  the  growth  of  a  life- 
totality  had  to  be  bought  with  pain,  what  would  be  the 
consequence  ?  I  will  not  here  enter  into  the  subject, 
but  I  may  mention  that  this  supposition  is  not  at  all 
without  foundation.  Assuming  that  it  were  so,  would 
not,  in  such  a  case,  the  good  be  as  Schopenhauer, 
Hartmann,  and  Mainlaender  propose,  that  which  de- 
stroys the  life-totality  of  consciousness  and  with  it  the 
whole  world  of  civilised  humanity,  built  up  of  the  in- 
numerable consciousnesses  of  individuals? 

Professor  Hoffding  has  seen  this  difficulty,  which 
arises  from  a  conflict  of  the  two  criteria  of  ethical  val- 


238  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

uation  (i)  the  hedonistic  principle  and  (2)  the  prin- 
ciple of  progress,  i.  e.  the  constant  evolution  of  a  higher 
life-totality.     He  says  : 

"John  Stuart  Mill  has  declared  that  it  is  better  to  be  a  dissat- 
isfied man  than  a  satisfied  pig,  a  dissatisfied  Socrates  than  a  satis- 
fied fool.  He  bases  this  assertion  upon  the  fact  that  even  if  the 
pig  and  the  fool  were  of  a  contrary  mind,  their  opinion  would  have 
to  be  rejected,  since  they  possess  no  knowledge  of  the  higher  point 
of  view  from  which  man  and  Socrates  consider  life,  whereas  man 
knows  the  needs  of  the  pig  and  Socrates  fathoms  the  fool.  We 
must  be  regulated  by  the  judgment  of  those  that  know  the  two 
kinds  of  needs  in  question  and  that  are  consequently  able  to  insti- 
tute an  estimation  of  the  value  of  the  same. 

"But  I  feel  obliged  to  put  in  a  word  for  the  pig  and  the  fool. 
The  difficulty  is  greater  than  Mill  imagines.  Man,  it  is  true,  knows 
all  the  wants  of  the  pig,  and  it  would  not  be  difficult  for  a  Socrates 
to  comprehend  those  of  the  fool.  But  man  does  not  have  the  wants 
of  the  pig,  nor  Socrates  those  of  the  fool,  as  his  sole  and  only  dom- 
inant wants.  And  yet  this  is  the  very  circumstance  that  determines 
the  matter  Man  cannot  transform  himself  into  a  pig  without 
ceasing  to  be  a  man,  and  a  Socrates  will  hardly  be  able  so  to  identify 
himself  with  a  fool  as  to  lose  completely  his  Socratic  wants.  If, 
now,  the  pig  can  attain  the  complete  satisfaction  of  all  his  wants,  is 
not  his  happiness  greater  than  that  of  man  whose  desires  and  whose 
longings  are  never  wholly  satisfied  ?  And  the  fool,  who  does  not 
nourish  many  thoughts  and  makes  no  great  demands  upon  life,  is 
he  not  happier  than  Socrates  who  spends  his  whole  life  in  striving 
to  know  himself  and  to  stimulate  others,  only  finally  to  declare  that 
death  is  really  preferable  to  life  ?  " 

Professor  Hoffding's  solution  of  the  difficulty  is 
summed  up  in  the  following  paragraph  : 

•'Welfare  is  an  illusion  if  we  understand  by  it  a  passive  con- 
dition of  things,  created  once  for  all.  It  must  consist  in  action, 
work,  development.  Rest  can  only  mean  a  termination  for  the  time 
being,  the  attainment  of  a  new  level,  upon  which  it  is  possible  for 
a  new  course  of  development  to  proceed." 

Thus  it  appears  that  Professor  Hoffding  decides  in 
favor  of  the  second  principle.     The  evolution  of  the 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  239 

life-totality  is  considered  higher  than  a  continuous  state 
of  pleasurable  feeling.  Nevertheless  Professor  Hoff- 
ding  adds  : 

"  On  that  account,  however,  we  are  not  obliged  to  retract  our 
first  definition  of  welfare  as  that  of  a  continuous  state  of  pleasur- 
able feeling.  That  which  must  be  rejected  is  only  the  notion  of  a 
passive  state." 

Truly,  as  Professor  Hoffding  says,  "the  difficulty 
is  greater  than  Mr.  Mill  imagined."  The  difficulty  is 
great  enough  to  undermine  the  whole  basis  upon  which 
welfare  is  defined  as  "a  state  of  continuous  pleasur- 
able feeling."  If,  as  Professor  Hoffding  declares,  wel- 
fare is  to  be  interpreted  as  activity,  work,  develop- 
ment ;  if  this  kind  of  active  welfare  is  the  greatest 
good,  whatever  admixture  of  pain  and  whatever  ab- 
sence of  pleasurable  feeling  it  may  have  ;  if  the  greatest 
amount  of  a  state  of  continuous  pleasurable  feeling  is 
not  welfare  in  an  ethical  sense,  what  becomes  of  the 
utilitarian  definition  of  welfare  as  pleasurable  feeling? 
If,  however,  welfare  is  "the state  of  a  continuous  pleas- 
urable feeling,"  how  can  we  declare  that  the  life  of  a 
pessimistic  philosopher  is  preferable  to  that  of  a  joyful 
fool? 

Must  not  the  ultimate  reason  of  this  conflict  be 
sought  in  Professor  Hoffding's  statement  that — 

"The  proposition  of  a  purpose  presupposes  in  the  subject 
which  makes  the  proposition  feelings  of  pleasure  and  displeasure." 
(P.  30.) 

Should  we  not  rather  say  that  the  proposition  of  a 
purpose  presupposes  an  expression  of  will  in  the  sub- 
ject which  makes  the  proposition?  Wherever  there 
is  will,  there  is  also  approval  and  disapproval,  but  ap- 
proval is  not  always  pleasurable  and  disapproval  is 
not  always  attended  with  displeasure.     Does  it  not 


240  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

often  happen   that  we  cannot  help  disapproving   of 
things  which  please  us? 

Professor  Hoffding's  present  explanation  of  the 
subject  does  not  satisfy  me.  The  main  point  of  my 
criticism,  it  seems  to  me,  has  not  been  answered,  and 
the  difficulty  is  not  overcome.  Professor  Hoffding 
declares  that  the  strong  desire  for  activity,  develop- 
ment, and  progress  does  not  exist  at  all  stages.  It  is 
itself  a  consequence  of  development  and  progress  (p. 
537).  This,  it  may  be  granted,  explains  why  a  civil- 
ised society  cannot  help  developing  workers  that  plod 
and  toil,  finding  no  satisfaction  unless  they  plod  and 
toil ;  but  it  does  not  explain  why  (if  after  all  the  crite 
rion  of  our  ethical  judgment  remains  happiness  or  the 
continuous  state  of  pleasurable  feelings)  their  state  is 
preferable  to  that  of  indolent  and  happy  savages. 

Professor  Hoffding  says : 

"If  it  could  be  proved  that  increasing  pain  followed  necessa- 
rily on  all  advancement  of  civilisation  ....  in  that  case  it  would  be 
impossible  to  combine  civilisation  and  welfare"  (i.  e.  a  continuous 
state  of  pleasurable  feelings). 

Well,  //"that  be  so, — as  Professor  Hoffding  himself 
in  the  comparison  of  man  to  a  pig  and  of  Socrates  to 
a  fool  has  actually  conceded  to  be  true, — if  we  stand 
between  the  dilemma  of  civilisation  and  welfare,  or  in 
other  words  if  we  have  the  choice  only  between  a 
higher  stage  of  life  and  a  happier  state  of  existence, 
which  is  preferable?  That  which  Professor  Hoffding 
considers  as  preferable  is  his  true  criterion  of  what  he 
calls  good.  The  other  one  holds  only  so  long  as  it 
agrees  with  his  true  and  final  criterion,  so  long  as  it 
does  not  come  in  conflict  with  it. 

Suppose  we  select  as  the  final  criterion  of  ethics  not 
the  growth  and  development  of  the  life-totality,  but 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  241 

that  of  procuring  to  the  greatest  number  of  men,  as 
much  as  possible,  a  continuous  state  of  pleasurable 
feelings, — what  will  be  the  outcome  of  it?  Can  we 
suppose  that,  if  these  two  principles  collide,  we  shall 
be  able  to  stop  growth?  Can  we  expect  to  overcome 
nature  and  to  curtail  natural  evolution  so  as  to  bring 
about  a  more  favorable  balance  between  our  pleasures 
and  pains?  If  we  do,  we  shall  soon  find  out  that  we 
have  reckoned  without  our  host. 

A  conflict  between  civilisation  and  welfare,  (i.  e. 
between  natural  evolution  and  our  pleasurable  feel- 
ings,) would  not  discontinue  civilisation  as  Professor 
Hoffding  supposes,  it  would  rather  produce  a  change 
in  what  we  have  to  consider  as  welfare.  We  have  to  be 
pleased  with  the  development  of  our  race  according  to 
the  laws  of  nature,  and  those  who  are  displeased  might 
just  as  well  commit  suicide  at  once,  for  they  will  go  to 
the  wall,  they  will  disappear  from  the  stage  of  life. 
Those  alone  will  survive  who  are  pleased  with  that 
which  the  laws  of  nature  demand. 

Our  pleasurable  feelings  are  subjective,  nature  and 
the  laws  of  evolution  are  objective.  The  criterion  of 
ethics  is  not  subjective  but  objective.  The  question 
is  not  what  produces  pleasurable  feelings,  but  what  is 
the  unalterable  order  of  the  world  with  which  we  have 
to  be  pleased. 

The  question  of  ethics,  in  my  mind,  is  not  what  we 
wish  to  do  or  what  we  think  we  ought  to  do,  but  what 
we  must  do.  Nature  prescribes  a  definite  course.  If  we 
choose  another  one,  we  shall  not  reach  our  aim,  and 
if  we  reach  it,  it  will  be  for  a  short  time  only. 

The  aim  of  nature  is  not  the  happiness  of  living 
beings,  the  aim  of  nature,  in  the  realm  of  organised 
life,  is  growth,  development,  evolution.  Pleasures  and 


242  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

pains  are  phases  in  the  household  of  life,  they  are  not 
life's  aim.  Experience  shows  that  in  reaching  a  higher 
stage  we  acquire  an  additional  sensibility  for  both,  for 
new  pleasures  and  new  pains.  The  pleasures  of  hu- 
man existence  in  comparison  with  those  of  animals 
have  been  as  much  intensified  and  increased  as  the 
pains.  The  ratio  has  on  the  average  remained  about 
the  same  and  it  has  rarely  risen  in  favor  of  pleasures. 
Rather  the  reverse  takes  place  :  the  higher  man  loses 
the  taste  of  enjoying  himself  without  losing  the  sensi- 
tiveness of  pain. 

Ethics,  as  a  science  and  from  the  standpoint  of 
positivism,  has  to  inquire  what  according  to  the  na- 
ture of  things  we  must  do.  It  has  to  study  facts  and 
from  facts  it  has  to  derive  rules  (the  moral  prescripts) 
which  will  assist  us  in  doing  at  once  what  we  shall 
after  all  have  to  do.  The  criterion  of  ethics  is  not  some 
standard  which  we  put  up  ourselves,  the  criterion  of 
ethics  is  agreement  with  facts. 

II.  THE  AUTHORITY  OF  MORAL  COMMANDS. 

Professor  Hoffding  emphasises  "the  fact  that  there 
is  not  merely  one  single  ethical  problem  but  many" — 
a  fact  which  cannot  be  denied,  for  there  are,  indeed, 
innumerable  problems  of  an  ethical  nature.  However, 
we  must  bear  in  mind  that  all  the  ethical  problems  are 
closely  interconnected.  The  better  we  understand 
them,  the  more  shall  we  recognise  that  all  together 
form  one  great  system  of  problems,  and  that  one  prob- 
lem lies  at  the  bottom  of  all.  This  one  basic  problem 
I  have  called  the  ethical  problem. 

The  solution  of  the  basic  problem  of  ethics  will  not 
involve  the  ready  solution  of  all  the  rest,  but  we  can 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  243 

be  sure  that  it  will  throw  light  upon  any  question  that 
is  of  an  ethical  nature. 

Professor  Hoffding  recognises  the  importance  of 
system  in  ethics.     He  says : 

"The  systematism  of  ethical  science  is  still  so  little  advanced 
that  it  is  necessary  to  draw  out  a  general  outline  before  we  pass 
on  to  any  single  feature.  The  value  of  systematism  is  namely 
this,  that  we  are  immediately  enabled  to  see  the  connection  of  the 
single  questions  with  one  another  as  well  as  their  distinctive  pe- 
culiarity." 

It  appears  almost  unfair  toward  the  present  state  of 
ethical  science  when  Professor  Hoffding  adds  : 

"In  ethics  we  are  not  yet  so  far  advanced." 

If  we  were  not,  we  should  do  our  best  to  advance 
so  as  to  recognise  the  unity  of  all  ethical  problems. 
We  must  first  recognise  the  ethical  problem,  before 
we  can  with  any  hope  of  success  approach  the  many, 
which  are  dependent  upon  the  one. 

Which  is  the  one  basic  problem  of  ethics  ? 

We  read  in  Matthew,  xxi.  23  : 

"And  when  Jesus  was  come  into  the  temple,  the  chief  priests 
and  the  elders  of  the  people  came  unto  him  as  he  was  teaching 
and  said,  By  what  authority  doest  thou  these  things  ?  and  who  gave 
thee  this  authority  ?" 

This  question  is  legitimate  and  all  our  ethical  con- 
ceptions must  necessarily  depend  upon  the  answer 
which  we  accept  as  satisfactory.  The  basic  problem 
of  ethics  is  the  foundation  of  ethics,  it  is  the  justifica- 
tion of  the  ethical  prescripts,  it  is  the  discovery  of  the 
authority  upon  which  ethical  rules  are  based.  If  there 
were  no  power  that  enforces  a  certain  line  of  conduct, 
ethics  in  my  opinion  would  have  no  right  of  existence  ; 
and  if  any  one  preaches  certain  commands,  he  is  bound 
to  give  satisfactory  reasons  why  we  must  obey  his  com- 
mands. 


344  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

Professor  Hoffding  says  that  ethics  "  starts  from 
its  own  assumptions"  (p.  in).  Ethics  should  not 
start  from  any  assumptions. 

If  we  are  to  come  to  a  mutual  understanding  we 
must  drop  all  subjectivism,  we  must  not  study  ethics 
from  special  points  of  view,  from  the  principles  or 
standards  of  any  individual  or  group  of  individuals. 
There  is  not  the  slightest  use  of  a  person  making  him- 
self any  "highest  and  only  aim"  which,  it  may  be 
true,  '*  from  his  point  of  view  can  never  be  refuted." 
So  long  as  ethics  starts  from  assumptions  or  prin- 
ciples, it  will  be  no  science ;  for  truly,  as  Professor 
Hoffding  says  in  excuse  of  the  inability  to  prove  prin- 
ciples, "The  difficulty  always  occurs  in  the  enuncia- 
tion of  a  principle  that  a  direct  demonstration  of  its 
validity  cannot  be  given." 

The  requirement  of  ethics  is  to  arrive  at  state- 
ments of  fact.  Let  us  build  upon  facts  and  we  shall 
stand  upon  solid  ground. 

Ethics  in  order  to  be  scientific  must  be  based  upon 
the  objective  and  unalterable  order  of  things,  upon  the 
ascertainable  data  of  experience,  upon  the  laws  of  na- 
ture. 

Professor  Hoffding  says  : 

1 '  Religious  ethics  is  founded  on  authority.  Its  contents  are 
the  revealed  commands  of  authority;  the  feeling  which  impels  us 
to  pass  ethical  judgments  is  the  fear  or  reverence  or  love  with 
which  men  are  filled  in  the  presence  of  divine  authority. " 

Scientific  ethics  can  in  this  respect  not  be  dif- 
ferent from  religious  ethics,  for  it  is  also  based  upon 
authority.  A  scientific  ethicist  has  to  proceed  like 
any  other  naturalist ;  he  must  observe  the  course  of 
events  and  attempt  to  discover  the  laws  in  accordance 
with  which  the  events  take  place.     These  laws  are  no 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  245 

less  unalterable  than  any  other  natural  laws,  and  we 
may  appropriately  call  them  the  natural  laws  of  ethics. 
The  moral  commands  of  ethical  teachers  have  been 
derived,  either  instinctively  or  with  a  clear-  scientific  in- 
sight, from  the  natural  laws  of  ethics.  The  authority  of 
the  natural  laws  of  ethics  has  been  decked  out  by  dif- 
ferent religious  teachers  with  more  or  less  mytholog- 
ical tinsel  or  wrapped  in  mystic  darkness  ;  for  practi- 
cal purposes  it  remained  to  some  limited  extent  the 
same  and  will  to  some  extent  always  remain  the  same, 
for  we  shall  have  to  obey  the  moral  law,  be  it  from 
fear,  or  reverence,  or  love. 

The  unity  of  all  the  ethical  problems  will  be  pre- 
served, however  much  they  may  be  differentiated.  In- 
deed Professor  Hoffding  in  his  enumeration  sufficiently 
indicates  their  interconnection.  He  speaks  of  (1)  the 
motive  principle  of  judgment,  (2)  the  test-principle  of 
judgment,  and  (3)  of  the  motive  to  action.  Whatever 
difference  he  makes  between  these  three  terms,  it  is  ob- 
vious that  whether  and  how  far  judgments,  tests,  or 
motives  are  sound  will  depend  upon  their  agreement 
with  the  authority  of  the  natural  law  of  ethics.  The 
pedagogic  problem  is  also  connected  with  the  ethical 
problem  because  upon  our  solution  of  the  latter  will 
directly  depend  the  aim  and  indirectly  also  the  method 
of  education.  Such  complex  motives  as  "ambition  or 
the  instinct  of  acquisition"  will  become  "the  means  of 
attaining  to  true  ethical  self-assertion  "  in  the  degree 
proportional  to  the  elements  they  contain  which  will 
strengthen  our  efforts  of  setting  us  at  one  with  the 
natural  law  of  ethics. 

To  sum  up  :  The  natural  law  of  ethics  has  to  be 
derived  from  facts  like  all  other  natural  laws.  The 
natural  law  of  ethics  is  the  authority  upon  which  all 


246  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

moral  commands   are  based,  and   agreement  with  the 
natural  law  of  ethics  is  the  final  criterion  of  ethics. 

III.  ETHICS  AND  WELFARE. 

I  have  no  objection  to  an  ethics  of  welfare ;  on  the 
contrary,  I  consider  every  ethics  as  an  ethics  of  wel- 
fare. My  objection  to  Professor  Hoffding's  ethics  is 
solely  directed  against  his  definition  of  welfare  as  "  a 
continuous  state  of  pleasurable  feelings."  Welfare  is 
according  to  my  terminology  that  state  of  things  which 
is  in  accord  with  the  natural  law  of  ethics,  and  it  so 
happens  that  welfare  must  as  a  rule  not  only  be  bought, 
but  also  constantly  maintained-  with  many  pains, 
troubles,  anxieties,  and  sacrifices.  It  is  true  that  upon 
the  whole  there  may  be  a  surplus  of  happiness  and  of 
satisfaction,  if  not  of  pleasures ;  but  the  surplus  of 
happiness  (important  though  it  is)  does  not  constitute 
that  which  is  morally  good  in  welfare.  Morally  good 
(the  characteristic  feature  of  the  ethical  idea  of  wel- 
fare) is  that  which  is  in  accord  with  the  natural  law  of 
ethics. 

If  the  term  ''utility "  were  defined  by  utilitarians 
in  the  sense  in  which  I  define  welfare,  I  should  also 
have  no  objection  to  utilitarianism.  The  utilitarians, 
however,  define  their  theory  as  "the  Greatest  Happi- 
ness Principle,"  and  if  "useful"  is  taken  in  its  ordi- 
nary sense  as  that  which  is  profitable  or  advantageous, 
it  makes  of  utilitarianism  an  ethics  of  expediency. 

IV.   FEELINGS  AND  JUDGMENTS. 

The  fundamental  difference  between  Professor 
Hoffding  and  myself,  and  as  it  seems  to  me  his  npooTov 
tpevSoS,  lies  in  his  definition  of  ethical  judgments.  He 
says  : 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  247 

"Ethical  judgments,  judgments  concerning  good  and  bad,  in 
their  simplest  form  are  expressions  of  feeling,  and  never  lose  that 
character  however  much  influence  clear  and  reasoned  knowledge 
may  acquire  with  respect  to  them." 

I  am  very  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  all  thinking 
beings  are  first  feeling  beings.  Thought  cannot  de- 
velop in  the  absence  of  feeling.  Without  feeling  there 
is  no  thought ;  but  thought  is  not  feeling,  and  feeling 
is  not  thought.*  By  thought  I  understand  the  opera- 
tions that  take  place  among  representative  feelings,  and 
the  essential  feature  of  these  feelings  is  not  whether 
they  are  pleasurable  or  painful,  but  that  they  are  cor- 
rect representations.  Judgments  are  perhaps  the  most 
important  mental  operations.  There  are  logical  judg- 
ments, legal  judgments,  ethical  judgments,  etc.  In 
none  of  them  is  the  feeling  element  of  mental  activity 
of  any  account.  That  which  makes  of  them  judgments 
is  the  reasoning  or  the  thought-activity.  Whether  a 
judgment  is  correct  or  not  does  not  depend  upon  the 
feeling  that  may  be  associated  with  it,  but  it  depends 
upon  the  truth  of  its  several  ideas  and  the  propriety  of 
their  connection. 

A  judgment,  be  it  logical,  juridical,  ethical,  or  any 
other,  is  the  more  liable  to  be  wrong,  the  more  we  al- 
low the  feeling  element  to  play  a  part  in  it.  Judgments 
swayed  by  strong  feelings  become  biassed  ;  they  can 
attain  to  the  ideal  of  truth  only  by  an  entire  elimination 
of  feeling,  f 

Ethics  in  which  the  feeling  element  is  the  main 
spring  of  action,  is  called  sentimentalism.     Sentimen- 

*  See  the  chapter  "  The  Nature  of  Thought  "  in  The  Soul  of  Man,  p.  354. 

t  Professor  HOffding  says  :  "  The  feeling  of  pleasure  is  the  only  psycho- 
logical criterion  of  health  and  power  of  life."  Every  physician  knows  the  in- 
sufficiency of  this  criterion.  Many  consumptives  declare  that  they  feel  per- 
fectly well  even  a  few  hours  before  their  death. 


248  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

tal  ethics  have  no  more  right  to  exist  than  a  sentimental 
logic  or  a  sentimental  jurisprudence. 

The  philosophy  of  Clarchen  in  "  Egmont  "  appears 
to  be  very  strong  sentimentalism,  and  I  do  not  believe 
that  her  demeanor  can  be  set  up  as  an  example  for  im- 
itation. Her  love  happiness  is  an  intoxication.  She 
vacillates  between  two  extremes,  now  himmelhoch  jauch- 
zend  and  now  zum  Tode  betrubt,  and  her  life  ends  in  in- 
sanity. 

To  consider  ethical  or  any  other  judgments  as  feel- 
ings, and  to  explain  their  nature  accordingly,  seems 
to  me  no  better  than  to  speak  of  concepts  as  consist- 
ing of  vowels  and  consonants,  and  to  explain  the  na- 
ture of  conceptual  thought  from  the  sounds  of  the  let- 
ters. We  cannot  speak  without  uttering  sounds,  but 
the  laws  of  speech  or  of  grammar  have  nothing  to  do 
with  sound  and  cannot  be  explained  in  terms  of  sound. 
When  we  think  and  judge,  we  are  most  assuredly  feel- 
ing, but  the  feeling  is  of  no  account,  and  whether  the 
feeling  is  pleasurable,  or  painful,  or  indifferent,  has 
nothing  to  do  whatever  with  the  correctness  or  the 
ethical  value  of  judgments. 

V.   PLEASURE  AND  PAIN. 

It  is  very  strange  that,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  no 
ethicist  who  bases  ethics  upon  the  Happiness  Prin- 
ciple has  ever  investigated  the  nature  of  pleasure  and 
pain.  It  is  generally  assumed  that  pleasure  is  an  indi- 
cation of  growth  and  pain  of  decay,  but  it  has  never 
been  proved,  and  after  a  careful  consideration  of  this 
theory  I  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  is  based 
upon  an  error.  Growth  is  rarely  accompanied  with 
pleasure  and  decay  is  mostly  painless. 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  249 

Optimistic  philosophers  look  upon  pleasure  as  posi- 
tive and  pain  as  negative,  while  the  great  pessimist 
Schopenhauer  turns  the  tables  and  says  pleasure  is 
negative  and  pain  positive. 

An  impartial  consideration  of  the  subject  will  show 
that  both  pleasure  and  pain  are  positive.  Pain  is  felt 
whenever  disturbances  take  place,  pleasure  is  felt 
whenever  wants  are  satisfied,  and  unsatisfied  wants 
are  perhaps  the  most  prominent  among  the  distur- 
bances that  produce  pain.* 

Professor  Hoffding  says : 

' '  I  agree  with  Dr.  Carus  that  ' '  this  world  of  ours  is  not  a 
world  suited  to  the  taste  of  a  pleasure-seeker, "  if  we  understand 
by  pleasure  passive  sensual  enjoyment,  an  enjoyment  which  is  not 
united  with  the  rest  and  nourishment  with  which  not  only  an  im- 
mediate pleasurable  feeling  is  connected,  but  whereby  power  is 
also  gathered  for  continued  endeavor." 

When  I  say  that  this  world  of  ours  is  not  a  world 
suited  to  the  taste  of  the  pleasure-seeker,  I  do  not  re- 
strict the  meaning  of  pleasure  to  "passive  sensual  en- 
joyment," but  to  all  kinds  of  pleasure.  There  are  also 
intellectual  and  artistic  voluptuaries  who  sacrifice  any- 
thing, even  the  performance  of  duty,  to  their  pleasure, 
which  I  grant  is  far  superior  to  any  kind  of  passive  sen- 
sual enjoyment.  The  pursuit  of  pleasure  is  not  wrong 
in  itself ;  but  it  is  not  ethical  either.  Ethics  in  my 
opinion  has  nothing  to  do  either  with  my  own  pleas- 
ures or  with  the  pleasures  of  anybody  else.  The  ob- 
ject of  ethics  is  the  performance  of  duty  ;  and  the 
main  duty  of  man  is  the  performance  of  that  which 
he  needs  must  do  according  to  the  laws  of  nature,  to 
let  his  soul  grow  and  expand,  and  to  develop  to  ever 
higher  and  nobler  aims. 

•  See  the  chapter  "  Pleasure  and  Pain  "  in  The  Soul  of  Man,  p.  338. 


250  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

VI.    PLEASURABLE  FEELINGS  AS  AN  ETHICAL 
CRITERION. 

I  know  of  a  French  teacher  who  has  an  excellent 
French  pronunciation  and  speaks  with  perfect  accu- 
racy, but  whenever  he  is  asked  to  give  a  rule  which 
may  serve  as  a  guide  and  a  help  to  correct  grammar 
and  elocution,  he  says  :  "  The  chief  rule  in  French  is 
euphony." — "Exactly!  But  the  same  rule  holds  good 
in  a  certain  sense  for  all  languages." — "O  no,"  he 
says,  "the  German  is  harsh  and  the  English  is  tongue- 
breaking  ;  only  in  French  is  the  supreme  law  eu- 
phony."— "Now  for  instance,"  we  venture  to  object, 
"you  say  la  harpe  and  not  V arpe ;  you  pronounce  the 
ai  different  in  different  words  you  say/' at,  but  you  say 
it  fait  and  you  have  again  a  different  pronunciation  of 
the  ai  in  nous  faisons."  He  replies,  "To  pronounce 
fai,  or  as  the  Germans  say  chai  would  be  barbarous. 
To  say  Varpe,  instead  of  la  harpe  is  simply  ridicu- 
lous."— "The  question  is,"  we  continued  in  our  at- 
tempts to  understand  him,  "what  is  euphonious  to  the 
ear  of  an  educated  Frenchman?" — "Well,"  he  says, 
"the  ear  will  tell  you.  That  which  jars  on  the  ear  is 
wrong.  To  say  quaf  instead  of  quatre,  or  voV  instead 
of  voire,  is  wrong,  it  is  vulgar.  Why  ?  it  jars  on  the 
ear." 

This  method  of  teaching  French  appears  to  me  a 
good  illustration  of  our  objection  to  the  happiness 
principle  of  ethics.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  instances 
of  immorality  jar  on  the  feelings  of  ethically  trained 
minds.  Why?  They  have  become  accustomed  to  them 
and  look  upon  them  as  barbarous.  Ungrammatical 
expressions  and  such  pronunciations  as  do  not  agree 
with  the  spirit  of  a  language  are  suppressed  by  those 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  251 

who  recognise  them  as  incongruous  elements.  Mis- 
takes jar  on  their  ears  because  they  are  incorrect,  but 
they  are  not  incorrect  because  they  jar. 

Oatmeal  is  a  favorite  dish  among  the  Scotch.  If 
you  ask  them  why  they  eat  it,  they  will  most  likely  tell 
you,  because  it  has  an  agreeable  taste.  But  why  do 
they  like  it?  Because  they  have  through  generations 
grown  accustomed  to  a  dish  which  is  conducive  to 
health.  Most  of  the  dishes  that  are  wholesome  have 
an  agreeable  taste  to  a  non-corrupted  tongue.  But 
agreeable  taste  for  that  reason  cannot  be  considered 
as  the  supreme  rule  in  selecting  our  menu.  Agreeable 
taste  is  in  cases  of  sickness  a  very  unreliable  guide  and 
it  is  no  criterion  for  a  wholesome  dinner.  Surely  the 
ethics  of  eating  could  not  be  based  on  agreeable  taste. 

The  pleasurable  feeling  that  is  perceived  in  the  sat- 
isfaction of  hunger  through  appropriate  food  or  in  the 
satisfaction  of  any  want,  is  not  the  bedrock  of  fact  to 
which  we  can  dig  down  ;  it  is  in  itself  a  product  of  cus- 
tom, of  inherited  habits,  and  other  circumstances  ;  and 
it  can  the  less  be  used  as  a  criterion  because  it  varies 
greatly  with  the  slightest  change  of  its  conditions. 

Liberty  is  generally  and  rightly  considered  as  a 
good,  even  though  the  slave  may  have  and  very  often 
actually  has  enjoyed  more  happiness  than  the  freed 
man.  Stupidity  is  considered  as  an  evil,  although  it 
inflicts  no  direct  pains  and  may  be  the  source  of  in- 
numerable pleasures  insipid  in  the  view  of  others,  but 
delightful  to  the  jolly  fool.  Professor  Hoffding  quotes 
from  Waitz  that  the  Indian  does  not  progress  because 
he  "  lives  a  happy  life."  Unhappiness  is  the  cause  of 
progress.  We  look  down  upon  the  Fuegians  and  upon 
the  indolent  South  American  tribe  described  by  Hum- 
boldt.    But  have  they  not  reached  the  aim  of  ethics, 


25a  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

if  happiness  be  that  aim?    Professor  Hoffding  says  in 
explanation  of  their  condition  : 

"  That  which  would  make  such  a  life  unendurable  for  us,  the 
strong  desire  for  activity,  development,  and  progress,  this  desire  does 
not  exist  at  such  stages." 

If  that  is  so,  our  strong  desire  for  activity  should 
be  denounced  as  the  source  of  evil.  It  would  be  ethical 
in  that  case,  as  some  labor  unions  and  trusts  actually 
propose,  to  stop,  or  at  least,  to  impede  further  pro- 
gress. The  attempt  of  the  Jesuits  in  Paraguay,  which 
to  some  extent  was  an  unequivocal  success,  to  rule  the 
people  through  a  spiritual  dependence  satisfying  all 
their  wants  and  keeping  them  in  perfect  contentment, 
cannot  be  condemned  from  that  principle  of  welfare 
which  defines  welfare  as  a  continuous  state  of  pleas- 
urable feelings. 

I  can  see  how  a  man  can  be  induced  to  submit  to 
a  moment  of  pain  in  order  to  escape  more  pain  in  the 
future,  but  I  cannot  see  on  what  ground  one  man  can 
be  requested  to  sacrifice  himself  to  suffer  pain  or  to 
forego  his  pleasures  in  order  that  a  dozen  or  a  hun- 
dred men  may  have  a  jolly  time.  It  appears  to  me 
that  a  greater  error  has  never  been  pronounced  than 
that  of  making  ''the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest 
number"  the  maxim  of  ethics. 

For  the  same  reason  that  prevents  us  from  regard- 
ing the  principle  of  happiness  as  the  aim  of  ethics  or 
as  its  test  and  criterion,  we  cannot  consider  self-hu- 
miliation, contrition,  misery,  and  the  abandonment  of 
gayety  and  merriness  as  moral  or  meritorious.  Joy  and 
grief  are  in  themselves  as  little  wrong  as  they  are  vir- 
tuous. Any  ethics  the  end  of  which  is  a  morose  aus- 
terity, simply  because  it  makes  life  dreary,  is  at  least 
as  much  mistaken  as  a  philosophy  which  finds  the  pur- 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  253 

pose  of  life  in  mere  pleasure,  be  it  ever  so  vain,  simply 
because  it  is  pleasure.  To  pursue  happiness  or  re- 
nounce it,  either  may  sometimes  be  moral  and  some- 
times immoral.  Again,  to  undergo  pain  and  to  inflict 
pain  on  others,  or  to  avoid  pain,  either  may  also  be 
moral  or  immoral.  The  criterion  of  ethics  will  not  be 
found  in  the  sphere  of  feelings.  Morality  cannot  be 
measured  by  and  it  cannot  be  expressed  in  pleasures 
and  pains. 

VII.  THE  SUPERINDIVIDUAL  AND  SOCIETY. 

Professor  Hoffding  criticises  my  view  of  "that  su- 
perindividual  soul-life  which  we  call  society,"  as  based 
upon  a  mystical  personification  of  society. 

The  superindividual  motives  of  the  human  soul  as 
I  use  the  term,  are  actual  realities,  they  are  no  less 
actual  and  concrete  than  are  the  image  and  the  concept 
of  a  tree  in  my  brain.  I  have  sufficiently  explained 
their  origin  and  natural  growth  ("Ethical  Problem," 
pp.  34-44),  and  feel  that  Professor  Hoffding's  charge 
rests  upon  a  misunderstanding.  It  appears  to  me  that 
his  term  "sympathy,"  which  he  regards  as  the  main 
element  of  ethical  feelings  leading  to  the  adoption  of 
the  principle  of  general  welfare,  is  much  more  liable 
to  be  interpreted  in  a  mystical  way.  At  least  Schopen- 
hauer's idea  of  sympathy  (which  he  calls  Mitleid*)  is 
undoubtedly  a  very  mysterious  thing,  and  its  existence 
is  supposed  to  be  a  direct  manifestation  of  the  met- 
aphysical. I  do  not  say  that  Professor  Hoffding  uses 
the  word  sympathy  in  the  sense  of  Schopenhauer's  idea 
of  Mitleid,  but  I  am  sure  that  if  he  attempts  to  ex- 
plain its  natural  origin,  he  will  (in  order  to  remain 
positive   and   scientific)    have   to  go   over  the   same 


254  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

ground  and  arrive  at  the  same  conclusion  as  I  did,  al- 
though he  may  express  himself  in  different  words. 

The  truth  is  that  man's  ideas  consist  in  representa- 
tions of  things  and  of  relations  without  him,  and  these 
ideas  are  not  the  product  of  his  individual  exertions 
alone,  they  are  the  product  of  social  work  and  of  the 
common  activity  and  intercourse  of  human  society. 
This-is  true  of  language  as  a  whole  and  of  every  single 
word  which  we  use.  This  is  true  of  all  conceptual 
thought  and  most  so  of  all  ethical  impulses.  In  spite 
of  all  individualism  and  in  spite  of  the  truth  that 
lies  in  certain  claims  of  individualism  as  to  personal 
liberty  and  freedom  of  self-determination,  I  maintain 
that  there  is  no  individual  in  the  sense  of  a  separate 
ego-existence.  That  which  makes  of  us  human  beings 
is  the  product  of  social  life.  I  call  the  ideas  and  the  im- 
pulses naturally  developing  in  this  way,  superindivid- 
ual,  and  if  we  could  take  them  out  of  the  soul  of  a 
man,  he  would  cease  to  be  a  man.  What  is  man  but 
an  incarnation  of  mankind  !  Social  intercourse  and 
common  work  produce  the  superindividual  ideas  and 
impulses  in  man,  and  these  superindividual  ideas  and 
impulses  in  their  action  constitute  the  life  of  society. 

This  view  is  not  "a  mystical  personification  of  so- 
ciety" under  the  simile  of  an  organism,  but  it  is  a  de- 
scription of  certain  facts  in  the  development  of  the  hu- 
man soul. 

Society  is  not  an  aggregation  of  individuals,  it  is 
constituted  by  the  superindividual  element  in  the  souls 
of  individual  men.  The  number  of  people  in  a  so- 
ciety is  for  ethical  purposes  unessential.  Professor 
Hotfding  accordingly  makes  an  unimportant  feature 
prominent,  when  he  says  : 

"The  idea  of  society,  if  it  is  to  be  scientifically  employed, 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS \  255 

must  always  be  so  applied  that  at  every  point  the  definite  group  of 
individuals  which  it  represents  may  be  established." 

If  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number 
among  a  definite  group  of  individuals  constitutes  the 
morality  of  an  act,  would  not  the  man  who  falls  among 
thieves  be  under  the  moral  obligation  to  renounce  his 
property  because  the  robbers  constitute  the  majority? 

If  we  leave  the  superindividual  element  out  of  sight, 
we  shall  naturally  fall  into  the  error  of  counting  the  in- 
dividuals and  deciding  right  and  wrong  by  majority 
votes.  The  pleasure  of  a  majority  however  does  not 
constitute  justice,  and  the  greatest  happiness  of  the 
greatest  number  is  no  criterion  of  that  which  is  to  be 
considered  as  morally  good. 

Society  in  the  sense  of  a  mere  number  of  individuals 
will  by  and  by  create  but  does  not  constitute  morality ; 
nor  can  the  majority  of  a  society  propose  a  criterion. 
The  nature  of  moral  goodness  is  not  a  matter  of  num- 
ber nor  of  size  nor  of  quantity.  It  must  be  sought  in 
the  quality  of  our  ideas  and  motives.  Moral  are  those 
ideas  which  tend  to  build  up  the  life-totality  of  our  souls 
so  as  to  engender  more  and  more  of  mankind  in  man, 
or  still  broader  expressed,  so  as  to  keep  man  in  har- 
mony with  the  whole  cosmos — with  God. 

VIII.   THE  POLICY  OF  THE  ETHICAL  SOCIETIES. 

Professor  Hoffding  considers  it  perfectly  justified 
that  the  leaders  of  the  ethical  societies  "keep  these  in- 
stitutions as  independent  as  possible  not  only  of  all 
dogmatic  tendency  of  thought  but  also  of  all  unneces- 
sary philosophical  hypotheses  and  speculations."  So 
do  we,  for  we  object  to  dogmas,  to  hypotheses,  and 
mere  speculations.  We  consider  the  era  of  dogmatic 
religion  as  past,  and  trust  in  the  rise  of  a  religion  based 


256  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

on  truth,  i.  e.  a  natural  and  cosmical  religion  which 
stands  on  facts  verifiable  by  science.  Every  religion, 
be  it  ever  so  adulterated  by  superstitions  which  as  a 
rule,  the  less  tenable  they  appear,  are  the  more  tena- 
ciously defended  as  infallible  dogmas — contains  in  its 
world-conception  at  least  the  germ  of  becoming  a  cos- 
mical religion.  The  development  of  all  religions  aims 
at  one  and  the  same  goal,  namely  the  recognition  of 
the  truth  and  the  aspiration  to  live  accordingly.  Those 
religions  which  remain  faithful  to  this  spirit  of  the  re- 
ligious sentiment  will  survive  ;  they  will  drop  the  errors 
of  dogmatic  belief,  they  will  free  themselves  of  the 
narrowness  of  sectarianism  and  develop  the  cosmic 
religion  of  truth — of  that  one  and  sole  truth  which  need 
not  shun  the  light  of  criticism  and  which  is  at  one  with 
science. 

We  do  not  object  to  the  ethical  societies  that  they 
have  no  dogmas  and  that  they  do  not  identify  them- 
selves with  a  special  philosophy ;  we  object  solely  to 
their  proposition  to  preach  ethics  without  having  a  re- 
ligion, or  without  basing  ethics  upon  a  conception  of 
the  world.  And  why  do  we  object?  Simply  because  it 
is  impossible  to  preach  ethics  without  basing  it  upon  a 
definite  view  of  the  world,  for  ethics  is  nothing  more 
or  less  than  the  endeavor  to  act  according  to  a  certain 
conception,  to  realise  it  in  deeds.  Can  you  realise  in 
deeds  a  conception  without  having  any?  Can  you  live 
the  truth  without  knowing  the  truth?  You  must  at 
least  have  an  instinctive  inkling  of  what  the  truth  is. 

Mr.  Salter  separates  the  domains  of  ethics  and 
science.  He  does  not  believe  that  ethics  can  be  es- 
tablished on  science,  for  he  declares  that  science  deals 
with  facts,  i.  e.  that  which  is,  while  ethics  deals  with 
ideals,  i.  e.  that  which  ought  to  be.    "We  have  to  be- 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  257 

lieve  in  ethics  if  we  believe  in  them  at  all,"  Mr.  Salter 
says,  "not  because  they  have  the  facts  on  their  side 
but  because  of  their  own  intrinsic  attractiveness  and 
authority."*  This  reminds  me  of  one  of  Goethe  and 
Schiller's  Xenions  in  which  the  German  poets  criticise 
the  one-sided  positions  of  enthusiasts  {Schwdrmer)  and 
philistines : 

Had  you  the  power,  enthusiasts,  to  grasp  your  ideals  completely, 
Certainly  you  would  revere  Nature.     For  that  is  her  due. 

Had  you  the  power  philistines,  to  grasp  the  total  of  Nature, 
Surely  your  path  would  lead  up  to  th'  idea's  domain. 

Ideals  have  no  value  unless  they  agree  with  the  ob- 
jective world-order  which  is  ascertained  through  in- 
quiry into  the  facts  of  nature.  Ideals  whose  ultimate 
justification  is  intrinsic  attractiveness  and  whose  au- 
thority is  professedly  not  founded  on  reality  but  on 
rapt  visions  of  transcendental  beauty,  must  be  charac- 
terised as  pure  subjectivism.  They  are  not  ideals  but 
dreams. 

The  ethical  societies  have  as  yet — so  far  as  I  am 
aware  of — not  given  a  clear  and  definite  definition  of 
good.  Professor  Adler  treats  this  question  with  a  cer- 
tain slight.  Concerning  the  facts  of  moral  obligation  he 
believes  in  "a  general  agreement  among  good  men  and 
women  everywhere."  (The  italics  are  ours.)  The  Open 
Court  (in  No.  140)  has  challenged  the  Ethical  Societies, 
saying  that  "we  should  be  very  much  obliged  to  the 
Ethical  Record,  if  it  would  give  us  a  simple,  plain,  and 
unmistakable  definition  of  what  the  leaders  of  the 
ethical  movement  understand  by  good,  i.  e.  morally 
good."    But  this  challenge  remained  unanswered. 

It  will  appear  that  as  soon  as  good  is  defined  not  in 

*  What  Can  Ethics  Do  For  Us,  p.  5.  By  W.  M.  Salter.  C.  H.  Kerr,  Chi- 
cago, 1891. 


258  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

tautologies,*  but  in  definite  and  unmistakable  terms, 
the  conception  of  good  will  be  the  expression  of  a 
world-conception.  Is  it  possible  to  do  an  act  which  is 
not  expressive  of  an  opinion  ?  And  if  an  act  is  not  ex- 
pressive of  a  clear  opinion,  it  is  based  upon  an  in- 
stinctive, an  unclear,  and  undefined  opinion.  When 
the  ethical  societies  declare  that  they  do  not  intend  to 
commit  themselves  to  religious  or  philosophical  views, 
they  establish  an  anarchy  of  ethical  conviction.  Re- 
ligion, as  we  have  defined  it,  is  man's  inmost  and  ho- 
liest conviction,  in  accord  with  which  he  regulates  his 
conduct.  The  ethical  societies  implicitly  declare  that  we 
can  regulate  our  conduct  without  having  any  conviction. 

Is  not  an  ethical  society  without  any  definite  con- 
victions upon  which  to  base  its  ethics  like  a  ship 
without  a  compass  in  foggy  weather? 

The  attitude  of  the  ethical  societies  in  not  com- 
mitting themselves  to  any  religious  or  philosophical 
view  is  after  all — and  how  can  it  be  otherwise? — a  pal- 
pable self-delusion,  for  their  whole  policy  bears  unmis- 
takably a  definite  and  characteristic  stamp.  The  lead- 
ers of  the  ethical  societies  will  most  likely  repudiate  my 
interpretation  of  their  position,  because  it  appears  to 
me  that  they  are  not  clear  themselves  concerning  the 
philosophical  basis  upon  which  they  stand  and  thus  (as 
I  am  fully  aware)  many  contradictory  features  appear 
by  the  side  of  those  which  I  should  consider  as  most 
significant. 

IX.   PROFESSOR  ADLER'S  POSITION. 

Professor  Adler  is  the  founder  of  the  Ethical  So- 
cieties, he  is  their  leader,  and  however  much  Mr.  Sal- 

*  It  is  obvious  that  such  definitions  as  "  good  is  that  which  produces  wel- 
fare "  are  meaningless,  so  long  as  we  are  not  told  what  it  is  that  makes  a  cer- 
tain state  well  faring  or  well  being. 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  259 

ter,  Dr.  Coit,  Mr.  Sheldon,  and  Mr.  Weston  may  dis- 
agree from  him  in  minor  matters,  his  views  are  decis- 
ive in  the  management,  and  the  policy  of  the  whole 
movement  depends  on  him.  Through  his  indefatig- 
able zeal  in  the  holy  cause  of  ethics,  his  unflinching 
courage  in  the  defense  of  what  he  regards  as  right,  his 
energetic  devotion  to  his  ideals,  and  through  the  influ- 
ence of  his  powerful  oratory  he  has  made  the  ethical 
societies  what  they  now  are.  He  determines  their 
character  and  he  is  the  soul  of  the  whole  movement. 
Now  it  is  true  that  Professor  Adler  has  never  pre- 
sented us  with  a  systematic  philosophy,  but  all  his  ac- 
tivity, his  speeches,  his  poems,  and  the  plans  of  his 
enterprises  represent  a  very  definite  philosophical  con- 
ception, which,  to  give  it  a  name,  may  briefly  be  called 
Kantian  Agnosticism. 

Professor  Adler  is  an  agnostic,  although  not  after 
the  pattern  of  Spencer  or  Huxley.  His  agnosticism 
has  been  impressed  upon  his  mind  by  Kant. 

I  expect  that  Mr.  Adler  will  repudiate  the  name 
of  agnostic,  and  it  is  quite  indifferent  with  what  name 
he  may  characterise  his  views.  His  position  remains 
the  same,  whatever  name  he  may  choose  to  call  it,  if  he 
chooses  any ;  and  he  will  choose  none  for  he  is  too 
consistent  an  agnostic  to  define  his  position  by  a  name. 

It  devolves  upon  me  to  prove  my  assertion  and  I 
hope  to  be  able  to  do  so. 

Professor  Adler  looks  upon  ethics  as  something 
which  lies  outside  the  pale  of  human  knowledge.  He 
says  in  one  of  his  lectures : 

"And  now  one  point  more  of  utmost  importance.  If  there 
be  an  existence  corresponding  to  our  highest  idea,  as  we  have  said 
there  is,  yet  we  know  not  what  kind  of  existence  that  may  be. 
....  why  then  should  we  speak  of  it  at  all,  why  should  we  try  to 


26o  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

mention  in  words  an  existence  which  we  cannot  know  ?    I  will  an- 
swer why.     Because  it  is  necessary  to  remind  mankind  constantly 

that  there  is  an  existence  which  they  do  not  know Because 

otherwise  the  sense  of  mystery  will  fade  out  of  human  lives " 

Is  "the  sense  of  mystery"  really  a  necessary  ele- 
ment in  human  lives  to  make  men  aware  of  the  grand- 
eur of  the  universe.  Is  there  no  holiness  in  clearness 
of  thought,  and  is  ethics  only  sacred  if  it  is  surrounded 
with  the  hazy  halo  of  an  unknowable  transcenden- 
talism? 

If  our  moral  ideal  does  not  come  by  the  special 
revelation  of  God,  as  the  dogmatic  religions  maintain, 
and  if  we  cannot  find  it  in  nature,  if  it  is  beyond  the 
ken  of  human  cognition,  if  it  is  unascertainable  by 
science,  whence  does  it  come?     Professor  Adler  says : 

"We  must,  indeed,  be  always  on  our  guard,  lest  we  confuse 
the  idea  of  the  Perfect  with  notions  of  the  good  derived  from  hu- 
man experience.  This  has  been  the  mistake  of  theology  in  the  past, 
the  point  wherein  every  theodicy  has  invariably  broken  down. 
When  we  think  of  the  Perfect  we  think  of  a  transcendental  state  of 
existence,  when  we  think  of  the  moral  law  in  its  completeness  we 
think  of  a  transcendental  law,  a  law  which  can  only  be  wholly 
fulfilled  in  the  regions  of  the  Infinite,  but  which  can  never  be  fully 
realised  within  the  conditions  of  space  and  time.  The  formula  of 
that  law  when  applied  to  human  relations,  yields  the  specific  moral 
commandments,  but  these  commandments  can  never  express  the 
full  content,  can  never  convey  the  far  off  spiritual  meanings  of  the 
supreme  law  itself.  The  specific  commandments  do,  indeed,  par- 
take of  the  nature  of  the  transcendental  law,  they  are  its  effects. 
The  light  that  shines  through  them  comes  from  beyond,  but  its 
beams  are  broken  as  they  pass  our  terrestrial  medium,  and  the  full 
light  in  all  its  glory  we  can  never  see. " 

In  this  passage  I  believe  to  recognise  the  influence 
of  Kant's  transcendentalism.  I  differ  from  Professor 
Adler's  conception  of  Kantian  transcendentalism,  but 
that  is  of  no  account  here.  One  point  only  is  of  con- 
sequence.    Professor  Adler  uses  the  word  transcen- 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  261 

dental  in  the  sense  of  transcendent  and  thus  he  changes 
the  ethics  of  pure  reason  into  mysticism.  Professor 
Adler  says : 

■  *  Though  I  can  never  be  scientifically  certain,  I  can  be  morally 
sure  that  the  mystery  of  the  universe  is  to  be  read  in  terms  of  moral 
perfection." 

I  do  not  deny  that  moral  instinct  ripens  quicker 
than  scientific  comprehension.  Why  ?  Because  in  a 
time  when  science  is  not  as  yet  so  far  advanced  as  to 
understand  the  operations  of  the  moral  law,  those 
people  who  instinctively  obey  the  rules  that  can  be 
derived  from  the  moral  law,  will  survive  and  all  the 
rest  will  go  to  the  wall.  But  the  fact  that  we  can  have 
a  reliable  moral  guide  in  an  instinctive  certainty  which 
is  generally  called  conscience,  even  before  we  attain  to 
scientific  clearness,  does  not  prove  that  science  will  be 
forever  excluded  from  the  world  of  moral  ideals. 

Professor  Adler's  agnosticism  found  a  very  strong 
expression  in  a  poem  which  resembles  in  its  tone  and 
ideas  the  church  hymns  of  the  New  Jerusalem.  The 
poem  is  very  unequivocal  on  the  point  that  moral  ac- 
tion is  comparable  to  building  an  ideal  city,  the  plan 
of  which  is  unknown  to  the  builders.     Professor  Adler 

says  : 

' '  Have  you  heard  the  Golden  City 

Mentioned  in  the  legends  old  ? 
Everlasting  light  shines  o'er  it, 

Wondrous  tales  of  it  are  told. 
Only  righteous  men  and  women 

Dwell  within  its  gleaming  wall ; 
Wrong  is  banished  from  its  borders, 

Justice  reigns  supreme  o'er  all. 
Do  you  ask,  Where  is  that  City, 

Where  the  perfect  Right  doth  reign  ? 
I  must  answer,  I  must  tell  you, 

That  you  seek  its  site  in  vain. 


262  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

You  may  roam  o'er  hill  and  valley, 

You  may  pass  o'er  land  and  sea. 
You  may  search  the  wide  earth  over, — 

'T  is  a  City  yet  to  be ! 

We  are  builders  of  that  City, — 

All  our  joys  and  all  our  groans 
Help  to  rear  its  shining  ramparts ; 

All  our  lives  are  building-stones. 

What  that  plan  may  be  we  know  not* 

How  the  seat  of  Justice  high, 
How  the  City  of  our  vision 

Will  appear  to  mortal  eye, — 

That  no  mortal  eye  can  picture, 

That  no  mortal  tongue  can  tell. 
We  can  barely  dream  the  glories 

Of  the  Future's  citadel." 

How  great  an  importance  is  attributed  to  this  song 
by  the  leaders  of  the  ethical  movement  may  be  learned 
from  Mr.  .Salter's  opinion  of  it.  Mr.  Salter  says  in 
criticising  Unitarianism  : 

"Not  from  Unitarianism,  not  from  Christianity,  has  come  the 
song  that  best  utters  and  almost  chants  this  thought  [of  an  ideal 
fellowship].  It  is  from  Felix  Adler,  upon  whom,  I  sometimes 
think,  more  than  upon  any  other  man  of  our  day,  the  mantle  and 
prophetic  spirit  of  Channing  have  fallen,  and  whose  words,  I  al- 
most believe,  are  those  which  Jesus  himself  would  utter,  should 
he  come  and  put  his  solemn  thought  and  passion  into  the  language 
of  to-day." 

Agnosticism  is  in  our  opinion  no  sound  basis  upon 
which  to  erect  ethics.  The  unknowable  is  like  quick- 
sand, it  gives  way  under  our  feet.  The  ethics  of  agnos- 
ticism must  necessarily  become  mysticism.  The  ethe- 
real dreams  of  mysticists  need  no  solid  basis,  they 
hover  in  the  air.  Mr.  Spencer  who  for  some  reason  or 
other  tried  to  escape  the  consequences  of  his  agnosti- 

♦The  italics  are  ours. 


THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS.  263 

cism  in  the  ethical  field,  adopted  Utilitarianism,  bas- 
ing his  moral  maxims  not  upon  the  unknowable,  as 
consistency  would  require,  but  upon  the  principle  of 
the  greatest  happiness  for  the  greatest  number. 

Professor  Adler  is  not  a  Spencerian  agnostic  and 
here  lies  the  strength  of  his  ethics.  Although  he  does 
not  attain  to  a  clear  and  scientific  conception  of  the 
origin  and  natural  growth  of  morality,  he  sounds  no 
uncertain  voice  with  regard  to  the  Happiness  Principle. 
He  has  on  several  occasions,  like  his  great  master 
Kant,  uncompromisingly  rejected  any  Hedonism  or 
Eudaemonism.  Among  all  societies  aspiring  to  foster 
moral  ideals,  the  societies  for  ethical  culture  are  dis- 
tinguished for  their  seriousness  and  ardor  ;  and  there 
can  be  no  doubt  about  the  cause  :  it  is  the  spirit  of  Pro- 
fessor Adler's  zeal  not  to  give  way  to  a  hedonistic  con- 
ception of  ethics. 

X.    THE  UNITY  OF  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

We  conclude.  Although  the  ethical  problem  can 
and  must  be  split  up  in  innumerable  different  prob- 
lems, we  should  never  lose  sight  of  its  unity. 

Our  age  is  a  period  of  specialisation,  of  a  division 
of  labor  and  of  detail  work.  This  is  true.  But  the 
more  will  it  be  necessary  to  survey  the  whole  field  and 
keep  in  mind  the  unity  of  which  all  piecemeal  efforts 
are  but  parts.  As  soon  as  we  lose  sight  of  the  unity  in 
a  certain  system  of  problems,  we  are  most  liable  to  drop 
into  inconsistencies.  This  is  true  of  all  things,  of  every 
science  in  particular,  and  of  philosophy,  the  science  of 
the  sciences,  also.  It  is  no  less  true  of  ethics.  We  can- 
not engage,  with  any  hope  of  success,  in  any  of  the  di- 
verse ethical  questions  unless  we  have  first  solved  the 
ethical  problem. 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  ETHICS. 


BY  WILLIAM   M.   SALTER. 


It  is  the  prerogative  of  man  to  ask  for  reasons  for 
what  he  is  enjoined  to  do  or  believe.  An  animal  does 
not  ask  a  reason  why ;  a  child  may  not — but  a  devel- 
oped human  being  has  a  dignity  with  which  mere  blind 
obedience  and  unreasoning  assent  are  felt  to  be  in- 
compatible. 

It  is  as  legitimate  to  question  and  inquire  in  the 
ethical  field  as  in  any  other.  There  is  nothing  sacred 
about  duty,  right,  good — in  the  sense  of  their  making 
a  region  which  we  should  not  explore,  or  look  upon 
with  critical  eyes.  If  we  are  told  we  ought  to  do  any 
special  thing,  we  have  a  right  to  ask,  why? — just  as 
we  have  a  right  to  ask  for  the  evidence  of  any  theo- 
logical creed  or  any  scientific  or  philosophical  proposi- 
tion. Yes,  more  than  "having  a  right,"  I  may  say 
that  we  should  ask  for  reasons  in  the  realm  of  morals  : 
For,  in  the  first  place,  some  things  which  we  may  be 
told  to  do  may  be  questionable  and  we  should  not  wish 
to  be  imposed  upon ;  in  the  second  place,  there  are 
different  notions  of  right  and  wrong  abroad  in  the 
world,  conflicting  notions,  and  we  are  obliged  to  have 
some  standard  by  which  to  judge  between  them ; 
thirdly,  the  very  sacredness  of  what  is  really  right 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  ETHICS,  265 

should  make  us  jealous  of  anything  that  falsely  goes 
by  that  name  ;  and  fourthly,  even  what  is  absolutely 
right  should  not  be  accepted  as  such  by  a  rational 
being  on  authority,  because  this  or  that  person  says 
so,  or  this  or  that  book  so  teaches — but  only  because 
he  sees  it  to  be  so  with  his  own  eyes,  because  it  is 
the  deliverance,  the  discovery  of  his  own  reason.  It 
may  not  be  possible  for  every  one  to  be  rationalised 
at  once  ;  and  in  the  meantime  those  for  whom  suffice 
the  poets  "few  strong  instincts  "  and  "  few  are  fortun- 
ate ;  none  the  less  is  it  the  ideal  for  every  one  who 
has  the  capacities  of  reason  in  him  to  develop  those 
capacities,  to  "look  before  and  after"  and  know  the 
why  and  wherefore  of  everything  he  does,  to  bring  his 
whole  life,  moral  and  intellectual,  out  into  the  light. 

And  now  perhaps  the  first  thing  we  need  to  do  is 
to  get  a  clear  idea  of  what  the  ethical  field  is,  which 
we  are  to  explore.  It  is,  firstly,  the  field  of  human 
action — and  not  only  of  actions  in  the  outward  sense, 
but  of  all  that  we  do,  whether  by  body  or  mind,  so  we 
do  it  voluntarily.  Whatever  happens  in  us  apart  from 
our  will  is  outside  the  realm  we  are  considering,  just 
as  much  as  what  happens  without  us :  the  digestion 
of  our  food,  for  example,  the  circulation  of  the  blood 
— though  to  the  extent  that  we  can  affect  these  by  our 
will  they  may  come  inside  ;  if,  for  instance,  they  are 
feeble  and  imperfect  and  by  anything  we  can  do  we 
can  make  them  stronger,  healthier,  it  may  be  our  duty 
to  do  so.  It  is  our  life  so  far  as  it  is  regulated  by  our 
thought  that  we  have  to  do  with  as  ethical  inquirers  ; 
so  far  as  it  goes  on  of  itself  and  is  ruled  by  laws  which 
we  are  powerless  to  affect,  it  is  beyond  the  province 
of  ethics.  Yet,  more  particularly,  all  voluntary  actions 
may  be  of  one  sort  or  another,  according  as  our  thought 


266  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

determines.  We  may,  for  example,  in  taking  a  walk, 
go  along  this  street  or  that  as  we  choose.  In  talking 
with  a  friend,  we  may  give  or  we  may  withhold  certain 
information  in  our  possession.  In  recollecting  a  prom- 
ise or  a  vow,  we  may  keep  it  or  break  it  as  one  or  the 
other  thought  is  predominant  in  us  at  the  time.  Now 
wherever  there  are  two  possible  thoughts  and  it  occurs 
to  us  to  say  that  one  is  better  than  the  other,  that  one 
should  be  followed  rather  than  the  other,  we  enter  the 
field  of  ethics  proper.  This  by  no  means  always  hap- 
pens in  the  case  of  voluntary  actions ;  when  we  are 
off  for  a  holiday  it  may  not  matter,  within  limits,  what 
we  do — whether  we  ride  or  walk  or  row  or  "lie  in  the 
sun  "  and  do  nothing;  the  only  duty  in  the  matter,  may 
be,  may  be  to  do  as  we  please.  But  sometimes  we  say, 
This  is  good  and  that  is  bad  ;  this  deserves  to  be  done 
and  that  ought  not  to  be  done.  Such  judgments  are 
ethical  judgments  ;  they  are  not  of  course  descriptive 
of  the  actions,  but  of  what  the  actions  should  be  ;  in 
other  words,  they  assert  an  ideal,  and  when  they  are 
repeated  and  generalised,  they  become  formulations 
of  a  rule.  Ethics  is  really  a  study  of  the  rules  of  hu- 
man action  ;  if  we  call  it  a  science,  it  is  an  ideal  science 
— for  it  is  not  a  study  of  the  actual  conduct  of  men 
(and  so  differs  entirely  from  sociology  or  history),  but 
of  what  that  conduct  would  be  if  it  conformed  to  cer- 
tain rules  ;  and  these  rules  themselves  are  not  simply 
the  matter-of-fact  rules  which  an  individual  or  a  peo- 
ple reverences,  but  the  true  rules,  the  rules  which  are 
intrinsically  worthy  of  reverence. 

Here  then  is  the  field  for  our  inquiry — not  nature, 
not  man  in  general,  not  his  actions,  but  the  rules  ac- 
cording to  which  he  conceives  he  should  act ;  and  our 
inquiry  now  is  not  so  much,  what  these  rules  are  in 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  ETHICS.  267 

detail  but  what  is  their  reason  for  being,  not  so  much 
how  and  when  they  arose  and  what  is  their  history,  but 
what  is  their  justification  and  validity.  To  trace  the 
rule,  *'  Thou  shalt  not  steal,"  for  example,  back  to  the 
one  who  first  conceived  it,  to  fix  its  authorship  and 
date  in  the  dim  distant  past,  and  follow  its  history  since, 
is  not  the  same  as  justifying  it ;  customs  and  rules 
may  have  existed  for  ages  and  yet  be  without  a  rational 
basis.  Ethics  proper,  on  its  intellectual  side,  is  a  rea- 
soning about  rules  of  conduct,  it  is  a  testing,  criticising, 
accepting  or  rejecting  the  rules  commonly  proposed  ; 
and  in  searching  for  first  principles  in  ethics,  we  are 
really  asking  for  the  ultimate  reasons  why  we  should 
follow  (or  refuse  to  follow)  this,  that  or  the  other  spe- 
cial injunction,  for  the  final  justification  of  whatever 
we  call  right. 

Where  shall  we  turn  for  light  as  to  this  problem  ? 
There  seem  to  be  those  who  think  that  science  can 
settle  it  for  us ;  they  say  that  the  basis  of  ethics  is  to 
be  found  in  a  clear  knowledge  of  the  world  in  which 
we  live.  And  there  is  a  measure  of  truth  in  this.  If 
we  do  not  understand  our  own  being  and  natural  laws 
about  us  we  are  to  this  extent  in  the  dark,  in  our  ac- 
tions. Ignorance  of  the  teachings  of  physiology  and 
hygiene  may  cause  us  aches  and  pains  that  knowledge 
might  have  prevented.  Ignorance  of  sanitary  science 
is  doubtless  responsible  in  part  for  the  large  mortality 
of  great  cities.  It  is  only  by  a  knowledge  of  nature's 
forces — gravity,  heat,  steam,  electricity, — that  we  can 
turn  them  to  account  and  make  them  serve  and  benefit 
man.  If  we  study  the  facts  of  sociology  and  history, 
we  learn  what  conditions  are  favorable  and  what  un- 
favorable to  the  growth  and  prosperity  of  communities. 
Such  knowledge  is  of  incalculable  value  ;  it  is  a  help 


268  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

and  guide  to  action — and  yet  there  is  some  confusion 
in  regarding  it  as  the  basis  of  ethics  or  as  giving  us  an 
ultimate  standard  of  right  action.  For  who  does  not 
see  that  everything  depends  upon  the  use  to  which  we 
mean  to  put  our  knowledge  ?  It  seems  to  be  taken 
for  granted  that  everybody  desires  happiness  or  long 
life  for  himself  and  for  others  ;  that  the  only  wish  of  a 
person  can  be  to  use  nature's  forces  for  the  general 
benefit ;  that  all  we  care  for  is  to  make  communities 
grow  and  prosper — in  which  case  it  would  of  course 
only  be  necessary  to  learn  how  these  ends  can  be  at- 
tained. But  the  fact  is  that  we  may  desire  other 
things ;  we  may  wish  to  know  how  to  cut  short  our 
lives  and  how  to  end  the  lives  of  our  people — time  and 
again  this  has  happened  and  is  happening  to-day,  a 
great  part  of  the  activity  of  men  consisting  in  killing 
one  another  or  making  preparations  to ;  we  may  use 
nature's  forces  to  injure  as  well  as  to  benefit — a  man 
of  violence  has  the  same  motive  for  getting  a  complete 
scientific  understanding  of  dynamite  that  any  other 
sort  of  man  would  have ;  we  may  desire  to  degrade 
and  humiliate  a  people  as  well  as  uplift  it  and  make  it 
prosperous — as  England  seems  to  have  acted  toward 
Ireland.  Such  scientific  knowledge  as  I  have  referred 
to  cannot  be  the  basis  or  ultimate  standard  of  ethics 
(however  useful  and  necessary  it  may  be  in  a  subsid- 
iary way),  for  one  may  act  in  complete  accordance 
with  it  and  yet  aim  at  opposite  things  ;  one  may  have 
the  clearest  view  of  the  world  in  which  we  live  and  yet 
play  either  (what  we  are  accustomed  to  call)  a  good 
part  or  a  bad  part  in  it.  The  real  question  of  ethics 
is,  what  are  the  true  things  to  aim  at,  what  is  the 
meaning  of  playing  a  good  or  a  bad  part  in  the  world 
— and,  so  far  as  scientific  knowledge  is  concerned,  for 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  ETHICS.  269 

what  ends  shall  we  use  that  knowledge  ?  Our  very  in- 
tentness  on  those  ends  (when  we  have  discovered  them) 
must  make  us  resolute  on  finding  out  every  possible 
means  and  observing  every  condition  necessary  for 
attaining  them. 

But  if  science  fails  us  at  the  critical  point  (a  cer- 
tain mental  confusion  being  involved  in  the  very  no- 
tion of  its  being  more  than  a  subsidiary  guide  for  us), 
what  else  have  we  to  do  than  to  face  the  problem  with 
our  own  discursive  minds  and  by  thinking  of  this  end 
of  our  action  and  that,  by  weighing  and  balancing  be- 
tween them,  try  to  find  out  that  which  seems  worth- 
iest, completest,  most  final  and  self-sufficient  ?  For 
this,  let  it  now  be  distinctly  said,  is  what  we  are  in 
search  of — something,  some  state  or  condition  which 
seems  good  in  itself,  which  does  not  need  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  means  to  another  end  but  which  of  itself 
satisfies  the  mind.  If  we  ask  for  a  reason  for  any  ac- 
tion or  rule,  it  must  be  because  the  action  or  rule  re- 
quires a  reason,  being  incomplete,  objectless,  irrational 
without  it — as  when  a  person  going  down  town  is  asked 
Why  ?  by  a  friend  and  in  replying  he  tells  his  errand, 
while  if  he  should  say,  For  nothing,  the  friend  would 
not  know  what  to  make  of  him.  There  are  plenty  of 
human  actions,  and  sustained  courses  of  conduct  that 
have  no  meaning  save  in  relation  to  some  purpose  be- 
yond themselves.  Yet  on  the  other  hand  there  may 
be  things  that  seem  so  good  that  we  do  not  look  be- 
yond them,  things  that  it  is  superfluous  to  ask  a  reason 
for ;  they  are  complete  in  themselves  and  do  not  re- 
quire any  justification.  It  is  such  things  that  we  have 
no  reason  of,  things  in  virtue  of  which,  or  by  their  re- 
lation to  which,  all  other  things  are  good,  things  that 
it  would  be  as  absurd  to  ask  for  a  reason  for  aiming 


270  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

at,  as  for  conceding  the  truth  of  any  self-luminous  fact 
of  nature.  If  such  things  can  be  found,  if  a  supreme 
rule  (or  rules)  can  thus  be  formulated  and  if,  on  the 
other  hand,  all  minor,  special  rules  can  be  traced  back 
to  the  supreme  one  and  an  explanation  and  justifica- 
tion thus  be  furnished  for  each  single  duty,  then  our 
problem  would  be  virtually  solved.  To  give  a  reason 
for  everything  that  requires  a  reason,  and  to  find  those 
things  for  which  no  reason  can  be  given  only  because 
they  are  self-evident — is  all  that  the  ethical  student 
can  ask.  It  is  as  when  (to  take  a  minor  and  imperfect 
illustration)  having  been  in  distant  parts,  we  begin  to 
travel  homewards ;  at  every  step  of  the  journey,  at 
every  change  from  sea  to  land,  or  from  train  to  train, 
there  is  a  reason  for  the  action  beyond  itself ;  but  when 
at  last  we  reach  the  loved  spot,  and  are  safe  within 
the  dear  old  walls  with  father  and  mother  or  with  wife 
and  child,  we  do  not  ask  a  reason  for  being  there — it 
is  where  we  belong. 

Let  us,  then,  without  attempting  systematic  com- 
pleteness, take  up  a  few  of  the  duties  and  see  if  good 
reasons  can  be  given  for  them  and  gradually  work  our 
way,  if  it  is  possible,  toward  the  discovery  of  ends 
that  are  good  in  themselves.  Temperance  is  one  of 
man's  duties  ;  it  is  almost  universally  admitted.  Yet 
I  think  it  is  legitimate  to  ask,  why  we  should  be  tem- 
perate— for  though  familiarity  with  the  idea  may  make 
it  appear  almost  self-evident,  it  is  not  from  the  stand- 
point of  reason  really  so.  We  take  in  as  much  air  as 
we  can  with  our  lungs,  we  can  hardly  have  too  much 
light  and  sunshine — why  may  we  not  drink  as  much 
water  or  wine  as  we  can  and  eat  as  much  food  ?  The 
answer  obviously  is  that  eating  or  drinking  beyond  a 
certain  amount  or  measure  is  injurious  to  our  health ; 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  ETHICS.  271 

if  we  have  gone  beyond  certain  limits,  we  strain  our 
bodily  organism  and  weaken  it.  Hence,  to  the  end  of 
health,  we  must  be  temperate ;  but  for  this,  temper- 
ance would  be  no  virtue  and  intemperance  no  vice. 
Or  consider  the  virtues  of  chastity  and  modesty ;  re- 
spect for  them  is  almost  instinctive  in  men  and  women 
who  have  been  normally  born  and  educated — and  yet 
we  may  ask  why  these  should  be  virtues  and  may 
come  to  see  that  if  the  race  were  not  perpetuated  as 
it  is,  if  certain  peculiar  consequences  did  not  flow 
from  certain  acts,  if  the  institution  of  the  family 
were  not  such  an  all-important  factor  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  man,  there  would  be  no  more  occasion  for  chas- 
tity and  modesty  than  there  is  for  refusing  to  shake 
hands  with  more  than  one  person  or  for  covering 
one's  face  so  it  shall  not  be  seen.  A  duty  is  no  less 
binding  because  we  see  the  reason  for  it ;  rather  it  is 
only  he  who  does  see  the  reason  who  feels  the  full  ex- 
tent of  the  obligation,  as  knowing  all  the  duty  rests 
upon.  This,  it  appears  to  me,  equally  applies  to  truth 
and  falsehood.  We  should  tell  the  truth  to  others  be- 
cause they  need  it,  because  without  knowledge  every 
one  is  more  or  less  in  darkness ;  and  if  there  are  ever 
times  when  we  should  withhold  the  truth  it  is  in  those 
rare  circumstances  when  it  may  injure  rather  than 
help.  Falsehood  is  base  because  it  is  a  sort  of  treach- 
ery— a  disowning  of  the  bond  by  which  we  are  united 
to  our  fellow  men.  For  the  same  reason  we  have  a 
right  to  the  truth  from  others  ;  and,  moreover,  we 
ought  to  give  it  to  ourselves,  or  search  for  it,  if  it  is 
not  at  hand  ;  we  can  only  grow,  we  can  only  step  sure- 
footedly  in  life,  as  we  know.  In  brief,  truth  is  obli- 
gatory, because  it  is  a  means  of  benefit ;  if  it  were  in 
and  of  itself  a  virtue,  irrespective  of  the  needs  or  cir- 


272  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

cumstances  of  those  to  whom  the  knowledge  is  im- 
planted, then  we  should  have  to  speak  the  truth  though 
it  killed  people  and  should  have  to  refuse  to  deceive 
a  raging  animal  though  at  the  risk  of  being  killed  our- 
selves. 

But  now  let  us  take  a  step  further.  We  have 
found  that  there  is  a  reason  for  some  of  the  commonly- 
recognised  duties  of  life,  that  they  are  duties,  because 
in  doing  them  we  contribute  to  certain  desirable  ends. 
In  the  one  case,  it  is  health  ;  in  another,  the  perpetua- 
tion of  the  race ;  in  another,  the  benefit  or  welfare  of 
men.  The  question  then  forces  itself  upon  us,  are 
these  ends  desirable  for  themselves  alone,  or  have  in 
turn  we  to  give  a  reason  for  choosing  them,  just  as  we 
had  to  for  temperance,  purity  and  speaking  the  truth  ? 
Have  we  at  this  stage  arrived  where  we  can  rest,  have 
we  the  ultimate  ends,  the  final  goods,  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  which  we  are  in  search  ?  It  does  not  alto- 
gether seem  so.  What  is  for  the  good  of  our  health 
should  indeed  at  once  have  respect  from  us ;  and  yet 
I  think  it  is  tolerably  evident  on  a  little  reflection  that 
health  is  desirable,  because  with  it  we  can  best  do  our 
work  in  life,  because  with  it  we  are  put  in  possession 
of  all  our  faculties — and  without  it  we  are  in  a  measure 
useless,  a  burden  to  others  and  a  burden  to  ourselves. 
If  we  could  do  our  work  as  well,  if  we  could  be  as 
cheerful,  if  we  could  think  and  attain  all  our  higher 
spiritual  development  as  well  without  health  as  with 
it,  health  would  be  a  matter  of  indifference.  And  if 
we  ever  allow  an  injury  to  our  health,  if  we  ever  take 
risks  with  it  (with  the  sanction  of  conscience,  I  mean), 
it  is  in  aiming  at  some  good  beyond  it — as  mothers 
may  in  child-bearing,  as  explorers  and  pioneers  may 
in  opening  up  new  countries  to  the  world,  as  students 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  ETHICS.  273 

and  philosophic  thinkers  may  in  endeavoring  to  un- 
ravel the  mysteries  of  existence,  as  reformers  may  in 
contending  with  old  wrongs  and  abuses,  as  patriots 
may  who  risk  their  very  life  in  the  defense  of  their 
firesides  and  homes.  We  should  keep  our  health  for 
a  purpose  ;  it  is  not  an  end  in  itself.  I  am  obliged  to 
think  in  the  same  way  of  the  perpetuation  of  the  race. 
I  think  we  may  ask,  why  should  we  follow  these  deep- 
seated  instincts  of  our  nature  ?  Natural  as  it  may  be 
to  obey  them,  self-evident  as  it  may  seem  to  many 
that  there  ought  to  be  more  and  more  people  in  the 
world,  I  think  that  on  sober  reflection  we  are  bound  to 
ask,  why  ?  My  answer  would  be  that  whether  more 
people  in  the  world  are  desirable  depends  upon  what 
sort  of  people  they  are  to  be,  how  circumstanced 
(whether  favorably  or  no  to  a  really  human  develop- 
ment)— for  we  can  easily  conceive  of  conditions  (and 
there  are  likely  to  be  such  in  the  later  history  of  the 
globe)  in  which  life  would  be  a  pitiful,  useless  strug- 
gle ;  and  there  may  be  inborn  tendencies,  physical  and 
mental,  that  may  make  it  better  for  some  men  and 
women  not  to  have  children  now.  The  perpetuation 
of  the  race  is  a  good,  so  far  as  it  means  the  possibil- 
ity of  the  race  rising  ever  to  higher  and  higher  levels, 
so  far  as  it  means  that  there  may  be  new  human  be- 
ings who  may  do  better  than  their  fathers  and  moth- 
ers did  (or,  at  least  as  well),  so  far  as  it  means  the 
continuity  and  perpetuation  and  advancement  of  that 
spiritual  something  we  call  human  civilisation  and 
culture.  No,  the  family,  is  not  an  end ;  it  is  a  means 
to  an  end — a  necessary  means,  indeed,  and  thereby  a 
sacred  institution,  but  still  looking  beyond  itself ;  and 
these  fathers  and  mothers  are  truly  hallowed  in  their 
domestic  lives  who  wish  to  bring  up  their  children  to 


274  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

carry  still  further  the  conquests  of  light,  of  love,  and 
of  justice  in  the  world. 

Yet  when  we  think  of  the  third  end  of  which  dis- 
covery was  made — namely,  the  benefit  or  welfare  of 
men,  must  we  not  say  that  this  is  a  self-evident  good, 
that  no  reason  outside  it  is  required  for  seeking  it, 
since  it  appeals  so  immediately  to  us?  In  a  sense  it 
must  be  admitted  that  this  is  so.  The  reasons  that 
have  been  given  for  the  other  ends,  just  discussed, 
are  more  or  less  closely  connected  with  this  end.  And 
yet  it  is  necessary  that  we  have  a  clear  idea  of  what 
the  benefit  or  welfare  of  men  means.  There  may  be 
different  standards  by  which  to  judge  it,  there  may  be 
limited  notions  of  it;  and  we  must  not  content  our- 
selves with  a  phrase  or  a  vague  idea.  Some  may  un- 
derstand by  welfare  simply  being  well-situated  in  life, 
secure  against  enemies  and  accidents  ;  but  such  wel- 
fare is  as  one-sided  and  incomplete  a  notion  as  health 
— we  may  ask,  Why  should  we  be  thus  favorably  situ- 
ated ?  what  is  the  good  of  it,  if  we  do  not  make  more 
of  ourselves  thereby  ?  Others  may  understand  by  wel- 
fare happiness ;  and  surely  happiness  has  the  marks 
of  being  a  good  in  itself.  When  we  are  happy,  we 
do  not  ask  why,  to  what  end  are  we  happy  ?  For  all 
labor,  for  all  effort,  for  all  self-denial  there  must  be  a 
reason ;  but  there  needs  be  no  reason  for  happiness. 
And  yet  happiness,  while  a  good  (in  itself),  is  not  nec- 
essarily the  good,  the  whole  good ;  and  such  is  its  sin- 
gular nature  that  it  may  be  connected  with  not  only 
what  is  otherwise  good,  but  with  what  is  unworthy 
and  bad.  Are  there  not  those  who  find  happiness  in 
ruling  other  people  and  bringing  them  under  their 
thumb,  are  there  not  those  who  find  happiness  in  liv- 
ing in  the  eyes  of  the  world  and  being  continually  no- 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  ETHICS.  275 

ticed  and  applauded,  are  there  not  those  who  find 
happiness  in  giving  themselves  up  to  selfish  pursuits 
and  are  never  so  pleased  as  when  they  have  driven  a 
successful  bargain  at  somebody  else's  loss?  Happi- 
ness in  and  of  itself  is  innocent  and  is  one  of  the  first 
ends  of  our  being,  but  when  it  is  made  into  the  only 
end,  when  other  goods  are  made  secondary  or  ignored, 
it  may  be  the  accompaniment  of  ignoble  as  well  as  no- 
ble action ;  moreover,  in  the  existing  state  of  human 
nature,  happiness  is  so  variable  a  quantity,  that  it  can 
scarcely  be  said  to  furnish  a  standard  at  all  (even  a 
low  or  poor  one),  and  so  an  ancient  writer  said  well, 
"Pleasure  is  the  companion,  not  the  guide  of  virtue." 
We  may  live  for  happiness,  if  we  only  make  it  con- 
sistent with  other  ends  of  our  being  ;  we  may  work  for 
other's  happiness,  so  it  be  a  worthy  happiness,  a  hap- 
piness which  is  a  harmonious  part  of  a  total  good. 

Physical  security  and  comfort,  happiness — these 
are  not  enough  as  measures  of  man's  welfare;  the  one 
is  too  low,  the  other  too  variable.  And  how  is  it  pos- 
sible to  judge  of  welfare  save  by  saying  that  it  must 
take  in  the  whole  of  man,  not  only  the  life  of  the  body 
or  the  satisfaction  of  existing  desires,  but  the  life  of 
the  mind  and  spirit,  the  possibilities  of  willing  and 
achieving,  the  capacities  of  love — so  that  to  work  for 
human  welfare  means  to  work  for  the  cultivation,  the 
enrichment,  the  indefinite  enlargement  and  expansion 
of  the  entire  life  of  men,  physical  and  spiritual?  If 
we  mean  by  human  welfare,  human  perfection,  if  we 
set  before  ourselves  the  ideal  of  a  perfected  humanity 
— then  we  have  an  end  in  which  we  can  rest,  a  goal 
that  has  every  appearance  of  being  a  final  goal,  be- 
cause we  can  imagine  nothing  greater  beyond  it,  be- 
cause there  is  no  outside  purpose  a  perfected  human- 


276  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

ity  could  serve  which  could  be  as  great  as  itself.  We 
may  not  be  able  to  say  beforehand  all  that  a  perfected 
humanity  would  attain,  all  it  would  be ;  we  may  not 
be  able  to  present  a  definite  picture  of  it — yet  we  know 
the  tendencies,  the  capacities  that  await  a  full  and 
complete  development,  we  know  the  lines  of  advance 
in  the  past,  we  see  how  they  stretch  out  before  us 
now ;  we  know  our  direction,  our  bearing — and  what 
will  be  (or  should  be)  in  the  future  is  only  an  exten- 
sion, an  unfolding,  a  blossoming  and  ripening  of  what 
we  have  now.  Humanity's  powers,  (all  it  has  con- 
sciously, all  that  may  be  revealed  to  it)  passed  into 
realisation — the  mind,  the  heart,  the  will  of  universal 
man  in  full  play  and  triumphant  activity ;  that  is  the 
ideal  that  seems  to  sum  up  what  is  valid  in  all  other 
ideals,  that  is  the  good  which  serves  to  measure  all 
other  goods ;  everything  is  right  which  tends  to  its 
accomplishment  and  everything  is  wrong  which  tends 
to  defeat  it  and  make  it  impossible  ;  all  our  duties 
(which  are  real  duties)  have  their  ultimate  sanction 
here — they  are  explained  by,  derived  from  the  one  su- 
preme duty  of  laboring  for  such  a  consummation ; 
every  valid  rule  of  action  is  only  an  application  of  the 
sovereign  rule  to  work  for  the  perfection  of  society, 
for  the  total  development  of  the  capacities  of  man. 

It  is  only  another  way  of  stating  this  to  say  that  we 
have  now  reached  the  point  where  we  cease  to  ask  for 
reasons.  It  is  as  with  any  scientific  investigation ; 
when  we  reach  an  ultimate  law  of  nature  or  an  ulti- 
mate fact,  we  are  satisfied.  We  do  not  wish  to  go  be- 
yond it,  because  there  is  no  going  beyond  it ;  and  all 
the  demands  and  efforts  of  our  reason  might  be  said 
to  be  to  the  end  of  finding  something  about  which  we 
have  to  reason  no  more.     Such  a  recognition  as  this 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  ETHICS.  277 

when  made  in  the  realm  of  morals  is  sometimes  mis- 
understood. When  we  propose  an  ultimate  rule  of 
right  action  and  say  that  no  reason  can  be  given  for  it, 
this  is  misinterpreted  as  meaning  that  we  give  up  re- 
liance or  reason  and  abandon  ourselves  to  mysticism  ; 
while  it  is  reason  and  reason  only  that  has  brought  us 
to  the  discovery  of  the  ultimate  rule,  and  the  rule 
might  be  called  (if  so  long  a  word  can  be  pardoned) 
the  objectification  of  reason — that  is,  reason  written 
out  into  an  objective  law.  Mysticism  is,  if  I  under- 
stand the  word,  a  love  of  vague,  shadowy,  nebulous 
thoughts,  a  preference  of  twilight  or  the  dark  rather 
than  the  clear  light  of  day ;  but  nothing  is  clearer,  more 
distinct,  (to  one  who  thinks  along  the  lines  I  have  just 
followed)  than  this  ultimate  law  of  right  which  I  have 
stated  ;  no  reason  could  be  given  for  it  that  is  as  clear 
as  the  law  itself.  A  sense  of  all  this  is  the  motive  for 
the  assertion  sometimes  made  that  it  is  absurd  for  a 
man  to  ask,  Why  should  I  do  right  ?  For  when  one  finds 
the  real,  ultimate  right,  the  question  is  absurd ;  but 
this  does  not  mean  that  it  is  absurd  to  ask  why  one 
should  be  temperate,  or  truthful,  or  chaste,  or  obedient 
to  authority,  all  of  which  are  right  only  in  relation  to  cir- 
cumstances that  may  change.  When  we  find  out  what 
is  right,  when  we  discover  any  special  minor  duty  that 
•  is  really  duty,  there  is  nothing  under  heaven  for  us 
but  to  do  it ;  and  the  question,  Why?  as  it  is  some- 
times raised  does  not  mean  a  demand  for  intellectual 
clarification,  but  rather,  What  am  I  going  to  get  by 
doing  right  ?  and  springs  from  a  base  motive  rather 
than  a  noble  one.  There  are  not  a  few  of  these  spe- 
cious questioners  to-day — weak,  timid  children  of  fash- 
ion and  conventional  religion — who  ask  why  should 
they  rule  their  passions  and  live  sober  righteous  lives, 


278  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

unless  it  is  that  they  are  going  to  be  rewarded  for  it 
hereafter;  so  little  does  popular  Christianity  really 
educate  the  moral  nature  of  its  followers.  For  there 
is  this  implication  in  the  idea  of  an  ultimate  rule  of 
action — namely,  that  man  has  a  capacity  of  acting  in 
accordance  with  it,  that  there  is  (what  we  may  call  for 
lack  of  a  better  term)  an  instinct  for  the  right  in  him, 
a  love  for  the  right  as  such,  just  as  there  is  a  love  for 
the  truth  as  such,  irrespective  of  any  personal  gain 
save  the  consciousness  of  knowing  it ;  this  disinter- 
ested love  of  truth  is  the  basic  motive  of  science  and 
the  love  of  right  is  the  basic  motive  of  really  moral 
conduct. 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  supreme  rule  it  ought 
now  to  be  possible  to  survey  the  whole  field  of  duty 
and  to  give  an  explanation  and  justification  for  each 
minor  rule.  This  would  be  necessary  to  complete  our 
investigation  and  to  give  it  a  thoroughly  scientific 
character.  But  I  fear  I  have  already  taken  more  space 
than  should  be  accorded  to  a  single  article. 


THE  "IS"  AND  THE"  OUGHT." 


The  distinction  between  explicative  and  normative 
sciences  is  for  certain  purposes  very  commendable. 
Such  sciences  as  psychology,  physiology,  botany,  gram- 
mar, etc.,  explain  the  "is,"  they  describe  facts  as  they 
are,  while  such  sciences  as  logic,  horticulture,  hygiene, 
ethics,  etc.,  set  forth  an  "ought";  they  prescribe  the 
methods  by  which  a  certain  ideal  is  to  be  attained. 
Normative  sciences  in  so  far  as  they  are  practically 
applied  are  also  called  disciplines. 

Yet  the  distinction  between  explicative  and  norma- 
tive sciences  is  artificial ;  it  serves  a  certain  purely 
scientific  purpose,  viz.  to  discriminate  between  natural 
laws  and  rules  ;  but  it  is  not  founded  in  the  nature  of 
things.  The  realities  which  form  the  objects  of  these 
sciences  are  undivided  and  indivisible.  Hygiene  is 
possible  only  on  the  basis  of  physiology ;  logic  only 
on  the  basis  of  a  knowledge  of  the  actual  modes  of 
thought ;  horticulture  only  on  the  basis  of  botany,  and 
ethics  only  on  the  basis  of  psychology  and  sociology. 

It  is  true  that  as  a  rule  a  skilled  gardener  will  raise 
better  fruit  than  a  scientific  botanist,  but  the  best  fruit 
will  be  raised  in  the  botanical  gardens  where  skill  is 
guided  by  scientific  insight. 

The  ethics  of  mankind  has  up  to  date  been  almost 
exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the  clergy,  who  in  so  far  as 


280  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

they  are  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  dogmatism,  claim  to 
be  in  possession  of  a  nostrum  which  was  by  a  divine 
revelation  entrusted  solely  to  their  care,  and  maintain 
that  nothing  can  be  learned  from  science.  The  pres- 
ent age,  however,  no  longer  believes  in  nostrums  and 
science  penetrates  everywhere.  Humanity  has  found 
out  that  ethics  forms  no  exception  among  the  norma- 
tive disciplines  and  that  it  can  be  based  upon  science 
as  much  as  hygiene  and  horticulture. 

The  greatest  demand  of  the  time  is  not  as  the  icon- 
oclast says  the  abolition  of  religion,  it  is  not  as  the 
dogmatist  says,  a  revival  of  the  blind  faith  of  ages  gone 
by,  the  greatest  demand  of  the  time  is  a  conciliation 
between  religion  and  science,  is  the  imbuement  of  the 
clergy  with  the  holy  spirit  of  research,  not  in  their 
symbolic  books  only,  not  in  the  Bible  only,  but  in  the 
wider  and  more  reliable  revelation  of  God,  in  nature  ; 
the  greatest  demand  of  the  time  is  the  maturing  of 
dogmatic  religion  into  a  religion  of  science  which  will 
finally  turn  the  cathedrals,  temples,  and  synagogues 
of  mankind  into  churches  of  science. 

The  Christian  catechisms  distinguish  between  the 
visible  churches  and  the  Invisible  Church,  the  latter 
being  the  ideal  of  the  former.  There  is  a  great  truth 
in  this  distinction.  The  Invisible  Church  is  that  church 
whose  faith  is  the  religion  of  science,  who  preaches 
the  ethics  based  upon  facts  and  stands  upon  the  ground 
of  demonstrable  truth.  The  Invisible  Church  is  an 
ideal ;  but  it  is  not  an  air  castle.  The  Invisible  Church 
is  the  aim  toward  which  the  development  of  all  the 
visible  churches  tends.  So  long  as  the  visible  churches 
grow  to  be  more  and  more  like  the  Invisible  Church, 
they  will  be  and  remain  the  moral  leaders  of  man- 
kind. 


THE  "IS"  AA'D  THE  "0C7GS/T.n  281 

If  the  churches  refuse  to  progress  with  the  spirit 
of  the  time,  they  will  lose  their  influence  upon  society, 
and  the  kingdom  will  be  taken  from  them  and  given 
to  others.  That  which  we  want,  that  which  we  must 
have,  and  that  which  mankind  will  have  after  all,  if 
not  to-day  or  to-morrow,  yet  in  some  not  too  distant 
future  is  a  church  which  preaches  the  religion  of  hu- 
manity, which  has  no  creed,  no  dogmas,  but  avowing 
a  faith  in  truth  and  in  the  provableness  of  truth, 
teaches  an  ethics  based  upon  the  facts  of  nature. 

When  the  Ethical  Societies  were  founded  many 
people  hoped  that  a  movement  was  started  which 
would  supply  the  demand  of  a  religion  of  science  and 
of  scientific  ethics  applied  to  practical  life.  This  hope 
was  not  fulfilled.  The  founder  of  the  ethical  societies  is 
swayed  by  principles  which  are  little  short  of  an  actual 
hostility  toward  science,  and  Mr.  Salter  is  not  as  yet 
free  from  the  belief  that  the  ultimate  basis  of  science 
rests  upon  some  transcendental  principle.  Science  in 
his  opinion  fails  at  the  critical  point. 

The  Societies  of  Ethical  Culture  can  be  called  pro- 
gressive in  so  far  only  as  they  discard  rituals  and  cere- 
monies ;  but  they  are  actually  a  reactionary  movement 
on  the  main  point  in  question.  And  there  are  frequent 
instances  of  clergymen  and  rabbis  who  proclaim  freely 
and  boldly  the  advanced  ideas  of  a  scientific  concep- 
tion of  religion.  Such  views  are  not  only  not  heard 
from  the  platforms  of  the  Societies  for  Ethical  Cul- 
ture, but  they  are  stigmatised  by  their  leader. 

It  seems  to  me  that  in  the  present  article  Mr.  Sal- 
ter has  considerably  approached  our  position.  He 
objects  to  mysticism,  which  Professor  Adler  formerly 
regarded  as  an  indispensable  element  of  ethics  and 
ethical  culture,  and  we  may  hope  that  the  barrier  of 


282  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

his  transcendentalism  that  separates  us  still  may  be 
broken  down  too. 
Mr.  Salter  says : 

"  Here  then  is  the  field  for  our  inquiry — not  nature,  not  man 
in  general,  not  his  actions,  but  the  rules  according  to  which  he 
conceives  he  should  act." 

But  he  exclaims  with  a  tinge  of  hopeless  despair, 
as  if  there  were  no  answer  to  the  question  : 

"  Where  shall  we  turn  for  light  as  to  this  problem  ? " 

He  answers  the  question  by  a  counter-question  ;  he 
asks  : 

"  Who  does  not  see  that  everything  depends  upon  the  use  to 
which  we  mean  to  put  our  knowledge  ? " 

*  *  It  seems  to  be  taken  for  granted  that  everybody  desires  hap- 
piness or  long  life  for  himself  and  others." 

"But  the  fact  is  that  we  may  desire*  other  things." 

Is  Mr.  Salter's  question  unanswerable  ?  We  hope 
not;  for  if  it  were  unanswerable,  ethics  could  not  ex- 
ist as  a  science. 

The  ultimate  question  of  ethics  is  not  what  WE 
desire,  but  on  the  contrary  what  IS  desired  of  us.  We, 
i.  e.  our  personal  likes  and  dislikes,  our  intentions  to 
make  or  to  mar,  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  subject. 
Ethics  does  not  in  the  least  depend  upon  the  use  to 
which  we  mean  to  put  our  knowledge.  The  mere  in- 
troduction of  the  we  and  what  we  intend  to  use  facts 
for,  will  produce  confusion.  This  "  we  "  of  our  per- 
sonal desires  is  the  veil  of  Maya  which  deceives  us 
and  leads  us  so  easily  astray. 

The  "is"  that  forms  the  basis  of  the  "ought"  in 
ethics  consists  in  the  nature  of  mankind  and  of  the 
universe  in  which  mankind  exists.  The  laws  of  na- 
ture, especially  of  human  nature  and  of  the  evolution 

*  Italics  axe  ours. 


THE  "75"  AND  THE  "OUGHT."  283 

of  humanity,  are  the  very  same  thing  which  the  dog- 
matic religions  call  "the  will  of  God."  The  will  of 
God  remains  and  will  remain,  for  ever  and  aye,  the  ba- 
sis of  ethics. 

Facts  are  such  as  they  are,  and  the  laws  of  nature 
will  prevail.  This  is  the  basic  truth  of  ethics  and  any 
question  whether  we  shall  recognise  the  will  of  God, 
whether  we  shall  acknowledge  the  truth  of  nature's 
laws,  whether  we  shall  adopt  the  rules  that  are  de- 
rived from  the  "is"  into  our  will  as  the  supreme  rule 
of  action,  is  another  question  of  a  personal  nature,  but 
it  does  neither  invalidate  the  basis  of  ethics,  nor  does 
it  stand  in  any  connection  with  it. 

We  might  be  dissatisfied  with  the  laws  of  nature 
and  might  imagine  that  we,  if  we  had  created  the 
world,  should  have  arranged  them  better  than  they  are. 
We  might  decline  to  respect  the  precepts  of  the  moral 
ought.  That  would  doom  our  souls  to  perdition,  for 
O  Man!  who  art  thou  that  repliest  against  God? 
(Rom.  ix,  20.)  It  is  hard  for  thee  to  kick  against  the 
pricks.     (Acts  ix,  5.) 

The  ought  of  ethics  remains  the  same  whether  I,  or 
you,  or  anybody  else,  deigns  to  follow,  or  refuses  to  fol- 
low, its  behests ;  for  the  ultimate  basis  of  ethics  is  not 
founded  upon  any  so-called  immovable  rock  of  our  con- 
science, not  upon  our  subjective  likes  or  dislikes,  not 
upon  what  we  choose  to  do  or  to  leave  alone.  The 
ultimate  basis  of  ethics  is  of  an  objective  nature.  The 
criterion  of  ethics  is  one  of  fact  and  not  of  opinion. 
That  which  has  to  be  the  standard  of  moral  action  can 
be  inquired  into,  and  can  be  searched  for  by  scientific 
methods ;  it  can  be  stated  with  as  much  exactness  as 
the  mathematical  or  logical  rules  or  as  any  other  pre- 
cepts of  the  normative  sciences. 


284  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

Ethics  is  a  normative  science.  It  is  as  truly  a  science 
in  every  respect  as  are  all  the  normative  sciences. 
The  ultimate  principles  of  the  normative  sciences  are 
not  of  a  transcendental  nature,  they  are  founded  upon 
the  actual  facts  of  life;  the  "ought"  derives  its  rules 
from  the  "is,"  the  ideal  is  rooted  and  must  be  rooted 
in  the  real. 


AN  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MORAL  OUGHT. 


COMMENTS    UPON    PROF.    H.    SIDGWICK'S    VIEW. 


The  question  has  been  raised  by  ethical  students, 
How  is  it  that  man  has  the  idea  of  "ought "  at  all  ?* 

The  ideas  "right,"  "moral  goodness,"  "duty," 
the  "ought,"  etc.,  are  fundamental  notions  of  ethics. 
As  such  they  should  be  carefully  defined  ;  yet  they  are 
frequently  used  by  moralists  without  an  analysis  of 
their  meaning.  Professor  Sidgwick  says  in  his  article 
"Some  Fundamental  Ethical  Controversies,"  Mind, 
No.  56,  p.  480 : 

"  Different  systems  give  different  answers  to  the  fundamental 
question,  '  What  is  right,'  but  not,  therefore,  a  different  meaning 
to  the  question." 

Professor  Sidgwick  adds : 

"According  tome,  this  fundamental  notion  is  ultimate  and 
unanalysable  :  in  saying  which  I  do  not  mean  to  affirm  that  it  be- 
longs to  the  'original  constitution  of  the  mind,'  and  is  not  the  re- 
sult of  a  process  of  development ;   that  is  a  question  of  psychol- 

*  I  owe  the  suggestion  of  writing  this  article  to  Mr.  Salter.  He  takes  the 
view  that  the  "ought"  is  an  obligation  of  absolute  authority  residing  beyond 
facts  and  beyond  the  realm  of  science.  Thus  my  attention  was  called  to  the 
importance  of  an  analysis  of  the  ought-idea  itself.  Whether  or  not  the  ought- 
idea  is  conceived  as  absolute,  ultimate,  and  unanalysable  is  not  a  merely 
theoretical  problem,  it  is  of  practical  importance  ;  for  if  we  suppose  that  the 
ought  is  absolute,  ultimate,  and  unanalysable,  we  are  prevented  from  inquir- 
ing into  its  nature  and  come  under  the  spell  of  a  mysticism  that  debars  pro- 
gress and  further  philosophical  research. 


286  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

ogy — or  rather  psychogony  with  which  I  am  not  concerned :  I 
merely  mean  that  as  I  now  find  it  in  my  thought,  I  cannot  resolve 
it  into,  or  explain  it  by,  any  more  elementary  notions.  I  regard  it 
as  co-ordinate  with  the  notion  expressed  by  the  word  '  is '  or  '  ex- 
ists.' Possibly  these  and  other  fundamental  notions  may,  in  the 
progress  of  philosophy,  prove  capable  of  being  arranged  in  some 
system  of  rational  evolution  ;  but  I  hold  that  no  such  system  has 
as  yet  been  constructed  and  that,  therefore,  the  notions  are  now 
and  for  us  ultimate." 

The  "ought "  is  most  certainly  a  fact,  or  to  use  Pro- 
fessor Sidg wick's  words,  it  is  "a  co-ordinate  with  the 
notion  expressed  by  the  word  'is'  or  'exists.'  "  But 
he  who  attempts  to  describe  the  meaning  of  the 
"ought"  will  find  that  it  is  neither  unanalysable  nor 
ultimate  ;  on  the  contrary  it  is  a  complex  fact  of  a  very 
special  kind.  The  expression  "ought "  represents  a  cer- 
tain relation  among  the  ideas  of  a  living,  thinking, 
and  acting  creature. 

By  "analysing  an  idea,"  I  understand,  as  Professor 
Sidgwick  expresses  it,  "a  resolving  it  into  more  ele- 
mentary notions."  All  our  notions  are  descriptions  of 
facts.  Those  notions  which  represent  a  complex  state 
of  things  accordingly  are  analysable,  they  can  be  de- 
scribed as  certain  relations  or  certain  configurations  of 
more  elementary  and  more  simple  facts.  Analysing 
is  at  the  same  time  classifying.  The  most  elementary 
and  most  simple  facts  would  be  those  qualities  of 
phenomena  which  are  a  universal  feature  of  reality. 
And  it  is  a  matter  of  course  that  something  that  is  uni- 
versal can  in  its  turn  be  no  further  subsumed  under 
more  general  views.  Analysis  as  well  as  classification 
ends  with  the  universal  and  simplest  qualities  of  exist- 
ence. 

The  mind  of  a  living  being  consists  of  many  im- 
pulses the  origin  of  which  is  a  problem  that  belongs 


AN  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MORAL  OUGHT.  287 

(as  Professor  Sidgwick  declares  of  the  "ought"),  to 
psychogony.  Yet  the  subject  is  too  important  to  be 
left  out  in  ethics  and  if  Professor  Sidgwick  knows  of 
no  system  that  can  analyse  such  facts  as  the  ethical 
impulse  of  "the  ought,"  it  is  highly  desirable  to  do 
the  work. 


Impulses  are  tendencies  to  pass  into  action.  To 
pass  into  action  is  an  incipient  motion.  What  is  mo- 
tion? 

Motion  is  change  of  place.  Hydrogen  and  oxygen 
when  brought  into  contact  show  a  tendency  to  com- 
bine ;  they  exhibit  an  incipient  motion.  A  ball  placed 
on  a  slanting  surface  will  roll  down  ;  it  is  going  to 
change  its  place  and  this  state  is  an  incipient  motion. 
The  process  of  chemical  combination  and  the  rolling 
ball  are  motions,  but  no  actions;  they  are  not  deeds 
of  rational  beings. 

The  word  "action"  is  used  in  two  senses,  (1)  to 
designate  the  purposive  deeds  of  rational  beings ;  and 
(2)  to  denote  a  certain  view  of  motion,  which  should 
include  every  kind  of  efficiency,  not  only  real  mo- 
tions, i.  e.  changes  of  place,  but  also  pressures  where 
the  effect  of  the  action  is  to  counteract  another 
action  of  equal  force  :  thus  the  result  of  +  1  and  —  1 
is  a  zero  of  motion,  or  rest.  In  this  wider  sense  of 
the  word  we  speak  of  the  action  of  oxygen  upon  other 
elements  and  the  action  of  a  resting  stone  that  exer- 
cises a  pressure.  Action  in  the  narrow  sense  of  the 
word,  designating  the  deeds  of  rational  beings,  is  a 
very  complex  kind  of  motion.  There  is  some  addi- 
tional feature  in  action.  What  is  that  additional 
feature? 


288  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

Action  is  purposive  motion.    What  is  purpose? 

Purpose  is  the  aim  of  the  actor. 

Has  the  rolling  ball  no  aim  ?  Yes  it  has  an  aim. 
Motion  cannot  be  thought  without  possessing  a  definite 
direction.  Every  gravitating  body  has  an  aim.  It  does 
not  always  reach  its  aim,  but  that  is  of  no  account. 
Every  chemical  atom  that  combines  with  another  atom 
has  an  aim.  Every  piece  of  reality  is  acting  somehow  in 
a  definite  way.  The  end  of  the  direction  of  its  action 
is  called  the  aim  of  its  action.  If  there  are  obstacles 
preventing  a  motion  reaching  its  aim,  the  motion  comes 
to  a  rest.  That  is  the  end  of  the  motion,  yet  not  the  end 
of  the  activity  of  the  moving  body.  The  action  of 
the  moving  body  (i.  e.  in  the  wider  sense  of  the  term 
"action")  continues  in  the  shape  of  pressure  in  the 
direction  of  the  aim. 

These  processes  are  described  by  the  physicist  who 
uses  the  terms  kinetic  and  potential  energy  to  repre- 
sent the  two  forms  of  the  activity  of  acting  things.  All 
acting  things  are  real.  Their  activity  is  that  feature 
which  makes  them  real.  Activity  in  this  sense  of  the 
term  is  called  in  German  Wirklichkeit  y  and  Wirklichkeit 
at  the  same  time  means  "reality." 

Every  motion  having  an  aim,  purpose  must  be 
something  more  than  "aim";  and  indeed  it  is.  Pur- 
pose is  the  conscious  representation  of  an  aim.  The 
falling  stone  has  an  aim.  If  the  stone  were  conscious 
of  its  aim,  we  should  say,  that  the  falling  stone  has  a 
purpose. 

This  then  is  the  main  difference  between  motion 
and  action,  between  aim  and  purpose.  Action  (in  the 
narrow  sense  of  the  term)  is  conscious  motion,  and 
purpose  is  a  conscious  aim. 


AN  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MORAL  OUGHT.  289 

Action  and  motion  are  different,  but  on  the  other 
hand  they  possess  something  in  common.  The  simi- 
larity between  action  and  motion  is  their  spontaneity. 

The  gravity  of  a  stone  acts  in  a  certain  way  ac- 
cording to  the  stone's  position.  This  gravity  is  a  qual- 
ity of  the  stone,  it  is  part  of  its  existence,  it  is  its 
intrinsic  and  inalienable  nature.  There  is  not  a  force 
outside  the  stone  that  pushes  it,  there  is  no  external 
so-called  "cause  "*  that  makes  it  fall,  but  the  stone  it- 
self falls.  The  stone  falls  because  that  is  its  nature, 
and  when  lying  on  the  ground  it  exercises  a  certain 
pressure,  because  that  is  its  nature.  In  certain  posi- 
tions this  same  nature,  called  "gravity,"  acts  as  mo- 
tion, in  others  as  pressure ;  but  throughout  it  is  spon- 
taneous activity — spontaneous,  because  rising  out  of 
its  own  being,  and  characterising  its  real  nature. 

This  same  spontaneity  is  found  throughout  reality, 
in  organic  nature,  and  also  in  the  conscious  actions  of 
living  organisms.  The  spontaneity  of  living  organisms 
is  so  immediate  that  men  have  always  believed  that 
their  actions  (in  the  absence  of  compulsion)  are  their 
own  doing  and  that  they  are  responsible  for  their  ac- 
tions. This  state  of  things  has  been  called  freedom  of 
will.  And  certainly  this  conception  is  not  based  upon 
error,  it  is  true.  Yet  men  noticing  that  actions  per- 
formed without  the  compulsion  of  others  are  spontan- 
eous expressions  of  the  actor's  character,  forgot  that 

*  This  wrong  usage  of  the  term  "  cause  "  has  discredited  the  idea  of  cause, 
so  that  philosophers  rose  to  say,  there  are  no  causes  whatever.  Their  inten- 
tions were  right ;  there  are  no  causes  acting  as  agents  upon  things.  But  this 
wrong  usage  of  the  term  cause  is  no  reason  to  discard  a  useful  idea.  Causa- 
tion is  transformation  and  the  term  "cause"  should  mean  only  the  relatively 
first  motion  in  a  series  of  motions  representing  in  a  certain  process  the  start 
of  the  transformation  which  can  be  arbitrarily  selected,  and  "  effect  "  the  final 
state  of  things  with  which  the  process  ends.    (See  Fund.  Prob.  pp.  96—104.) 


2go  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

this  is  true  of  all  activity  in  nature.  The  light  burns 
because  it  is  its  nature  to  burn.  The  burning  is  spon- 
taneous. The  oxygen  combines  with  the  fatty  sub- 
stances of  the  oil  in  the  wick  not  because  there  is  a 
so-called  "cause"  operating  upon  it,  but  because  the 
oxygen  is  a  reality  of  a  definite  nature  and  to  enter 
under  this  condition  into  a  combination  with  certain 
atoms  of  combustible  materials  is  this  nature  of  the 
oxygen.  Its  action  is  spontaneous  just  as  much  as  a 
man's  action  is  spontaneous. 

There  is  no  reality  but  it  is  possessed  of  spontane- 
ity, nay  reality  is  spontaneity  itself ;  and  the  constancy 
of  this  spontaneity  makes  it  that  natural  processes,  the 
actions  of  men  included,  can  be  foreseen  and  prede- 
termined ;  or  as  the  scientist  expresses  it  that  all  na- 
ture is  governed  by  law — not  that  there  were  a  law 
from  the  outside  imposed  upon  the  world,  but  that  the 
nature  of  everything  that  exists  is  constant  in  all  its 
changes,  that  accordingly  it  exhibits  regularities  which 
can  be  described  in  formulas  called  natural  laws. 

Natural  law  is  no  oppression  of  nature.  Natural 
law  is  only  a  description  of  its  being  ;  and  nature  is 
free  throughout.  Everything  in  nature  acts  not  as  it 
must,  but  (to  speak  anthropomorphically)  as  it  wills, 
i.  e.  according  to  its  own  being. 


Man's  actions  are  distinguished  from  the  motions 
of  so-called  inanimate  nature  in  so  far  as  he  is  con- 
scious of  his  aim.  The  aims  of  so-called  inanimate 
nature  are  not  conscious,  they  cannot  be  called  pur- 
poses. Conscious  beings  alone  can  have  purposes.  The 
problem  of  the  origin  of  consciousness  accordingly  will 
also  solve  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  purpose  and 


AN  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MORAL  OUGHT.  291 

purposive  action.  We  have  treated  the  problem  of  the 
origin  of  consciousness  at  length  on  other  occasions, 
which  briefly  recapitulated  is  as  follows  :  * 

Consciousness  is  a  certain  feature  of  our  existence 
which  is  best  characterised  as  awareness.  Conscious- 
ness is  not  objective  existence,  it  is  not  matter  and 
not  motion  :  it  is  subjective  existence.  Consciousness 
is  a  complex  state  of  simpler  elements  and  these  simpler 
elements  are  called  feelings.  The  simplest  feelings  a 
man  knows  of  are  perceived  as  awarenesses  of  certain 
states.  Feelings  as  they  are  perceived  and  known  have 
a  meaning,  and  this  meaning  originates  by  comparison 
with  other  feelings  and  memories  of  feelings.  Feel- 
ings represent  something,  and  that  which  they  repre- 
rent  is  called  the  object.  A  feeling  organism  feels  it- 
self as  a  body,  as  an  objective  thing  among  things. 
This  body  affects  and  is  affected  by  other  bodies  and 
it  feels  differently  as  it  is  differently  affected.  Although 
other  bodies  like  our  own  body  belong  to  and  are  a 
part  of  objective  existence,  we  communicate  with  them 
and  cannot  deal  with  them  otherwise  than  by  treating 
them  as  possessing  subjectivity.  We  regard  them  as 
conscious  beings  like  ourselves.  Their  feelings,  their 
consciousness  cannot  be  seen,  but  their  whole  attitude 
indicates  that  their  feelings  are  analogous  to  ours.  It 
is  natural  that  feelings  cannot  be  seen,  or  observed, 
for  they  are  not  objective  states  but  subjective  states. 
They  are  felt  by  the  subject  that  is  feeling.  Our  own 
feelings  would  appear  to  others  who  looked  into  our 
pulsating  brain  as  motions,  so  it  is  natural  that  the 
feelings  of  others  can  appear  to  us  likewise  as  motions 
only.  Motion  and  feeling  accordingly  are  the  subjec- 
tive and  objective  aspects  of  reality. 

*  See  The  Soul  of  Man,  pp.  23-45 


2Q2  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

Every  feeling  is  objectively  considered  a  motion, 
but  not  vice  versa.  Not  every  motion  is  a  feeling. 
Feelings  are  in  their  objective  aspect  very  complex 
motions.  Yet  while  we  do  not  say  that  every  motion 
is  a  feeling,  we  say  that  every  objective  existence,  is 
at  the  same  time  a  subjective  existence,  and  this  sub- 
jective existence  which  seems  of  no  account  in  inor- 
ganic nature,  is  no  mere  blank,  it  is,  not  feeling,  but 
potentiality  of  feeling  ;  it  contains  the  germs  of  psy- 
chical existence,  and  this  leads  to  the  inevitable  con- 
clusion that  the  world  is  throughout  spiritual  in  its 
innermost  nature.  That  which  appears  to  a  subject 
as  objectivity  is  in  itself  subjectivity,  that  which  ap- 
pears as  matter  is  in  itself  spiritual :  either  actual  spirit 
or  potential  spirit. 

We  can  form  no  idea  of  the  subjective  existence  of 
inorganic  nature,  but  its  objective  existence  is  grand 
enough  to  satisfy  us.  The  subjectivity  of  the  sun  for 
instance  may  be  as  grand  as  the  enormous  amount  of 
energy  that  carries  his  light  through  cosmic  space,  an 
extremely  small  part  of  which  is  intercepted  by  the 
earth  where  it  is  the  main  source  of  light  and  life  and 
joy.  Yet  whatever  be  the  subjectivity  of  inorganic  na- 
ture, apparently  it  does  not  consist  in  representations. 
Representations  originate  only  with  the  rise  of  feelings 
when  feelings  acquire  certain  meanings,  and  when  sub- 
jectivity becomes  representative  we  call  it  mind. 

Living  organisms  are  active  beings,  and  with  the 
rise  of  consciousness  the  aims  of  their  actions  become 
purposes. 

Suppose  a  conscious  being  were  possessed  of  one 
purpose  only,  his  action  would  be  determined  by  that 
one  purpose.  Yet  living  beings  are  very  complex  and 
the  memory-structures  of  their  minds  will  under  cer- 


AN  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MORAL  OUGHT.  293 

tain  circumstances  naturally  suggest  in  a  rapid  succes- 
sion several  propositions  of  which  one  only  can  be  se- 
lected as  a  purpose.  The  conflict  among  these  several 
propositions,  which  are  called  motives  of  action,  will 
cause  a  delay,  this  conflict  is  called  deliberation,  which 
lasts  until  the  strongest  motive  has  overcome  the  re- 
sistance of  the  other  motives. 

The  strongest  motive  at  any  one  moment  is  by  no 
means  the  strongest  motive  at  other  moments.  Thus 
actions  are  done  which  afterwards  would  not  have  been 
done.  If  a  man  considers  a  former  action  performed 
through  a  motive  that  has  lost  its  strength,  he  pro- 
nounces the  verdict  "I  ought  not  have  done  it." 

This  "ought"  is  not  as  yet  the  moral  ought.  The 
moral  ought  is  still  more  complex. 

If  a  man  has  a  certain  purpose  and  performs  an 
action  in  compliance  with  that  purpose  but  fails  in 
realising  his  purpose,  he  says,  I  ought  to  have  acted 
otherwise  in  order  to  attain  my  purpose.  His  means 
to  the  end  were  inadequate.  If  on  another  occasion 
he  follows  the  same  motive,  he  says  to  himself,  I  have 
more  carefully  to  consider  the  means  to  the  end  I  have 
in  view. 

This  idea  of  "  I  have  to"  is  again  an  ought,  but  it 
is  not  as  yet  the  moral  ought. 

The  choice  among  several  motives  to  do  a  thing, 
or  among  several  ways  of  doing  a  thing  is  the  condi- 
tion of  any  ought.  The  idea  that  this  or  that  will  have 
to  be  regretted  or  will  fail,  that  another  thing  will  not 
have  to  be  regretted  and  will  succeed,  leads  to  the 
formulation  of  rules.  These  rules  appear  to  him  who 
has  the  intention  to  obey  them,  as  an  ought. 

It  is  natural  that  those  motives  which  promise 
pleasure  are  stronger  than  others.  Almost  all  the  rules 


294  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

of  ought  are  to  protect  a  man  against  the  temptation 
of  his  pleasure-promising  motives. 

The  idea  of  ought  in  general  is  a  very  complex 
idea,  yet  the  moral  ought  is  still  more  complex.  What 
is  the  moral  ought? 

Man  is  a  social  animal.  Society  is  not  merely  a 
collection  of  individuals,  but  the  individual  is  a  pro- 
duct of  society.  An  individual  that  is  prompted  by 
egotistic  motives  alone  will  always  fail  in  the  end ;  and 
suppose  that  a  certain  man's  fate  were  an  exception, 
that  he  succeeded  by  a  favorable  combination  of  cir- 
cumstances, death  will  defeat  him  after  all. 

A  man  in  whom  the  idea  of  his  being  a  member  of 
a  family,  of  a  nation,  of  humanity,  is  a  live  presence, 
will  feel  bound  to  stand  up  for  the  common  welfare 
with  equal  or  even  more  energy  than  for  his  private 
interests.  He  is  impressed  with  the  importance  that 
everyone  in  his  place  has  to  attend  to  the  work  al- 
lotted him,  and  he  himself  will  be  serious  in  the  per- 
formance of  what  he  is  wont  to  call  duty. 

Duty  is  formulated  as  a  norm  or  a  prescript  which 
is  to  be  the  highest  motive  for  action  and  the  intent 
of  the  moral  man  is  to  make  it  unbendingly  strong  so 
as  to  overrule  all  other  considerations. 

* 

*  * 

To  sum  up : 

We  have  seen  that  the  moral  ought  is  not  unana- 
lysable, it  is  not  an  ultimate  notion.  It  is  a  very  com- 
plex mental  fact  which  admits  of  analysis  and  a  de- 
scription of  both  its  origin  and  its  nature.  The  moral 
ought  is  a  special  kind  of  any  ought  or  of  any  rule  of 
action  devised  for  the  guidance  of  conduct.  Conduct  is 
a  special  case  of  natural  processes  ;  it  is  a  motion  plus 
purpose,  purpose  being  an  aim  pursued  with  conscious 


AN  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MORAL  OUGHT.  295 

intention.  And  aim,  again,  is  one  constituent  feature 
of  motion.  There  is  no  motion  without  aim.  The 
ought  grows  from  the  realm  of  inorganic  existence  to- 
gether with  the  unfolding  of  mind  in  animal  organ- 
isms and  it  reaches  its  grandest  development  in  the 
moral  ideals  of  man. 

Professor  Sidgwick  has  sufficiently  guarded  his 
statement,  saying  that  he  merely  means  he  cannot  now 
resolve  it  into  or  explain  it  by  any  more  elementary 
elements.  Nevertheless  it  is  not  advisable  to  deal 
with  a  fundamental  idea  as  if  it  were  unexplain- 
able  or  unanalysable  and  thus  cast  the  glamor  of  mys- 
ticism over  the  whole  realm  of  the  most  important  and 
practical  of  sciences.  There  are  ethical  students  who 
follow  blindly  the  authority  of  such  a  great  teacher  as  is 
Professor  Sidgwick  and  they  are  too  apt  to  forget  the 
cautious  limitation  of  his  words  preaching  the  mystery 
of  the  ought  in  its  transcendent  incomprehensibility. 

There  are  always  minds  who  love  to  live  in  the 
twilight  of  thought,  who  think  that  the  unintelligible 
is  grander  than  that  which  can  be  understood ;  and 
these  minds  seize  eagerly  upon  every  expression  that 
throws  a  shadow  on  science,  that  dwarfs  philosophy, 
and  makes  human  knowledge  appear  dull  and  useless. 


NATURE  AND  MORALITY. 


AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  ETHICAL  VIEWS  OF  JOHN 
STUART  MILL. 


I.    THE  MEANING  OF  BASING  ETHICS  UPON  NATURE. 

John  Stuart  Mill  has  written  an  essay  on  Nature 
in  which  he  "inquires  into  the  truth  of  the  doctrines 
which  make  Nature  a  test  of  right  and  wrong."  He 
sums  up  the  results  of  his  inquiry  in  the  following  con- 
clusions : 

"The  word  Nature  has  two  principal  meanings  :  it  either  de- 
notes the  entire  system  of  things,  with  the  aggregate  of  all  their 
properties,  or  it  denotes  things  as  they  would  be,  apart  from  human 
intervention. 

"  In  the  first  of  these  senses,  the  doctrine  that  man  ought  to 
follow  nature  is  unmeaning  ;  since  man  has  no  power  to  do  any- 
thing else  than  follow  nature  ;  all  his  actions  are  done  through, 
and  in  obedience  to,  some  one  or  many  of  nature's  physical  or 
mental  laws. 

"In  the  other  sense  of  the  term,  the  doctrine  that  man  ought 
to  follow  nature,  or  in  other  words,  ought  to  make  the  spontaneous 
course  of  things  the  model  of  his  voluntary  actions,  is  equally  irra- 
tional and  immoral. 

"Irrational,  because  all  human  action  whatever,  consists  in 
altering,  and  all  useful  action  in  improving,  the  spontaneous  course 
of  nature : 

"Immoral,  because  the  course  of  natural  phenomena  being 
replete  with  everything  which  when  committed  by  human  beings 
is  most  worthy  of  abhorrence,  any  one  who  endeavoured  in  his 


NA  TURE  AND  MORALITY.  297 

actions  to  imitate  the  natural  course  of  things  would  be  universally 
seen  and  acknowledged  to  be  the  wickedest  of  men." 

If  the  word  Nature  is  used  in  the  second  meaning, 
it  is  obvious  that  an  imitation  of  nature  would  signify 
the  suppression  of  the  human  in  man,  of  that  which 
is  properly  called  ethical ;  it  would  deprive  man  of  his 
most  characteristic  and  noblest  feature, — rationality 
— and  degrade  him  into  an  animal  blindly  obeying  its 
instincts. 

Yet  what  is  instinct  but  inherited  habit  ?  How 
have  habits  been  acquired  but  by  repeated  action  ? 
Instinct  is  by  no  means  bare  of  the  rational  element. 
Instinct  is  not  totally  blind.  Although  it  may  not 
prove  rational  intelligence  in  the  individual,  yet  it 
does  prove  rational  intelligence  in  the  race.  Instinct 
can  be  explained  only  as  having  been  acquired  through 
race-experience.  The  human  has  grown  out  of  the 
race-experience  of  man's  ancestors,  and  the  rationality 
of  certain  instincts  are  a  prophecy  of  the  human.  If 
the  blindness  of  instinct  has  to  be  called  "natural," 
and  that  element  of  rationality,  however  small  it  may 
be,  which  represents  judgment  and  may  be  con- 
sidered as  the  germ  of  humanity  is  to  be  counted  as 
"non-natural,"  the  whole  animal  kingdom  from  man 
down  to  the  moner  must  be  classed  as  part  of  the  non- 
natural  domain  of  the  world.  Nature  in  that  case 
would  have  to  be  limited  to  the  province  of  unorgan- 
ised things,  to  stones  or  minerals,  and  the  world  of 
plants  might  be  a  disputed  ground. 

This  conception  of  nature  is  not  admissible,  and  it 
contradicts  its  etymological  meaning,  which  is  not  as 
yet  forgotten.  The  word  "Nature"  is  derived  from 
nascere,  to  grow,  and  denotes  especially  the  evolution 
of  organised  life. 


298  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

If  we  take  "nature  "  in  its  first  meaning,  denoting 
"  the  entire  system  of  things  with  the  aggregate  of  all 
the  properties,"  Mr.  Mill  declares  that  the  doctrine 
that  "man  ought  to  follow  nature"  has  no  meaning. 
He  says : 

"The  scheme  of  Nature  regarded  in  its  whole  extent,  cannot 
have  had,  for  its  sole  or  even  principal  object,  the  good  of  human 
or  other  sentient  beings.  What  good  it  brings  to  them,  is  mostly 
the  result  of  their  own  exertions." 

Certainly,  that  good  which  nature  brings  to  sen- 
tient beings,  is  mostly  the  result  of  their  own  exertions. 
But  if  nature  comprises  the  entire  system  of  things,  it 
also  includes  the  exertions  of  sentient  beings.  That 
sentient  beings  can  make  efforts,  is  one  of  the  most 
important,  nay,  for  us  it  is  the  all-important  part  of 
nature.  In  other  words,  ethics  is  not  something  arti- 
ficial in  contrast  to  that  which  is  natural,  it  is  not  some- 
thing non-natural  or  unnatural ;  ethics  is  the  most 
characteristic  feature  of  human  nature. 

Mr.  Mill  has  much  to  say  about  art  and  the  arti- 
ficial. He  treats  art  as  something  radically  different 
from  nature.  He  ought  to  have  remembered  Shake- 
speare's lines  : 

"  Yet  nature  is  made  better  by  no  mean, 
But  nature  makes  that  mean  ;  so,  over  that  art, 
Which,  you  say,  adds  to  nature,  is  an  art 
That  nature  makes.    ..... 


This  is  an  art 

Which  does  mend  nature — change,  rather  ;  but 
The  art  itself  is  nature  !" — Winter's  Tale. 

Mr.  Mill  tries  to  dispel  some  ambiguities  that  lurk 
in  the  old  proposition  naturam  segui,  yet  he  confines 
his  investigation  to  one  interpretation  of  this  rule  only, 
and  indeed  to  that  which  is  the  crudest  and  the  most 
obviously  absurd  conception  we  can  form  of  it,  so  crude 


NATURE  AND  MORALITY.  299 

that  nobody  has  ever  maintained  it  and,  so  far  as  I 

know,  even  thought  of  it  before  Mr.  Mill  refuted  its 

proposition. 

* 
*  * 

In  the  introductory  remarks  to  his  essay  on  Na- 
ture, Mr.  Mill  complains  about  the  "many  meanings, 
different  from  the  primary  one,  yet  sufficiently  allied 
to  it  to  admit  of  confusion."  The  article  was  appar- 
ently suggested  by  the  reading  of  certain  propositions 
of  theological  authors,  who  maintain  that  nature  must 
be  considered  as  a  divine  revelation  ;  nature's  doings  are 
acts  of  God;  the  scheme  of  nature  indicates  a  plan 
wisely  premeditated  and  designed  to  serve  the  good 
of  human  or  of  other  sentient  beings;  and  that  "all 
things  are  for  wis-2  and  good  ends.  Such  a  view  has 
been  presented  to  "exalt  instinct  at  the  expense  of 
reason." 

Mr.  Mill  deals  with  these  notions  with  great  adroit- 
ness. He  refutes  the  idea  that  natural  processes  are 
an  indication  of  the  Creator's  designs.  Natural  laws 
act  blindly ;  the  storm  rages  without  taking  into  con- 
sideration that  it  may  do  harm  to  sentient  beings. 

Now,  if  we  consider  nature  as  a  personal  being  who 
acts  not  in  uniformities  of  law,  but  with  conscious 
knowledge  of  the  consequences  of  his  doings,  and  ad- 
justing them  to  special  ends,  it  would  truly  be  ridic- 
ulous to  say  that  we  must  act  as  indeliberately,  ruth- 
lessly, and  blindly,  as  nature  acts.  Mr.  Mill  has 
succeeded  completely  in  the  refutation  of  this  view, 
although  it  almost  appears  to  me  that  a  serious  refu- 
tation is  scarcely  necessary. 

The  following  passage  might  be  suspected  of  hu- 
mor, but  Mr.  Mill  is  in  deep  earnest. 

He  says : 


300  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

"In  sober  truth,  nearly  all  the  things  which  men  are  hanged 
or  imprisoned  for  doing  to  one  another,  are  nature's  every  day 
performances.  Killing,  the  most  criminal  act  recognised  by  hu- 
man laws,  Nature  does  once  to  every  being  that  lives  ;  and  in  a 
large  proportion  of  cases,  after  protracted  tortures  such  as  only 
the  greatest  monsters  whom  we  read  of  ever  purposely  inflicted  on 
their  living  fellow-creatures. 

"  Nature  impales  men,  breaks  them  as  if  on  the  wheel,  casts 
them  to  be  devoured  by  wild  beasts,  burns  them  to  death,  crushes 
them  with  stones  like  the  first  christian  martyr,  starves  them  with 
hunger,  freezes  them  with  cold,  poisons  them  by  the  quick  or 
slow  venom  of  her  exhalations,  and  has  hundreds  of  other  hideous 
deaths  in  reserve,  such  as  the  ingenious  cruelty  of  a  Nabis  or  a 
Domitian  never  surpassed.  All  this,  Nature  does  with  the  most 
supercilious  disregard  both  of  mercy  and  of  justice,  emptying  her 
shafts  upon  the  best  and  noblest  indifferently  with  the  meanest 
and  worst ;  upon  those  who  are  engaged  in  the  highest  and  wor- 
thiest enterprises,  and  often  as  the  direct  consequence  of  the  no- 
blest acts  ;  and  it  might  almost  be  imagined  as  a  punishment  for 
them.  She  mows  down  those  on  whose  existence  hangs  the  well- 
being  of  a  whole  people,  perhaps  the  prospects  of  the  human  race 
for  generations  to  come,  with  as  little  compunction  as  those  whose 
death  is  a  relief  to  themselves,  or  a  blessing  to  those  under  their 
noxious  influence.  Such  are  Nature's  dealings  with  life.  Next  to 
taking  life  (equal  to  it  according  to  a  high  authority)  is  taking  the 
means  by  which  we  live  ;  and  Nature  does  this  too  on  the  largest 
scale  and  with  the  most  callous  indifference.  A  single  hurricane 
destroys  the  hopes  of  a  season ;  a  flight  of  locusts,  or  an  inunda- 
tion, desolates  a  district ;  a  trifling  chemical  change  in  an  edible 
root,  starves  a  million  of  people.  The  waves  of  the  sea,  like  ban- 
ditti seize  and  appropriate  the  wealth  of  the  rich  and  the  little  all 
of  the  poor  with  the  same  accompaniments  of  stripping,  wound- 
ing, and  killing  as  their  human  antitypes.  Everything  in  short, 
which  the  worst  men  commit  either  against  life  or  property  is 
perpetrated  on  a  larger  scale  by  natural  agents. 

"  Nature  has  Noyades  more  fatal  than  those  of  Carrier  ;  her 
explosions  of  fire  damp  are  as  destructive  as  human  artillery  ;  her 
plague  and  cholera  far  surpass  the  poison  cups  of  the  Borgias. 
Even  the  love  of  '  order '  which  is  thought  to  be  a  following  of  the 
ways  of  Nature,  is  in  fact  a  contradiction  of  them.  All  which 
people  are  accustomed  to  deprecate  as  '  disorder '  and  its  conse- 


NATURE  AND  MORALITY.  301 

quences,  is  precisely  a  counterpart  of  Nature's  ways  Anarchy 
and  the  Reign  of  Terror  are  overmatched  in  injustice,  ruin,  and 
death,  by  a  hurricane  and  a  pestilence." 

The  passage  quoted  appears  to  me  of  special  in- 
terest because  the  anthropomorphic  view  of  nature  is 
pushed  to  its  utmost  extreme.  Mr.  Mill  combats  here  the 
conception  of  a  personification  of  nature  which  is  un- 
equalled in  mythology.  Mr.  Mill  concludes  from  his 
considerations  : 

' '  Nature  cannot  be  a  proper  model  for  us  to  imitate.  Either 
it  is  right  that  we  should  kill  because  nature  kills  ;  torture  because 
nature  tortures  ;  ruin  and  devastate  because  nature  does  the  like; 
or  we  ought  not  to  consider  at  all  what  nature  does,  but  what  it  is 
good  to  do.  If  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  reductio  ad  absurdum, 
this  surely  amounts  to  one.  If  it  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  doing 
one  thing,  that  nature  does  it,  why  not  another  thing  ?  If  not  all 
things,  why  anything  ?  The  physical  government  of  the  world 
being  full  of  the  things  which  when  done  by  men  are  deemed  the 
greatest  enormities,  it  cannot  be  religious  or  moral  in  us  to  guide 
our  actions  by  the  analogy  of  the  course  of  nature." 

Mr.  Mill  apparently  takes  the  words  naturam  seqiri 
in  the  sense  of  naturam  imitari.  To  follow  nature  is 
in  his  conception  not  a  conforming  to  the  entire  system 
of  things  and  its  laws,  but  the  regarding  the  facts  of 
nature  as  the  actions  of  a  person,  and  acting  accord- 
ingly. 

If  "nature"  is  taken  in  the  sense  of  the  whole 
system  of  things,  the  precept  to  follow  nature,  Mr. 
Mill  says,  is,  with  reference  to  the  irrefragable  neces- 
sity of  natural  laws,  meaningless.  For  every  atom — 
so  to  say — obeys  the  law  of  gravitation,  and  every  mo- 
tive sufficiently  strong  to  incite  a  man  to  action,  if  not 
counteracted  by  other  and  equally  strong  motives,  will 
pass  into  an  act ;  it  will — so  to  say — obey  the  laws  of 
psychical  dynamics.     Any  advice  to  obey  the  laws  of 


3o2  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

nature  in  this  sense  is  not  quite  as  ridiculous  as  the 
injunction  to  imitate  nature,  but  it  is  meaningless.  It 
makes  no  sense. 

But  there  is  another  sense  still — and  Mr.  Mill  has 
not  overlooked  it — in  which  the  doctrine  of  basing 
ethics  upon  nature  can  be  conceived.  Mr.  Mill,  it 
appears,  has  devoted  little  space  to  an  explanation  of 
it,  because  to  his  mind  it  seemed  so  very  obvious  and 
unquestionably  correct.  Indeed  it  is  as  unquestion- 
ably correct  as  the  other  views  which  he  combats  are 
unquestionably  erroneous  and  meaningless. 

The  original  definition  of  nature  is  formulated  by 
Mill  as  follows  : 

"As  the  nature  of  any  given  thing  is  the  aggregate  of  its 
powers  and  properties,  so  Nature  in  the  abstract  is  the  aggregate 
of  the  powers  and  properties  of  all  things. 

"  Nature  means  the  sum  of  all  phenomena,  together  with  the 
causes  which  produce  them  ;  including  not  only  all  that  happens, 
but  all  that  is  capable  of  happening  ;  the  unused  capabilities  of 
causes  being  as  much  a  part  of  the  idea  of  Nature,  as  those  which 
take  effect." 

Mr.  Mill  concludes  : 

"  Since  all  phenomena  which  have  been  sufficiently  examined 
are  found  to  take  place  with  regularity,  each  having  certain  fixed 
conditions  ....  on  the  occurrence  of  which  it  invariably  happens ; 
mankind  have  been  able  to  ascertain,  either  by  direct  observation 
or  by  reasoning  processes  grounded  on  it,  the  conditions  of  the  oc- 
currence of  many  phenomena  ;  and  the  progress  of  science  mainly 
consists  in  ascertaining  those  conditions." 

tr.  Mill  proposes  to  express  the  doctrine  not  by 
naturam  sequi  but  by  naturam  observare.     He  says : 

'  To  acquire  knowledge  of  the  properties  of  things,  and  make 
use  of  the  knowledge  for  guidance,  is  a  rule  of  prudence,  for  the 
adaptation  of  means  to  ends ;  for  giving  effect  to  our  wishes  and 
intentions  whatever  they  may  be. 

"If,  therefore,  the  useless  precept  to  follow  nature  were 
changed  into  a  precept  to  study  nature  ;  to  know  and  take  heed  of 


NATURE  AND  MORALITY.  303 

the  properties  of  the  things  we  have  to  deal  with,  so  far  as  these 
properties  are  capable  of  forwarding  or  obstructing  any  given  pur- 
pose ;  we  should  have  arrived  at  the  first  principle  of  all  intelligent 
action,  or  rather  at  the  definition  of  intelligent  action  itself." 

The  ancients,  Mr.  Mill  says,  were  very  unequivocal 
in  basing  their  ethics  upon  nature.  "The  Roman 
jurists,  when  attempting  to  systematise  jurisprudence 
place  in  the  front  of  their  exposition  a  certain  Jus 
naturale,  'quod  natura '  as  Justinian  declares  in  the 
Institutes,  'omnia  animalia  docuit.' "  Mr.  Mill  after 
alluding  to  Christianity,  continues: 

"The  people  of  this  generation  do  not  commonly  apply  prin- 
ciples with  any  such  studious  exactness  [as  the  ancients] ,  nor  own 
such  binding  allegiance  to  any  standard,  but  live  in  a  kind  of  con- 
fusion of  many  standards  ;  a  condition  not  propitious  to  the  for- 
mation of  steady  moral  convictions,  but  convenient  enough  to 
those  whose  moral  opinions  sit  lightly  on  them,  since  it  gives  them 
a  much  wider  range  of  arguments  for  defending  the  doctrine  of  the 
moment." 

This  is  very  true.  But  how  can  we  improve  the 
present  state  of  ethics,  otherwise  than  by  being  exact 
and  trying  to  find  out  the  leading  principle  of  ethics. 
A  leading  principle  of  ethics,  which  may  serve  us  as  a 
standard  for  the  rules  of  action  and  a  test  for  right  or 
wrong,  cannot  be  artificially  constructed.  The  facts 
upon  which  moral  aspirations  have  to  be  based,  are 
just  as  much  facts  of  nature  as  the  formation  of  crys- 
tals or  the  growth  of  plants.  The  conditions  under 
which  those  facts  are  formed  can  be  ascertained  ;  and 
we  can  by  observation  and  forethought  predefine  their 
consequences.  They  can  be  described  in  laws  that 
are  just  as  immutable  as  the  laws  which  concern  the 
growth  of  plants  or  the  health  of  the  body.  Morality 
in  all  its  phases  and  possibilities  is  deeply  founded  in 
the  nature  of  things,  and  unless  morality  be  an  unex- 


3o4  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

plainable  fact  in  contradiction  to  all  other  facts  of  na- 
ture— there  is  but  one  way  of  comprehending  morality 
and  discovering  its  principle.  This  way  is  to  study 
the  facts  of  social  life,  the  consequences  of  what  is 
called  immorality  and  the  consequences  of  moral 
aspiration,  to  analyse  them,  to  observe  them  in  their 
origin  and  further  development,  to  understand  their 
importance,  and  to  formulate  their  operation  as  exact 
natural  laws. 

The  principle  of  morality  cannot  be  contrived ;  it 
must  be  discovered.  It  cannot  be  devised  like  a  work 
of  art,  but  has  to  be  found  out  not  otherwise  than  any 
other  natural  law.  Principles  of  art  might  be  fashioned 
so  as  to  suit  our  imagination — not  so  principles  of 
morality.  Artistic  taste,  yet  even  that  in  a  certain  sense 
only,  is  arbitrary,  but  the  principles  of  morality  are 
not  arbitrary  ;  they  are  not  a  product  of  our  fancy,  to 
suit  special  inherited  or  acquired  inclinations,  be  they 
ever  so  lofty,  charitable,  altruistic,  generous,  or  self- 
sacrificing.  The  principles  of  morality  are  to  be  based 
upon  rigid  truths  which  must  be  ascertained  by  ex- 
perience and  demonstrated  by  the  usual  scientific 
methods. 

There  is  no  choice  left ;  but  we  have  to  base  ethics 
upon  nature. 

II.  THE  ETHICS  TAUGHT  BY  NATURE. 

What  can  be  the  meaning  of  Mr.  Mill's  objection 
to  basing  morality  upon  nature,  i.  e.  upon  the  entire 
system  of  things,  of  the  universe,  of  which  we  are  a 
part  ?  I  see  only  three  possibilities :  either  it  means 
(i)  that  there  is  no  ethics  at  all,  or  (2)  that  ethics  is 
imported  somehow  into  the  world  from  the  outside,  or 


NATURE  AND  MORALITY.  305 

(3)  that  ethics  is  a  purely  subjective  invention,  that  it 
is  an  artificial  product  of  man's  fancy. 

If  nature  were  a  chaos,  if  there  were  no  constancy  of 
law  in  the  universe,  no  regularity  but  only  the  sportive 
arbitrariness  of  an  irregular  play  of  chance,  no  world- 
order  but  a  tohuvabhohu  of  general  confusion,  intelli- 
gent as  well  as  moral  action  would  be  impossible,  for 
no  calculation  of  consequences  would  be  reliable.  Yet  if 
there  is  a  world-order,  conformity  to  it  will  be  possible. 
Upon  the  presence  of  law  depends  the  intelligibility 
of  the  world ;  the  regularity  of  law  is  the  basis  of  ra- 
tional action,  of  foresight,  of  responsibility,  and  of 
moral  action. 

The  view  that  ethics  are  imported  into  the  world 
from  the  outside  is  the  theological  theory  of  revelation. 
It  is  based  upon  the  dualistic  world-conception  that 
the  world  and  God  are  two  distinct  entities.  The 
world  by  itself  is  supposed  to  be  a  chaos,  but  God 
brings  order  into  it  by  penetrating  the  chaos.  Ac- 
cording to  this  view  the  regularity  of  law  is  not  of  the 
world  but  of  God ;  it  is  not  an  intrinsic  feature  of  ex- 
istence, but  it  is  imposed  upon  it  by  an  extra-mundane 
Deity. 

The  view  that  ethics  is  a  purely  subjective  inven- 
tion, that  it  is  human  to  the  exclusion  of  the  not  hu- 
man in  nature,  we  may  fairly  assume,  is  Mr.  Mill's 
view.  Mr.  Mill  would  have  objected  to  the  idea  of 
considering  his  view  as  a  special  case  of  the  revelation 
theory  in  ethics,  but  such  it  is  none  the  less.  What 
is  the  human  but  a  product  of  nature.  Those  forces 
and  laws  which  shaped  man  are  the  very  same  agen- 
cies which  shaped  the  rest  of  the  things  in  the  universe. 
If  the  human  be  something  so  radically  different  from 
and  in  essence  so  extraordinarily  superior  to  the  wnole 


306  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

of  nature  as  to  justify  the  idea  that  the  human  can  create 
a  new  world-order  instead  of  using  the  world  order 
that  exists  by  accommodating  itself  to  it,  it  must  con- 
tain, at  least  in  germ,  a  certain  something  that  is  not 
of  this  world.  Man's  existence  in  that  case  must  be  the 
revelation  of  an  extra-mundane  power  which  thus  en- 
ables him  to  rise  above  nature  so  as  to  be  her  superior. 

Mr.  Mill  does  not  accept  this  view.  There  is  no 
doubt  about  it  that  he  regards  man  as  the  product  of 
nature.  His  philosophical  standpoint  excludes  the 
possibility  of  revelation.  Accordingly,  he  can  only 
mean  that  ethics  is  an  artificial  product  of  man's  im- 
agination. Man  shapes  his  moral  ideals  as  the  musi- 
cian composes  a  sonata  or  as  the  poet  conceives  a 
beautiful  dream. 

There  are  men  who  believe  that  ethics  cannot  be 
based  upon  facts,  i.  e.  upon  nature,  but  that  it  must  be 
based  upon  some  principle.  But  what  is  the  value  of 
a  principle  if  it  is  not  derived  from  facts  ?  Ideals  are 
mere  dreams  unless  they  are  realisable,  and  to  be  re- 
alisable they  must  be  shaped  out  of  the  facts  of  expe- 
rience. Principles  are  rules  to  attain  ideals.  If  ideals 
are  in  conflict  with  nature  and  nature's  laws,  what  is 
their  use?  If  they  are  not  based  upon  a  solid  knowl- 
edge of  facts,  they  are  nothing  but  worthless  vagaries 
of  the  human  mind  and  it  will  be  a  positive  waste  of 
time  to  ponder  over  them  or  to  give  them  a  minute's 
serious  thought. 

There  is  only  one  kind  of  ideal  that  is  useful  and 
worthy  of  man's  attention.  It  is  that  ideal  which  aims 
at  creating  a  better  state  of  things  upon  the  ground  of 
the  eternal  order  of  things.  Ideals  must  be  based 
upon  the  terra  firma  of  natural  law,  otherwise  they  are 
mere  fancies. 


NATURE  AND  MORALITY.  307 

This  world  of  ours  in  which  we  live  is  a  world  of 
law,  and  the  irrefragibility  of  natural  law  renders  in- 
telligent action  possible.  Intelligent  action  is  such  as 
foresees  and  predetermines  the  course  of  events.  Intel- 
ligent action  consists  in  fixing  an  aim  and  in  adapting 
means  to  this  aim  as  an  end.  Intelligent  action  is  the 
condition  of  moral  action.  Intelligent  action  becomes 
moral  through  rationalising  the  aim  of  action.  Man- 
kind in  the  child  phase  of  its  development  obeys  al- 
most blindly  its  natural  impulses,  the  general  intent  of 
which  has  been  characterised  as  self-preservation. 
Self-preservation  remains  the  ultimate  aim  of  moral 
action.  Yet  with  a  modification,  with  an  amplification 
and  an  increase  of  man's  knowledge  of  the  nature  of 
himself,  the  ultimate  aim  of  his  actions  must  be  mod- 
ified. 

The  question  arises,  Can  man  at  all  preserve  his 
self?  Is  not  every  individual  doomed  to  die  and  is 
not  self-preservation  for  any  length  of  time  absolutely 
impossible?  Yes,  it  is  impossible,  if  by  "self"  we  un- 
derstand this  particular  body  consisting  of  a  definite 
quantity  of  living  matter  in  a  special  form.  This  par- 
ticular self  cannot  be  preserved  for  it  is  constantly 
changing ;  through  slight  modifications  it  becomes 
another  with  every  minute,  with  every  second  of  its  life. 

Yet  man's  self  contains  a  something  that  is  pre- 
served, that  is  transmitted  to  others.  What  is  this 
part  of  his  self?  Every  man  has  received  it,  or  at 
least  the  greatest  part  of  it,  through  heredity  and  edu- 
cation, from  his  ancestors.  It  is  his  organisation  in- 
cluding the  rationality  of  his  speech,  thoughts,  and  ac- 
tions— in  one  word  it  is  his  soul.  His  fellowman,  too, 
has  inherited  it  and  in  so  far  as  two  or  several  men 
recognise  the  sameness  of  their  souls,  they  call  each 


3o8  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

other  brothers.  In  preserving  his  fellowmen's  souls 
a  man  preserves  his  own  soul. 

An  advanced  knowledge  of  self  necessarily  changes 
the  original  impulse  of  self-preservation  into  a  preser- 
vation of  the  soul. 

Man,  as  a  particular  individual  being  mortal,  can 
preserve  his  soul  only  in  and  through  others.  The 
nature  of  man's  being  is  social  and  his  life  is  ephem- 
eral. Thus  self-knowledge  will  teach  him  that  he  is 
a  part  of  a  greater  whole  ;  the  most  important  elements 
of  his  soul  originate  out  of  his  intercourse  with  his 
fellow-beings  ;  the  essence  of  his  life,  of  his  speech, 
his  thoughts,  his  aspirations  and  ideals,  lies  in  his  con- 
nections with  them.  At  the  same  time  he  must  learn 
that  his  particular  life  is  only  a  phase  in  the  fuller  life 
of  the  soul  which  has  come  to  him  out  of  the  past 
animating  him  now  and  sweeping  onward  into  the  dim 
future.  Man's  real  self  is  not  the  materiality  of  which 
his  body  consists  at  a  given  moment,  but  his  soul. 
The  former  cannot  be  preserved,  the  latter  can.  Any 
attempt  at  preserving  the  former  is  thwarted  by  na- 
ture. If  we  attempt  to  preserve  anything  of  ourselves, 
we  can  preserve  only  our  soul.   No  other  choice  is  left. 

There  is  one  strange  fact  about  self-preservation. 
This  world  of  ours  is  never  at  rest,  there  is  no  stand- 
still. Any  attempt  at  preserving  life  exactly  as  it  is 
leads  to  dissolution.  Preservation  is  only  possible  in 
growth ;  the  preservation  of  life  must  be  for  its  further 
development,  it  must  include  progress. 

Such  is  in  broad  outlines  the  injunction  that  nature 
teaches.  Such  is  an  ethics  based  upon  the  facts  of 
life,  it  is  the  derivation  of  an  ultimate  aim  of  action 
from  nature,  i.  e.  from  the  nature  of  the  being  that 
acts  and  also  from  the  nature  of  the  world  in  which  this 


NATURE  AND  MORALITY.  309 

being  lives.  When  we  thus  base  our  ethics  upon  the 
facts  of  experience  and  the  natural  laws  that  have 
been  derived  therefrom  ;  in  one  word,  when  we  base 
our  ethics  upon  nature,  we  define  those  actions  as 
moral  which  tend  to  preserve  and  further  develop  the 
human  soul. 

III.     INTELLIGENT  ACTION  AND  MORAL  ACTION. 

Mr.  Mill  says,  "to  make  use  of  knowledge  for  guid- 
ance is  a  rule  of  prudence."  But  it  is  more  ;  it  is  also 
a  rule  of  ethics. 

What  is  the  difference  between  a  prudent  action 
and  an  ethical  action  ?  A  prudent  action  may  have 
been  performed  from  a  selfish  motive  merely  ;  an  eth- 
ical action  is  performed  from  a  motive  broader  than 
self-interest,  from  a  desire  to  be  somehow  of  service 
to  the  development  of  humanity.  Prudence  is  not 
morality ;  but  prudence  will  lead  to  morality,  for  ail 
immorality  will  defeat  itself  in  the  end.  Thus  prudence 
teaches  us  to  avoid  immorality. 

Not  every  intelligent  action  is  moral ;  but  every 
moral  action  is  intelligent ;  and  it  is  an  indispensable 
principle  of  morality  to  render  all  actions  intelligent. 
Yet  while  all  moral  actions  are  intelligent,  the  intelli- 
gence or  rationality  of  an  action  does  not  as  yet  make 
it  moral. 

A  man  may  act  in  the  right  way  against  his  in- 
clinations from  mere  prudence.  He  may  act  in  a  cer- 
tain way  not  because  he  wants  to  do  the  act,  but  be- 
cause he  knows  that  it  is  after  all  the  best  way ;  he 
thus  acts  against  his  will ;  he  acts  under  a  certain  com- 
pulsion. His  act  in  such  a  case  may  be  called  mere 
prudence.  However  as  scon  as  the  desire  to  act  in  the 
best  way  or  to  act  as  he  knows  that  he  should  act,  be- 


3io  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

comes  part  of  his  character,  as  soon  as  he  performs  the 
act  done  in  the  right  way,  because  he  wills  it,  his  ac- 
tion is  truly  ethical. 

All  our  actions — even  those  performed  for  our  pri- 
vate interest,  which  are  perfectly  legitimate — should 
be  guided  by  higher  motives  than  by  the  impulse  of 
a  selfish  self-preservation;  all  our  proceedings,  our 
omissions  and  our  undertakings  should  be  regulated  by 
superindividual  considerations  ;  they  should  be  in  strict 
harmony  with  what  may  fitly  be  called  the  moral  law. 

The  moral  law  has  been  taught  us  by  our  parents 
and  teachers.  We  may  accept  their  instruction  simply 
on  the  ground  of  their  authority,  but  we  have  a  perfect 
right  to  ask,  Why  must  we  obey  moral  commands  ? 
And  the  answer  would  be  :  Because  the  natural  course 
of  events  demands  it.  Nature  defeats  all  egoistic  in- 
tentions ;  and  it  sanctions  the  superindividual  aspira- 
tions only — those  which  are  commonly  called  moral 
principles. 

There  is  no  right  in  this  world  but  it  is  the  coun- 
terpart of  duty.  We  have  a  right  to  ask  why  egotism 
should  be  overruled  by  higher  principles.  What  is  the 
duty  that  corresponds  to  this  right  ?  This  duty  is  our 
obligation  to  inquire  into  the  conditions  of  human  life, 
so  as  to  ascertain  the  principles  by  which  our  actions 
must  be  regulated.  We  must  not  rest  satisfied  with 
our  moral  sentiments  ;  we  must  understand  our  senti- 
ments, that  we  may  be  assured  not  by  mystic  intuition 
but  by  clear  comprehension,  that  they  are  truly  moral. 
We  must  be  on  our  guard  against  ethical  enthusiasm 
which  is  not  based  upon  a  clear  comprehension  of  facts  ; 
for  there  are  many  noble  sentiments  which,  as  can  be 
demonstrated  by  scientific  investigation,  are  anything 
but   morality.     For    instance,    eleemosynary   philan- 


NATURE  AND  MORALITY.  311 

thropy,  has  been  highly  praised  as  the  acme  of  moral- 
ity ;  and  yet,  scientific  investigation  has  stated  with 
irrefutable  conclusiveness  that  it  is  a  wrong  practice. 
All  enthusiasm  that  has  been  wasted  in  this  direction, 
can  be  called  moral  only  if  motives  alone  be  considered. 
Objectively,  they  are  as  immoral  as  any  criminal  act 
committed  under  the  influence  of  an  erring  conscience. 

IV.    THE  ANTHROPOMORPHIC  STANDPOINT  OF  MR.    MILL. 

Mr.  Mill  in  opposing  the  conclusions  drawn  from 
an  anthropomorphic  conception  of  nature,  impercept- 
ibly slips  into  the  same  erroneous  position.  He  treats 
nature  as  if  it  were  a  person  and  arraigns  nature  for 
immorality.  He  looks  upon  every  progress  as  a  fur- 
ther aberration  from  nature  and  speaks  of  the  lower 
stages  of  savage  life  as  "  the  times  when  mankind  were 
nearer  to  their  natural  state."  Thus  he  easily  proves 
that  nature  is  chaos  and  that  civilisation  is  a  conquest 
of  man  over  nature.  As  if  man  were  not  a  part  of  na- 
ture !  "To  dig,  to  plough,  to  build,  to  wear  clothes," 
Mr.  Mill  declares,  "are  direct  infringements  of  the 
injunctions  to  follow  nature." 

If  we  accepted  Mr.  Mill's  usage  of  the  word  nature, 
which  deliberately  excludes  man's  exertions  from  the 
sphere  of  the  natural,  we  should  have  to  declare  that 
man's  entire  being  is  "  supernatural."  The  adversaries 
of  Mr.  Mill  may  very  well  thank  him  for  his  method 
of  attack,  for  he  furnishes  evidence  in  support  of  the 
very  conception  he  so  eagerly  attempts  to  overthrow. 
It  is,  of  course,  allowable  to  use  the  concept  nature  in 
this  restricted  sense,  as  Mr.  Mill  does.  We  may  de- 
fine our  words  as  we  please  ;  but  if  we  were  to  limit 
the  word  nature  always  to  the  lower  stages  of  natural 
evolution,  we  should  recognise  the  truth  that  the  "su- 


3i2  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM 

pernatural"  naturally  grows  from  the  natural.  The 
supernatural  has  been  regarded  as  having  come  into 
nature  from  spheres  beyond  by  some  extra-mundane 
intercession  ;  and  we  discard  the  idea  of  supernatural- 
ism  simply  and  solely  in  order  to  avoid  this  miscon- 
ception. If  by  "supernatural"  is  understood  that 
higher  kind  of  nature  which  evolves  from  the  lower 
stages  of  nature,  we  shall  entertain  no  objection  to  the 
word. 

Nature  is  not  a  person  and  natural  laws  are  not  the 
decrees  of  a  personal  being.  The  order  of  nature  is 
not  a  scheme  designed  for  an  end.  Nevertheless  nature 
has  an  aim.  Every  process  of  nature  has  an  aim, 
every  motion  has  a  certain  direction  and  if  all  the  nat 
ural  processes  are  viewed  as  a  whole,  they  possess  in 
their  entirety  also  an  aim.  Our  scientists  have  form- 
ulated the  general  aim  of  nature  and  call  it  evolution. 
If  we  look  upon  nature  as  a  person,  we  are  led  to  ab- 
surdities, but  if  we  look  upon  nature  not  only  as  pur- 
poseless but  also  as  aimless,  we  sink  into  a  bottomless 
pit  of  errors  and  confusion. 

Nature  being  no  person,  we  cannot  speak  of  nature 
as  being  moral  or  immoral.  Nature  is  non-moral. 
Persons  alone,  individual  beings,  can  be  moral  or  im- 
moral ;  and  morality  is  nothing  but  the  intentional  con- 
formity to  nature  and  to  the  order  of  nature. 

It  has  been  said  that  God  is  moral.  There  is  no 
sense  in  speaking  of  God  as  moral — unless  it  be  in 
popular  language  where  the  usage  of  the  phrase  is  to 
be  regarded  as  an  excusable  and  allowable  poetic  li- 
cense (within  certain  limits  even  quite  legitimate). 
God  can  only  be  called  the  standard  of  morality.  God 
is  non-moral ;  man  only,  if  he  conforms  to  the  will  of 
God,  can  be  said  to  be  moral. 


NATURE  AND  MORALITY.  313 

Mr.  Mill  in  arraigning  nature  for  being  beset  with 
all  kinds  of  vices,  disorder,  uncleanliness,  and  cowar- 
dice, is  very  emphatic  in   denouncing  her  injustice. 

He  says  : 

"It  is  one  of  Nature's  general  rules,  and  part  of  her  habitual 
injustice,  that  '  to  him  that  hath  shall  be  given,  but  from  him  that 
hath  not,  shall  be  taken  even  that  which  he  hath.'  The  ordinary 
and  predominant  tendency  of  good  is  towards  more  good.  Health, 
strength,  wealth,  knowledge,  virtue,  are  not  only  good  in  them- 
selves but  facilitate  and  promote  the  acquisition  of  good,  both  of 
the  same  and  of  other  kinds.  The  person  who  can  learn  easily, 
is  he  who  already  knows  much  :  it  is  the  strong  and  not  the  sickly 
person  who  can  do  everything  which  most  conduces  to  health  ; 
those  who  find  it  easy  to  gain  money  are  not  the  poor  but  the 
rich  ;  while  health,  strength,  knowledge,  talents,  are  all  means  of 
acquiring  riches,  and  riches  are  often  an  indispensable  means  of 
acquiring  these.  Again,  e  converso,  whatever  may  be  said  of  evil 
turning  into  good,  the  general  tendency  of  evil  is  towards  further 
evil.  Bodily  illness  renders  the  body  more  susceptible  of  disease ; 
it  produces  incapacity  of  exertion,  sometimes  debility  of  mind, 
and  often  the  loss  of  means  of  subsistence.  All  severe  pain,  either 
bodily  or  mental,  tends  to  increase  the  susceptibilities  of  pain  for 
ever  after.  Poverty  is  the  parent  of  a  thousand  mental  and  moral 
evils.  What  is  still  worse,  to  be  injured  or  oppressed,  when  ha- 
bitual, lowers  the  whole  tone  of  the  character.  One  bad  action 
leads  to  others,  both  in  the  agent  himself,  in  the  bystanders,  and 
in  the  sufferers.  All  bad  qualities  are  strengthened  by  habit,  and 
all  vices  and  follies  tend  to  spread.  Intellectual  defects  generate 
moral,  and  moral,  intellectual ;  and  every  intellectual  or  moral 
defect  generates  others   and  so  on  without  end." 

It  is  certainly  true  that  "to  him  that  hath  shall  be 
given,  but  from  him  that  hath  not,  shall  be  taken 
even  that  which  he  hath ;"  but  it  is  perfectly  useless  to 
complain  about  it.  It  is  neither  justice  nor  injustice, 
but  it  is  a  law  of  nature  or  if  you  prefer  the  expression, 
it  is  the  will  of  God ;  and  we  have  to  mind  it. 

To  speak  of  the  injustice  of  nature  is  just  as  an- 
thropomorphic as   to   speak  of  the  morality  of  God. 


3i4  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

Mill's  mistake  is  that  he  argues  from  an  antiquated 
theological  standpoint  which  is,  even  among  theolo- 
gians, not  at  all  the  universally  accepted  view. 

Morality  may  be  described  as  our  attempts  to  im- 
prove the  given  state  of  nature,  but  it  certainly  can 
never  improve  the  order  of  nature.  All  the  improve- 
ments we  can  make  upon  the  given  state  of  nature, 
have  to  be  based  upon  the  unalterable  order  of  nature, 
and  he  who  attempts  to  formulate  any  rules  of  action, 
be  it  in  the  department  of  industrial  enterprises,  in 
social  and  political  reform,  or  in  the  realm  of  moraf 
aspirations,  will  have  to  do  it  after  a  careful  study  of 
facts.  The  irrefragable  laws  of  nature  form  the  im- 
movable basis  upon  which  we  have  to  take  our  stand. 
Whatever  action  we  undertake,  before  we  plan  or  de- 
vise, we  must  take  heed  of  the  laws  to  which  we  have 
to  conform.  The  laws  of  nature  and  among  them  the 
moral  laws,  are  not  flexible,  they  are  stern  and  im- 
mutable. If  we  cannot  understand  the  nature  of  things 
in  scientific  abstractness,  and  if  (in  order  to  under- 
stand the  earnest  necessity  that  the  moral  law  must  be 
obeyed)  we  represent  the  order  of  nature  as  a  personal 
being,  it  will  be  well  to  remember  the  parable  of  Christ 
in  which  he  compares  God  to  a  hard  man,  reaping 
where  he  has  not  sown  and  gathering  where  he  has 
not  strewed.  If  we  have  received  one  talent  only, 
there  is  but  one  way  to  keep  that  one  talent ;  we  must 
go  and  trade  with  the  same  and  make  with  it  another 
talent.  But  if  the  very  knowledge  that  we  have  to 
deal  with  a  hard  man,  induces  us  to  be  afraid,  so  as  to 
go  and  hide  that  one  talent  in  the  earth,  then,  that  one 
talent  will  be  taken  from  us. 

The  parable  of  the  talents  is  very  instructive.  Its 
doctrine  seems  severe  on  the  poor,  especially  those 


NATURE  AND  MORALITY.  315 

who  are  poor  in  spirit ;  but  it  is  just  as  much  severe 
on  the  rich.  Christ  spoke  to  the  poor  and  his  applica- 
tion was  made  so  as  to  impress  their  minds,  that  he 
who  has  received  little  is  no  less  responsible  for  that 
little,  than  he  who  has  received  much  for  the  much  he 
has  received.  "For  unto  whomsoever  much  is  given, 
of  him  shall  be  much  required,  and  to  whom  men  have 
committed  much,  of  him  they  will  ask  the  more."  If 
Christ  had  spoken  to  the  rich,  the  learned,  and  the 
great,  he  might  have  made  a  different  application  of 
the  parable  and  might  have  told  them  of  the  servant 
who  having  received  five  talents  had  not  only  buried 
but  wasted  the  rich  gift.  There  are  perhaps  more  men 
ruined  through  having  received  too  much  than  by 
having  received  too  little.  The  temptations  are  greater 
in  the  former  case,  and  the  dire  necessity  of  the  latter 
case  often  exercises  a  wholesome  and  educating  in- 
fluence. 

If  justice  means  that  every  servant,  whether  he  in- 
creases the  talents  he  has  received  or  buries  them  in 
the  earth,  should  in  the  end  receive  an  equal  share, 
Mr.  Mill  would  be  justified  in  denouncing  the  course 
of  nature  as  unjust.  But  it  appears  to  me  advisable 
that  any  one  who  thus  indicts  the  very  order  of  nature 
for  injustice,  imagining  that  the  whole  universe  is 
wrong  and  he  alone  and  perhaps  also  a  few  fellow  be- 
ings of  his  with  him  are  right,  should  first  revise  the 
logic  of  his  conception  of  justice  ;  for  it  is  in  such  a 
case  most  probable    that    on    close  scrutiny  he   will 

somewhere  discover  a  flaw  in  his  idea  of  justice. 

* 
*  * 

Mr.  Mill's  objection  to  basing  ethics  upon  nature 
was  made  to  oppose  a  theological  conception  of  ethics. 
Our  traditional  religions,  we  must  know,  are  in  their 


3i6  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

intentions  monistic,  they  are  dualistic  only  if  the  al- 
legory of  their  symbols  is  taken  as  literal  truth.  In 
opposing  the  theology  of  traditional  religions  Mr. 
Mill  attacked  erroneously  their  very  heart,  the  monistic 
meaning  of  their  doctrines  instead  of  striking  at  the 
dualistic  interpretation  of  their  mythology.  Thus  if 
Mr.  Mill  were  right  in  his  objection  to  basing  ethics 
upon  nature — i.  e.  upon  the  unalterable,  the  eternal 
in  nature,  upon  the  law  of  nature  or  to  use  the  relig- 
ious and  most  pregnant  term,  upon  God — if  Mr.  Mill 
were  right,  there  would  be  two  alternatives  left :  Either 
there  is  no  ethics  at  all,  which  view  Mr.  Mill  would 
not  accept,  or  the  dualistic  interpretation  of  theology 
is  correct,  that  ethics  is  an  extramundane  factor. 

When  ethics  and  the  conditions  of  ethical  ideals 
are  found  and  can  be  proved  to  be  an  immanent  part 
of  nature,  the  dualistic  interpretation  of  the  old  re- 
ligions will  have  to  be  surrendered  while  their  monis- 
tic meaning  which  is  after  all  the  core  and  living  spirit 
of  all  religious  aspirations  will  appear  in  a  stronger 
light  than  ever. 


AN  AMERICAN  MORALIST. 


BY    PROF.   L.    M.  BILLIA. 


Dr.  Paul  Carus,  one  of  the  editors  of  The  Monist 
and  The  Open  Court — periodicals  which  rank  among 
the  most  important  of  the  socio-philosophical  reviews 
of  the  United  States  of  America — proposes,  in  three 
lectures  upon  the  "  Ethical  Problem,"  the  adoption  of 
a  course  which  might  be  considered  as  a  compromise 
between  the  utilitarian  and  the  objective-moral,  or,  as 
he  terms  it,  the  "  intuitionalist "  school.  He  meets 
the  utilitarian  principle  at  the  outset  by  the  following 
declaration : 

"We  may  say  that  the  pursuit  of  happiness  is  a  natural  right 
of  man,  but  we  cannot  derive  the  moral  "ought  "  from  the  pursuit 
of  happiness.  And  the  mere  pursuit  of  happiness  is  not  sufficient  to 
make  a  complete  and  worthy  human  life.  On  the  contrary,  the 
mere  pursuit  of  happiness  wherever  it  prevails  unchecked  in  the 
soul  of  man  is  a  most  dangerous  tendency,  which  unfits  man  for 
business  as  well  as  for  family  life,  and  above  all  for  ideal  aspira- 
tions. What  is  the  reason  that  trustworthy  persons,  competent 
workers,  dutiful  men  and  women  are  so  rare  ?  It  is  simply  be- 
cause most  people  are  too  eager  in  their  pursuit  of  happiness. 

"The  pursuit  of  happiness  is  not  wrong.  Enjoyment  is  not  a 
sin,  and  recreation  is  not  improper.  Yet  it  is  wrong  to  make  hap- 
piness the  sole  aim  of  existence.     We  cannot  live  without  enjoy- 

*  Translated  from  the  Italian.  The  article  appeared  first  in  //  Nuovo  Ri- 
sorgimento  Rivista  di  Filosofia,  Scienze,  Lettere,  Educazione  e  Studi  Sociali 
(Milan),  a  Roman  Catholic  magazine,  and  was  republished  in  pamphlet  form. 


3i8  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

ment;  enjoyment  keeps  our  minds  healthy  and  buoyant ;  yet  en- 
joyment is  not  the  purpose  of  life.  Recreation  is  the  rest  we  take 
after  our  work  is  done.  We  do  not  work  in  order  to  have  recrea- 
tion ;  but  we  seek  recreation  in  order  to  do  more  work. 

"If  the  pursuit  of  happiness  is  not  sufficient  to  make  man's 
life  complete  and  worthy,  what  then  is  needed  to  make  it  so  ?  We 
all  know  what  is  needed  :  it  is  ethics.  Then  let  us  have  ethics — 
not  mere  theories  about  pleasurable  sensations,  but  true  ethics — 
ethics  that  are  nobler  than  the  mere  pursuit  of  pleasure." 

If  these  lofty  conceptions  do  not  suffice  to  gain  our 
sympathies  for  him,  the  author  acquires  a  new  claim 
on  us  by  virtue  of  the  following  declaration  : 

' '  I  shall  be  glad  to  learn  from  my  critics ;  and  wherever  any 
one  will  convince  me  of  an  error,  he  will  find  me  ready  to  change 
my  opinion  and  to  accept  the  truth  whatever  it  be." 

Both  from  a  scientific  and  a  practical  point  of  view, 
I  find  his  disagreement  with  those  who  would  promote 
the  elevation  of  moral  life  without  regard  to  philo- 
sophical or  religious  opinions,  or  without  fundamental 
principles,  a  very  serious  matter. 

Dr.  Carus's  book  had  its  origin  in  a  controversy 
between  the  author  and  the  "Society  of  Ethical  Cul- 
ture," represented  by  The  Ethical  Record,  of  Philadel- 
phia. Although  we  cannot  agree  with  him  in  his  posi- 
tion that  supernatural  revelation  is  an  impossibility, 
we,  nevertheless,  approve  of  his  conception  of  the 
necessity  of  a  philosophico-scientific  basis  of  ethics — a 
necessity  which,  in  our  opinion,  is  a  logical  objective 
exigency  of  speculative  thought,  and,  socially,  a  sub- 
jective exigency  of  our  time  and  of  modern  education. 
This  view  is,  in  our  opinion,  fully  in  accord  with  An- 
tonio Rosmini's  "Philosophy  of  Ethics"  and  "Phi- 
losophy of  Right  (Dirittoy 

The  author,  possessed  of  a  happier  memory  than 


AN  AMERICAN  MORALIST.  3ig 

ours,  very  well  recollects  the  time  when  man  was  an 
animal,  living  in  herds  with  others  of  his  kind  ;  and 
he  knows  also,  that  at  that  early  day  higher  ethics  had 
received  but  little  development.  But,  as  little  by  lit- 
le  a  higher  ethics  grew,  society  emerged  from  bar- 
barism into  the  light  of  civilisation.  And  here  criti- 
cism grows  somewhat  laborious ;  for,  notwithstanding 
his  earnest  profession  of  scientific  research,  the  author's 
method  of  procedure  is  that  of  the  statement  of  aphor- 
isms and  definitions,  each  of  which  we  should  be  jus- 
tified in  calling  in  doubt.  In  fact,  it  is  these  very 
aphorisms  and  definitions  from  which  he  proceeds, 
that  should,  first  of  all,  have  been  submittted  to  crit- 
cal  examination — even  from  a  historical  standpoint — 
if  the  author  really  wished  to  give  ethics  a  scientific 
basis.  In  agreement  with  Comte's  conceptions  of  the 
three  natural  stages  of  development,  he  declares  that 
the  question,  whether  ethics  is  a  science  and  can  be 
founded  upon  a  scientific  basis,  is  the  same  as  that  of 
the  reconciliation  of  religion  and  science,  or  of  the  de- 
velopment of  religion  from  infancy  to  its  state  of  ma- 
turity, from  dualism  to  monism,  from  the  mysticism 
of  a  vague  supernaturalistic  speculation  to  the  light  of 
positive  certainty,  from  an  authoritative  and  credulous 
faith  to  the  faith  of  scientific  knowledge. 

However  correct  and  honest  the  intentions  of  the 
author  may  be,  we  consider  as  truly  deplorable  his 
arbitrary  conception  of  religion,  which,  in  his  presup- 
position undiscussed,  and,  for  him,  admitting  of  no 
discussion,  is  nothing  but  a  human  fact,  while  to  us 
the  elevation  of  man  to  the  Absolute  is  itself  a  work 
of  God.  If  the  author's  supposition  were  true,  his 
course  would  have  to  be  approved  of,  although  the 
difficulty  would  remain,  whether  a  scientific  religion 


320  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM, 

could   be  understood  by  the  multitude,  who  might 
know  it  generally,  but  not  scientifically. 

Nor  are  we  less  surprised  at  the  author's  confound- 
ing the  ideas  "vague,"  "supernatural,"  and  "fan- 
tastic "j  the  fantastic,  the  ideal,  and  the  supernatural 
being  three  orders  much  at  variance  with  facts.  Alto- 
gether, Dr.  Carus's  point  of  departure  differs  in  noth- 
ing from  that  of  Comte. 

And  thus,  when  he  comes  to  establish  the  "basis" 
of  ethics  —  always  in  aphoristic  form  —  he  states  the 
hypothesis,  that  knowledge  is  a  representation  of 
facts — a  definition  of  which  our  readers  know,  beyond 
doubt,  is  disputable. 

It  is  true,  the  author  attempts  to  found  ethics  upon 
reason,  upon  the  immutable  and  necessary  order  of 
things,  and  he  deserves  praise  for  thus  having  elevated 
himself  above  the  level  of  the  utilitarian  ;  but,  in  de- 
fault of  tradition  and  through  excessive  fear  of  the 
supernatural  and  mystical,  he  falls  into  the  error  of  a 
material  monism  and  fails,  at  the  same  time,  to  give 
his  doctrine  a  foundation. 

However,  the  author  is  worthy  and  capable  of 
something  better,  as  may  be  seen  in  his  beautiful  ob- 
servation in  censure  of  the  ferocious  and  pharisaical 
theory,  which  pretends  to  derive  all  moral  sentiment 
from  egotism.  Here  he  is  entirely  in  accord  with  the 
Italian  school,  and  I  doubt  if  the  remarks  he  makes 
could  be  improved  upon. 

Only  it  is  deplorable  that,  owing  to  his  disregard- 
ing a  great  part  of  ancient  and  modern  philosophic 
speculation,  he  should  not  be  able,  while  face  to  face 
with  the  utilitarians,  to  perceive  others  than  the  ranks 
of  those  whom  he  terms  intuitionalists,  wrongfully 
accusing  them  of  ignoring  and  of  refusing  to  demon- 


AN  AMERICAN  MORALIST.  321 

strate,  by  natural  and  scientific  methods,  the  reasons 
or  motives  underlying  morality,  of  making  duty  a 
mystery,  etc.,  etc.  All  this  we  naturally  read  with 
something  akin  to  ill-will  here,  in  the  home  of  the 
philosophy  of  right  (diritto)  ;  in  fact,  in  Europe  gen- 
erally, where  for  so  many  centuries  the  supreme  mo- 
tives of  the  good  have  been  scientifically  investigated. 

He  likewise  touches  upon  the  problem  of  freewill 
and  believes  to  have  found  its  solution,  but  does  not 
seem  to  be  well  aware  of  the  main  difficulty,  which 
consists  in  this,  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the  fact  of  free- 
will is  attested  by  the  consciousness ;  on  the  other 
hand,  that  will  without  motive  is  an  absurdity.  Cer- 
tainly. But,  with  the  usual  defect  of  Anglo-Ameri- 
cans— the  tendency  to  vaporings,  as  in  the  McKinley 
bill,  so  in  philosophical  speculation, — the  work  of  cen- 
turies,— he  falls  into  a  twofold  error:  historical  and 
philosophical.  His  classification  of  those  who  have 
entered  into  an  investigation  of  this  problem  into  theo- 
logians, who  hold  freewill  a  will  without  motive  and 
an  inscrutable  mystery,  and  freethinkers,  so  called, 
who  place  it  among  illusions,  is  much  too  superficial. 
Assuredly,  these  two  views  are  both  false ;  but,  if  our 
author  had  kept  accurate  account  of  philosophical  tra- 
dition, and  above  all,  if  he  had  paid  closer  attention 
to  Italian  philosophy,  and  to  that  of  Rosmini  in  par- 
ticular, he  would  have  observed  that  the  difficulty  has 
been  by  many  not  only  recognised,  but  also  sur- 
mounted. 

In  fact,  the  doctrine  of  practical  judgment,  in  our 
opinion,  while,  on  the  one  hand,  it  justifies  the  exist- 
ence of  freedom  of  choice,  is  not  satisfied  with  merely 
affirming  it,  but  demonstrates  the  operation  by  a  keen 
analysis  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  confutes  in  the  best 


322  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

possible  manner  determinism,  physiological,  as  well 
as  psychological  and  rationalistic.  And  what  is  this 
"best  possible  manner"?  That  of  conceding,  or 
rather,  of  comprehending  whatever  truth  there  may  be 
in  those  views,  in  order  the  better  to  avoid  the  fallacies 
they  may  contain.  An  act  not  determined  by  a  rea- 
son is  an  absurdity.  Decidedly.  But  a  free  will  con- 
sists precisely  in  the  ability  to  determine,  in  the  abil- 
ity to  make  real  a  given  reason,  a  given  impulse,  a 
given  sentiment.  How  is  freewill  reconcilable  with 
the  evident  subjection  of  our  acts  to  the  status  of  the 
nervous  system,  the  status  of  health  or  disease,  ad- 
ventitious or  constitutional,  individual  or  hereditary  ? 
Free  choice  is  an  act  of  reflection,  or  rather,  one  of 
the  higher  acts  of  reflection.  Now,  reflection  requires 
a  certain  status  of  order  and  calmness  in  our  functions, 
which,  for  instance,  does  not  exist,  at  least  not  with- 
out great  expenditure  of  force,  in  fever,  hysterics,  ex- 
cessive pain,  extraordinary  somnolence,  or  any  ardent 
superexcitation.  But  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  these 
same  conditions,  favorable  or  unfavorable  as  they  may 
be  to  reflection,  and  to  the  exercise  of  free  choice,  have 
for  the  most  part  their  origin  in  liberty  of  choice  itself, 
as  in  disease  which  has  been  neglected  or  aggravated, 
or  criminally  transmitted  to  descendants,  or  in  cases 
of  exaltation  not  restrained  at  the  outset,  or  to  assume 
a  less  ignoble  case,  in  any  excessive  lassitude  or  strain, 
whether  of  muscle  or  brain,  consequent  upon  hard 
labor. 

At  times  Dr.  Carus  recognises  the  difficulty,  but 
then  again,  following  the  imperfect  theory  of  some 
German  moralists,  he  confounds  liberty  of  will  with 
freedom  from  passion,  and  ends  by  admitting  liberty 
solely  in  connection  with  the  Good.     Now,  it  is  very 


AN  AMERICAN  MORALIST.  323 

true  that  liberty  makes  for  the  Good.  It  is  very  true 
that  he  who  does  good  is  freer  than  he  who  works 
evil ;  that  the  practice  of  virtue  not  only  educates  and 
refines  sentiment,  but  also  strengthens  freedom  of  will, 
just  as,  on  the  other  hand,  yielding  to  certain  vices 
weakens,  and,  in  the  end,  almost  entirely  nullifies  it. 
But  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  liberty  presents  itself 
in  connection  with  the  Evil  as  well  as  in  connection 
with  the  Good.  So  true  is  this  that,  before  entering 
on  the  examination  of  certain  crimes,  men  often  sus- 
tain fierce  struggles  with  themselves  in  the  endeavor 
to  silence  the  voice  of  nature,  of  conscience,  of  blood ; 
as  may  especially  be  noticed  in  criminal  cases  of  a 
political  nature,  and  in  all  those  which  are  executed  with 
open  predetermination  and  which  are  designed  to  some 
end  of  vast  importance.  Nor  is  it  the  case  that  those 
who  have  preceded  Dr.  Carus  have  not  well  distin- 
guished between  necessity  and  compulsion — a  very  old 
and  well-known  distinction.  On  the  contrary,  he  him- 
self does  not  well  distinguish  libertas  a  coactione  from 
libertas  a  necessitate,  in  which  freedom  of  choice  pre- 
cisely consists.  Libertas  a  necessitate,  we  repeat,  does 
not  in  itself  denote  absence  of  reason,  but  determines 
to  itself  the  preponderant  reason. 

We  must  say,  however,  by  way  of  causer ie,  as  the 
French  would  put  it,  that  we  have  been  better  enter- 
tained than  we  at  first  expected  to  be,  by  this  work 
of  the  author  of  "Meliorism."*  We  find  two  good 
reasons  for  not  being  displeased  with  it. 

The  first  is  the  author's  innate  goodness  and  lofti- 
ness of  spirit,  which  constantly  reveals  itself  in  his 
combating  egotism,  in  his  lifting  up  his  readers  out 

*  This  is  the  title  of  another  of  the  author's  works,  and,  in  fact,  the  one 
which  he  applies  to  his  system. 


324  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

of  the  slough  of  "  Spencerianism,"  and  in  the  fact 
that  he  reposes  the  supreme  ethical  law  in  truth.  Al- 
though rejecting  his  doctrine  of  representation,*  we 
cannot  but  congratulate  Dr.  Carus  on  his  happy  dec- 
laration :  that  ethics  should  recognise  as  its  principal 
basis  the  search  for  truth  and  adaptation  thereto ; 
that  an  honest  inquiry  into  truth  is  the  condition  of 
all  ethics,  and  that  faithfulness  and  obedience  to  truth 
includes  all  the  laws  that  a  system  of  ethics  could 
contain. 

*  For  the  convenience  of  our  readers,  especially  the  young  and  strangers, 
we  may  repeat  the  reasons  upon  which  we  reject  the  theory  of  representation : 
That  which  is  known  is  the  truth  ;  that  which  is  known  is  the  idea.  Idea  and 
truth  are  entirely  wholly  one,  and  are  wholly  one  also  with  the  object  thought 
of.  If,  instead  of  saying  that  the  idea  is  the  object  thought  of,  we  say  that  the 
idea  is,  through  sense-reminiscence,  a  representation  of  the  object,  it  would 
come  to  pass  that  we  could  never  think  of  any  object,  but  always  of  its  repre- 
sentation ;  therefore,  I  could  not  think  :  one,  two,  three — the  thought  itself 
would  be  impossible.  Moreover,  the  representation  could  not  be  thought,  if 
not  by  means  of  a  certain  resemblance  or  similitude  with  the  object  thought 
of;  this  similitude  is  what  is  actually  thought :  it  is  a  common  element;  it  is 
the  unity  of  the  representation  and  that  which  is  represented.  Idea  in  this 
sense  is  the  representation  of  many  things  similar  to  each  other,  but  this  is 
not  its  definition.    (See  Rosmini,  Psychology,  vol.  II,  p.  1339.) 


ROSMINI'S  PHILOSOPHY. 


BY  DR.    PAUL  CARUS. 


Prof.  L.  M.  Billia  is  a  Roman  Catholic  and  a  dis- 
ciple of  Antonio  Rosmini-Serbati.  There  is  a  deep- 
seated  and  radical  difference  between  our  view  and 
that  of  our  critic,  and  yet  there  is  also  in  some  points 
of  great  consequence  a  striking  agreement.  As  there 
is  no  hope  of  a  conversion  on  either  side,  we  may  for- 
bear arguing  the  case  and  be  satisfied  with  a  simple 
statement,  which  will  contrast  the  two  world-concep- 
tions. But  before  entering  into  a  discussion  of  the 
present  subject,  it  seems  advisable  to  sketch  the  phi- 
losophy of  Professor  Billia's  great  master,  who  may 
fairly  be  regarded  as  the  most  representative  Roman 
Catholic  thinker  of  modern  times. 

Rosmini  was  born  in  March,  1797,  in  Roveredo, 
Tyrol,  the  eldest  son  of  a  wealthy  and  noble  family. 
He  attended  the  Lyceum  at  Trient  and  the  University 
of  Padua,  and  selected  in  1821  the  ecclesiastical  call- 
ing with  the  avowed  purpose  of  giving  to  theology  a 
sound  philosophical  basis.  In  his  love  of  the  church 
and  eagerness  for  reform,  he  became  the  founder  of  a 
new  religious  order,  the  Society  of  the  Brothers  and 
Sisters  of  Charity,  popularly  called  in  Italy  "  The  Ros- 
minians."  He  joined  Piedmont  in  1830  and  Pope  Pius 
IX.  in  1848,  under  whose  reform-ministry  he  became 


326  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

the  papal  minister  of  education.  At  the  outbreak  of 
the  Roman  revolution,  he  retired  from  public  life  and 
died  July  ist,  1855  at  Stresa. 

In  spite  of  all  his  devotion  not  only  to  the  church 
but  also  to  the  Pope  personally,  whom  he  followed 
into  his  exile  at  Gaeta,  one  of  his  writings  "On  the 
Five  Wounds  of  the  Church  "  has  been  placed  upon 
the  Index. 

Rosmini's  numerous,  and  partly  very  ponderous, 
writings  are  little  accessible  to  the  English  speaking 
world.  His  works  were  collected  (according  to  Meyer's 
Konversations-Lexikon)  in  seventeen  volumes  (Milan, 
1842-44),  and  he  wrote,  according  to  Davidson,  not 
fewer  than  ninety-nine  various  publications,  books, 
and  among  them  very  voluminous  books,  articles  and 
pamphlets,  on  philosophical,  theological,  ethical,  legal, 
and  miscellaneous  subjects.  Among  them  are  claimed 
to  be  the  most  important  ones,  '*  Nuovo  saggio  sull'  ori- 
gine  delleidee,"  3  vol.;  and  "  Philosophia  del  diritto." 
The  best  known  Italian  works  on  his  life  are  by  Tho- 
maseo  (Turin,  1855)  and  Bernardi  (Pinerolo,  i860). 

There  is  a  translation  extant  of  Rosmini's  "Nouvo 
saggio  sull'  origine  delle  idee,"  entitled  "New  Essay 
on  the  Origin  of  Ideas  "  (London,  1883-84),  published 
by  the  English  branch  of  the  Rosminians  which  is  at- 
tached to  the  ancient  church  of  St.  Etheldreda,  Ely 
Place,  Holborn.  The  most  convenient  work  for  Eng- 
lish readers  will  be  Davidson's  book  '*  Rosmini's  Phil- 
osophical System"  (London,  1882). 

In  order  to  overcome  doubt  and  unbelief  Rosmini 
attempted  to  establish  a  rational  basis  of  the  Christian 
faith,  thus  to  work  out  a  conciliation  of  reason  and  re- 
ligion. He  opposed  the  sensualism  and  empiricism  as 
represented  in  Italy  by  Gioja  and  Ramagnosi,  and  pro- 


ROSMINPS  PHILOSOPHY.  327 

pounded  a  philosophical  system  which  in  accord  with 
Descartes's  idealism  was  expected  to  be  in  agreement 
with  the  doctrines  of  the  church. 

The  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  characterises  Ros- 
mini's  philosophy  as  follows  : 

"Rosmini,  contemplating  the  position  of  recent  philosophy 
from  Locke  to  Hegel,  and  having  his  eye  directed  to  the  ancient 
and  fundamental  problem  of  the  origin,  truth,  and  certainty  of  our 
ideas,  wrote  : — '  If  philosophy  is  to  be  restored  to  love  and  respect, 
I  think  it  will  be  necessary,  in  part,  to  return  to  the  teachings  of 
the  ancients,  and  in  part  to  give  those  teachings  the  benefit  of 
modern  methods'  ('Theodicy,' n.  148).  Pursuing,  therefore,  the 
now  generally  approved  m  thod  of  the  observation  of  facts,  he  most 
carefully  examined  and  analysed  the  fact  of  human  knowledge,  and 
obtained  the  following  results  : 

"  1)  That  the  notion  or  idea  of  being  or  existence  in  general 
enters  into,  and  is  presupposed  by,  all  our  acquired  cognitions,  so 
that,  without  it,  they  would  be  impossible. 

'  2)  That  this  idea  is  essentially  objective,  inasmuch  as  what 
is  seen  in  it  is  as  distinct  from  and  opposed  to  the  mind  that  sees 
it  as  the  light  is  from  the  eye  that  looks  at  it. 

' '  3)  That  it  is  essentially  true,  because  '  being '  and  '  truth ' 
are  convertible  terms,  and  because  in  the  vision  of  it  the  mind 
cannot  err,  since  error  could  only  be  committed  by  a  judgment, 
and  here  there  is  no  judgment,  but  a  pure  intuition  affirming  noth- 
ing and  denying  nothing. 

"4)  That  by  the  application  of  this  essentially  objective  and 
true  idea  the  human  being  intellectually  perceives,  first,  the  animal 
body  individually  conjoined  with  him,  and  then,  on  occasion  of 
the  sensations  produced  in  him  not  by  himself,  the  causes  of  those 
sensations,  that  is,  from  the  action  felt  he  perceives  and  affirms  an 
agent,  a  being,  and  therefore  a  true  thing,  that  acts  on  him,  and 
he  thus  gets  at  the  external  world, — these  are  the  true  primitive 
judgments,  containing  (a)  the  subsistence  of  the  particular  being 
(subject),  and  (o)  its  essence  or  species  as  determined  by  the  qual- 
ity of  the  action  felt  from  it  (predicate). 

"5)  That  reflexion,  by  separating  the  essence  or  species  from 
the  subsistence,  obtains  the  full  specific  idea  (universalisation), 


328  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

and  then  from  this,  by  leaving  aside  some  of  its  elements,  the  ab- 
stract specific  idea  (abstraction). 

"  6)  That  the  mind,  having  reached  this  stage  of  development, 
can  proceed  to  further  and  further  abstracts,  including  the  first 
principles  of  reasoning,  the  principles  of  the  several  sciences,  com- 
plex ideas,  groups  of  ideas,  and  so  on  without  end. 

"7)  Finally,  that  the  same  most  universal  idea  of  being,  this 
generator  and  formal  element  of  all  acquired  cognitions,  cannot 
itself  be  acquired,  but  must  be  innate  in  us,  implanted  by  God  in 
our  nature.  Being,  as  naturally  shining  to  our  mind,  must  there- 
fore be  what  men  call  the  light  of  reason.  Hence  the  name  Ros- 
mini  gives  it  of  ideal  being  ;  and  this  he  laid  down  as  the  one  true 
fundamental  principle  of  all  philosophy,  and  the  supreme  criterion 
of  truth  and  certainty." 

We  are  in  sympathy  with  the  aspiration  represented 
by  Rosmini,  of  rationalising  the  Christian  faith.  We 
do  not  believe  that  Rosmini  was  successful  in  his  ef- 
forts ;  indeed,  we  think  that  he  could  not  be,  because 
he  took  a  wrong  start  and  was  blinded  by  the  firm  and 
fore-determined  conviction  that  the  Christianity  of  the 
church  was  undeniable  and  indubitable  truth.  Never- 
theless, we  regard  the  effort  of  any  man  of  conciliating 
his  religion  with  science  and  rational  thought  as  praise- 
worthy, and  we  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  gist  of  Chris- 
tianity, i.  e.  the  main  tenets  of  Christian  ethics,  admit 
indeed  of  a  perfectly  rational  foundation.  We  deny, 
however,  the  possibility  of  rationalising  the  dogmas  of 
the  church.  We  see  in  them  only  the  crystallised  myth- 
ology of  past  ages,  which,  when  regarded  as  a  myth- 
ology, is  profound,  venerable,  full  of  oddly  and  mys- 
teriously expressed  truths,  but  when  regarded  as  truth 
itself,  are  utterly  absurd. 

We  agree  with  Professor  Billia  in  substance  while 
we  disagree  in  form.  We  agree  in  rejecting  hedon- 
ism, or  the  pleasure  theory  in  ethics,  and  we  agree  in 
accepting  the  ethics  of  a  stern  search  for  truth.  Neither 


ROSMINPS  PHILOSOPHY.  329 

of  us  can  think  of  speaking  of  ethics  as  independent  of 
a  definite  world- conception.  Both  of  us  regard  moral- 
ity simply  as  the  practical  application  of  our  deepest 
religious  convictions  concerning  that  which  we  have 
found  to  be  the  truth.  Yet  we  disagree  as  to  the  form 
in  which  we  cast  our  convictions.  Rosmini  and  his 
school  favor  mystical  expressions  and  extol  the  tradi- 
tion of  the  church  in  comparison  to  the  results  of  mod- 
ern science.  We,  on  the  contrary,  do  not  rest  satisfied 
until  the  mysteries  disappear  like  fog  before  the  sun ; 
and  while  we  place  little  reliance  upon  ecclesiastical 
traditions,  we  rely  mainly  upon  that  which  God's  rev- 
elation in  nature  teaches  us  through  science. 

Thus  my  Roman  Catholic  critic  who  enjoys  the  ad- 
vantage of  living  in  the  cradle  of  an  ancient  civilisa- 
tion and  the  very  home  of  the  "  Filosophia  del  diritto" 
jokes  at  my  ingenuousness  of  accepting  the  theory  of 
evolution.  He  does  not  attempt  to  overthrow  the 
theory  of  evolution,  and  does  not  seem  to  expect  me 
to  take  the  trouble  of  proving  it  to  him.  I  hope,  he 
will  not  be  offended  when  I  openly  confess  that  the 
smile  was  fully  reciprocated  on  my  part.  It  is  not  ig- 
norance of  the  philosophical  and  ecclesiastical  tradi- 
tions, nor  a  horror  of  the  supernatural  that  prevent  me 
from  accepting  an  ecclesiastical  philosophy  as  is  that 
of  Rosmini's.  Yet  Professor  Billia,  it  appears  to  me, 
does  not  appreciate  the  full  weight  of  overwhelming 
proofs  which  give  evidence  to  the  truth  of  the  theory 
of  evolution. 

Professor  Billia,  so  it  seems  to  us,  still  regards  re- 
ligious truths  (i.  e.,  the  moral  tenets  which  confessedly 
contain  the  gist  of  religion)  as  incompatible  with  the 
results  of  modern  science.  This  may  be  excusable  in 
the  face  of  the  fact  that  almost  all  modern  ethicists 


33o  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

who  accept  the  theory  of  evolution,  Spencer,  Hofl- 
ding,  Gizycki,  etc.,  are  hedonists.  We  trust  that  the 
theory  of  evolution,  far  from  overthrowing  the  moral 
truths  of  religion  will  give  them  a  scientific  and  relia- 
ble basis.  If  evolution  is  true,  we  must  live  in  obe- 
dience to  the  law  of  evolution.  In  that  case,  we  can- 
not fashion  our  lives  according  to  our  pleasure,  for  the 
facts  of  nature  sternly  demand,  by  penalty  of  degenera- 
tion and  perdition,  a  constant  progress  and  higher  de- 
velopment of  our  souls.  Here  we  are  in  accord  with 
the  old  Hebrew  and  Christian  tradition.  Ethics  is  not 
subjective ;  our  rules  of  conduct  are  not  self-made ; 
there  is  an  objective  authority  which  must  be  obeyed, 
whose  will  is  plainly  recognised  in  the  laws  of  nature 
and  in  the  course  of  evolution. 

We  have  no  "fear  of  the  supernatural";  we  simply 
regard  its  conception  as  an  error.  To  Professor  Billia 
religious  truths  are  acquired  by  a  supernatural  revela- 
tion, and  scientific  truths  by  a  natural  revelation.  The 
former  only  are  regarded  as  holy  and  infallible,  not 
the  latter,  which  are  rather  dubitable  and  unreliable. 
To  us  all  truth  is  holy.  In  so  far  as  truth  is  a  state- 
ment of  fact,  a  description  of  some  feature  or  part  of 
the  objective  reality  in  which  and  of  which  we  are, 
truth  is  always  divine.  Thus  religion,  or  our  attempt 
of  living  the  truth,  no  less  than  science,  or  our  search 
for  the  truth,  are  in  one  respect  "human  facts"  and 
in  another  respect  "a  work  of  God." 

The  main  difference  between  our  Catholic  critic 
and  ourselves  consists  in  this :  that  he  regards  the 
traditional  authority  of  the  Church  as  ultimate,  while 
we  replace  it  by  the  authority  of  objective  truth,  prov- 
able according  to  the  usual  methods  of  science. 

We  do  not  intend  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  mi- 


RO  SMI  NFS  PHILOSOPHY.  331 

nor  points ;  so  we  abstain  here  from  repeating  our  doc- 
trine of  freewill,  simply  stating  that  we  do  not  feel  guilty, 
as  Professor  Billia  maintains,  of  having  confounded 
"liberty  of  will  with  freedom  from  passion";  on  the 
other  hand,  we  do  not  see  how  the  Italian  school  can 
boast  of  having  solved  the  problem,  while  claiming  to 
have  confuted  "in  the  best  possible  manner  determin- 
ism, physiological,  psychological,  and  rationalistic." 
We  further  abstain  from  discussing  whether  or  not  and 
how  far  there  is  an  agreement  of  our  position  with  Au- 
guste  Comte's  positivism.  We  concur  with  Comte  in 
the  recognition  of  the  scientific  method ;  we  depart 
from  his  agnosticism  and  many  details  of  his  philo- 
sophical views ;  and,  finally,  we  only  hint  here  that 
when  the  author  of  "The  Ethical  Problem  "  spoke  of 
the  "intuitionalists,"  he  did  not  have  reference  to  the 
"  Objective  school "  of  Rosmini.  Intuitionalism  is  a 
peculiarly  English  phenomenon,  which  can  only  in  one 
point,  indeed,  in  the  main  point,  be  compared  to  Ros- 
mini's  view,  viz. :  in  its  strange  tenet  of  the  intuitive 
apprehension  of  truth.  This  latter  point,  however,  is 
of  sufficient  consequence  to  deserve  a  few  additional 
remarks. 

Professor  Billia  regards  it  as  a  matter  of  course 
that  "the  doctrine  of  representation"  is  wrong.  By 
doctrine  of  representation  he  understands  our  proposi- 
tion that  knowledge  is  a  representation  of  facts  and  that 
truth  is  a  correct  representation  of  facts.  According  to 
his  view  "idea  and  truth  are  wholly  one,  and  are  wholly 
one  with  the  object  thought  of."  This  sentence,  if  I 
understand  this  rather  mystifying  explanation  cor- 
rectly, means,  that  ideas  are  directly  perceived  in  the 
same  way  as  sensations  —  the  Anschauungen  of  our 
senses.     Our  sensations  (i.  e.,  in  Kant's  terminology 


332  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

our  A nschauungen,  often  translated  by  "intuitions") 
are  not  subject  to  doubt ;  they  are  immediately  per- 
ceived as  real ;  and  a  similar  immediateness  has  been 
attributed  by  many  philosophers  to  certain  very  gen- 
eral or  universal  truths. 

Rosmini  regards  "being"  and  truth  as  identical. 
We  make  a  distinction  between  reality  and  truth. 
Sensations  are  "real";  we  cannot  say  that  sensations 
as  such  are  either  true  or  untrue.  For  instance,  I  feel 
a  slight  pang  of  hunger  in  the  stomach  :  Is  there  any 
truth  or  untruth  in  this  feeling  ?  Or  a  certain  color 
sensation  takes  place  in  the  eye  :  Is  there  any  truth 
or  untruth  in  this  sensation?  Sensations  are  simply 
real ;  they  are  the  data  of  our  experience,  out  of  which 
we  construct  our  ideas.  But  these  ideas  if  they  prop- 
erly represent  the  objects  sensed,  are  true ;  if  not, 
they  are  untrue.  Truth  and  untruth  always  presup- 
pose mental  activity.  If  I,  having  a  color-sensation 
which  is  a  subjective  hallucination,  judge  that  there  is 
an  object  before  me,  I  am  mistaken ;  the  sensation  in 
that  case  is  not  wrong,  but  my  judgment  of  it  is  wrong. 
The  sensation  is  right  enough ;  it  is  caused  somehow 
according  to  the  laws  of  nature ;  but  I  have  allowed 
myself  to  be  misguided  by  its  appearance. 

Thus  truth  is  never  a  thing  of  immediate  percep- 
tion, but  always  the  product  of  mental  activity.  The 
very  laws  of  mind  would  have  to  be  reversed,  should 
truth  be  directly  perceived  as  are  sensations. 

Professor  Billia  assumes  that  if  an  idea,  "through 
sense- reminiscence,"  were  "a  representation  of  the 
object," 

"It  would  come  to  pass  that  we  could  never  think  of  any  ob- 
ject, but  always  of  its  representation  ;  therefore, 

he  adds, 


ROSMINPS  PHILOSOPHY.  333 

"I  could  not  think  one,  two,  three — the  thought  itself  would 
he  impossible." 

Why?  Is  this  not  self-mystification?  Let  us  not 
stultify  ourselves.  By  having  and  thinking  a  repre- 
sentation, we  think  of  the  object  represented.  A  cer- 
tain feeling,  being  caused  somehow,  say  by  a  certain 
sense-impression,  comes  to  represent  an  object,  and 
thus  it  stands  for  it ;  it  symbolises  it.  This  is  the  na- 
ture of  thought.  Whenever  the  symbol  is  felt,  the 
object  represented  in  it  is  thought  of. 

There  is  a  long  distance  between  Alessandria  in 
Northern  Italy  and  Chicago  in  the  prairies  of  Illinois, 
but  it  almost  seems  to  us  that  the  distance  between 
the  spiritual  roads  of  Professor  Billia  and  ourselves  is 
greater  still.  Centuries  seem  to  lie  between  us.  But 
in  spite  of  all  our  divergencies  we  observe  with  pleas- 
ure a  certain  concurrence  in  some  most  important 
points.  We  have  in  this  sketch  attempted  to  repre- 
sent the  case  with  faithful  impartiality,  not  attenuat- 
ing and  not  extending  either  the  differences  or  agree- 
ments. 


FAITH  AND  REASON. 


A  REVIEW  OF  FECHNER'S  METHOD  OF  CONCIL 
IATING  RELIGION  WITH  SCIENCE. 


Gustav  Theodor  Fechner  is  the  founder  of  psy- 
cho-physics, i.  e.,  the  science  which  determines  the 
relation  between  sense-stimuli  and  sensations, thus  ex- 
plaining the  interdependence  between  bodily  functions 
and  psychical  phenomena.  Prof.  E.  H.  Weber  had 
set  up  the  law  that  the  increase  of  a  stimulus  to  be 
appreciable  must  always  bear  some  fixed  and  definite 
proportion  to  the  intensity  of  the  stimulus  with  which 
it  is  compared.  For  instance  if  we  can  just  distinguish 
between  16  ounces  and  17  ounces,  we  shall  be  able  to 
distinguish  between  32  and  34  ounces,  not  between 
33  and  34.  The  fraction  T^  must  be  the  same.  This 
fraction,  the  smallest  noticeable  difference,  which  is 
to  be  found  out  by  experiment,  is  called  the  "differ- 
ence threshold  "  of  muscular  sense. 

Fechner  took  up  Weber's  investigations  and  stated 
Weber's  law  with  greater  precision  in  a  mathematical 
form  thus  :  "  The  sensation  increases  as  the  logarithm 
of  the  stimulus."  He  made  this  law  of  the  relation 
that  obtains  between  body  and  soul  the  basis  of  a  new 
branch  of  science  which  he  called  "psycho-physics." 

We  must  add  that  the  law  is  approximately  true  in 
the  case  of  sight,  hearing,  pressure,  and  the  muscular 


FAITH  AND  REASON.  335 

sense,  it  is  most  exactly  true  of  sound,  but  it  is  un- 
certain for  the  chemical  senses  of  smell  and  taste. 
It  is  most  exact  in  the  middle  regions  of  the  sensory 
scale  but  becomes  unreliable  when  we  approach  either 
the  lower  or  upper  limit  of  sensibility. 

Fechner  called  attention  to  the  duality  of  sensation 
and  motion  ;  yet  he  proposed  to  conceive  this  duality 
as  two  aspects  only  of  one  and  the  same  thing.  Fech- 
ner's  philosophical  ideal  was  monism,  yet  we  must  add 
that,  in  our  opinion,  he  has  not  fully  realised  his  mo- 
nistic ideal.  His  imaginative  powers  were  those  of  a 
poet  and  we  find  that  his  views  of  God  and  soul  and 
immortality  are  sometimes  bordering  on  or  even  en- 
tering into  that  kind  of  fanciful  spiritualism  which  is 

generally  called  supernaturalism. 

* 
*  * 

This  is  a  short  description  of  Fechner's  position 
and  importance  as  a  psychologist.  At  present  we  do 
not  intend  to  give  any  further  explanation  of  his  meta- 
physical, or  psychological,  or  philosophical  views,  but 
to  describe  his  attitude  toward  religion.  No  one  per- 
haps could  feel  more  deeply  and  earnestly  the  demand 
of  the  soul  to  have  science  and  religion  conciliated. 
He  was  a  man  of  science  ;  his  life  was  devoted  to  most 
intricate  investigations  and  experiments,  but  he  never 
lost  sight  on  the  one  hand  of  the  religious  importance 
of  scientific  work  and  on  the  other  hand  of  the  indis- 
pensability  of  religion  to  science. 

Fechner  argues : 

Knowledge  and  faith  are  intimately  interconnected. 
Science  cannot  live  without  faith.  I  know  that  I  have 
a  sensation  of  red  or  green  or  yellow,  I  also  know  that 
the  sum  of  the  angles  in  a  plane  triangle  are  equal  to 
180  degrees.    But  I  do  not  know  in  the  strictest  sense 


336  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

of  knowledge  that  another  man  has  the  same  color- 
sensation  when  he  looks  at  the  same  objects.  I  do 
not  even  know  that  space  is  tri-dimensional,  I  may 
have  (and  we  cannot  say  that  we  do  not  have)  good 
reasons  for  believing  the  one  and  the  other,  but  this 
belief,  certain  though  it  may  be,  res'ts  upon  our  faith  in 
the  regularity  and  cosmic  order  of  the  universe,  which 
is  the  result  of  an  inference  but  not  an  object  of  direct 
knowledge.  Fechner  starting  from  such  considera- 
tions, says,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  man  of  science  not  to 
abolish  faith  but  to  replace  it  so  far  as  possible  by  ex- 
act knowledge. 

Faith  originates  because  we  need  it,  we  are  in  want 
of  it,  it  is  a  necessity  of  life.  We  cannot  extend  our 
knowledge  without  faith,  we  cannot  act  without  it, 
and  that  faith  an  essential  feature  of  which  is  the  as- 
piration to  extend  knowledge  is  superior  to  the  self- 
sufficient  faith  of  the  Moslem  who  burns  the  books  and 
spurns  science. 

The  basis  of  religion  lies  deeply  buried  in  the  na- 
ture of  man  and  human  society,  so  deeply  that  many 
cannot  detect  it.  Many  propose  the  principles  of  hu- 
manity or  pure  ethics  as  a  surrogate  in  the  place  of 
religion.  But  they  forget  that  these  principles  of  hu- 
manity are  a  product  of  religion  and  would  not  exist 
without  it.  Humanity  and  religiosity  rise  and  sink 
together.  We  may  imagine  the  stones  in  the  founda- 
tion of  the  building  useless,  because  they  are  hidden 
from  sight,  but  if  we  should  take  them  away  the  house 
must  fall. 

Religion  holds  and  keeps  human  society,  and  hu- 
man society  is  such  an  immediate  presence  as  the  air 
we  breathe.  To  discard  religion  and  keep  humanity 
or  ethics  is  about  the  same  as  to  propose  that  we  can 


FAITH  AND  REASON.  337 

dispense  with  the  air  so  long  as  and  because  we  have 
breath. 

Fechner  maintains  that  there  are  three  essential 
elements  in  religion  and  no  religion  is  perfect  unless 
it  proposes  a  belief  in  all  three.  These  three  elements 
are  the  belief  in  (1)  God,  (2)  an  immortal  soul,  and  (3) 
spirits.  God  is  to  him  not  only  the  ground  of  all  exist- 
ence but  also  the  soul-tie  of  all  spirits  among  whom 

Christ  is  our  ideal  as  the  foremost  revealer  of  God. 

* 

*  * 

We  do  not  intend  to  give  further  explanations  of 
Fechner's  views  and  are  satisfied  in  having  outlined 
his  religious  standpoint.  We  shall  now  attempt  to  con- 
strue his  views  satisfactorily  to  our  world-conception. 

Fechner's  conceptions  of  God,  the  soul,  and  the 
spirit-world  are  not  without  fantastic  notions,  and  we 
cannot  accept  the  arguments  he  proposes,  especially 
for  the  last  and  most  favorite  of  his  three  religious 
ideas.  We  do  not  deny  the  spirituality  of  the  world, 
for  we  ourselves  are  spirits,  not  pure  spirits  but  spirits 
after  all,  and  our  innermost  nature  is  spiritual.  But  we 
deny  Fechner's  peculiar  conception  of  a  spirit-world 
above  the  spirituality  of  nature. 

Let  us  see  whether  we  can  give  to  Fechner's  views 
an  interpretation  that  will  stand  the  test  of  scientific 
critique. 

The  idea  of  a  spirit-world  is  strange,  but  if  inter- 
preted allegorically  it  has  a  deep  significance.  Among 
Christians  it  finds  its  expression  in  the  mythology  of  an- 
gels, saints,  and  devils.  Yet  this  idea  of  a  spirit-world, 
although  it  is  mythology,  contains  (as  all  mythology 
does)  a  great  and  important  truth.  If  we  decipher  the 
mythological  meaning  of  the  belief  in  saints  and  trans- 
late it  into  a  statement  of  facts,  we  should  say  that 


338  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

the  soul-life  of  all  humanity  is  one  great  stream  ;  all 
sentient  creatures  that  lived  on  earth  since  organised 
life  began  form  one  great  empire,  one  large  republic 
of  interdependent  citizens.  A  man's  life  does  not  be- 
gin with  birth,  nor  does  it  end  with  death.  There  are 
no  individuals  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word.  The 
soul-life  of  past  generations  flows  through  the  present 
generation  into  future  generations.  Our  ancestors' 
souls  are  not  lost ;  our  dead  are  not  dissolved  into 
nothing ;  they  continue  ;  so  long  as  we  speak  their 
language,  think  their  ideas,  and  act  according  to 
their  maxims ;  they  are  with  us  all  the  time  and  will 
be  with  us  even  unto  the  end  of  the  world.  In  so 
far  as  their  presence  is  effective  of  evil,  they  are  de- 
mons, in  so  far  as  it  is  effective  of  good,  as  their  in- 
fluence leads  the  race  onward  and  upward,  they  corre- 
spond to  the  saints  of  the  church. 

Is  there  also  a  truth  in  the  belief  in  angels  ?  Cer- 
tainly there  is  !  If  those  features  of  nature's  all-being 
which  produce  and  uphold  the  spiritual  world  of  man's 
soul-life,  are  called  in  their  harmonious  totality  God, 
we  should  say  that  the  single  powers  of  nature  tend- 
ing to  advance  God's  work  in  the  world,  are,  mytho- 
logically  expressed,  his  messengers  and  servants.  If 
we  conceive  the  sun  merely  in  his  physical  effects,  we 
are  overwhelmed  with  his  grandeur,  his  awfulness  and 
beneficence.  Through  him  we  receive  directly  and 
indirectly  most  of  the  boons  that  produce  and  sustain 
life.  The  sun  is  not  a  mind,  yet  we  stand  in  a  relation 
to  the  sun  that  is,  on  our  part,  of  a  personal  nature. 
We  can  and  often  do  regard  him  with  gratitude,  and 
to  represent  him  as  an  archangel  of  God  is  by  no 
means  an  inappropriate  allegory.  It  is  mythology,  but 
the  mythology  has  a  meaning. 


FAITH  AND  REASON.  339 

Our  consciousness  is  the  effect  of  the  subconscious 
spirituality  of  our  organisation.  This  subconscious 
spirituality  is,  as  it  were,  our  attending  angel,  our  fa- 
miliar, the  spirit  that  nourishes  and  bears  our  mental- 
ity, it  is  the  pedestal  upon  which  our  conscious  life 
rests. 

It  is  a  wrong  conception  of  nature  to  think  of  na- 
ture as  a  dead  machine  regulated  by  the  law  of  inertia. 
Nature  is  life,  nature  is  spontaneity,  nature  is  spirit- 
uality. 

If  we  weigh  the  materialistic  conception,  (which 
considers  solely  and  exclusively  what  we  define  as  the 
objectivity  of  nature  i.  e.  matter  in  motion,  dropping 
that  source  of  psychical  life  which  we  call  the  subjec- 
tivity of  nature),  if  we  compare  materialism  with  the 
mythology  of  ancient  and  modern  religions,  we  should 
say  that  the  former  is  radically  wrong  and  the  latter, 
the  modern  and  even  the  ancient  religions,  are  right 
in  the  face  of  the  former.  The  latter  are  wrong  only 
in  so  far  as  the  truth  is  symbolically  expressed  and  not 
in  exact  scientific  formulas.  But  the  truth  is  there 
nevertheless. 

*  * 

Fechner  concludes  a  little  volume  which  he  has 
written  on  the  subject, with  a  peculiar  confession.  He 
says  in  his  "Drei  Motive  und  Grunde  des  Glaubens": 

"  As  free  as  the  position  is  which  I  advocate  in  this  work  and 
have  advocated  in  former  writings,  yet  the  orthodox  position 
where  I  have  met  it  elsewhere,  has  on  the  whole,  though  not  in 
every  case,  pleased  me  better  than  the  free.  .  .  . 

"To  this  firmness  of  faith  is  attached  a  wonderful  blessing. 
When  I  observe  that  many  enjoy  this  blessing  even  now  and 
apply  it  in  their  principles  and  actions,  in  as  far  as  it  is  possible 
in  this  time  of  imperfection,  relying  partly  on  the  need  of  such 
blessing  and  partly  upon  the  truth  and  goodness  of  the  principal 


34o  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

tenets  of  the  Christian  religion,  I  am  thereby  filled  with  a  secret 
admiration  and  joy.  I  see  in  this  on  the  one  hand  an  expression 
and  on  the  other  hand  an  acceptation  of  the  meaning  and  fact  of 
a  perfect  religion,  an  acceptation,  which  can  only  take  place  in  so 
far  as  the  respective  religion  is  looked  upon  as  that  which  accord- 
ing to  its  idea  it  intends  to  be  in  completion,  and  in  so  far  as  its 
historic  sources  are  considered  entirely  reliable.  .  .  . 

"Religion  should  furnish  to  reason  the  highest,  safest,  and 
surest  points  of  view  ;  and  now  it  is  left  to  the  function  of  the  in- 
dividual reason  to  govern,  to  improve,  to  judge  and  to  sift  these 
views ;  that  is  to  reverse  the  whole  subject,  and  in  the  place  of 
the  unity  settling  all  things  which  we  must  expect  from  religion, 
we  now  get  in  addition  to  the  other  causes  of  dissent  we  already 
have,  also  the  confusion  and  contention  about  religion  itself,  so 
that  we  easily  lose  all  religion." 

Let  us  pause  here  for  a  moment  and  ask,  What  is 
1 '  the  individual  reason  "?  Reason  is  reason  in  so  far  only 
as  it  agrees  with  that  feature  of  reality  which  makes 
of  the  world  a  cosmos.  Objectivity  accordingly  is  the 
nature  of  reason;  and  "individual  reason,"  denoting 
a  subjective  kind  of  reason  is  a  contradictory  term. 

The  individual  reason  (supposing  that  the  term 
means  subjective  rationality,  a  rational  taste  or  fancy) 
is  not  and  cannot  be  an  absolute  criterion  of  truth.  That 
is  not  true  which  pleases  the  taste  of  a  rational  being 
best,  but  that  which  agrees  with  reality ;  not  that  which 
satisfies  one's  conception  of  rationality,  but  that  which 
is  in  conformity  with  actual  facts.  There  are  some 
people  who  believe  that  that  is  right  which  their  con- 
science tells  them  to  be  right,  and  that  that  is  true 
which  pleases  their  peculiar  sense  of  rationality  best. 
But  their  position  is  false.  The  standards  of  truth  and 
error,  and  of  right  and  wrong,  are  objective  not  sub- 
jective ;  and  the  very  instrument  of  reasoning,  man's 
organ  of  arranging  the  facts  of  experience  in  proper 
relations,  his  mechanism  of  formal  thought  is  but  a 


FAITH  AND  REASON.  341 

copy  of  the  world-order",  an  imitation  of  the  ways  of 
nature,  and  a  systematised  recognition  of  the  forms  of 
existence.  Through  reason  the  scientist  can  formu- 
late the  regularities  of  the  universe  in  laws  and  through 
reason  alone  living  beings  are  enabled  to  set  them- 
selves purposes  for  their  actions. 

Religion  is  the  recognition  of  authority.  It  stands 
on  the  recognition  of  something  that  is  independent  of 
our  wishes  and  tastes ;  of  something  that  is  as  it  is 
whatever  we  think  of  it ;  it  stands  on  the  recognition 
of  reality.  But  religion  is  not  based  alone  on  the  rec- 
ognition of  reality,  it  implies  also  the  demand  of  find- 
ing out  the  nature  of  reality.  Religion  demands  cog- 
nition, and  so  the  proper  employment  of  reason  is  an 
essential  part  of  religion. 


Fechner  proposes  three  principles  which  lead  to 
faith,  (1)  the  historical  principle,  (2)  the  practical 
principle,  and  (3)  the  theoretical  principle.  The  first 
and  second  are  the  main  stays  of  orthodox  religion  for 
they  lead  to  religion  whatever  it  may  be,  the  third 
principle,  however,  which  includes  critique  and  sci- 
ence, is  that  which  purifies  religion  and  leads  on  to 
that  ideal  religion  of  which  the  mythological  concep- 
tions are  dim  prophecies.     Fechner  continues  : 

"And  why  then  do  I  not  place  myself  upon  the  ground  of  un- 
conditional faith  in  what  has  become  historical  ?  I  cannot,  and 
hundreds  and  thousands  cannot.  The  theoretical  principle  asserts 
itself,  too,  and  must  assert  itself.  And  if  implicit  faith  in  what  has 
generally  been  accepted,  for  those  who  have  such  faith,  has  its 
advantages  which  nothing  could  replace,  yet  with  the  impossibil- 
ity that  all  have  it  and  that  reason  be  sacrificed  to  faith  under  all 
circumstances,  another  task  of  history  comes  into  play,  that  is  the 
task  to  make  the  advantages,  which  those  believers  alone  can  have 


342  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

almost  exceptionally  and  yet  not  in  a  perfect  degree,  because  they 
look  upon  the  yet  imperfect  religion  as  already  perfect,  the  com- 
mon property  of  all,  by  really  advancing  religion  to  its  perfection 
and  thus  making  it  possible  for  it  to  reach  its  culminating  point. 
"It  must  finally  arrive  where  reason  will  be  fully  satisfied  and 
will  be  a  pillar  of  the  faith  it  now  constantly  shakes,  instead  of 
demanding  impossible  sacrifices  of  reason  in  behalf  of  faith.  And 
for  this  end  indeed  the  introduction  of  new  positions  in  history  is 
needed ;  the  efforts  of  a  reason  no  longer  tied  to  rigid  dogmas  and 
its  attempts  to  overthrow  what  is  destined  to  fall  at  some  time,  re- 
quire the  greatest  diversity  of  aspirations,  a  ceaseless  fight  from  all 
sides  and  the  failure  of  most  of  these  efforts,  so  that,  after  all  the 
false  courses  are  exhausted  and  done  away  with,  the  right  course 
may  at  least  surely  and  safely  remain." 

There  is  much  truth  in  what  Fechner  says  and  we 
sympathise  with  the  position  he  takes  ;  yet  we  pro- 
pose to  go  further  : 

Fechner's  third  principle  is  the  most  important  one 
of  all.  Without  it  the  other  two  principles  cannot 
produce  religion.  Without  it,  religion  would  be  dog- 
matism, and  would  cease  to  be  religion. 

Fechner  concludes  his  book  "Die  drei  Motive  und 
Griinde  des  Glaubens  "  with  a  poem  which  may  be  re- 
garded as  his  confession  of  faith.  Some  verses  ex- 
press the  author's  sentiment  in  the  words  of  Christian 
mythology  and  we  must  know  his  scientific  faith  in  God 
as  the  all-and-one  in  order  to  avoid  misconstruction. 
We  here  present  a  translation  (made  by  Mr.  E.  F. 
L.  Gauss,  of  Chicago,  for  this  special  purpose)  which 
faithfully  preserves  the  rhythm  and  the  character  of 
the  original  even  in  most  of  its  details. 
• 

"  In  God  my  soul  is  resting ;  "  In  God  my  soul  is  resting  ; 

He  lives  and  therefore  I ;  Say  that  it  ends  who  lists  : 

Life  is  in  and  about  Him,  I  have  no  care,  for  surely 

I  cannot  live  without  Him,  For  aye  rests  there  securely 

He  cannot  let  me  die.  What  now  in  Him  exists. 


FAITH  AND  REASON. 


343 


"  In  God  my  soul  is  resting  ; 

My  life  with  all  its  trim 
In  Him  is  bound  and  bidden, 
And  when  He  shall  have  bidden 

My  soul  returns  to  Him. 

"  In  God  my  soul  is  resting  ; 

Though  hid  He  from  its  sight, 
The  witnesses  descending 
Reveal  Him  without  ending, 

Foremost  the  Christ,  the  Light. 

"  In  God  my  soul  is  resting  ; 

The  angels'  host  I  see 
In  His  pure  heights  of  Heaven 
In  glory  move,  and  even 

One  of  them  doth  bear  me. 

"  In  God  my  soul  is  resting ; 

The  tie  of  souls  is  He, 
Faith,  Love,  and  Hope  forever 
Will  shun  the  soul's  endeavor 

Till  this  we  fully  see. 

"  In  God  my  soul  is  resting; 

In  Him  are  ever  rife 
The  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty 
That  purpose  be  in  duty 

And  harmony  in  life. 


1  In  God  my  soul  is  resting  ; 

What  could  the  parcel  be  ? 
Far  what  I'd  fain  be  grasping  I 
Fear  not,  soul,  in  thy  gasping 

Salvation  comes  to  thee. 

'  In  God  my  soul  is  resting  ; 

He  is  its  very  source. 
His  will  my  acts  commandeth, 
And  though  my  will  withstandeth 

He  holds  His  steady  course. 

'  In  God  my  soul  is  resting  ; 

Although  He  never  sins, 
Yet  with  His  children's  ailings 
He  also  bears  their  failings 

And  them  to  duty  wins. 

1  In  God  my  soul  is  resting ; 
Comfort  in  grief,  sublime  t 
He's  love  and  must  unfold  it, 
And  never  can  withhold  it, 
I  still  abide  my  time. 

'  In  God  my  soul  is  resting  ; 

This  be  my  final  word. 
Though  storms  my  bark  encumber 
Yet  peace  attends  my  slumber  : 

He's  my  eternal  port !" 


We  regard  Fechner's  method  of  conciliating  Re- 
ligion with  Science  as  an  attempt  in  the  right  direc- 
tion, but  we  cannot  say  that  we  are  fully  satisfied  with 
the  conclusion  at  which  he  arrives.  His  expositions 
do  not  clearly  show  the  boundary  line  between  Faith 
and  Reason,  and  thus  his  Faith  actually  interferes 
with  his  Reason. 

There  is  one  way  that  will  hopelessly  confound  the 
issues  between  religion  and  science,  which  is,  when 
faith  performs  the  function  of  science.  There  is  an- 
other way  that  will  take  out  of  life  purpose,  charity, 
and  comfort,  which  is  when  cold  and  unimpressible 
reason  performs  the  function  of  faith,  i.  e.  when  the 
sentiment  and  enthusiasm  of  the  heart  is  chilled  or  en- 
tirely replaced  by  the  figures  of  dry  calculations. 
There  is  but  one  way  that  will  reconcile  science  and 


344  THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

religion  and  that  is  when  science  and  faith  harmoni- 
ously work  together,  each  of  the  two  in  their  coopera- 
tion performing  its  own  function. 

Faith  when  it  performs  the  function  of  reason  is 
called  creed.  Creed  is  injurious,  but  faith  is  whole- 
some.    He  only  who  is  faithful  will  conquer. 

Reason  when  it  performs  the  function  of  faith  is 
craftiness  and  guile.  Craftiness  is  a  vice  but  ration- 
ality is  the  human  in  man. 

Faith  is  not  knowledge,  but  an  attitude  of  the  soul. 
Faith  is  a  moral  not  a  mental  quality.  Faith  is  char- 
acter, strength  of  will,  loyalty  to  truth.  There  is  no 
religion  in  a  man  unless  he  be  faithful. 

Reason  is  the  arranging  and  systematising  of 
knowledge  so  as  to  represent  facts  correctly,  or  in  one 
word,  so  as  to  construct  truth.  Reason  must  be  the 
torch  in  the  hand  of  faith,  so  that  faith  may  walk  on 
the  right  path. 

Reason  without  faith  makes  of  man  a  machine 
without  sympathy,  without  tenderness,  without  en- 
thusiasm for  his  ideals.  Reason  in  the  soul  without 
good-will,  constancy  and  moral  stamina,  is  a  torch  in 
the  hand  of  a  vicious  man,  and  the  mischief  it  works 
is  great. 

Faith  without  reason  is  superstition.  It  is  like 
unto  a  man  that  is  groping  in  the  dark.  He  has  eyes 
but  either  they  are  blind  or  he  shuts  them  to  the  light. 
There  is  light  and  he  might  use  the  light  to  illumine 
his  path,  but  he  scorns  the  light.  He  rather  relies  upon 
what  he  imagines  to  be  an  inner  light  which  is  in  reality 
luminous  hallucinations  that  appear  to  him  when  he 
runs  his  head  against  the  objects  of  his  surroundings. 

To  sum  up :  Irrational  faith  is  as  much  irreligious 
as  faithless  reason. 


INDEX. 


Abomination  and  pleasure,  70. 
Action,  ethical,  and  knowledge,  5. 
Activity,  desire  for,  252. 
Activity,  natural  desire  for,  71. 
Adaptation  to  truth  and  ethics,  64. 
Adler,  Prof.   Felix,  vii,   17,  257,  263  ; 

Adler,  Jesus  and,  262;  his  agnostic- 
ism, 261 ;  his  position,  258  et  seq. ; 

his  song,  "  The  Golden  City,"  261. 
Agnosticism,  194,  262. 
Agreeable  taste  an  unreliable  guide, 

251- 
Aim  and  motion,  288. 
Alessandria  and  Chicago,  333. 
Algebra  and  ethics  (see  calculation, 

65). 
Alive,  is  Nature,  36. 
All-existence,  unity  of,  29. 
Altruistic  and  egotistic  motives,  38, 

54- 
Altruism  and  egotism,  xix. 
Altruism,  ethics  is  not,  xx. 
Altruistic  motives  not  unnatural,  65. 
American  Moralist,  Prof.  L.  M.  Bil- 

lia,  317-324- 
Amuna,  xxiv. 

Analysis  of  ethical  motives,  65. 
Analysis  of  the  moral  ought,  an,  258- 

295. 
Anarchy,  50. 
Apostle  St.  Paul,  83. 
Application  of  knowledge  and  ethical 

rules,  6. 
Apriori,  27. 

Apriori  and  ethics,  26. 
Aristotle,  79,  81. 
Aristotle's  and   Spencer's  views  of 

happiness,  79. 


Arithmetical  example  of  ethics,  65. 

Attitude,  98. 

Authority  of  truth,  10. 

Authority,  ethics  an,  135;  of  ethica, 

rules,  243;  of  scientific  ethics,  244; 

of  the  Church,   330;    religion  the 

recognition  of,  341. 
Autonomy  of  will,  49,  50. 

Babes  in  Christ,  83. 

Bad,  definition  of,  31,  42. 

Barriers  between  the  individual  and 
humanity,  40. 

Basis  of  ethics  and  belief  in  magic,  6, 

Basis  of  ethics,  vi,  18,  in,  113. 

Belief  and  faith,  xxiv. 

Believer  and  infidel,  52. 

Bentham,  55,  60,  61,  67. 

Billia,  Prof.  L.  M.,  An  American  Mor- 
alist, 3t7-324.  328,  329,  331,  332,  333- 

Bribery,  59. 

Broadway  street-railway  case,  58. 

Bruno,  Giordano,  66,  67. 

Brutus,  172. 

Buddha,  7. 

Buddhist  Scriptures,  xxii. 

Byron,  Lord,  77. 

Calculation  of  pleasurable  feelings, 
65- 

Cause  and  motive,  35. 

Chicago  and  Alessandria,  333. 

Childbearing  and  pleasure,  70. 

Christ,  7,  14,  21. 

Church,  authority  of  the,  330. 

Churches  and  ethics,  14,  15. 

Churches  and  the  Societies  for  Eth- 
ical Culture,  13. 


u 


346 


THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 


Church-life,  ethics  will  revive,  83. 

Clifford,  W.  K.,  x. 

Compulsion  and  freewill,  47. 

Comte's  agnosticism,  331. 

Confucius,  7. 

Conscience,  25,  39,  40,  53,  60. 

Conscience,  100;  develops  from  com- 

.  prehension,  128;  growth  of,  119  et 
seq.;  individual,  134 ;  instinctive 
morality  of,  97;  is  it  absolute?  117; 
liberty  of,  135;  not  mysterious,  122; 
not  unanalysable,  120;  representa- 
tive of  an  authority,  131. 

Consciousness,  9,  291. 

Continuity  of  soul-life,  40,  43. 

Convictions  and  morality,  329. 

Copernicus,  17. 

Crime  and  evil,  consequences  of,  60. 

Crime,  results  of,  teach  a  lesson,  129. 

Criterion  of  ethics,  68. 

Criterion  of  ethics  according  to  Prof. 
Friedrich  Jodl,  168. 

Criticism,  102. 

Data  of  ethics,  25  et  seq. 
Death  and  pain,  71. 
Death,  soul-life  after,  62. 
Definiteness  of  opinion,  136. 
Definition  of  good  and  bad,  31,  42. 
Definition  of  religion,  7. 
Demarcation  between  old  and  new 

ethics,  line  of,  18. 
Description,  knowledge  a,  119. 
Determinism,  44  et  seq. 
Determinism,  153,  156. 
Dogmas  and  mythology,  328. 
Dogmas  and  the  religion  of  science, 

10. 
Dogmatic  believers  and  the  ethical 

problem,  13. 
Dogmatism,  134. 

Doubt  and  ethics  as  a  science,  51. 
Dreamer  and  thinker,  19. 
Duty,  motives  of,  25. 
Duty  and  right,  310. 
Duty,  weight  of,  and  moral  worth,  73. 

Education,  necessity  of,  12. 
Egotism  and  altruism,  zix. 
Egotistic  and  altruistic  motives,  38, 
54- 


Eleemosynary  philanthropy,  311  et 
seq. 

Enjoyment,  Goethe  on,  81. 

Enthusiasm,  99. 

Epictetus  on  freewill,  45. 

Errors  of  the  searchers  for  truth,  52. 

Estimation  of  motives,  37. 

Estimation,  principle  of,  40. 

Eternity,  ethics  of,  42. 

Eternity,  standpoint  of,  62. 

Ethical  Culture,  Societies  for,  vi. 

Ethical  Movement,  109. 

Ethical  Record,  The,  vi  et  seq.,  ix. 

Ethical  rules,  authority  of,  243. 

Ethical  Societies,  109,  255,  256. 

Ethics,  a  conception  of  the  world, 
114;  an  authority,  135;  evolution 
and,  330;  knowledge  and,  309;  na- 
ture and,  296;  based  on  facts,  115; 
compared  with  science,  133 ;  not 
altruism,  xx ;  science  and,  125-130; 
taught  by  nature,  304  et  seq.;  the 
criterion  of  an  objective  reality, 
234-263 ;  the  science  of  morality, 
in. 

Ethology,  27. 

Euphony,  250. 

Evolution,  196,  329. 

Evolution  and  ethics,  330. 

Evolution  of  ethics  and  knowledge,  6. 

Evolution  of  soul,  41. 

Evolution  not  merely  a  quasi-me- 
chanical process,  190  et  seq. 

Expediency,  utilitarianism  an  ethics 
of,  246. 

Experience  and  ethics,  33. 


Facts,  98;  attitude  toward,  116;  eth- 
ics based  on,  115;  not  mute,  116; 
and  belief,  xxiv;  and  reason,  334 

344- 
Facts  and  the  basis  of  ethics,  18. 
Facts  and  modern  sciences,  22. 
Facts,  ethics  to  be  based  upon,  33. 
Faith  and  scientific  truth,  16. 
Faithless  reason  and  irrational  faith, 

334- 
Faust,  78,  79,  81. 
Fechner,   his    conceptions    of   God, 

337;  his  method,  334 ;  his  poem,  342, 


INDEX. 


347 


343;  his  views  of  a  spirit-world,  337 

et  seq. 
Feeling  and  motion,  292. 
First  principles  in  ethics  according 

to  William  M.  Salter,  264-278. 
Following  nature,  301. 
Forecast,  the  ability  to,  27. 
Formalism  of  Kant,  32. 
Forms  of  brain-tissue,  43. 
Freedom  of  thought  and  laws  of 

thought,  47. 
Freewill,  problem  of,  321. 
Freewill  and  compulsion,  47. 
Freewill  and  the  moral  law,  45. 
Freewill  neither  a  mystery  nor  an  il- 
lusion, 46. 
Fulfil,  not  destroy,  83. 
Funeral  and  pleasure,  69. 

Generations,  future,  197. 

Gizycki,  Prof.  Georg  von,  x  et  seq. 

God,  Fechner's  conceptions  of,  337- 

God  of  science  intolerant,  132. 

God  the  standard  of  morality,  312. 

God,  will  of,  283. 

God  and  Laplace,  18,  20. 

God,  conscience  voice  of,  53. 

God  no  ghost  but  spirit,  21,  22. 

God,  the  belief  in  a  personal  and 

supernatural,  12. 
God,  truth  in  the  idea  of,  20. 
Goethe,  78,  79,  81. 
Good  and  useful,  55,  57.  60.  63. 
Good,  definition  of,  31.  42. 
Good-will,  Kant's  definition  of  the, 

32. 
Goodness,  adapted  to  some  end,  63. 
Growth  and  pleasure,  70. 
Growth,  unconscious,  9. 

Habit  and  morality,  12. 
Happiness  and  duties,  71. 
Happiness  and  pessimism,  77. 
Happiness  in  terms  of  virtue,  79,  81. 
Happiness,  is  it  the  end  of  reason? 

3°- 
Happiness,  the  greatest  happiness  of 

the  greatest  number,  56. 

Happiness,  172,252;  and  martyrdom, 

195;  and  morality,  196;  not  a  stand- 


ard of  morality,  175;  not  wrong, 
pursuit  of,  xiv. ;  pursuit  of,  175; 
quality  of,  107 ;  ultimate  test  of, 
107;  will  progress  bring  more ? 

176. 

Hedonism,  65,  67,  68,  69,  106,  168,  170, 
171  et  seq.,  237. 

Hegeler,  Mr.  E.  C.,  99- 

Higher  kind  of  pleasure,  69. 

Higher  motives  no  self-delusion,  61, 

Hoffding,  Prof.  Harald,  x,  xiii,  55". 
his  principle  of  welfare,  199-233- 

Holland,  F.  M.,  a  test  of  conduct  ac- 
cording to,  162-167 ;  on  the  leading 
principles  of  ethics,  157-161. 

Hostility  toward  science,  281. 

Hume,  David,  14. 
Huss,  Johannes,  66. 

I,  or  speaking  in  the  first  person,  39 
I,  what  am,  xviii. 
Ideals,  128. 
Ideals  and  ethics,  19. 
Ideals,  origin  of,  19- 
Ideals  born  of  want,  23. 
Immortal  soul  of  mankind,  42. 
Immortality,  197,  198- 
Impulse,  173. 
Impulses,  174,  287. 

Incongruity  of  religion  and  science, 
according  to  Robert  Lewins,  M.D., 
179-183. 

Indefiniteness,  136. 

Independence  of  morality,  100. 

Individual  defined,  xix  et  seq. 

Individualism,  196. 

Infallible,  conscience  not,  40. 

Infidel  and  believer,  52. 

Ingersoll,  Robert,  99. 

Injustice  of  nature,  313. 

Inspiration,  9. 

Instinct  and  reason,  39. 

Instinct  inherited  habit,  297. 

Instinctive  morality  of  conscience, 

97- 
Intolerance,  136. 

Intolerant,  religion  of  science,  10. 
Intuitionalism,  ix,  54,  56.  ItJ4.  ,29- 
Intuitionalists,  105. 
Invitation  to  lecture,  "ix,  101 ;  not  to 
criticise,  99. 


34» 


THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 


Irresistible  force  of  some  moral  mo- 
tives, 39. 

Is  and  the  ought,  the,  279-284. 

Is  to  be,  154,  155. 

Isolated  feelings  do  not  constitute 
ethics,  44,  67,  68. 

Jesus  and  Adler,  262. 
Jodl,  Prof.  Friedrich,  a  criticism  by, 
168-169;  answer  to,  170-178. 

Kant,  29,  30,  32. 
Kingdom  of  science,  194. 
Knowledge  a  description,   119;   and 

ethics,  309;  creates  the  ought,  154; 

the  basis  of  any  achievement.  128. 
Knowledge  and  ethical  action,  5. 

Lao-Tze,  xxit. 

Laplace  and  God,  18,  20. 

Laws  and  the  ethical  spirit,  3. 

Laws  of  form,  27. 

Least  resistance,  progress  not  in  the 

line  of,  72. 
Lewins,  Dr.  Robert,  184,  185 ;  on  the 

incongruity  of  religion  and  science, 

179-183. 
Life-totality,  235,  237,  239. 
Living  the  truth,  330. 
Luther,  15. 

Maddock,  John,  the  ought  and  the 
must,  149-151. 

Magic,  belief  in,  and  science,  8,  9. 

Majority,  pleasure  of  a,  255. 

Majority  vote  and  morality,  107. 

Martyrdom  and  happiness,  195. 

Material  goodness  and  moral  good- 
ness, 63. 

Maxim  of  ethics,  Kant's,  32. 

Meliorism,  82,  83. 

Memory  of  living  substance,  36. 

Metaphysics,  formal  laws  of  natural 
science,  28. 

Metaphysics  of  ethics,  30. 

Mephistopheles,  79. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  ix,  26.  305,  306;  on 
nature,  300  et  seq.;  his  views,  296- 
316. 

Millennium  and  ethics,  49. 


Miracle,  sense  of  duty  declared  to  be 
a,  53.  54- 

Misology,  31. 

Mitleid,  253. 

Modern  paganism,  22. 

Monism,  108  et  seq. 

Moral  law,  98, 117  et  seq.;  the  author- 
ity of  the,  131-137. 

Moral  rules,  117  et  seq. 

Moral  worth  and  weight  of  duty,  72, 
73- 

Morality  a  formation  of  character, 
xviii;  and  convictions,  329;  and 
happiness,  196;  ethics  the  science 
of,  III. 

Motion  and  aim,  288. 

Motion  and  feeling,  292. 

Motive,  98. 

Motive  and  cause,  35. 

Motives  determined,  46. 

Motives  for  action,  the  data  of  ethics, 

25- 

Must,  the  master,  156. 

Mythological  ethics,  51. 

Mythology  of  ethics  considered   in, 

dispensable,  53. 
Mysticism,  100. 

Napoleon,  188. 

Natural  law,  290. 

Natural  selection  and  ethics,  5. 

Nature,  312;  and  ethics,  296;  and 
morality,  296-316;  has  an  aim,  312; 
injustice  of,  313;  John  Stuart  Mill 
on,  300  et  seq.;  non-moral,  312;  not 
a  person,  312 ;  unalterable  order  of, 
314  ;  is  alive,  36. 

New  religion,  84. 

New  sense  of  duty,  112. 

Nobler  self,  63. 

Non-moral  nature,  312. 

Normative  sciences,  279. 

Objective  and  subjective  world,  41. 
Objective  standard,  134. 
Open  Court,  The,  v  et  seq. 
Order  of  nature  and  reason,  31. 
Origin  of  ideals,  19. 
Orthodox,  religion  of  science  is,  10. 
Ought,  the,  and  the  must,  152-156;  a 
saviour,  156;  a  very  complex  idea, 


INDEX. 


349 


294 ;  knowledge  creates  the,  154  ; 
not  unanalysable,  294  ;  the  is  and 
the  — ,  279-284. 

Paganism  of  Christianity,  22. 

Pain  and  disturbances,  71. 

Pains  and  pleasures,  242. 

Paley,  103,  104. 

Parables  and  religion,  21. 

Parables  and  ethics,  51. 

Parable  of  the  talents,  314  et  seq. 

Paraguay,  252. 

Passions  enslave,  45. 

Peace  of  soul,  80. 

Penal  laws,  7. 

Personality,  xx. 

Pessimism,    189;   and  happiness,  77. 

Petrie,   Professor,   W.    M.   Flinders, 

xxii. 
Philosophy  and  religion,  7,  8. 
Philosophies  and  the  basis  of  ethics, 

16,  17. 
Pleasurable  feelings,  subjective,  241; 

welfare  as  a  continuous  state  of, 

246. 
Pleasure  and  abomination,  70. 
Pleasure  and  growth,  70. 
Pleasure    and   pain,   242;    afford   no 

standard  of  morality,  174 ;  nature 

of,  248  et  seq. 
Pleasure,  usefulness  not,  157. 
Pleasures  and  the  satisfaction  of 

wants,  71. 
Pleasure  not  the  purpose  of  moral 

acts,  66. 
Pleasures  of  egotism,  78,  79. 
Pleasure  seeker,  62,  82. 
Positivism  and  metaphysics,  28. 
Practical,  the  ethical  problem,  3,  4. 
Prescientific  ethics,  51. 
Principle  in  ethics,  37,  111. 
Principles  of  morality  not  contrived, 

304. 
Principle  of  truthfulness,  64. 
Principle  of  right  and  wrong,  4. 
Progress  not  in  the  line  of  least  re- 
sistance, 72. 
Pronoun  /,  39. 

Prudence  leads  to  morality,  309. 
Purpose  of  moral  acts  not  pleasure, 

66. 


Purpose  of  reason. 
Pursuit  of  happiness,  175,  317;   not 
wrong,  xiii. 

Quality  of  pleasure,  68,  69. 

Quotations  from  Schiller  on  philoso- 
phy, 17;  from  Kant  on  happiness 
and  reason,  30;  on  the  moral  max- 
im, 32;  from  Schopenhauer  on  pes- 
simism, 74-77. 

Rationalising  the  aim  of  action,  307. 

Real  and  true,  332. 

Reason,  98,  340;  and  formal  thought, 
29;  and  instinct,  39;  and  the  order 
of  nature,  31 ;  purpose  of,  30. 

Reason  why,  98,  99,  112,  264. 

Reformation,  135. 

Regularity  in  nature,  41. 

Relations  illustrated  by  threads,  34. 

35.  36,  37- 
Relations,  the  sociological,  38. 
Religion,  no,  185;  the  recognition  of 

authority,  341. 
Religion  of  science,  135. 
Religions,  ethical  ideas  of  monistic, 

316. 
Religion  and  philosophy,  7,  8. 
Religions  are  systems  of  ethics,  73. 
Religion  defined,  7. 
Religion  of  science,  10. 
Religion,  scientific  maturity  of,  9. 
Responsibility,  25,  49. 
Resist  not  evil,  xxi  et  seq. 
Revelation  and  inspiration,  8. 
Right  and  duty,  310. 
Roman  Christianity,  135. 
Rosmini,  321,  326,  332,  325-333. 
Royer,  Madame,  x  et  seq. 

Salt  of  the  earth,  14. 

Salter,  W.  M.,  concluding  remarks 
of  discussion  with,  138-148;  on  the 
first  principles  in  ethics,  264-278; 
on  The  Ethical  Problem,  86-96;  re- 
ply to,  97-124. 

Salvation  and  religion  of  science, 74. 

Salvation  by  ethics,  83. 

Samuel  and  Saul,  xxiii. 

Schiller  on  freewill,  45. 

Schiller  on  philosophy,  17. 


35Q 


THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 


School  work,  the  effects  of,  43. 

Schopenhauer,  viii,  74-77;  his  idea  of 
sympathy,  253. 

Science,  99;  and  ethics,  125-130;  and 
religion,  in  answer  to  Dr.  Lewins's 
criticism,  184-185 ,  compared  with 
ethics,  133;  hostility  toward,  281; 
kingdom  of,  194, 

Science  and  belief  in  magic,  8,  9. 

Scientific  ethics,  authority  of,  244. 

Scioppius,  67. 

Sectarianism,  136. 

Self,  xviii  et  seq. 

Self,  man's  real,  308. 

Selfishness,  futility  of,  61. 

Self-preservation,  61,  307  et  seq.,  310. 

Sentimentalism,  247  et  seq. 

Sheep  and  wolf,  xxi. 

Sidgwick,  Prof.  H  ,  z,  104;  on  the 
ought  as  unanalysable,  285  et  seq. 

Single  motive  has  no  right  to  be  con- 
sidered for  itself  alone,  43. 

Slave  and  free  man.  47,  48. 

Sleep  and  death,  71. 

Smith,  Goldwin,  on  morality  and  re- 
ligion. 186-198. 

Societies  for  ethical  culture  and  the 
churches,  13. 

Societies  for  ethical  culture  and  the 
ethical  movement,  13. 

Society  and  ethics,  7. 

Society  and   the  super-individual 
soul-life,  34. 

Sociological  relations,  38. 

Socrates  and  a  pig,  240. 

Soul,  184;  objective  element  of  man's, 
xvii. 

Spirit-world,  Fechner's  views  of,  337 
et  seq. 

Spontaneity,  289. 

Standard,  objective,  134;  of  morality, 
177;  of  morality,  pleasure  and  pain 
afford  no,  174. 

Standard  of  estimation,  68,  69. 

Standard  of  ethics,  37. 

Standard  of  morality,  is  the  useful 
the?  58. 

Standard  of  right  and  wrong,  4. 

Stand-up,  the  it  priori  a,  26, 

Strength  of  man,  44. 

Struggle,  102. 


Subjective  and  objective  world,  41. 
Success  not  explained  by  vices,  188. 
Superindividual,  aspirations,  124; 

considerations,  198,  253,  310. 
Superindividualism,  196. 
Super-individual  elements  of  the 

soul,  44. 
Super-individual  soul-life,  34. 
Supernatural,  311  et  seq. 
Supernaturalism,  113,  177,  130. 
Super-personal,  God  is  not  personal 

but,  21. 
Sympathy,  Schopenhauer's  idea  of, 

253. 

Talents,  parable  of  the,  314  et  seq. 

Teething  and  pleasure,  70. 

Test  of  conduct,  according  to  F.  M. 

Holland,  162-167. 
Theories  of  ethics  in  their  practical 

importance,  4. 
Thinker  and  dreamer,  19. 
Thought  and  ethics,  26. 
Threads,  representing  the  relations 

of  man,  34,  35,  36,  37. 
Threads,    the    invisible    threads    of 

super-individual  motives,  56. 
Tiger  not  more  immoral  than  the 

lamb,  195. 
Tolerance,  136. 
Torquemada,  xxiii. 
Transcendent  and  transcendental.29. 
Transcendental  in  the  sense  of  tran- 
scendent, 260,  261. 
True  and  real,  332. 
Truth  and  salvation,  74. 
Truth,  condition  of  ethics  is  search 

for,  64. 
Truth  in  the  idea  of  God,  20. 

Unalterable  order  of  nature,  314. 
Untenable,  the  old  reasons  of  ethics, 

12. 

Untenable,  theological  conception 
of  freewill,  46. 

Useful  and  good,  57,  60,  64. 

Usefulness  not  pleasure,  157. 

Utilitarianism,  ix,  55.  56,  59,  105,  106, 
171,235,236;  an  ethics  of  expedi- 
ency, 246;   reconciliation  with,  106. 


INDEX. 


35* 


Utility  of  consequences  and  morality, 
59- 

Victorious,   in   the   end    the   ethical 

movement  will  be,  16. 
Virtue  in  terms  of  happiness,  79,  81. 

Want,  the  origin  of  ideals,  23. 

Wants,  the  satisfaction  of,  and  pleas- 
ures, 71. 

We,  the  to  be  eliminated,  282  et  seq. 

Weber's  law,  Prof.  E.  H.,  334. 

Welfare,  168,  236,  238;  as  a  continu- 
ous state  of  pleasurable  feelings, 


246;  ethics  of,  criticised,  239  ;  the 

principle   of,   according    to    Prof. 

Harald  Hoffding,  199-233. 
Will  and  action,  36. 
Will  of  God,  283. 
Wolf  and  sheep,  xxi. 
Wood  cutter,  100. 

World,  a  field  for  realising  ideals,  23. 
World,  a  network  of  causes  and  ef, 

fects,  36. 
World,  objective  and  subjective,  41. 
World-theories  and  ethics,  17. 
Wundt,  Prof.  Wilhelm,  x. 


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